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THE ORIGINS OF STOIC COSMOLOGY 
David E. Hahm 
Though there never was in antiquity a single, 
all-pervasive ideology or school of philosophy, 
for half a millennium beginning about 300 
B.C., the Stoic outlook, as it apprehended both 
the physical and ethical universes, captured 
a sufficiently large number of adherents to 
be considered the ancient counterpart of the 
currently popular scientific world view. 
This world view of the Stoics appealed to 
all classes and attracted slaves and laborers 
as well as kings and emperors. Its ideas and 
tenets infiltrated and shaped all branches of 
art and learning —poetry, drama, religion, 
theology, science, medicine, law. and govern­
ment — and its concepts influenced and in­
formed the later doctrines of Christianity, 
Gnosticism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, and Neo­
platonism. 
Despite its undoubted historical importance, 
however, the question of Stoicism's origin has 
usually been passed over with glib generaliza­
tions; and there has remained, until the ap­
pearance of Professor Hahm's book, a crucial 
need to undertake a systematic study of all 
the evidence in order to determine conclusively 
from whom the ideas of the Stoics were de­
rived, what sorts of ideas they appropriated, 
and how they used this borrowed material to 
create a new and enduring popular philosophy. 
Professor Hahm performs this service for 
one of the major areas of Stoic philosophy. 
On the basis of a new and more careful recon­
struction of the cosmological theories of Zeno, 
Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, the three heads 
of the Stoic school in the third century B.C., 
Hahm demonstrates that Stoic cosmology grew 
directly out of the contemporary philosophical 
and scientific debates and was, in fact, a 
unique, original synthesis of the latest Greek 
theories of cosmology and biology. 
(Continued on hack flap) 
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Preface 
Although I can never adequately express my gratitude to all who aided 
me in writing this book, I would like to acknowledge at least my most 
outstanding personal debts. My foremost obligation is to my teacher 
and friend, Friedrich Solmsen, to whom this book is gratefully dedi­
cated. It was he who through his writings and personal discussions 
awakened in me a zeal for Greek philosophy in general and an interest 
in Stoic physics in particular. In writing the thesis from which this 
book evolved and in reshaping it for publication, I was guided by his 
encouragement and his generous and painstaking criticism. 
I would also like to thank those who enabled me to devote a full year 
to reshaping this work, namely, the National Endowment for the 
Humanities, which awarded me a summer fellowship, and the Center 
for Hellenic Studies in Washington, D.C. together with its director 
Bernard M. W. Knox, which provided me a year of leisure in an idyllic 
mouseion. I am also grateful to Charles L. Babcock, Herbert M. 
Howe, Robert J. Lenardon, Mark P. Morford, Paul Plass, Wesley D. 
Smith, and several anonymous referees for ideas, advice, criticism, 
and encouragement along the way, to Vicki Nau for typing the manu­
script, to the Ohio State University College of Humanities for a grant-
in-aid to defray the cost of typing the manuscript, and to Sarah T. 
Millett of the Ohio State University Press for many refinements in the 
text. 
Finally my deepest debt is to my wife, Donna, not only for eliminat­
ing countless errors, suggesting many improvements, and proof­
reading the entire manuscript, but above all for her patience, under­
standing, and unfailing support, without which this book would never 
have been written. 
The manuscript of this book was completed a few years ago. Since 
then many important publications have appeared of which I have been 
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unable to take account. I particularly regret that I have been unable to 
make use of L. Bloos, Probleme der stoischen Physik, Hamburger 
Studien zur Philosophic 4 (Hamburg, 1973); A. Graeser, Zenon von 
Kition: Positionen und Probleme (Berlin, 1975); M. Lapidge, "Αρχαί 
and (ττουχέϊα: A Problem in Stoic Cosmology," Phronesis 18 (1973): 
240-78; J. Longrigg, "Elementary Physics in the Lyceum and Stoa" 
his 66 (1975): 211-29; and K. von Fritz, "Zenon von Kition," RE, 
2d ser. 10A (Munich, 1972): 83-121. 
David E. Hahm 
The Ohio State University 
Columbus, Ohio 
February, 1976 
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Introduction 
For half a millennium Stoicism was very likely the most widely ac­
cepted world view in the Western world. Although there was, of 
course, never a single all-pervasive world view in antiquity, yet from 
the third century B.C. to the second century A.D. more people in the 
Mediterranean world seem to have held a more or less Stoic conception 
of the world than any other. The Peripatos had its following among a 
few intellectuals; Platonism was dormant while skepticism ruled in the 
Academy; and even if Epicureanism had a slightly larger following, it, 
too, was limited to a small coterie of ardent believers with a somewhat 
larger group of sympathizers, particularly among the Roman aristo­
crats. The Stoic world view, however, appealed to all classes, attracting 
slaves and laborers as well as kings and emperors. Its ideas infiltrated 
religion and science, medicine and theology, poetry and drama, law 
and government. Even when it had to yield to other world views, it left 
its mark on Christianity, Gnosticism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, and Neo-
Platonism.1 For a variety of reasons the Stoic outlook, both physical 
and ethical, captivated a large number of people in the ancient world, 
probably many more than we shall ever realize;2 and, in fact, in view 
of its pervasiveness, it may not be much of an exaggeration to say that 
the Stoic physical world view was the ancient counterpart of our cur­
rent, popular, scientific world view. 
In spite of the historical importance of Stoic physics, the question of 
its origins is usually passed over with glib generalizations or incom­
pletely tested hypotheses. The ancient intellectual historians, who 
sought simple family trees, probably traced Stoicism back to Socrates 
by way of an alleged Cynic school.3 Another tradition made Stoicism 
an heir of the Platonic school.4 Modern discussions, particularly the 
earlier ones and the handbooks, are fond of making Stoic physics 
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essentially a revival of Heraclitus, on the grounds that several Stoics 
wrote books about Heraclitus, and that there are some similarities 
between Heraclitus and Stoicism.5 Most careful scholars, however, 
have been aware of the clear traces of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas in 
Stoicism and therefore have avoided making Stoicism a simple revival 
of Heraclitus.6 Some have attempted to show how the problems of 
Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy could lead to a viewpoint similar 
to that of Heraclitus, or could at least prepare the way for the accep­
tance of Heraclitean views.7 Then, too, there have been occasional 
attempts to detect influences from other quarters, such as the late 
fourth-century Academy, Pythagoreanism, Greek medical thought, 
and Zeno's Semitic background.8 Since none of these attempts has yet 
proven, or could possibly prove, that Stoicism is essentially identical 
with some earlier philosophical system, the result has been that Stoi­
cism has been left looking like some kind of schizophrenic eclecticism. 
Because of this situation Max Pohlenz, while admitting some Heracli­
tean, Aristotelian, and Semitic influences, has argued eloquently for 
the essential unity and originality of Stoic philosophy.9 Finally, to 
round out this gamut of opinions, we must mention the view that 
quests for the intellectual roots of Stoicism serve no useful purpose, 
because Stoic doctrines were chosen solely for their popular appeal, to 
win converts to Stoicism as a social movement.10 
The problem facing the student of Stoicism today is not that the 
question of the formative influences on Stoic physics has received no 
answer; the problem is that it has received too many partial answers. 
All attempts to solve the problem either have drawn hasty gener­
alizations on the basis of a few selected Stoic ideas or have considered 
only broad, abstract, structural characteristics (such as the immanence 
of deity or ultimate mover) and ignored the details of the system. In 
every case conclusions have been based on partial evidence. Thus 
there seems to be a real need for a systematic study of all the evidence 
to see from whom the Stoics derived ideas, what sorts of ideas they 
borrowed, and how they used this borrowed material to create a new 
popular philosophy.11 By posing the question in this way one may also 
transcend the false dichotomy that has so often forced Stoicism to be 
either original or derivative. A careful comparison of Stoic physics 
with its predecessors can reveal both the sources of Stoic ideas as well 
as the nature of Stoic originality and thus may provide some insight 
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into the conscious and unconscious operation of the Stoic mind. This 
study is an attempt to make such a comparison for one preliminary 
topic, the theory of corporealism, and for one of the major divisions of 
Stoic physics, namely cosmology.12 In the course of this investigation 
it will also be necessary to discuss some Stoic biological theories and 
to make a tentative identification of their origins; but a thorough study 
of Stoic biological and psychological theories, such as would be re­
quired to reach firm conclusions in these areas, still remains to be 
done. Similarly, though some aspects of Stoic theology will enter into 
the discussion, I will not attempt a detailed study of the Stoic views of 
god, providence, and fate. 
Here several words of warning are in order. Though a detailed 
comparison of Stoic theories with those of their predecessors may 
reveal the origins of Stoic physics, it cannot give a fair impression of 
the Stoic system as it appeared to its followers. Stoicism was a tightly 
knit, interrelated system. An analysis of its origins requires pulling 
apart what the Stoics deliberately put together. Thus such an analysis 
cannot and should not replace the standard, comprehensive accounts of 
Stoic philosophy. A second limitation of this sort of study is that one 
can seldom answer the question why Stoicism is precisely as it is. In 
the absence of extensive polemics against rejected ideas, one can only 
determine which ideas the Stoics adopted and used, not why they 
preferred the ideas they adopted to those they rejected. 
Finally, no study of Stoicism may begin without the conscious rec­
ognition that the sources for early Stoic philosophy are tragically in­
adequate. Since not a single complete treatise of any of the Stoics of 
the third century B.C. survives intact, all reconstructions of Stoic doc­
trine must rely on second- and third-hand reports or on later Stoic 
writers. Herein lies a host of difficulties. First of all, the sources seldom 
record the philosophical differences between Zeno, Cleanthes, and 
Chrysippus, the three heads of the Stoa in the third century B.C.; and so 
it is possible neither to reconstruct in detail the physical philosophy of 
Zeno, the founder of Stoicism nor to ascertain with certainty the inno­
vations of Cleanthes or Chrysippus. Consequently, I have decided to 
follow the common practice of regarding the philosophy of the early 
Stoa as a unit, except where our sources allow us to differentiate 
between individuals.13 Even this practice is not without pitfalls, since 
our sources do not always distinguish the philosophy of the early Stoa 
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from its later adaptations. To maintain a degree of probability in recon­
structing early Stoic cosmology, I have tried to rely mainly on quota­
tions and paraphrases explicitly attributed to one of the three early 
Stoics, supplementing these sources with more general references, 
when the general references seemed to be compatible with statements 
explicitly attributed to an early Stoic. Even so gaps remain that can 
only be filled by conjecture.14 
The fact that the reconstruction of early Stoic cosmology is at best 
probable and sometimes plainly conjectural casts a shadow over any 
study of its origins; and this is not the only difficulty resulting from the 
inadequacy of our sources. When the early Stoa is regarded as a unit 
and the individual views of the different Stoics are ignored, the intel­
lectual background against which Stoicism must be compared is widen­
ed by a whole century; and we are forced to consider not only the 
influences on Zeno but also the influences that might have affected 
Zeno's successors, Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Moreover, as third-
century Stoicism defended itself against attacks from other schools, it 
undoubtedly consolidated its position and welded its system into a 
tighter, more unified whole, obscuring debts to individual predeces­
sors and incorporating further developments on the basis of its own 
premises. Since in our quest for origins we must take a whole century 
of philosophical development, with its varying trends and emphases, 
and treat it as a single, synchronous unit, it is natural that our results 
will be only approximate, and that we may never know for certain 
whether some Stoic idea was a single, bold step of Zeno, a result of 
several, more conservative steps by each of the old Stoics in turn, or 
even a belated attempt of Chrysippus to bring the Stoa into conformity 
with views that had by his time become current outside the Stoa. 
Recognizing the difficulties and limitations, we might begin the 
quest for the origins of Stoic cosmology by looking at the ancient 
reports concerning the lives of the early Stoics to see whether they 
harbor any clues. However, after subjecting these reports to critical 
analysis we will only find them suggesting that Zeno and his succes­
sors were open to all the philosophical influences of the day.15 Zeno is 
portrayed as a man of insatiable curiosity, an avid hearer of nearly 
every current philosopher, and a voracious reader of Greek literature 
and philosophy. Similarly his successors obviously did not shut them­
selves off from outside influences, but were familiar with the wisdom 
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of the past and kept up with contemporary developments in philosophy 
and science. Consequently, it seems clear that if we wish to discover 
the origins of Stoic cosmology, we may as well ignore the biographical 
tradition and turn instead to the doctrines themselves, in the hope that 
by analysis and comparison with antecedents we may discover where 
the Stoics went to quarry cosmological ideas and how they erected 
their cosmological system from these ideas. 
1. The influence of Stoicism has received a thorough discussion in M. Pohlenz, Die 
Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung3 (Gottingen, 1964). See also the apology 
for the study of Stoicism by L. Edelstein, The Meaning of Stoicism, Martin Classical 
Lectures 21 (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), vii-x. 
2. Reasons for the widespread appeal of Stoicism are discussed by E. Bevan, Stoics 
and Sceptics (Oxford, 1913), 23-33 (with some necessary corrections by L. Edelstein 
[above, note 1], 12-18), and by W. W. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization3 (London and 
New York, 1952), 325-35. For the social and economic conditions that encouraged 
Stoicism, see Tarn (above), 79-125, and "The Social Question in the Third Century" 
in J. B. Bury, et al., The Hellenistic Age (Cambridge, 1923; reprint ed., New York, 
1970), 108-40; and more generally, M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic His­
tory of the Hellenistic World (Oxford, 1941). Cf. also H. Simon and M. Simon, Die 
alte Stoa und ihr Naturbegriff (Berlin, 1956), 13-28. 
3. This family tree lies behind the statement of Diogenes Laertius 2.47 and the 
arrangement of Books 6 and 7. See Appendix 1, note 7 
4. See Diog. Laert. 7.2 (=SVF 1.1) and Appendix 1. 
5. E.g., E. Brehier, The History of Philosophy: The Hellenistic and Roman Age, 
trans. W. Baskin (Chicago, 1965), 31; F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy2 
(Westminster, Md., 1950), 387-88; B. A. G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy3 (New 
York, 1955), 253, 258; H. Meyer, Geschichte der alien Philosophic (Munich, 1925), 
392, 396-98; P. E. More, Hellenistic Philosophies (Princeton, 1923), 78; F. Ueber­
weg and K. Praechter, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic des Altertums10 
(Berlin, 1909), 257; W. Windelband, History of Ancient Philosophy2, trans. Η. Ε. 
Cushman (New York, 1906), 314-15, A History of Philosophy, trans. J. H. Tufts 
(New York, 1901), 180; E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, trans. O. J. 
Reichel (London, 1880), 161, 197-98, 204-5, 393-96; E. Zeller and W Nestle, 
Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy13, trans. L. R. Palmer (London, 1931), 
211. Many special monographs on the Stoa take the same attitude, e.g., E. V Arnold, 
Roman Stoicism (Cambridge, 1911), 35-37, 70-71, 161, 176-77, 190-91, 195, 243, 
260-61; Bevan (above, note 2), 40-41, 43; E\ Brehier, Chrysippe et I'ancien 
stoicisme2 (Paris, 1951), 134-36, 141-44, 176-77; A. Bridoux, Le stoicisme et son 
influence (Paris, 1966), 48 and note 2; W. L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed (Edinburgh, 
1907), 23, 85-87; P. P. Hallie, "Stoicism," and "Zeno of Citium," Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (New York, 1967), 8.19, 368; R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean (New 
York, 1910), 10-13, 31; R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen z.u Cicero's philosophischen 
Schriften (Leipzig, 1882), 2.38-40, 120-82; A. C. Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno 
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and Cleanthes (London, 1891), 21-23; Pohlenz, Stoa (above, note 1), 1.160; and R. 
M. Wenley, Stoicism and its Influence (Boston, 1924), 81-83. A notable exception is 
A. H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy3 (London, 1957), 122-25, 
who seems to regard the similarities to Heraclitus as superficial. 
6. Arnold (above, note 5), 55, 165-66, 192; Brehier, Chrysippe (above, note 5), 
108-211; Copleston (above, note 5), 387-88; Davidson (above, note 5), 22-23; 
Fuller (above, note 5), 258-59; Hicks (above, note 5), 13, 28, 31-32, 41, 61-65; 
Meyer (above, note 5), 392, 396-98; More (above, note 5), 73-74; Pearson (above, 
note 5), 23-26; F. E. Peters, The Harvest of Hellenism (New York, 1970), 131-37; 
Pohlenz, Stoa (above, note 1), 1.64-110; 2.37-63; Ueberweg and Praechter (above, 
note 5), 257-58; G. Verbeke, Kleanthes van Assos, Verhandelingen van de Vlaamse 
Academie voor Wetenschappen, Klasse der Letteren, Vol. 11, no. 9 (Brussels, 1949), 
118-200, and esp. 232-33; Windelband, History of Ancient Philosophy2 (above, note 
5), 314-15; A History of Philosophy (above, note 5), 180-82; Zeller, (above, note 5), 
194-96, 202-6, 396-400, but cf. 133 (Zeno was "repelled by the Peripatetic 
school"); Zeller and Nestle (above, note 5), 211. Cf. J. Moreau, L'ame du monde de 
Platon aux Stoiciens (Paris, 1939), for a discussion of the continuity of the motif of the 
world soul in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Though ethics is not within the scope of 
this study, I might note that Aristotelian influence on Stoic ethics has been the subject 
of recent discussions by A. A. Long, "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics," BICS 15 
(1968): 72-85; and J. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969), 1-21. 
7. H. Siebeck, "Die Umbildung der peripatetischen Naturphilosophie in die der 
Stoiker," Untersuchungen zur Philosophic der Griechen2 (Freiburg, 1888), 181-252. 
In the edition of 1873 Siebeck discussed how certain fundamental doctrines in Stoi­
cism evolved out of Aristotelianism; but in the edition of 1888 he replied to his 
conservative critics that he intended not to deny the influence of Heraclitus but merely 
to show how problems posed by Aristotelian metaphysics prepared the way for an 
acceptance of Heraclitean views (see pages iii-iv, 181-83). This had the effect of 
inhibiting for a time research into the influence of fourth-century philosophy on Stoi­
cism. The approach was picked up again by E. Grumach, Physis und Agathon in der 
alten Stoa, Problemata 6 (Berlin, 1932), 44-71. Armstrong (above, note 5), 122-25, 
131-32, and Peters (above, note 6), 132-37, also seem to regard Aristotle as the chief 
influence on Stoic physics. 
8. W. Wiersma, "Die Physik des Stoikers Zenon," Mnemosyne, 3d ser. 11 (1943): 
191-216, sees Pythagoreanism and the Academy at the root of Zeno's physics, limit­
ing the influence of Heraclitus to Cleanthes and the influence of Aristotle to Chrysip­
pus. The influence of Greek medical thought is discussed by G. Verbeke, L'evolution 
de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoicisme a S. Augustin (Paris and Louvain, 1945), 
12-15; Brehier, History of Philosophy (above, note 5), 31-34; F Solmsen, 
"Cleanthes or Posidonius? The Basis of Stoic Physics," MNAW, n.r. 24 (1961): 
265-89, and "Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves," MusHelv 18 
(1961): 180-81; and Peters (above, note 6), 132-37; cf. also H. Siebeck, "Die 
Entwicklung der Lehre vom Geist (Pneuma) in der Wissenschaft des Altertums," 
Zeitschrift fur Volkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft 12 (1880): 372-80. At­
tempts to discern Semitic and oriental influences on the Stoa have been made by M. 
Pohlenz, "Stoa und Semitismus," Neue Jahrbiicher, n.s. 2 (1926):257-69; and J. 
Bidez, "La Cite du Monde et la Cite du Soleil chez les Stoiciens," Bulletin de la 
classe des Lettres de Γ Academie Royale de Belgique, 5th ser. 18 (1932):244-94; cf. 
also Brehier, History of Philosophy (above, note 5), 34-36. 
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9. Pohlenz, Stoa (above, note 1), 64-110, and esp. 159-67 Another advocate of 
the essential unity of Stoicism is J. Christensen, An Essay on the Unity of Stoic-
Philosophy (Copenhagen, 1962). 
10. H. Simon and M. Simon (above, note 2), 95-96. 
11. The need for such a study has been felt by Solmsen, "Cleanthes" (above, note 
8), 23-24, and Η. Κ. Hunt, "The Importance of Zeno's Physics for an Understanding 
of Stoicism during the Late Roman Republic," Apeiron 2 (1967): 5, 11. 
12. I have tried to include all of the Stoic doctrines pertaining to the origin, struc­
ture, and life cycle of the universe. I have, however, omitted a discussion of the Stoic 
concepts of mixture and time, and of several incidental meteorological and geological 
topics, because they did not seem essential to the story of the career of the cosmos. 
These topics, however, are important aspects of Stoic physics and still deserve detailed 
study for their origins. 
13. Since our sources preserve more of Chrysippus's formulation of Stoicism, this 
reconstruction will most likely be closer to the philosophy of Chrysippus than to that of 
Zeno. Some of the rare instances in which Zeno's doctrine can be distinguished from 
that of Chrysippus are considered by M. Pohlenz, "Zenon und Chrysipp," NGG, 
Phil.-hist. Kl., N.F., Fachgruppe I, vol. 2 (1938), 173-210. A reconstruction of the 
philosophy of Cleanthes is attempted by G. Verbeke, Kleanthes (above, note 6) and 
the philosophy of Chrysippus by J. B. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus, 
Philosophia Antiqua 17 (Leiden and Albany, N.Y., 1970). 
14. The way in which fragmentary ideas are assembled makes an astonishing differ­
ence in the final appearance of a philosophical reconstruction. For example, compare 
how a difference in emphasis affects the appearance of Stoic physics in Pohlenz, Stoa 
(above, note 1), 1.64-110; S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London, 1959); and 
J. Christensen (above, note 9). 
15. See Appendix 1. 

THE ORIGINS OF STOIC COSMOLOGY 

CHAPTER I 
Corporealism 
No idea is more deeply ingrained in Stoic philosophy than the convic­
tion that everything real is corporeal. This notion is found in Stoic 
logic, epistemology, cosmology, psychology, theology, and ethics, in 
fact, wherever the Stoics discussed what they believed to be real. 
Consequently, an examination of this fundamental belief makes an 
appropriate prelude to a discussion of Stoic cosmology. 
According to the Stoics the only things that really exist are material 
bodies (σώματα, SVF 2.319, 320, 329, 525, cf. 2.336, 469). One 
Stoic definition of body was "that which is spatially extended in three 
dimensions with resistance" (το τρυχτ) διαστατον μετά άν­
τίτνπίας).1 A second, far more significant definition of body was 
"that which is capable of acting or being acted upon" (reconstructed 
from SVF 1.90, 146b, 518; 2.140, 363, 387; 3.84). This definition is 
not found in our sources as a theoretical definition, but is always found 
within an argument as a mark of body. It is frequently used as the 
major premise of a syllogism: "Everything which either acts or is 
acted upon is body. This thing acts [or "is acted upon"]. Therefore, 
this thing is body." In its simple form this definition was used to prove 
the corporeality of voice or sound (φωνή, SVF 2.140, 387). The same 
definition was modified somewhat to prove the corporeality of the 
soul. For instance, Cleanthes, after enumerating examples in which 
wounds to the human body cause pain to the soul and similarly exam­
ples in which passions of the soul affect the body, asserted that this 
mutual action and suffering, which he called intercommunication of 
affections, is a mark of body and therefore proof that the soul is 
corporeal (SVF 1.518; cf. 2.792; 3.84). 
The doctrine of the corporeality of the soul was too important to 
Stoic philosophy to be dismissed with a single argument, and so it was 
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buttressed by others based on still other marks of body In one argu­
ment Chrysippus assumed that only bodies can come into contact with 
each other; therefore only bodies can experience the contrary of com­
ing into contact, namely separation. Since in death the soul separates 
from the body, the soul must also be body (SVF 2.790, 791; cf. 792). 
In still another proof Cleanthes asserted that similarity is a property of 
body alone. Since children are sometimes similar to their parents in 
character and hence in soul, the soul is capable of similarity and must 
therefore be body (SVF 1.518; cf. 2.792). 
Finally, the Stoics asserted that if the constituent material of a thing 
is body, the thing itself is body. Since the soul is composed of pneuma, 
a corporeal substance, the soul must be body (SVF 1.137; 2.774, 792; 
3.305; cf. 2.793). This last proof, from constituent material, was also 
used to maintain the corporeality of sound and of god (SVF 2. HI [cf. 
139, 140], 1032, 1035 [cf. 1031]). The most startling application of 
this mark of body, however, is found in the field of ethics. The Stoics 
seem to have thought of a quality as "matter in a certain state" (ύλη 
πως έχουσα), though direct evidence for such a definition is slight 
(cf. SVF 2.376, 379, 380). Apparently they regarded the substrate of a 
quality as comparable to the constituent material of an object and 
therefore concluded that the qualities of corporeal things are them­
selves corporeal (SVF 2.377, 380, 381, 383, 388, 389; cf. 2.410; 
3.84). This assumption required that even the qualities of the soul, the 
virtues and vices, and knowledge, be corporeal (SVF 2.132, 848; 
3.84, 305; cf. 2.797, 801; 3.85); for virtue is "the soul [or its "chief 
part"] in a certain state" (ψυχή πως έχουσα or ήγεμονίκόν πως 
έχον), and the soul had been proven to be corporeal (SVF 3.307, cf. 
305).2 The corporeality of the passions was confirmed by two of the 
other marks of body. Since the passions cause changes in facial ex­
pression, they must be capable of action on the one hand, and also of 
contact, since change cannot be caused without contact (SVF 3.84). 
Finally, the Stoics maintained that even the activities of living cor­
poreal subjects are themselves living corporeal beings, e.g., walking, 
dancing, cutting leather, and hammering bronze (Plut. Comm. Not. 
1084b-c; cf. SVF 2.801). 
Thus by positing a handful of corporeal characteristics, namely, 
spatial extension with solidity, action and suffering, contact and sep­
aration, similarity, and finally corporeal composition, the Stoics were 
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able to maintain that all real things are bodies. Conversely, they could 
maintain that whatever lacks these characteristics is both incorporeal 
and nonexistent. Among the incorporeals recognized by the Stoics 
were time, place, void, and certain logical entities that exist only in 
thought, e.g., predicates and propositions (SVF 2.132, 166, 170, 331, 
335; cf. 1.89; 2.336). 
In seeking the origin of the Stoic belief that only bodies exist, two 
possible explanations may be dismissed at once. In view of the sup­
posed influence of Heraclitus on the Stoics, one might conjecture that 
his apparent corporealism gave impetus to the Stoic doctrine.3 But the 
corporealism of Heraclitus was, at best, implicit and quite a different 
thing from the explicit corporealism of the Stoics; so there is still the 
question of how the Stoics came to adopt an explicit corporealism. 
Moreover, it may be going too far even to say that Heraclitus's philos­
ophy was implicitly corporealistic.4 Although the distinction between 
corporeal and incorporeal may already have been made, it had not been 
applied to the problem of the nature of existing things; and it is unfair 
to impute to any man the answer to a question he has not heard. The 
formulation of Heraclitus's philosophy presupposes no distinction be­
tween body and nonbody; and it is possible that if Heraclitus had 
thought in terms of this distinction, his philosophy would have had an 
entirely different formulation. Therefore, there is no justification at all 
for deriving the Stoic doctrine from Heraclitus. 
Another explanation that could be advanced is the spirit of the 
times.5 It is true that the Epicureans and third-century Peripatetics, 
such as Strato, were also corporealists. But far from explaining the 
origin of Stoic corporealism, this explanation begs the question and 
only whets one's curiosity even more to know how all these schools 
came to adopt the corporealist view, after the fourth-century Academic 
and Aristotelian philosophies had given such prominence to the incor­
poreal . 
Since the roots of Stoic corporealism do not lie in the time of the 
early pre-Socratics before the question had been raised or in the Hel­
lenistic period when the question had been answered, they must lie in 
the intervening period, during which the question of the nature of truly 
existing things was raised and subsequently discussed until it reached 
such a state that the Stoic view was, if not inevitable, at least reason­
able.6 
6 The Origins of Stoic Cosmology 
Discussion of the relation between corporeality and that which truly 
exists seems to have been inaugurated by the Eleatics, probably first by 
Melissus. In his defense of Parmenides' assertion that "what i s " must 
be one and homogeneous, Melissus added that it must also be without 
body (σώμα) or thickness (πάχος).7 His assertion that "what i s " 
must be incorporeal provoked an immediate reaction. Not only did 
Gorgias of Leontini, in refutation of the Eleatics, acknowledge body as 
a possible candidate for the title of what truly exists (DK 82 Β 3.73), 
but most of the natural philosophers of the latter part of the fifth 
century explicitly attributed corporeality to the elemental realities in 
their systems. The atoms of Leucippus and Democritus (DK 68 Β 156; 
cf. index, DK 3.419al6-27), the air of Diogenes of Apollonia (DK 64 
Β 7), and even the monads of the Pythagorean Ecphantus (DK 51.2; 
cf. 51.1, 4) were explicitly called bodies.8 From this time on, 
"bodies" was the standard name given to the material elements. 
It was at this point that Socrates entered the scene and shifted the 
entire emphasis of philosophical inquiry. In investigating the basis of 
man's ethical behavior, Socrates now began inquiring into the content 
and definition of ethical terms, such as temperance, courage, piety, 
beauty, and justice. In the next generation Plato carried Socrates' 
investigation one step further and inquired also into the nature of these 
terms, or rather of the realities they describe. His conclusion was the 
theory of Forms, according to which universals, including the ethical 
predicates, exist apart from the particular manifestations of them, and 
these transcendent universal ideas are the only true beings (όντα).9 
Plato believed that these truly existing Forms are incorporeal (Phaedr. 
247c, Soph. 246b, 247b-c, Polit. 286a, cf. Rep. 5.476a). The theory 
of Forms brings us back in one respect to the position of Melissus, in 
that what truly exists is incorporeal; but Plato's reason for taking this 
position was totally different from that of Melissus. Whereas Melissus 
had arrived at his position by abstract logic, Plato was led there by 
seeking the objective realities denoted by ethical terms, a problem that 
he felt was bound to trouble all but the most irrationally stubborn 
materialist.10 For the materialist assumption that all that truly exists is 
corporeal must lead to one of two absurd consequences—either the 
well-known virtues do not exist or else they too are corporeal (Soph. 
245e-247c). Plato felt he could solve this dilemma only by positing a 
set of truly existing incorporeal Forms to serve as the objects of 
thought, one Form corresponding to each universal concept. 
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The history of the question of the corporeality of real entities 
suggests that by the mid-fourth century there was only one outstanding 
proponent of incorporeal real entities, that is, Plato and his Academy. 
Before Zeno the Stoic appeared on the scene, the Platonic theory of 
Forms was to become the subject of much discussion and criticism. 
The most vociferous critic of all was Aristotle. Aristotle's criticisms 
are to be found in several of his works, especially in On Ideas, On 
Philosophy, Posterior Analytics, On Generation and Corruption, and 
the Metaphysics.11 In these works Aristotle brought many arguments 
against the theory of Ideas, showing that Plato's theory leads to con­
tradictions, for which a single, fundamental error is responsible, 
namely, that the Ideas exist separate or apart from the individual par­
ticulars.12 Aristotle insisted that to avoid contradictions the Ideas must 
be considered universals inherent in the particulars.13 For Aristotle, 
universals are inseparable from objects, and separability is a mark of 
substance (ουσία). Hence universals cannot be called substances 
(ονσίοίί).14 This, however, does not mean that they do not exist or that 
they can be ignored; for, in fact there can be no science or knowledge 
without universals (Metaph. 3.6.1003al3-15, 11.2.1060bl9-21, 
13.9.1086b5-6, 10.1086b32-37; De An. 2.5.417b22-23; Eth. Nic. 
6.6.1140b31-32, 10.9.1180bl5-16). Universals must, therefore, 
have some mode of existence, and Aristotle's conception of this mode 
of existence can be deduced from his descriptions of universals. For 
instance, Aristotle spoke of a universal as something spoken or predi­
cated universally of more than one thing (e.g., Int. 7.17a39-bl; Anal. 
Post. 2.12.96al2-15 [cf. 1.31.87b32-33]; Metaph. 3.3.999a20-21; 
5.26.1023b29-32; 7.13.1038b8-12; Part. An. 1.4.644a27-28); thus 
the universal exists in human language. Moreover, Aristotle described 
the process of induction (επαγωγή), by which a man comes to the 
knowledge of a universal concept, and therein made it clear that the 
universal also exists in the human mind.1 5 Thus Aristotle asserted that 
though the universal per se does not exist apart from particulars, it is 
separable by the mind, as a universal concept, and may, in turn, be 
expressed in language. The relation between the realms of language, 
thought, and objects is summarized in the introductory paragraph of 
On Interpretation, where it is stated that words are signs (σύμβολα or 
σημεία) of thoughts (νοήματα or παϋήματα τής ψυχής), and 
thoughts correspond to (ομοιώματα) things (πράγματα).16 In this 
scheme the Aristotelian universal would find no place among things, 
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but would exist as a thought, which could be represented by a word. 
Aristotle's criticism of Plato had the effect of removing the Platonic 
Form from the throne of sole independent reality to the position of 
mental concept, although in this position it was still allowed to retain 
some of its Platonic attributes, i.e., incorporeality, eternity, and im­
perishability.17 
The Stoics, entering the philosophical scene a decade after the death 
of Aristotle, followed him closely in their assessment of the Platonic 
Ideas. Zeno and Cleanthes stated simply that the Platonic Ideas are 
thoughts in our mind and, as such, are nonexistent (ανύπαρκτους, 
SVF 1.65, 494; cf. 2.360). Zeno even used Aristotle's favorite exam­
ples, men and horses. Furthermore, the Stoics followed the analysis of 
On Interpretation and distinguished the word (φωνή or σημαίνον), 
the concept (σιημαινόμενον) and the actual object (τνγχάνον). Two 
of these, the voice (struck air) and the object, are corporeal. The third, 
the concept, the group in which the Platonic Ideas would be found, is 
incorporeal.18 Not only is the content of this analysis dependent on 
Aristotle,19 but even the vocabulary is Aristotelian, for φωνή and the 
verb σημαίνω were also used by Aristotle in this context. Thus it is 
apparent that the Stoics were studying Aristotle and accepting his 
criticisms. This explains how the incorporeal entities of the Platonic 
theory of Forms came to be retained by the Stoic system, stripped of 
their real, separate existence, but still retaining their incorporeality. 
The similarity between the Aristotelian and the Stoic attitude toward 
the Platonic Ideas might suggest that Aristotle's ontology lies at the 
root of Stoic corporealism. Aristotle did maintain that only substance 
(ουσία) is self-subsistent; qualities, quantities, and all the other 
categories must be present in or predicated of some substance 
(Metaph. 7.1.1028al3-b7; 9.1.1045b27-32; 11.3.1061a7-10; 
12.5.107U1-2; 13.2.1077b4-9; 14.2.1089b24-28; Phys. 
1.2.185a31-32; Cat. 5.2a34-b6; 2bl5-17). Only substance may be 
said to be primarily and without qualification (Metaph. 
5.11.1019a4-6; 7.1.1028al3-b7; 9.1.1045b27-32; 12.1.1069al8­
24; cf. 7.3.1029a7-9). Moreover, there are two types of substance. 
The species and the genus, such as man and animal, are secondary 
substances (δεύτεραι ούσίαί); and even they cannot exist apart by 
themselves, but are predicated of some individual. In the last analysis, 
only the individuals, the primary substances (πρώται οΰσίαι), are not 
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present in or predicable of any subject, and so exist apart by them­
selves (Cat. 5 .2al l-3b23; Metaph. 7.1.1028al0-b7; 12.1.1069­
a 18-24). 
Aristotle's insistence that only particular substances are self-
subsistent might by pressed into service as an antecedent of the Stoic 
view that only bodies exist,20 but this would certainly be misleading if 
not incorrect. Even though Aristotle did maintain that only particular 
substances are self-subsistent, he in no way believed that only particu­
lar substances exist. On the contrary, he repeatedly insisted that being 
may be predicated of any number of things, indeed, of everything that 
can be placed under one of the categories.21 Moreover, he mentioned 
more than once without approval the very theory that only perceptible 
bodies exist.22 In addition, he himself believed that alongside percep­
tible movable entities there is an eternal, unmoved being, the incor­
poreal, prime mover.23 This belief is patently incompatible with the 
notion that only bodies exist. In short, there is still a wide gulf between 
Aristotle's ontology, which found a way for everything, corporeal and 
incorporeal alike, to exist, and Stoic ontology, which recognized only 
two possibilities, corporeal being or nonexistence.24 
Nor will the subsequent Peripatetic discussion of the nature of the 
soul and of god be of much use in explaining the origins of Stoic 
corporealism.25 Of course, before the Stoics could maintain that every 
real thing is corporeal, they did have to assert the corporeality of god 
and soul, in opposition to the views of Plato and Aristotle; but the 
origin of the Stoic doctrines of a corporeal soul and a corporeal god 
cannot be more than a small part of the explanation for the Stoic view 
that only bodies exist. At most, these Stoic doctrines constitute a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Stoic corporealism. 
Since Stoic corporealism cannot easily be explained in terms of the 
general evolution of ontological speculation, we will have to examine 
the fragmentary details of Stoic ontological statements for clues to the 
origin of their doctrine. In so doing we cannot fail to notice im­
mediately that in the extant fragments the thesis that only bodies exist 
is never found serving as a presupposition.26 It is never used as a 
premise to prove the corporeality of anything, nor is it ever used to 
deny the existence of something demonstrably incorporeal. In fact, as 
a simple statement it is found only in a few late and hostile sources, 
namely, Plotinus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Plutarch (SVF 
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2.319, 320, 329, 525). Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that the 
Stoics believed it. Hence it must have followed as a conclusion, on the 
one hand, presupposing the corporeality of god, the soul, virtues, and 
qualities, and, on the other hand, derived by argument from specific 
premises. This confirms our observation that the Stoic thesis that only 
bodies exist was not taken over fully evolved, but was a new thesis 
which the Stoics felt a need to demonstrate. It is to their demonstra­
tions that we must now turn. 
The first Stoic definition of body, "that which is extended in three 
dimensions with resistance" (το τρυχΎ) δυαστατόν μετά άν­
ητνπίας), was used also by the Epicureans (Sext. Emp. Math. 1.21; 
11.226; cf. 10.221-22, 240, 257; Plut. Adv Colot. 1116d) and was 
based on the traditional mathematical definition of body. Aristotle 
gave this definition in nearly the same form, το ττάνττ\ (i.e., τρυχτ}) 
διάστασιν έχον, referring of course, to length, breadth, and depth as 
the three dimensions.27 Before Aristotle, the three dimensions were 
considered characteristic of body by both Plato (Leg. 10.896c-d) and 
Gorgias (DK 82 Β 3.73). From the descriptions of Plato and Aristotle 
it is clear that the mathematical definition of body is a result of the 
position body takes in the series: (1) point or number; (2) line or 
length; (3) surface or breadth; (4) body (solid, στερεόν) or depth. 
Since each member of the series has one dimension more than the 
preceding member, body has three dimensions (Plato Rep. 7.528a-b; 
cf. Epin. 990c-d; Arist. De An. 1.2.404b 16-24; Cael. 1.1.268a6-8; 
Metaph. 5.6.1016b24-31, 13.1020al 1-14). That the Stoics recog­
nized the mathematical nature of this definition is clear from the fact 
that Apollodorus, the author of the first handbook of Stoic philosophy, 
lists the entire series, defining body as "that which is extended in three 
dimensions" (το τριχτ\ διαστατόν), and defining each subsequent 
member as the limit of the previous member, hence lacking one of the 
dimensions (SVF 3.Apollod. 6; cf. 2.357). 
This definition of body, which the Stoics and Epicureans borrowed 
from mathematics, makes body a member of a series of mathematical 
entities and thus leaves the question of its materiality or corporeality 
open. Consequently the Stoics and Epicureans had to supplement it 
with the phrase "with resistance" (μετά άντιτυπίας). The verb άν­
τιτνττε\ν means "to strike against," especially against a hard, resist­
ing object (e.g., Arist. Meteor. 2.8.368a3; 3.1.370bl8) or "to offer 
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active resistance and strike back" (as iron does to lightning that strikes 
it in Arist. Meteor. 3.1.371a24-26). Accordingly, the adjective 
(άντίτνπος) may mean "firm, resistant," and may even serve as an 
explanation of hardness (as in Plato Tim. 62b-c). Consequently the 
phrase "with resistance" in the Stoic and Epicurean definition of body 
suggests that for them body is not only spatially extended in three 
directions, but that it is able to exert active opposition to a force that 
acts upon it.2 8 In fact, the phrase seems to convey much of the content 
of the second Stoic definition of body, namely "that which has the 
power of acting or being acted upon." 
The Stoic and Epicurean definition has a significant precedent in 
Plato, who listed the attributes of bodies as length, breadth, depth, and 
strength (ρώμη, Leg. 10.896d). Apparently even before the Stoics 
arrived on the scene, the Greek philosophers were aware that the word 
"body" has two meanings: (1) the three-dimensional mathematical 
figure abstracted from the physical particulars,29 which serves as the 
subject matter of solid geometry (στερεόμετρία, Plato, Rep. 
7.527d-528e, cf. Epin. 990d); and (2) the physical bodies that are also 
three-dimensional, but in addition are perceptible and serve as the 
subject matter of physics. The Stoics and Epicureans, attempting to set 
forth the second of these two meanings, did just what Plato had done 
and what others may also have been doing; they combined the mathe­
matical definition of body with a phrase indicating physical existence 
and the power to interact.3 0 
The second Stoic definition of body, "that which either acts or is 
acted upon," was the most important, for this definition was actually 
used to prove the corporeality of sound, the soul, and the passions. 
Moreover, this definition was probably the one used to prove the 
all-important conclusion that only bodies exist. Unfortunately this im­
portant proof is not actually attested in the extant fragments, but it is 
possible to reconstruct it. Lucretius gives us the Epicurean proof that 
only bodies and void exist: "Whatever exists by itself will either act on 
something or will itself have to be the recipient of an action when other 
things act upon it, or it will be such that things may exist and happen in 
it. But nothing can act or be acted upon without body, nor can anything 
offer space except the void and empty. Therefore, besides void and 
bodies no third nature by itself can be left in the sum of things" (Lucr. 
1.440-446). If we extract the argument for the existence of bodies, we 
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find it is essentially a simple syllogism: "Whatever exists either acts or 
is acted upon. Nothing can act or be acted upon without body. There­
fore, only bodies exist." The Stoics certainly agreed with the minor 
premise and conclusion (SVF 1.90, 146b; 2.140, 319, 320, 329, 363, 
387, 469, 525; cf. 3.84); and the major premise is deducible from a 
principle that also seems to have been accepted by the Stoics, that is, 
"acting and being acted upon are characteristic of what i s . "  3  1 Thus it 
is likely that the Stoics, as well as the Epicureans, used this simple 
syllogism to conclude that only bodies exist.32 
This proof is unknown before the Epicureans and Stoics used it. If 
we look for precedents for the premises of the proof, we find that the 
assumption that acting and being acted upon are marks of being was 
first stated explicitly by Plato in the Sophist (247d-e). However, an 
examination of Plato's use of this definition of being shows that the 
Stoics and Epicureans have grossly perverted its intent. Plato proposed 
this definition to the materialists as a mark of real being in place of 
their favorite marks, visibility and tangibility. Plato's argument was, 
in brief, as follows: The soul and its virtues, such as justice and 
wisdom, are real beings (όντα). These same beings are neither visible 
nor tangible (ορατον καϊ άπτόν), and are consequently incorporeal. 
Therefore, perceptibility by sense, or corporeality, cannot be a mark of 
the real. As a substitute Plato proposed "the power to act or be acted 
upon" (Soph. 246e-248a). Thus Plato intended this mark to include 
both corporeal and incorporeal realities, and to exclude tangibility as a 
characteristic of being.3 3 Plato argued up to this mark of being on the 
premise that incorporeal entities exist; the Stoics and Epicureans, on 
the other hand, used Plato's definition as a premise to prove that 
incorporeal entities do not exist. 
This complete inversion of Plato's argument could take place only 
on two conditions. First, Plato's mark of real being had to become 
accepted in its own right and not as the consequence of an argument 
presupposing incorporeal entities. Secondly, the minor premise of the 
Stoic and Epicurean argument, namely, that only bodies can act and be 
acted upon, had to be firmly established. 
In his Topics Aristotle seems to know Plato's mark of the real as a 
familiar definition (Top. 5.9.139a4-8). The only fault Aristotle could 
find with it as a definition is that it has two parts, thus enabling 
anything that only acts, but is not acted upon, to be proven both 
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existent and nonexistent (Top. 6.7.146a21-32). Since in the Topics 
Aristotle seems to have used propositions current in philosophical 
circles during his student days,34 we may infer that this mark of being 
was far more widespread than its single occurrence in Plato's Sophist 
would suggest. Thus the first condition for the inversion of Plato's 
argument seems to have been met already by the time of Aristotle's 
youth. 
Although Aristotle was clearly familiar with this definition of true 
being, he never once used it in his own metaphysical writings, appar­
ently because he felt that the concepts of action and passion had no 
place in the science of metaphysics. This is not to say that these 
concepts were totally useless to him. On the contrary, when we turn to 
Aristotle's physical works, we find that acting and being acted upon 
are vital concepts, brought to bear on some of the most important 
physical problems, such as genesis, mixture, and the transformation of 
elements.35 A point on which Aristotle insisted most firmly was that 
there can be no action or suffering without contact (αφή, Gen. Corr. 
1.6.322b22-24, 26-29, 9.327al-3; cf. Phys. 3.2.202a3-9; 
7.1.242b24-27, 2.243a3-245b2; 8.10.266b27-267a20). From action 
and suffering he deduced not only contact but position (ΰέσυς), exis­
tence in place (εν τόττω), and finally weight and lightness (Gen. 
Corr. 1.6.322b26-323a9). It is hard to imagine what besides body 
could have all these qualities.36 Furthermore, acting and being acted 
upon are similar to moving and being moved. In fact, Aristotle often 
used the terms interchangeably.37 Aristotle was willing to admit in a 
different context that there can be no motion apart from the physical 
body (άνευ φνσίκον σώματος, Cael. 1.9.279al5-16), and, again, 
that qualitative change, which is the strict meaning of "suffering" 
(πάσχειν, cf. Gen. Corr. 1.6.323al7-20; Metaph. 5.21.1022bl5­
21), can occur only by the action of perceptible things (αϊσΰιητά), 
presumably bodies (Phys. 7.3.245b3-6). Thus Aristotle came very 
close to asserting that there can be no acting or suffering without body, 
but he never quite made this statement. His reason for reluctance is 
obvious from the passage in On Generation in which he insisted on the 
necessity of contact for acting and suffering. Here we see that Aristotle 
had in the back of his mind his unmoved mover, which was without 
parts, without extension, and without material substrate (Phys. 
8.10.266al0-267b26; Metaph. 12.6.1071 bl2-22). Since the most 
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important mover or agent was without body, he could not simply assert 
that there can be no acting or suffering without body. In fact, even 
touch proved to be an embarrassing property of acting and suffering. 
To get around it Aristotle called upon a metaphorical meaning of the 
word " touch," which he detected in the statement, "One who grieves 
us touches us " (Gen. Corr. 1.6.323a32-33). The unmoved mover, 
which moves the outermost heaven ' 'like the object of love" (Metaph. 
12.7.1072b3), could then be said to touch the thing that is moved, 
without the moved object touching the unmoved mover (Gen. Corr. 
1.6.323a28-32). Thus Aristotle found a device to allow an incorporeal 
and therefore untouchable mover to touch and act upon other things. 
This far-fetched solution satisfied Aristotle; but his pupil Eudemus 
could not see how a partless mover could touch anything, and so he 
limited contact to movers that are themselves in motion (Eudemus, fr. 
123a, b, Wehrli). Eudemus's solution to the embarrassment was to 
limit the universality of Aristotle's principle that there can be no acting 
or suffering without touch. The disadvantage of this solution was that 
it left unexplained how the unmoved mover could transfer its motion to 
the moved objects. There was another possible solution for avoiding 
this difficulty—that is, giving up the incorporeality of the first mover. 
This was the solution adopted by the Stoics. Since the Stoic deity and 
active cause (ποιονν) was corporeal, the universality of the principle 
that there can be no acting or suffering without contact or body could 
be maintained. 
Thus the Stoics seem to have derived their most important mark of 
body from Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle's preconception of the incor­
poreality of the first mover had prevented him from asserting as a 
universal principle that there can be no acting or suffering without 
corporeal contact, the Stoics boldly accepted the promptings of Aristo­
tle's physical researches and universalized his principle so that it could 
serve them as a mark of body. Since the only stumbling block in the 
path of its universality was the highly controversial Aristotelian doc­
trine of the first mover, the Stoics felt no reluctance to use the principle 
as a proven premise and apparently anticipated no objections from 
opponents. Finally, by combining this universalized Aristotelian prin­
ciple with an Academic commonplace, "Being is that which is capable 
of acting or suffering," the Stoics and Epicureans came up with a 
conclusion that is neither Academic nor Aristotelian, but that to them 
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must have seemed most probable, since its premises had the authority 
of the two most respected philosophical schools of Greece. 
Another argument, this one used by Chrysippus to prove the cor­
poreality of the soul, ran as follows: "Death is the separation 
{χωρισμός) of soul from body. Nothing incorporeal is separated from 
the corporeal, for nothing incorporeal comes into contact with [or "is 
joined to , " εφάπτεται] the corporeal. The soul is joined to and is 
separated from the body. Therefore the soul is corporeal [SVF 2.790, 
791; cf. 792]." The first premise in this argument is the hallowed 
Platonic dogma that death is the separation of soul from body {Phaed. 
64c, 67c-d, Gorg. 524b, Rep. 10.609d, Tim. 81d, cf. Leg. 12.959b). 
Plato was not consistent in the word he used for separation, but 
χωρίζειν and χωρισμός were preferred in the well-known passage of 
the Phaedo. 
Chrysippus's second premise is more difficult to trace. It is itself the 
conclusion to an independent argument, consisting of two subordinate 
premises: (1) nothing incorporeal can have contact with the corporeal, 
and (2) χωρίζειν is the opposite of εφάτττειν. The first of these 
subordinate premises seems to be that contact (αφή) is a property of 
body and only of body. The Greek word has two meanings. One 
meaning is simple "contact"; the other is the sense perception that 
operates through contact, namely, touch. Tangibility, that is, the capa­
bility of being perceived by touch, was a widely accepted mark of 
body.3 8 But for Aristotle, who seems to have distinguished between 
the two meanings,39 simple contact was not a property of body alone 
but also of the mathematical abstractions (Gen. Corr. 1.6.323al-3). 
Chrysippus thus has not simply taken over a traditional mark of body 
(αφή, meaning "tangibility") but has changed it so that αφή, mean­
ing "contact," is the mark. It is possible that he was unaware of the 
distinction in meaning and overlooked the fact that he had given an old 
definition a new meaning, thereby producing a sophistical argument. It 
is also possible that the change was intentional. When Aristotle was 
deducing the properties of things that act or suffer, he began with 
contact and worked through position, and in place, to weight and 
lightness (Gen. Corr. 1.6.322b21-323a9). He was obviously thinking 
primarily of bodies. Perhaps it was for this very reason that he pointed 
out that some of these attributes apply also to the mathematical figures 
that can be abstracted from bodies. To Aristotle's mind, then, contact 
16 The Origins of Stoic Cosmology 
may have been a property only of bodies and mathematical figures 
(and in a metaphorical sense also of the unmoved mover). The mathe­
matical figures, however, do not exist outside of the mind according to 
Aristotle; they are really things that do not exist apart considered as 
though they do exist apart (Metaph. 13.3.1078a21-23; cf. 
11.3.1061a28-b4; Phys. 2.2.193b22-35). Chrysippus, likewise, 
seems to have ranked them with the universal ideas, as thoughts in the 
mind.40 Thus even if Chrysippus agreed with Aristotle that mathemat­
ical figures can, in a sense, be in contact, the only real things that can 
be in contact are bodies; and so for the sake of an argument concerning 
soul and body, two undeniably real things, the premise that contact is a 
mark of body was absolutely true.41 
Chrysippus's second subordinate premise, that χωρίζειν is the op­
posite of εφάτττειν, is much more clearly dependent, directly or indi­
rectly, on Aristotle; for Aristotle made άμα and χωρίς contraries and 
then went on to say that touch (άπτεσΰαυ) occurs to things whose 
extremities are together (άμα, Phys. 5.3.226b21-23). Aristotle, in 
turn, was dependent on Plato who said that what is about to touch must 
be apart (χωρίς, Parm. 149a4-5).42 Since χωρίζειν and έφάπτειν 
are not commonplace opposites, it is likely that Chrysippus's premise 
depends on the Platonic and Aristotelian analyses of these terms.43 
From the two subordinate premises (that contact occurs only between 
bodies, and contact is the opposite of separation) Chrysippus con­
cluded separation can occur only between corporeal substances. Then 
since the soul in death is separated from the body, he concluded the 
soul, like the body, must be corporeal. The method here, as in the 
other argument, is one of synthesis; Chrysippus has combined a 
Platonic definition with some totally unrelated suppositions, which 
seem to have some Aristotelian influence, and has come up with a new 
proof that the soul is corporeal. 
A third argument, used by Cleanthes to prove the corporeality of the 
soul, ran as follows: Children are similar (όμοιος) to their parents not 
only in body but also in soul; that is, they have similar characters. 
Since the similar and dissimilar are characteristic of body, but not of 
the incorporeal, the soul must be corporeal (SVF 1.518; cf. 2.792). 
The argument is a strange one, for it presupposes that similarity is a 
mark of body, and it is not easy to see how Cleanthes should have 
come to hold this. Cleanthes seems to have assumed that similarity or 
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dissimilarity may be predicated only of subjects that have qualities. 
This is an obvious assumption and one to which Aristotle called atten­
tion (Cat. 8.1 Ial5—19). In fact, two of the respects in which Cleanthes 
thought children resembled their parents, namely in dispositions (δυα­
ΰέσείς) and affections (πάΰη), were given by Aristotle as types of 
qualities (Cat. 8.8b25-9al3, 9a27-10al0). So we must now ask how 
Cleanthes came to feel that qualities inhere only in corporeal subjects. 
Strictly speaking, this does not seem to be true; for the Stoics described 
the characteristics and qualities also of incorporeal subjects. For in­
stance, the void is empty, unlimited, and, of course, incorporeal (SVF 
1.95, 96; 2.331, 503, 509, 535, 539). Not only did the Stoics describe 
the negative qualities of incorporeal things, but they said void, place, 
and time are continuous and divisible to infinity (SVF 2.482, 509). 
Simplicius says the Stoics believed that the qualities of corporeal sub­
jects are corporeal, whereas the qualities of incorporeal subjects are 
incorporeal (SVF. 2.388, 389). If Cleanthes held this view, his argu­
ment is not valid, for qualities do not inhere only in corporeal subjects; 
and consequently even incorporeal subjects can be compared for like­
ness. But it is possible that the theory of the qualities of incorporeal 
subjects had not yet been worked out in Cleanthes' day. The early 
Stoics were much more interested in the idea that qualities of corporeal 
subjects are themselves corporeal. If Cleanthes was thinking only of 
corporeal entities and of their corporeal qualities, it is somewhat easier 
to understand how he came to hold the theory that similarity and 
dissimilarity are marks of body. He must have felt similarity entails 
qualities and qualities entail corporeality. Even on this assumption his 
argument remains a curiosity and only partially explainable.44 
Probably the most startling argument used by the Stoics to prove the 
corporeality of anything was that used to prove the corporeality of the 
virtues, vices, and qualities in general. Virtues, vices, truth, and 
knowledge were all said to be "states of the soul" or, alternatively, 
" the soul in various states" (SVF 2.132; 3.459[= 1.202], 198, 
307). To us, it makes a big difference whether one defines virtue as  " a 
state (δίάΰεσίς) of the soul" or "the soul in a certain state" (ψνχή 
πως εχον(τα). Aristotle in his Topics had called it an error to make 
what is actually the subject of an affection the genus of that affection, 
for the genus must always be truly predicated of the thing defined, so 
that the predicates of the genus are true also of the species (Top. 
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4.5.127a3-17). Any student of Aristotle's Topics ought to have re­
jected a definition of virtue as a soul in a certain state, because the 
predicates of soul do not apply to the virtues. The Stoics, however, 
claimed that the virtues and other states of the soul are by definition 
souls and then boldly went on to attribute to states of the soul all the 
attributes of the soul itself. Accordingly, they concluded that truth, 
knowledge, the virtues, and the vices are corporeal (SVF 2.132, 848; 
3.84, 305, cf. 2.797; 3.85). This approach even allowed the Stoics to 
make the extraordinary assertion that virtues are living beings, for the 
soul is a living being.45 
These notions, so strange to our ears as well as to the ears of some 
ancient writers,46 may not be as hard to account for as one might 
expect. The sources, fragmentary as they are, give a number of unmis­
takable clues to the origin of this theory. Chrysippus stated that the 
virtues and vices are qualities (SVF 3.259, cf. 255). They exist in the 
soul or its principal part (τηγεμονυκόν) as substance (υπόστασυς, 
ουσία SVF 3.305, 306). More generally, substance or matter (ουσία 
or ύλη) underlies all qualities (SVF 2.380). With this vocabulary there 
can be no doubt that the Stoics were operating with Aristotelian 
ideas.47 
Returning to Aristotle we find that he maintained in the Metaphysics 
that qualities, like all the other categories except substance, have no 
separable existence, but subsist only in some primary substance. Aris­
totle actually mentions that someone might doubt whether "walking," 
"being healthy," and "being seated" (infinitives: βαδίζει, 
ΰγίαίνευν, καΰήσϋαι) exist, for they do not exist apart from sub­
stance (ουσία;). He points out, however, that "the walker," "the 
healthy one," and "the seated" (participles: το βαδϊζον, το 
καΰήμενον, το ύγυαϊνον) certainly do exist, for these have a sub­
strate (υποκείμενον), which is the substance (ουσία) and the indi­
vidual (το κα#' εκαστον). What is more, in this same context he 
mentioned that among things spoken of with a substrate is "the good'' 
(TO aya&ov, Metaph. 7.1.1028al0-29; cf. 9.1.1045b27-32; 
12.1.1069al8-24, 5.1071al-2; 13.2.1077b4-9; 14.2.1089b24-28; 
Phys. 1.2.185a31-32;Ca/. 5.2a34-b6, 2bl5-17. 
To Zeno and the Stoics this analysis may have suggested that the 
very existence of the virtues and other qualities was problematic, and 
that the meaning of qualitative terms would have to be reinterpreted 
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and definitions found that would ensure the reality of qualities. Aristo­
tle would, no doubt, have been dismayed to learn that someone could 
come to such a conclusion after he had taken such pains to show how 
everything that falls under any of the categories can be said to exist,48 
but the Stoics clearly were not about to follow him in distinguishing 
different senses of the verb " to be . " The Stoic defense of the reality of 
the virtues and other qualities was to be along a different Aristotelian 
line. This becomes clearest when we compare the type of definition 
used by the Stoics with some of Aristotle's thoughts on the subject of 
definitions. 
We have already observed that in the Topics Aristotle criticized the 
type of definition that the Stoics ultimately chose (Top. 4.5.127a3­
17); but this part of Aristotle's Topics was the work of his youth, and 
Aristotle did not necessarily approve philosophically of all the argu­
ments he advanced.4 9 Moreover, in the Topics he considered the defin­
ition only from the point of view of logic. In a discussion of substance 
in the Metaphysics Aristotle considered the definition from the point of 
view of ontology to determine the reality to which the definition corre­
sponds (Metaph. 8.1-3.1042a3-1044al4). Here he pointed out that 
since substances may be either matter, form, or composites of matter 
and form, there are three kinds of definitions: (1) of the material alone 
(e.g., a house is stones, bricks, and wood); (2) of the form or actuality 
alone (e.g., a house is a covering for property and bodies); and (3) of 
the composite (e.g., a house is a covering made of bricks and stones 
lying in a certain way). He admitted that the matter which underlies 
processes of change is generally recognized as substance, and 
elsewhere he remarked on the natural philosopher's inclination to de­
fine things in terms of the matter alone (De An. 1.1.403a29-bl2). 
What he felt compelled to add is that material definitions are in­
adequate. Since the qualifications of the differences in the matter make 
a thing what it is, the definition of anything requires specification of 
these qualifications and differences. These differences, although they 
do not constitute the full actuality, are analogous to the form, or 
actuality, and are essential in a definition of the form or of the compos­
ite of matter and form. As examples of such definitions Aristotle 
suggested: a threshold is wood or stone lying in a certain way (ώδί 
κείμενον); a house is bricks and wood lying in a certain way (ώδί); 
ice is water solidified in a certain way (ώδί);5 0 harmony is a particular 
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sort of (τοίαδϊ) mixture of high and low {Metaph. 8.2.1043a7-l 1); or 
to speak generally, a thing is certain things disposed in a certain way 
(ώδι ταδ\ έχοντα, Metaph. 7.11.1036b23-24). 
This was just what the Stoics needed to ensure the existence of 
qualities even on their own premises. The qualities predicated of a 
particular object could be expressed in terms of a definition that stated 
both the material substrate and the specific differences that identified 
the quality. All the Stoics had to do now was to apply this theory to the 
affections or qualities of the soul. The Stoics could easily have taken 
this step by themselves, but Aristotle again led the way. Aristotle 
pointed out that observation shows the affections of the soul, such as 
anger, fear, and joy, to be inseparable from the body, that is, from the 
physical material of living things. The affections are, in fact, formulas 
in matter (λόγοι εννλοι); and the definitions of them must include the 
material substrate in which they occur. Therefore, anger must be de­
fined as a movement of a body (or a part or faculty of a body) in a 
particular state by a particular agent for a particular purpose. In fact, 
all definitions given by natural philosophers ought to include both the 
matter and the form (De An. 1.1.403a3-bl9). The Stoics could not 
have asked for a plainer directive.51 Following the examples given by 
Aristotle in the Metaphysics, they defined virtue and all affections and 
activities of the soul as "the soul disposed in a certain way" (ψνχη 
πως έχουσα).52 
The result, however, was far removed from the Aristotelian point of 
view. Aristotle had used definitions of this type only of perceptible, 
natural objects, which were themselves corporeal.53 Affections of the 
soul, for Aristotle, were not natural objects but were formulas em­
bodied in matter and inseparable from body or natural material (De 
An. 1.1.403al0-27, bl7-19). Anger he defined as a movement of 
some body, not a body itself (De An. 1.1.403a25-27). By defining 
affections of the soul as the soul disposed in a certain way, the Stoics 
extended the application of this type of definition in an unprecedented 
and un-Aristotelian way. Furthermore, they seem to have treated defin­
itions as if they were Aristotelian definitions, consisting of a genus and 
specific differences, and so applied the predicates of the genus to the 
thing being defined.54 Consequently the affections of the soul, being 
themselves souls, were called "bodies" and even "living beings."55 
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Whether the Stoics were aware of their violations of Aristotelian 
logic is not known. They made no pretense of being faithful to Aristot­
le or the Peripetos. They were using the philosophical material avail­
able and combining it in a new way to produce a new philosophy. The 
creation of a reasonable, unified system was a more important de­
sideratum than faithfulness to the principles that had given them their 
starting point. 
So it seems that all the Stoic proofs for corporeality, whether of the 
soul, of its dispositions and affections, or of all real things, were built 
on premises taken over from Plato or Aristotle or else followed from 
suggestions made by Aristotle's metaphysical and logical researches. 
Stoic corporealism, therefore, appears not to have been taken over 
intact from any predecessor, nor to have followed the general trend of 
Greek metaphysical speculation, but rather to be an entirely new philo­
sophical creed, constructed in an ostensibly reasonable fashion out of 
current Greek philosophical ideas. 
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of this tripartite division. For example, he makes a distinction between the spoken 
word and the epistemological concept in Metaph. 4.4.1006a28-1007a7 (esp. 
1006b5-ll), 5.1009al8-22; and between the concept and the thing in Metaph. 
11.8.1065a21-24; 6.4.1027bl7-1028a2 (this latter passage discusses truth and false­
hood in thought and closely resembles Int. 1.16a9-16). He appears to distinguish all 
three in Anal. Post. 2.7.92b5-8. Cat. 2.1al6-b9 distinguishes between words and 
όντα. The όντα here include universals and all categories, both substantive and 
attributive, thus embracing both separable and inseparable entities (compare the simi­
lar use of πράγματα in Int. 7.17a38-bl). 
17. Anal. Post. 1.8.75b21-36, 24.85bl5-18; cf. Gen. An. 2.1.731b31-732al. In 
Eth. Nic. 6.3.1139bl9-24 Aristotle makes the objects of knowledge eternal, ungener­
ated, and imperishable. As noted above these objects of knowledge are the universals. 
Aristotle does not expressly call the universals incorporeal, but he does imply they are 
immaterial (άνευ ύλης) and therefore cannot be corporeal (De An. 3.4.429bl0-22, 
430a3-9; cf. Cherniss [above, note 10], 77, note 56). 
18. The chief source is SVF 2.166. See B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley, 1953; 
reprint, 1961), 11-26. It should be noted that there is some question whether the 
λεκτά mentioned in a number of Stoic sources are identical with the σημαινόμενα. 
Ε. Brehier, La theorie des incorporels dans Vancien stoicisme2 (Paris, 1928), 14-23, 
has attempted to show that they are different, whereas Mates (above) and Pohlenz, Die 
Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung3 (Gottingen, 1964), 1.39, take the tradi­
tional view that they are identical. The question is irrelevant for our purposes. 
19. Even the definition of φωνή as άήρ πεπληγμένη (SVF 1.74; 2.139; 
3.Diog.l7) is based on Aristotle (cf. De An. 2.8.420b27-29, which is reminiscent of 
Plato Tim. 67b). 
20. Cf. H. Siebeck, "Die Umbildung der peripatetischen Naturphilosophie in die 
der Stoiker," Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen2 (Freiburg, 1888), 
240-41. 
21. Metaph. 4.2.1003b5-10; 5.7.1017a22-27; 6.2.1026a33-b2; 7.1.1028al0­
13, 4.1030al8-27; 9.10.1051a34-35; 11.3.1061a7-10; 14.2.1089a7-9; De An. 
1.5.410al3-15. cf. G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology," in New 
Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough (New York, 1965), 69-95. 
22. Phys. 4.7.213b32; Gen. Con 1.3.318bl8-27; and Metaph. 3.5.1002a8-12. 
In Metaph. 5.8.1017bl0—26 bodies constitute only one of the four meanings of 
ουσία. 
23. Metaph. 12.1.1069a30-33, 6.1071b3-5. The prime mover is immaterial 
(άνευ νλης, Metaph. 12.6.1071 b20-21), separate from perceptible things 
(κεχωρισμένη των αίσϋτητών. Metaph. 12.7.1073a3-5), and above all, partless, 
indivisible, and without magnitude (Phys. 8.10.266al0-267b26; Metaph. 
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12.7.1073a5-11). It is these last attributes that most of all rule out corporeality Cf. F 
Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World: A Comparison with his Predeces­
sors, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 33 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960), 240, 248-49. 
See also Cicero's statement based on On Philosophy: "sine corpore idem vult esse 
deum" (Nat. D. 1.33 [ = De Phil. fr. 26, Ross]). 
24. Incorporeal entities, such as time, void, place, and λεκτά, though not called 
beings (όντα) are recognized as "somethings" {τινά, SVF 2.331, cf. 329). This 
sounds like a face-saving device to allow the Stoics to think and talk about things that 
have no substantial existence (cf. SVF 2.332). 
25. Siebeck (above, note 20), 240-44, in trying to establish the Peripatetic influ­
ence on Stoic corporealism makes much of the process by which a materialistic 
doctrine of soul evolved in the Peripatetic school. His discussion is more relevant to 
the origin of the Stoic doctrines of soul and god than it is here. Its weak point in this 
context is that at the period in which Zeno was evolving the Stoic doctrine, the 
Peripatetics were making no positive contributions to a corporealistic world view. 
Theophrastus and Eudemus were criticizing certain aspects of Aristotle's doctrine of 
the first mover; and Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus were developing a radical, noncor­
porealistic doctrine of the soul along Pythagorean lines. It is only with Strato, who 
became head of the Peripatos more than a decade after Zeno began teaching, that the 
Peripatos came around to a corporealistic view of the world and of the soul. 
26. Although the fragmentary nature of our sources makes certainty impossible, it 
is at least highly probable that the Stoics did not use this doctrine as a premise, for 
Alexander of Aphrodisias (SVF 2.792), in refuting the Stoic doctrine of the corporeal­
ity of the soul, gives what is presumably a complete list of Stoic proofs for the belief, 
and he does not mention any proof in which the corporeality of all things is used as a 
premise. 
27. Phys. 3.5.204b20;CW. 1.7.274b 19-20; Metaph. 11.10.1066b32. Sometimes 
he varies the wording to το πάντγ (or τριχτ)) διαιρετόν (Cael. 1.1.268a6—10, cf. 
24-25; Metaph. 5.6.1016b27-28; cf. 3.5.1002al8-20; 5.13.1020al 1-14) or τό 
έχον τρε'ις διαστάσεις (Top. 6.5.142b24-25; cf. Cael. 2.2.284b21-25; Phys. 
4.1.209a4-6). Euclid Elem. ll.Def. 1 also defines solid as "that which has length, 
breadth, and depth." 
28. Sext. Emp. Math. 1.21; 10.12 (=SVF 2.501) stresses the fact that άντιτνπϊα 
is what distinguishes corporeal matter from place or void. 
29. On the process of mathematical abstraction, cf Arist. Metaph. 
11.3.1061a28-b3;/J/7y.y. 2.2.193b22-35. 
30. In Theaet. 155e-156a Plato calls the materialists who refuse to believe in 
anything intangible σκληρούς και άντιτνπονς άνϋρώπονς. This characterization 
may reflect a current usage of the word άντ'ιτνττος among contemporary materialists, 
whoever they may have been. E. Zeller, Die Philosophic der Griechen5 (Leipzig, 
1922), 2.1.297 and note 1, following the suggestion of earlier scholars, has speculated 
that Plato here refers to Antisthenes and his followers and that the Antisthenic materi­
alism was then transmitted via the Cynic school to the Stoics; but he has no firm 
evidence that Antisthenes was a materialist, or that Plato is thinking specifically of him 
in this passage. On the fictitious connection of Antisthenes with the Cynics see below, 
Appendix 1, note 7. 
31. This statement is found only in Plutarch Comm. Not. 1073e (=SVF 2.525), a 
hostile source, where von Armim reads: 'όντα γαρ μόνα τα σώματα καλονσιν. 
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επειδή όντος το ποιε'ιν τι και πάσχειν, etc. With this punctuation Plutarch appears 
to be stating an elliptical form of the syllogism we have reconstructed for the Stoics. 
The course of the argument, however, makes it clear that we must make a strong break 
after καλονσιν and understand the following clause as the premise to the following 
part of the argument. Plutarch is attempting to show the absurdities implied in the Stoic 
conception of the πάν. To do this he makes deductions from the Stoic admission that 
the πάν, the combination of cosmos and void, is neither body nor incorporeal. 
Plutarch argues that since the Stoics call only bodies beings (οντά), the πάν is a 
nonbeing. Then, since acting and being acted upon are essential characteristics of 
being, the πάν, a nonbeing, can neither act nor be acted upon. To give this sense M. 
Pohlenz in the Teubner edition of Plutarch conjectures έπειτα δ' for επειδή and so 
reads " . .  . καλονσιν. έπειτα δ ' όντος . . . " 
Although Plutarch is not giving an elliptical form of the Stoic proof that only bodies 
exist, he does state the major premise of this proof (acting and being acted upon are 
characteristic of being). Unfortunately, Plutarch does not expressly assign this premise 
to the Stoics with a word like καλονσιν, λέγονσιν, όμολογονντες, or φασίν, as he 
does other Stoic statements in this passage. Therefore, we cannot be certain whether he 
has actually derived the premise from a Stoic source or has merely used a commonly 
accepted idea, but we can be sure Plutarch believed the premise could not be rejected 
by the Stoics. 
32. It should be noted that the Stoics were also in agreement with the Epicureans in 
using the premise that only body can act and be acted upon to prove the corporeality of 
the soul (Epicurus Ep. 1.67; cf. Lucr. 3.161-67). 
33. Whether or not Plato himself accepted this as a mark (όρος) of being is irrele­
vant for our purposes. Cf. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 
1935; reprinted, New York, 1957), 238-39. 
34. See E. Hambruch, Logische Regeln der platonischen Schule in der aristote­
lischen Topik (Berlin, 1904); G. Ryle, "Dialectic in the Academy," in New Essays on 
Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough (London and New York, 1965), 39-68; and 
P. Moraux, "La joute dialectique d'apres le huitieme livre des Topiques," in Aristotle 
on Dialectic, ed. G. E. L. Owen (Oxford, 1968), 277-311. 
35. Gen. Corr. 1.6-10.322bl-328b22; 2.2.329b20-26, cf. 4.331a7-b2. See 
Solmsen (above, note 23), 353-67. 
36. Aristotle adds parenthetically that the μαθηματικά also have the properties of 
contact, position, and place; but he does not infer further that they can act or suffer, or 
that they have weight or lightness. This is because the μαθηματικά are inseparable 
from material objects and are considered as separate by the mathematician in the 
process of abstraction, wherein he may leave behind any unnecessary qualities such as 
action or suffering and weight or lightness (Metaph. 11.3.1061a28-b3; cf. 
13.3.1078a21-23; Phys. 2.2.193b22-35). Hence the presence of the μαθηματικά in 
this passage does not weaken the implication that action and suffering are limited to 
bodies. 
37. Gen. Corr 1.6-7 and esp. 1.6.323al5-16, 7.324a24-b24. He points out that 
κι^εΐΐ^ may be a wider term than ποιεϊν, if πάσχειν, the opposite of ποιεϊν, is 
limited to πάθη, and thus to changes in quality (Gen. Corr. 1.6.323al6-20). Note 
that Plato, Theaet. 156a, makes ποιέιν and πάσχειν two είδη of motion. 
38. E.g., see Plato, Soph. 247b-c (cf. Theaet. 155e); Tim. 28b, 31b; Phaed. 81b; 
Arist. Phys. 4.7.213b34-214al; Gen. Corr. 2.2.329b7-8. 
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39. Cf. Solmsen (above, note 23), 350 and note 53. 
40. SVF 2.365; cf. 1.65; 2.360; see also Brehier (above, note 18), 7-8. Brehier 
sees this as an explanation for Chrysippus's paradoxical solution of the problem of the 
equality or inequality of the sections of a cone (SVF 2.489), but other explanations of 
this difficult text are also possible. For a full discussion, see D. Hahm, "Chrysippus' 
Solution to the Democritean Dilemma of the Cone," Isis 63 (1972): 205-20. 
41. The Epicureans may have held the same view as Chrysippus. At least Lucr. 
3.166 uses contact as a mark of body. Chrysippus was probably not original, but 
merely expressing a common Stoic and Epicurean idea. 
42. On Aristotle's dependence on Plato in this respect, see Solmsen (above, note 
23), 187-90. 
43. Chrysippus uses the compound εφάτττειν ("attach to" or "lay hold of," 
translated by Tertullian as contingo) rather than the simple form άπτειν The reason 
for the choice may be to recall Plato's belief that the soul is attached to the body with 
tight bonds (δεσμοί, Tim. 8Id; cf. Phaed. 83d). At the same time, it is the word used 
by Plato to designate the corporeal contact that materialists regard as the criterion of 
reality (Soph. 246a). 
44. Cf. G. Verbeke, L'evolution de la doctrine du pneuma du stoicisme a S. 
Augustin (Paris and Louvain, 1945), 43; Kleanthes van Assos, Verhandelingen van de 
Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Klasse der Letteren, vol. 11, no. 9 (Brus­
sels, 1949), 152-54. Verbeke's explanation does not take into account the statements 
of Simplicius (5KF 2.388, 389). Less satisfactory is the explanation of Brehier (above, 
note 18), 7-8. 
45. SVF 3.306, 307, cf. 2.848. Two proofs that the soul is a living being (ζωον) 
are recorded. In one the soul is a living being because it has the two marks of a living 
being, namely, life and perception (SVF 3.306). In the other the soul is called a living 
being because it is the cause of our being living beings (SVF 3.307). 
46. See, for example, the treatise De Qualitatibus Incorporeis, found among the 
works of Galen, but of disputed authorship (cf. E. Orth, "Les oeuvres d'Albinos le 
Platonicien," AC 16 [1947]: 113—14, who assigns it to Galen's teacher Albinus). A 
number of sections of this treatise are included in SVF (see index, SVF 4, page 201). 
Typical is SVF 2.385, in which the author marvels at the strange Stoic belief that the 
movements of bodies are corporeal. 
47 In Metaph. 5.14.1020bl2-13, 18-25, virtue and vice are explicitly mentioned 
as examples of qualities (ποια). 
48. See above, note 21. 
49. See P. M. Huby, "The Date of Aristotle's Topics and its Treatment of the 
Theory of Ideas," CQ, n.s. 12 (1962):72-80. (Huby, 72, note 1, gives further bibliog­
raphy.) Cherniss (above, note 10), 18-19, points out that Aristotle did not necessarily 
approve of all the philosophical implications of the criticisms he voiced in the Topics. 
For an example, see below, note 50. 
50. A nearly identical definition of snow as solidified water was criticized by 
Aristotle in Topics 4.5.127a3-17 for making the subject of the πάΰος the genus of the 
definition. If Aristotle could ignore the criticism he had voiced in the Topics, so could 
the Stoics. 
51. G. Verbeke, L'evolution (above, note 44), 42-46; Kleanthes (above, note 44), 
156-60, emphasizes the relevance of Aristotle's statement to the Stoic proofs for the 
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corporeality of the soul, and especially to Cleanthes' proof from the intercommunica­
tion of the passions of body and soul; but since Stoic psychology as such is beyond the 
scope of our study, we cannot here explore all the connections between this passage 
and Stoic doctrines. 
52. The expression εχόντων πώς is actually used by Aristotle in reference to this 
type of definition. He says a living being must be defined in terms of των μερών 
εχόντων πώς (Metaph. 7.11.1036b28-30). 
53. Even harmony (σνμφωνίά), a mixture of high and low, is corporeal, if high 
and low are construed as movers and causes of sound, as in De An. 2.8.420a26-b5. 
See also Gen. An. 5.7.786b21-22, where voice (φωνή) is called the matter (νλη) of 
speech. 
54. Aristotle discusses this principle in Cat. 3.1blO-15; 5.2al9-27, 3a37-b5. 
55. It is not necessary to suppose as does M. Pohlenz, "Stoa und Semitismus," 
Neue Jahrb'ucher, n.s. 2 (1926):261, that since no pre-Stoic philosopher held the view 
that the virtues and passions are corporeal, this doctrine must be part of Zeno's 
Phoenician heritage. The sources give every reason to believe that this doctrine did not 
enter Stoicism fully developed, but was deduced by the Stoics from premises found in 
Greek (mainly Aristotelian) thought. Against Pohlenz's theory of Semitic influences in 
general see the references cited below, Appendix 1, note 2. 
CHAPTER II 
Principles 
The doctrine of the principles or archai is usually discussed at or near 
the beginning of an account of Stoic cosmology, presumably because 
the archai are felt to be logically, if not temporally, prior to the rest of 
the cosmological doctrines. This practice goes back to the Hellenistic 
doxographies, which conventionally began with a discussion of ar­
chai.1 Diogenes Laertius, however, explicitly states that this doctrine 
was discussed by Chrysippus, not at the beginning, but near the end 
(προς τω τέλει) of the first book of his Physics (SVF 2.300, cf. 316). 
Although this information need not make us hesitate to discuss the 
principles at this point, it ought to make us pause and consider very 
carefully what role the archai actually played in the Stoic physical 
system. 
Diogenes Laertius in a brief summary says that Zeno, Cleanthes, 
Chrysippus, and Archedemus all recognized two archai, the active (το 
ποιούν) and the passive (το πάσχον). The passive is the unqualified 
substance (άποιος ουσία), also called matter (νλη). The active is the 
logos in the matter and is also called god (SVF 1.85, 493, 2.300; 
3.Arch. 12; cf. 1.98; Calcid. In Tim. 289). Most frequently the archai 
are simply said to be god and matter (SVF 1.85, 98, 495; 2.301, 310, 
312; Calcid. In Tim. 289). 
The first book of Chrysippus's Physics, where the doctrine was 
apparently discussed at length, was devoted to cosmogony and cos­
mology.2 Presumably the book contained an account of the origin of 
the cosmos in the early part. If the archai were discussed near the end, 
they were probably discussed after the account of the cosmogony. The 
precise context in which Chrysippus discussed the archai is not 
known, but a reasonable guess may be made on the basis of Diogenes 
Laertius's summary of Stoic cosmology, which is said to be based on 
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Zeno's On the Universe, Book One of Chrysippus's Physics, and 
Archedemus's On Elements.* This fragment, after describing the ori­
gin of the four elements, states that the four elements taken together 
(Όμον) are the unqualified substance, or the matter. Since Diogenes' 
source has already discussed the archai, there is no compelling reason 
to bring up the unqualified substance again, unless the original account 
of Zeno or Chrysippus discussed the subject after the origin of the 
elements. Moreover, the statement itself seems somewhat strange, for 
it is hard to see how the four elements can be called unqualified.4 One 
is tempted to suspect that Diogenes is presenting in severely abridged 
form some Stoic book, such as the first book of Chrysippus's Physics 
or Zeno's On the Universe; and in the abridgement the Stoic doctrine 
of the archai has become somewhat distorted. 
Fortunately, part of the account of unqualified substance given by 
Zeno and by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics is preserved, 
and so we may test this hypothesis to some degree. Zeno and Chrysip­
pus are said to have distinguished between substance (ουσία) and 
matter (νλη). Matter is the material of anything that exists, as for 
example, the metal out of which a statue is made. Substance (ουσία) is 
the prime matter (πρώτη νλιη) of all things in general, the substrate in 
which all qualities inhere. As such it is itself entirely unqualified, but 
capable of receiving any quality (SVF 1.86, 87, 88; 2.316, 317). The 
point of view of this discussion seems to be the cosmos in its present, 
ordered state, analyzed in terms of substrate and quality. If after de­
scribing the origin of the elements and before going on to their cosmic 
arrangement, Zeno and Chrysippus had provided this analysis of the 
material of the cosmos in terms of substrate and quality, rather than in 
terms of the elements, Diogenes' source might understandably have 
condensed the discussion in such a way that the four elements that 
compose the cosmos are made to appear to be the unqualified sub­
stance or matter.5 After the discussion of the unqualified matter 
Chrysippus may well have explained the cause of qualification, 
namely the active arche. He would thereby have produced a discussion 
of the archai, and this discussion would probably have come near the 
end of the book. For if Diogenes gives a fair summary of the book 
(SVF 2.580), only an account of the quality of each element and the 
arrangement of the elements within the cosmos would have followed.6 
The discussion of the active (ποιούν), the cause of qualification, 
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would have made an appropriate preliminary to a description of the 
quality possessed by each element.7 
Having tentatively reconstructed the context in which Zeno and 
Chrysippus may have discussed the archai at greatest length, we can 
go on to determine more precisely the role that the archai played in the 
Stoic system. The first question that comes to mind is whether the 
Stoics actually referred to the active god and the passive matter as 
archai. Aristotle in Metaphysics I and the Hellenistic doxographers 
assigned archai to Plato and the pre-Socratics, although it is improba­
ble that all these earlier philosophers, without exception, explicitly 
called their first elements or principles by the name archai. We may 
well wonder whether a doxographer is also responsible for assigning 
the term archai to the Stoic active and passive. This is almost certainly 
not the case. When seeking archai in the pre-Socratics, Aristotle, 
followed by the later doxographers, always resorted to the first element 
(or elements) from which these early philosophers claimed things ulti­
mately originated. The Stoic account of the origin of the cosmos, 
which, in Chrysippus at least, preceded the discussion of the active and 
the passive, makes it absolutely clear that the element from which all 
the other elements originated was fire. Chrysippus states: "The change 
of fire is this: It is changed through air into water; from the water, 
when earth has settled out, air is evaporated; then, when the air has 
thinned, aether is spread around in a circle" (SVF 2.579). Thus the 
four elements came into being. A doxographer, following the pattern 
that made water the arche of Thales, air, of Anaximenes, and fire, of 
Heraclitus, could only have said that fire is the arche of the Stoics. A 
doxographer could hardly have passed over this cosmogony to call the 
active god and passive matter archai, unless the Stoic sources them­
selves led the doxographer to believe that the active and the passive 
were archai in a more real sense than fire was. It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that the early Stoics themselves used the term archai for the 
active god and the passive matter. 
The function of the archai in the Stoic system was very simple. We 
have already referred to the fact that the passive matter is frequently 
called unqualified.8 In addition, it is said to be in itself without shape 
or form and also unmoved.9 On the other hand, the active principle is 
said to give to matter shape, form, and movement.10 From this it is 
clear that the archai were called upon to explain two attributes found in 
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all things, namely, movement and form (in the broad sense including 
every sort of qualification). The only other function assigned to the 
archai is the specific application of this activity to the cosmos; so the 
active cause is said to be the maker (δημιουργός) of the cosmos and 
all things in the cosmos.1 1 
The fragmentary sources also record a few attributes of the archai. 
They are eternal, ungenerated, and imperishable (SVF 1.85 
[ = 493 = 2.300], 87, 88; 2.299, 317, 323a; Calcid. In Tim. 289, 293; 
cf. SVF 2.311, 408, 599). Furthermore, each is a body.1 2 Finally, 
since the two archai are in actuality inseparable from each other (SVF 
2.306, 307, 308), god penetrates matter in a total mixture (SVF 1.155, 
158; 2.310, 323a, 475, 1035, 1036, 1039, 1040, 1044, 1047, 1048). 
Having determined the functions and attributes of the archai, we 
may go on to identify the role played by the archai in the Stoic system. 
The role seems to be twofold. The one role comes into view when we 
focus our attention on the Stoic description of matter, the passive 
principle. As we have seen, Zeno and Chrysippus probably discussed 
the archai after an account of the origin of the cosmos. Their approach 
seems to have been by way of the concept of material substrate. Mat­
ter, in general, is defined as that from which something comes to be 
(SVF 2.316; Calcid. In Tim. 289; cf. SVF 2.303, 318) or as the 
substrate of qualified things.1 3 For example, the various metals are 
matter for the things made out of them. From here the Stoics proceeded 
by analogy. As a statue, being a shaped body, has bronze as its sub­
strate, so bronze being shapeless, but still not without quality, has a 
more ultimate substance as its substrate, namely the unqualified pass­
ive principle.14 Accordingly, they defined substance (ουσία), the 
passive principle, as the ultimate or first matter (πρώτη νλη) of all 
things (SVF 1.86, 87; 2.316, 318, 323; Calcid. In Tim. 293). Appar­
ently, the passive arche, matter, was reached by a process of logical 
abstraction, which started from the cosmos in its present state of or­
ganization and worked down to the ultimate substrate of everything in 
the cosmos.1 5 That the cosmos as a whole, and not any given part of it, 
was the subject of this process of abstraction is suggested by the fact 
that the Stoics considered the material principle to be limited like the 
cosmos (SVF 1.88; 2.323; 3.Ant.32, Apollod. 4; Calcid. In Tim. 295; 
cf. SVF 2.524, 528, 534; 3.Ant.43, Apollod.9) and neither to increase 
nor decrease in amount.1 6 
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If we now step back somewhat from this close-up view, we may see 
in perspective one of the roles played by the archai in the Stoic system. 
Stripped of all qualifications, the cosmos is seen to be nothing but 
bare, corporeal material.17 In the last analysis the nature of the cosmos 
is one.18 Nevertheless, the multiplicity we see in the world around us 
is real, too, and can be explained by positing an active force, which, 
eternally inherent in the matter, produces the qualification and move­
ment we observe. Thus one role of the archai is to provide a motive 
and a material cause for the qualified state of the cosmos as it appears 
today. 
These two eternally coexistent principles could, if necessary, main­
tain the cosmos in its present state of organization for all time. In fact, 
one would expect to find them undergirding an eternal, ungenerated, 
and imperishable cosmos; but in the Stoic system we do not find this. 
The Stoics were firm believers in a cyclical cosmos, one that came to 
be and will eventually perish, only to be born again in an infinite cycle. 
The question that occurs immediately is whether the archai play any 
role in the other phases of the cosmic cycle. A priori one would 
suppose that since god and matter are eternal, they must somehow be 
operative in the part of the cycle in which only fire exists. Moreover, 
when fire changes to form the four elements, one could expect the 
active arche to play a role in causing this change. 
A search of the fragments shows these inferences to be substantially 
correct. If Aristocles may be believed, god and matter were said to be 
the archai of fire.19 Alexander of Aphrodisias simply assumes that the 
Stoics believed god and matter to be archai of the primal fire, for he 
argues that since in the conflagration fire is the only element existing, 
and since god and matter survive in the fire, god must be the form 
supervening on the matter of the fire (SVF 2.1047). Of course, since 
he is trying to translate the Stoic archai into Aristotelian terms, we do 
not have to take him seriously when he concludes that for the Stoics 
god is equivalent to form. We have ample evidence that god, as an 
arche, is not the form but the cause of form in matter. But it is 
significant that although Alexander feels he must prove that god is 
equivalent to form, he feels safe in assuming that in the conflagration 
god and matter survive along with the fire. 
Although there is only this indirect hint that the Stoics applied their 
doctrine of the archai to explain the qualification of the primal fire, 
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there is clear evidence that the archai were sometimes used to account 
for the change of fire into the other elements in the formation of the 
cosmos. We have Chrysippus's own words to tell us how the cosmos 
originated in terms of elemental change: "The transformation of fire is 
as follows: It is turned [τρέπεται] through air into water, etc." (SVF 
2.579). This same account of the origin of the elements is found 
elsewhere in the words: "God . . . originally being by himself turns 
[τρέπειν] the entire substance (ovcria) through air into water, e t c . "  2  0 
Apparently at least some of the old Stoics viewed the active and 
passive, god and substance, as responsible for initiating the transfor­
mation that produced the four elements. The continuation of this same 
fragment shows by its choice of words that the archai were brought in 
also at the next stage in the origin of the cosmos: "This [scil. god] 
. .  . is left behind in the wet, making the matter [ττουουντα την νλην] 
adapted [ενεργόν] to himself for the generation of the subsequent 
things [scil. the four elements]" (SVF 1.102[ = 2.580]). Thus the sec­
ond role of the archai seems to be to provide a motive and a material 
cause for the origin of the cosmos. 
The two roles are by no means incompatible. The archai serve as 
motive and material cause in both roles, in the second role causing the 
genesis of the cosmos, in the first causing the qualities, shapes, and 
changes in the existing cosmos. Yet the roles are different enough to 
merit separate mention; for besides the temporal difference, there is a 
difference in emphasis. In the first role, the concept of matter as 
substrate of all qualities is the prominent member; the active cause 
serves merely as correlative to the concept of matter to provide the 
quality that matter by itself lacks. In the second, the two archai are 
evenly balanced, and their active and passive properties seem to be the 
most essential aspect of their nature, inasmuch as one acts upon the 
other to bring the cosmos into existence. Moreover, the absence of 
quality in matter is irrelevant, if not actually embarrassing. 
It is quite obvious that Aristotle influenced the Stoic doctrine of 
archai,21 for it was Aristotle who popularized the term archai and the 
search for principles. Even more indicative of Aristotle's influence is 
the particular choice of archai made by the Stoics. Aristotle suggests 
that some of the pre-Socratics used the term arche for the first element, 
or cause, from which all things came to be. 2  2 Before Aristotle no one 
had ever put forth matter (νλη) as an arche.23 Both the concept of 
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matter and the use of the word νλη for this concept were Aristotle's 
own original contributions to philosophy.24 
The suspicion that the Stoics derived their concept of matter from 
Aristotle can be confirmed by a detailed comparison of Aristotle's 
ideas on the subject. Aristotle's concept of matter was developed in 
connection with his doctrine of genesis and change. According to 
Aristotle all change occurs between opposites. Underlying such 
change between opposites there is a substrate (νττοκείμενον), which 
may be called matter (νλη, Phys. 1.5-7; Gen. Corr. 1.4.319b6­
320a7; Metaph. 8.1.1042a32-34; 11.12.1068bl0- l 1; 1 2 . 1 ­
2.1069b3-9 [cf. 9-26]). If matter is approached from the point of view 
of genesis, the result is slightly different. Genesis is, in one sense, a 
species of change, namely, change in the category of substance (Gen. 
Corr. 1.3.319a3-14; Metaph. 8.1.1042bl-3; 12.2.1069b9-11); but 
in another sense it embraces changes in several categories, namely, 
change of shape, growth, alteration, and so forth (Phys. 1.7.190a31 — 
blO). What is common to all forms of genesis is the fact that every­
thing that comes to be comes to be from something (εκ τίνος), and that 
from which it comes to be is the matter (νλιη).25 
Thus Aristotle may speak of matter either as the substrate of change, 
or as that from which a thing comes to be, depending on his point of 
view. The particular opposites between which change occurs will, of 
course, depend on the type of change; but they will always fall under 
one of the general categories, form (είδος) and privation (στέρησυς, 
Metaph. 12.2.1069b9-14, 32-34; cf. Phys. 3.1.201a3-9). If the pro­
cess is viewed as one progressing from privation to form, matter must 
be the substrate of this process. On the other hand, if the process is 
viewed as one in which the matter acquires a form and becomes a 
formed object, matter must be that from which the formed object 
comes to be. 
It is this second point of view that Aristotle takes in Physics I, where 
he seeks to identify the archai of nature and natural objects. He con­
cludes that matter must be one of the archai, and all things that come 
to be must come to be from matter.2 6 One of the examples he uses is 
that of the bronze statue. The matter out of which the statue is made, 
the bronze, is without form or shape; but if the bronze undergoes a 
change of shape (μετασχημάτισα), a statue is produced.2 7 The 
bronze, shaped either as a statue or a sphere, is one of Aristotle's 
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favorite examples of matter in the Metaphysics.28 In Metaphysics V 
Aristotle points out that the ultimate matter (πρώτη υλη) of the statue 
is in the first place bronze; but since bronze can be melted into water, 
the ultimate matter is in the last analysis water (Metaph. 5.4.1015a7­
11, 24.1023a26-29). This suggests that there are successive levels of 
matter that may be reached in analyzing any object, and that ultimately 
everything can be reduced to the four elements.29 In On Generation 
and Corruption Aristotle carries the process to its conclusion. Since 
the elements may be observed to change into one another, there must 
be a substrate in which this change takes place. It is the qualification of 
this substrate by one of each of the two pairs of contraries, hot and 
cold, and wet and dry, that produces the four elements.30 
Although Aristotle's account of matter is not found in connected 
form in any of his extant works, it is obvious that his approach is 
identical with that of the Stoics. Both begin with the formed objects of 
our cosmos and by logically stripping off successive layers of qualifi­
cation arrive at the ultimate prime matter. Even the example the Stoics 
use, the bronze statue, is Aristotle's. Although no extant Stoic frag­
ment specifically mentions the step in which the bronze is broken 
down to one of the four elements,31 the similarity of approach and 
example leave no doubt that there was some connection between Aris­
totle and the Stoics. 
The attributes that the Stoics assigned to their prime matter were 
also, to a large extent, anticipated by Aristotle. Aristotle does not 
actually call prime matter unqualified (άποίος), but he does imply this 
by making it the substrate of the qualities that constitute the four 
elements (e.g., Gen. Corr. 2.1.329a27-32) and by saying that none of 
the categories (including quality) applies to it (Metaph. 
7.3.1029a20-25). Moreover, matter may be defined as that which 
underlies quality (Metaph. 5.28.1024b8-9) and therefore by defini­
tion must be unqualified. The absence of form and shape is asserted by 
Aristotle, particularly of the bronze out of which a statue is made, but 
Aristotle also generalizes and applies the term to the substrate of any 
formed object (Phys. 1.7.191a8-12; Cael. 3.8.306bl6-17). Though 
Aristotle does not explicitly say prime matter is unmoved, as the Stoics 
do, he does incidentally speak of the matter that is the substrate of local 
motion, that is, change in the category of place (Metaph. 
8.1.1042a32-35, b5-6, 4.1044b6-8; 9.8.1050b20-22; 12.1­
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2.1069b3-15, 24-26). Such matter must in itself be unmoved, just as 
the substrate of quality or form must be unqualified and unformed. The 
Stoic assertion that matter is eternal, ungenerated, and imperishable 
can also be found in Aristotle. Since matter is the substrate of genesis 
and destruction and is that which persists {υπομένει) through these 
processes, it must preexist all genesis and survive all destruction. It is 
therefore ungenerated and imperishable and consequently eternal 
{Phys. 1.9.192a29-34; Metaph. 3.4.999b5-14, 7.7.1032b30­
1033al, 9.1034bl2; 12.3.1069b35-1070a4). This is also implied by 
the fact that matter underlies the eternally revolving heavenly bodies, 
as well as the four changing elements of the eternal cosmos.32 
The Stoics maintained that matter is corporeal. Aristotle's view on 
this point is more complex. As deeper layers of matter are stripped 
bare of qualification, the matter remains corporeal down to and includ­
ing the four elements, but no farther. Aristotle makes special mention 
of the fact that there is no such thing as "body in general" {σώμα 
χοινόν) or separable corporeal matter (v\r)v σωμαηκτ\ν κα\ 
χωριστών), but corporeal matter always has some particular qualifica­
tion that makes it perceptible body {Gen. Corr. 1.5.320b22-23; 
2.1.329a8-13). By this he means that one cannot strip off all qualifica­
tion from body until only bare, corporeal material is left. When the last 
perceptible qualities (hot, cold, wet, and dry) are removed, perceptible 
body is also removed. Therefore behind the four elements lies only 
imperceptible or potentially perceptible matter {Gen. Corr. 
2.1.329a27-33, 5.332a26-27, a35-bl, cf. 2.329b7-20). 
Although for Aristotle the ultimate prime matter is not corporeal, the 
Stoics could have pointed to texts in which Aristotle, referring to a 
partially qualified level of matter, says that matter is corporeal. A 
particularly pertinent statement is one made by Aristotle in On the 
Heavens. Referring to the fact that the cosmos comprises all the per­
ceptible matter that exists (i.e., the sum total of the four elements), 
Aristotle remarks that "the physical and perceptible body is matter for 
the cosmos" {νλιη yap αντω το φνσυκόν σώμα καϊ αϊσΰτητόν, 
Cael. 1.9.279a8-9). 
Although the Stoics might find only dubious support in Aristotle for 
their belief that prime matter is corporeal, they could point to clear 
statements supporting their belief that matter does not exist separable 
by itself. Aristotle repeatedly claimed that matter is inseparable except 
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logically (Gen. Corr. 1.5.320bl2-25; 2.1.329a24-26, 5.332a35-bl; 
Phys. 4.2.209b22-23, 4.211b36-212a2, 7.214al4-15, 9.217a24; cf. 
Metaph. 7.3.1029a26-30). The only difference between Aristotle and 
the Stoics is that Aristotle meant that matter is inseparable from form 
or qualities, whereas the Stoics said matter is inseparable from the 
active principle, which is the cause of form and qualities. Both agreed 
that prime matter is never found by itself in nature. 
Another attribute of the Stoic matter was limitedness. The amount of 
matter in the cosmos was considered limited and able neither to in­
crease nor decrease in amount. Aristotle did not directly consider the 
question of the amount of matter in the cosmos; but he did imply that it 
is limited when he explained how genesis and destruction could be 
eternal. He argued that if destruction means passing completely into 
nonexistence, the process of genesis and destruction will eventually 
come to an end, unless the amount of material is infinite. Since nothing 
can be actually infinite, the destruction of one thing must be the 
genesis of another, and the reciprocal process must be viewed as a 
change taking place in a persisting substrate (Gen. Corr. 
1.3.318al3—27). It would not be hard to infer from this argument that 
matter is limited in amount, but matter's limitedness is more easily 
deduced from the fact that the cosmos is limited. Both the Stoics and 
Aristotle maintained that the cosmos is limited (SVF 2.524, 528, 534; 
3.Ant.43, Apollod.9; Arist. Cael. 1.5-7, esp. 1.7.276al6-17), and 
so the Stoics may well have deduced directly from this fact that matter 
is limited. 
Not only was there agreement between Aristotle and the Stoics that 
matter is limited, but there was also agreement that it does not increase 
or decrease in amount. Aristotle explained growth, or increase in size, 
by the addition of more matter from outside. Strictly speaking, it is the 
form that grows; the matter is merely supplemented and does not itself 
increase in size (Gen. Corr. 1.5, esp. 321blO-28). On this theory the 
sum total of matter in the cosmos cannot increase or decrease, because 
there is no matter outside the cosmos that may be added to it, nor is 
there any place or void outside the cosmos into which the matter of the 
cosmos can withdraw.33 The Stoics apparently agreed not only with 
the cosmic application of this idea but also with the Aristotelian theory 
of growth, for Chrysippus said that the matter of a man does not 
increase or decrease in size, but the quality (i.e., form) does.34 
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Although the Stoics and Aristotle agreed on the basic concept of 
matter, and nearly all the attributes assigned to matter by the Stoics 
either can be traced to Aristotle, or at least conform to his theory, the 
Stoics cannot be considered Peripatetics in their concept of matter. 
There are two respects in which the Stoics diverged from Aristotle. 
First of all, Aristotle used the concept of matter to solve particular 
problems of change and genesis that he had encountered in his study of 
physics and biology. As a result his discussions of matter are found in 
various contexts scattered throughout his physical, biological, and 
metaphysical works. Matter for him was the substrate of a particular 
change, such as the transformation of elements; or it was the material 
from which a particular thing, such as a bronze statue, comes to be. 
The Stoics, on the other hand, used matter as a cosmic constituent; it is 
the material that underlies the cosmos as a whole as well as all that is in 
the cosmos. The Stoics thus universalized what for Aristotle was a 
concept of particularized application. What this reflects is a difference 
in personal outlook. Aristotle was a researcher seeking to understand 
natural phenomena; the Stoics were teachers of philosophy, appropriat­
ing scientific theories and forging from them a world view that would 
conform to the latest scientific researches. It is this change in emphasis 
that constitutes the Stoic originality. 
The new Stoic point of view, however, was not entirely without 
precedent. It had a precedent in Plato, whose speculations on genesis 
perhaps supplied the impulse for Aristotle's discovery of the concept 
of matter. Plato realized that to account for the objects of experience 
something more than the form is needed. He concluded that "Being, 
Space, and Becoming—three distinct things—existed even before the 
heaven came into being" {Tim. 52d). This third thing, which exists 
alongside the Form and the object of Becoming, was given a cos­
mological application in the form of the receptacle (υποδοχή) in 
which the cosmos comes to be (Tim. 48e-52d). In developing his 
doctrine of genesis, Aristotle substituted matter for Plato's space as the 
third thing existing alongside form and the formed object, whereas 
Plato's space, with its cosmological application, the receptacle, en­
tered Aristotle's system as place (τόπος).35 The Stoics, we have seen, 
accepted Aristotle's concept of matter, but they gave it a cosmological 
application that resembles Plato's concept of the receptacle. Plato's 
receptacle is, of course, quite different from the Aristotelian and Stoic 
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concept of matter, but does resemble matter insofar as it is without any 
form (μορφή, ιδέα, είδος) whatsoever, and is moved and shaped 
(χινονμενον, διασχηματυζόμενον) by the things that come into it 
(Tim. 50a-51a). One cannot rule out the possibility that Plato's recep­
tacle, which Aristotle cites as Plato's counterpart to his concept of 
matter (Gen. Corr. 2.1.329al3-24; cf. Phys. 4.2.209bl 1-13, 
209b33-210a2), encouraged the Stoics to give matter the role of cos­
mic constituent, thereby returning the elements of genesis to their 
Platonic position in cosmology.36 
There is also another difference between the Stoic doctrine and 
Aristotle's, namely the alternate name by which the Stoics referred to 
matter. The first matter was called "substance" (ονσϊα). To limit the 
term "substance" to matter would have been unthinkable to Aristotle. 
Aristotle would have admitted that matter could be called "substance" 
(e.g., Metaph. 8.1.1042a32-b6; cf. Bonitz 545a27-32, 786a43-46), 
but he would have insisted that the primary meaning of "substance" is 
form (e.g., Metaph. 7.11.1037a29-30, 17.1041b7-9; cf. Bonitz 
545a32-b45). His school followed him in calling the form "sub­
stance" (cf., e.g., Theophr. Metaph. 1.5a8, 2.6a7, 6.8al3, 8.8b21, 
9a5, lOall, 10al4). How then, did the Stoics come to apply the term 
"substance" exclusively to matter? This question may well never 
receive an answer. Nothing survives of any Stoic discussion of the 
applicability of the term "substance" to matter. In fact, there is no 
evidence that the Stoics ever raised the question. The common non-
philosophical meaning of "substance" (ονσϊα) was "material posses­
sion," and even in philosophical usage it was frequently applied to the 
material nature of the cosmos and its parts.37 The Stoic usage, thus, is 
not anomalous; but it is noteworthy in the context of a Stoic doctrine 
that owes much to Aristotle. Apparently here, as we have observed 
once before, the Stoics have seen fit to follow Aristotle up to a point, 
but no further.38 We had best not even speculate on their reasons.39 
That the Stoic passive principle, the first matter or unqualified sub­
stance, was taken from Aristotle's notion of matter is clear enough. 
The origin of the Stoic active principle is not so obvious. In Physics I, 
also called On Principles, Aristotle says the archai are matter and 
form; and to these he tentatively adds the negation of form, privation, 
as a third arche. The Hellenistic doxographers, following this book, 
popularized the idea that Aristotle's archai were matter and form, or 
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matter, form, and privation (Stob. Eel. \A2[ = DG 448]; Aet. 1.3.22; 
cf. Simplic. Phys. 25.18-19, Diels [ = DG 477.16]). The Stoic active 
principle, though it produces form, is not form. It would appear that 
the Stoics have actually modified Aristotle's doctrine;40 but such an 
inference is, at best, premature. 
Further inquiry discloses that the Hellenistic doxographers, by rely­
ing on only one work have misrepresented Aristotle. In Metaphysics 
XII Aristotle repeats that the archai of nature are matter, form, and 
privation; but he goes on to maintain that by themselves these are not 
enough to explain genesis. Everything that comes to be comes to be by 
some agent (υπό τίνος). This agent is the mover (το κινονν) or the 
source of motion (αρχή της κινήσεως). To be accurate we must say 
that there are four archai: form, privation, matter, and agent or motive 
cause (Metaph. 12.1-3.1069b3-1070a2, 4.1070bl0-35, 
5.1071a29-34). Also in On Generation and Corruption he insists that 
the matter and form are not sufficient (ίκαναί) for causing genesis; 
there must be a third arche, a moving cause. This, he says, is the cause 
of which everyone dreams, but which no one puts into words (Gen. 
Corr. 2.9.335a24-336al2; cf. Gen. An. 2.6.742b33-35). 
Aristotle does not restrict application of the motive cause to indi­
vidual instances of genesis; he universalizes the concept so that it can 
account for all movement and change in the entire cosmos. According 
to Aristotle every movement is caused by a mover. With one exception 
every mover is itself in motion, moved by a prior mover. If there were 
no exception to this rule, the series of movers would be infinite. Since 
it cannot be infinite, there must at some point be an unmoved first 
mover, which initiates all movement (Phys. 7.1.241b24-243a2; 8.4-5 
[esp. 4.256a2-3, 5.256bl3-24, 257a25-27]; 8.10.267a21-b5; 
Metaph. 12.3.1069b36-1070a4, 7.1072a21-26). Aristotle even goes 
to the trouble of explaining precisely how the motion initiated by the 
prime mover is transferred through a series of movers until it causes 
such mundane changes as meteorological phenomena and biological 
genesis.41 
Aristotle's prime mover bears a significant resemblance to the Stoic 
active principle in that it is a single principle that through a chain of 
causes is responsible for the movements and changes in the cosmos, 
but the resemblance does not end there. Aristotle's prime mover is 
actually god (ϋεός, Metaph. 12.7.1072b24-30, 9.1074bl5-1075al0; 
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cf. 1.2.983a8-9); and, furthermore, its essence is mind (νονς, 
Metaph. 12.7.1072bl8-24, 9.1074bl5-1075al0). The Stoic active 
principle agrees in both respects; it is called both god (ΰεός) and 
reason (λόγος).42 Moreover, we should notice that like the Stoic ac­
tive principle, Aristotle's prime mover is eternal, ungenerated, and 
imperishable (Phys. 8.6.258bl0-259a8, 13-15; Gen. Corr. 
2.10.337al7-20; Metaph. 12.7.1072a21-26, 1073a3-5). Thus in its 
two alternate names, as well as in one of its basic functions, the Stoic 
active principle resembles Aristotle's universal moving principle, his 
divine prime mover. 
Nevertheless, we must not fail to notice that the Stoics have not 
merely appropriated Aristotle's prime mover in toto. Aristotle's prime 
mover is unmoved, but the Stoics nowhere give the impression that 
their active principle shares this characteristic. In fact, Simplicius says 
the Stoic mover is in motion,43 and Sextus records what appears to be a 
Stoic argument that the active principle is self-moved (SVF 2.311). 
Furthermore, Aristotle's prime mover exists beyond the cosmos and 
gives movement only to the outermost sphere of the heavens, from 
which the movement must be transmitted by a series of moved movers 
to the rest of the cosmos.44 In contrast, the Stoic active principle lies 
within the cosmos, permeating every inch of its matter, causing 
movement directly throughout the cosmos.45 
Both these characteristics have a precedent in the prototype of Aris­
totle's prime mover, namely Plato's world soul. Plato's world soul 
manifests the same complex of ideas—eternal source of movement, 
god, and psychic activity—that are shared by both the Stoic active 
principle and Aristotle's prime mover.46 In addition, Plato's world 
soul is immanent in the cosmos, stretching from the center to the 
periphery (Tim. 34b, 36d-e), and is a self-mover, causing movement 
directly wherever it exists, be it in the heavenly bodies or in living 
things.47 In these two respects the Stoics are closer to Plato than to 
Aristotle. 
One other point should perhaps be added. Plato's source of move­
ment is soul, which "takes mind to itself" in its activity, and so differs 
from Aristotle's prime mover who is pure mind.48 Although the Stoic 
active principle is identified with logos, and therefore must be mind, the 
Stoics also identify god with the soul of the cosmos (SVF 1.158, 532; 
2.1042, 1047) and thereby bring the active principle into connection 
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with soul too. What the Stoics have done now becomes apparent. 
When Aristotle developed his idea of a transcendent, unmoved mover, 
devoid of all psychic functions except mind, he moved away some­
what from the Platonic position on the basis of which he had begun his 
analysis of the origin of movement.4 9 The Stoics in their idea of god 
preserved precisely those Platonic associations which Aristotle had 
dropped.50 
If we now take stock of our position, we find that the Stoic concept 
of matter owes a great deal to Aristotle's treatment of this concept; and 
furthermore, the Stoic active principle embodies some of the basic 
ideas of Plato's world soul and Aristotle's prime mover. These are 
valuable observations, to be sure; but as soon as we turn from the 
archai, as two individual concepts, to the doctrine of the archai as a 
whole, we realize that we are still far from an adequate understanding 
of the basis of the Stoic doctrine. 
One of the basic functions of the Stoic archai is to account for the 
genesis of the cosmos. Plato's world soul does not do this; in fact, in 
the Timaeus it is itself fashioned by a higher power (Tim. 34a-36e). 
Since Aristotle denied that the cosmos is generated, naturally his prime 
mover does not bring the cosmos into existence. Then, too, the Stoics 
maintained that there were two and only two archai. There is nothing 
in Plato that would have led the Stoics to believe that the world soul 
and the receptacle (or Aristotle's refinement of it, matter) were princi­
ples in a more real sense than some other basic Platonic concepts, such 
as the demiurge or the Forms. A similar overabundance of principles 
confronted the Stoics in Aristotle, and Aristotle clearly labeled them as 
archai. We have already seen that Aristotle began with two positive 
archai, form and matter, but felt the need to add another, the active 
cause. The truth is that even these three were not enough archai for 
Aristotle. There had to be still another, the final cause, called the 
" e n d " (τέλος) or " for the sake of which" (ov ένεκα). In 
Metaphysics I Aristotle investigates his predecessors for traces of 
these four archai. He observes that all four have been anticipated 
indistinctly by his predecessors, but he for the first time is setting forth 
all four with clarity (esp. Metaph. 1.7, 10). It now becomes obvious 
that the archai for Aristotle are none other than his four causes: formal, 
material, motive, and final. In fact, Aristotle admits that causes are 
archai, and the words are virtually synonymous (Metaph. 
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4.2.1003b22-25, 5.1.1013al7; cf. Bonitz 112a49-56). In view of the 
abundance of causative principles in Plato and Aristotle any explana­
tion of the origin of the Stoic doctrine of archai must account for the 
number and choice of archai.51 
Moreover, accounting for the choice of archai is not as simple as it 
might appear at first sight. It will not do to view the Stoic doctrine as a 
simple selection of two of Aristotle's four causes and a rejection of the 
other two,52 for the formal and final causes were also recognized by 
the Stoics. They maintained that when the active principle acts upon 
matter, it produces form. They also agreed with Plato and Aristotle 
that purpose exists in the cosmos.53 The purpose manifested in the 
cosmos and in men, animals, and plants is spelled out as carefully by 
the Stoics, as it had been by Aristotle (SVF 2.1141-1167). This pur­
pose (πρόνοια) is virtually identified with the active cause, so that 
purpose is said to penetrate all things (SVF 1.153[ = 2.1029]) and to 
serve as maker (δημιουργός) of the unqualified matter (SVF 2.1107, 
1108, cf. 1157). Obviously, what the Stoics have done is not to recog­
nize the existence of only two of Aristotle's four causes but to distrib­
ute his four causes between two entities, assigning the material cause 
to one entity, and the motive, formal, and final causes to the other. The 
Stoic archai are these entities, one of which (the active) is more than a 
simple Aristotelian cause or arche and embraces three causes in itself. 
So far, we have uncovered no basis for this distribution of causes. 
Then, too, the basic function of the Stoic archai is to account for 
shape, form, and movement. Aristotle's discussions of matter stress its 
role in accounting for shape and form, but they make only incidental 
mention of the role of matter in movement. On the other hand, the 
prime mover causes all the movement in the cosmos, but it is not 
actually given credit for producing the shape and form of all things in 
the cosmos. Hence we must confess that we have not yet found in 
Aristotle the basis on which the Stoics asserted that the function of the 
archai is to produce form, shape, and movement. 
Finally, the Stoic archai are characterized by the relation of active to 
passive. In fact, the first name given them by the doxographies is 
active and passive archai. Aristotle in his physical works occasionally 
refers to passivity (το πάσχειν) as a characteristic of matter (e.g., 
Gen. Corr. 1.7.324a21, bl8; 2.9.335b29-30; Meteor. 1.2.339a27­
30; 2.8.368a33), but he does not generally reduce the difference be­
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tween motive and material cause to a contrast between active and 
passive. 
It is plain we must seek further if we wish to track down the basis of 
the Stoic archai. A further clue is given us by a passage in On Genera­
tion and Corruption. As a preliminary to a discussion of genesis, and 
in particular, the genesis of elements, Aristotle feels it is necessary to 
explain acting and being acted on (ποιεϊν και πάσχευν). In his ex­
planation he relates these concepts to his doctrine of causes and con­
cludes that the active agency (ττοιητικόν) is a cause in the sense of 
motive cause (ή άρχη της κινήσεως), and that matter is passive 
(παϋητυκόν, Gen. Corr. 1.7.324bl3-18). Here Aristotle does just 
what the Stoics like to do; he plainly pairs motive and material cause. 
What is of particular significance is the context in which he does 
this—a discussion of genesis. 
If we keep searching, we will discover further clues. There are 
several passages in which Aristotle says that at times some of his four 
causes coalesce into a single entity. The most illuminating passage 
expressive of this view is found in the Physics: "Often three causes 
coincide. For the form and the purpose are one, and the first source of 
movement is the same as these in form. For example, a man generates 
a man" (Phys. 2.7.198a24-27, cf. 8.199a30-32). This gives us the 
clue we are looking for; it is in biological genesis that form, purpose, 
and motive cause coincide, as they do in the Stoic active principle. 
The Metaphysics is full of references pointing in the same direction. 
Aristotle mentions the motive cause most frequently in connection 
with genesis, either artificial or natural. In art the form preexists in the 
soul of the maker; and when the maker acts, he imposes this form on 
matter and produces a formed object. In natural genesis, the form and 
the motive cause coincide in the father; and in begetting another man, 
the father reproduces his form in different matter (Metaph. 
7.7.1032al2-bl4, 9.1034a9-bl9; 9.8.1049bl7-29). The frequent 
references to genesis in the Metaphysics would allow us to deduce 
much more about Aristotle's theory, but this is unnecessary since 
Aristotle treats the subject much more fully in his biological works. 
In On the Generation of Animals Aristotle gives a complete account 
of biological genesis. The male and the female are the principles of 
generation (άρχαϊ της γενέσεως), the male by virtue of possessing 
the source of movement and generation (άρχη της κινήσεως κα\ 
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γενέσεως) and the female by virtue of possessing the source of matter 
(Gen. An. 1.2.716a4-7 [cf. 7-13], 21.730a24-28; 2.1.731bl8-19, 
732a7-9, 4.738b20-23; 4.1.763b21-24). When male and female 
come together in reproduction, the male through the semen gives 
movement and form to the matter supplied by the female, and thereby 
fashions (δημιονργεϊν) the offspring (Gen. An 1.20.729a9-ll, 
28-30, 21.729bl8-21, 730a28-30, 22.730b8-23; 2.1.733M8­
734al, 734b4-735a29 [cf. 2.4.738b25-27], 3.737al8-22, 
4.738b9-13; 4.1.765blO-13, 766al6-22, 3.767bl5-18, 4.771M8­
23). 
Here, at last, we have discovered the central ideas of the Stoic 
doctrine of the archai. In Aristotle's theory of biological genesis we 
find two entities, called archai, whose interaction is expressly stated to 
be that of an active (ποιονν) upon a passive (πάσχον, Gen. An. 
1.20.729a24-31, 21.729bl2-14; 2.4-740bl8-25; cf. 1.18.724b4-6; 
4.3.768bl5-25). It is clearly stated that the function of the active 
principle is to give both movement and form to the matter. Even the 
verb that is used of this process, δημιονργεϊν, agrees with the Stoic 
description of the function (cf. Bonitz 174b26-28). Moreover, since 
the form of man is the goal or purpose of genesis and the form in 
actuality is also the motive cause, all three causes (final, formal, and 
motive) are lined up on one side and contrasted with matter (Part. An. 
1.1.639bll-21, 641a25-27; 2.1.646a30-35; Gen. An. 1.1.715a4-9; 
2.1.732a3-5, 735a2-4); and finally, the matter supplied by the mother 
is identified with body (e.g., Gen. An. 1.20.729a9-ll; 2.4.738b20­
26, 35-36). 
We have previously called attention to the fact that Platonic pro­
totypes of Aristotle's matter and first mover bear a resemblance to the 
Stoic archai. Again Plato provides a parallel for the process of genesis, 
and, what is more, a precedent for genesis on the cosmic level. Plato's 
description of the genesis of the cosmos reveals a number of 
similarities to the Stoic doctrine of archai. Plato's creator is called 
demiurge, god, and even maker (ποιών, e.g., Tim. 29a, 30a,d, 31b, 
41a, 53b, 55c, 76c). Moreover, Plato characterizes the genesis of the 
cosmos as the introduction of shape, form, and movement into the 
receptacle (Tim. 50c, 53b). 
Since the Stoic description of the archai contains the same motifs, 
we must raise the question of the extent of Plato's influence on the 
Principles 47 
Stoic doctrine. To answer this question all we need to do is to examine 
the structural organization of these motifs in Plato's theory. There is a 
marked difference between the theory underlying Plato's cosmogony 
and Aristotle's theory of biological generation. The most significant 
difference is, as we might expect, in the role played by form. In 
Aristotle the motive cause and the form preexist in the same entity and 
subsequently produce form in the matter. In Plato the motive cause and 
the preexistent form are distinct. The preexistent form has its own 
motive power and introduces form (  = quality) and movement into the 
receptacle (Tim. 50b-53a). Then, in another step, the motive cause, 
called god, overcomes the disorderly motion of the receptacle and 
introduces order and shape (Tim. 53a-b). Unlike the Stoic god, 
Plato's god works upon a receptacle already moved and having traces 
(ίχνη) of the elements; and, unlike the Stoic matter, the Platonic 
receptacle receives its initial movement and form apart from god, the 
active force.5 4 Nor does Plato give the active-passive contrast any 
significant place in this process. These differences make it clear that in 
the theoretical details the Stoics are much nearer to Aristotle, even 
though in their application of the general ideas to the cosmos they 
approach Plato. 
We must now sum up what the Stoics have done in formulating their 
doctrine of archai. They seem to have begun with the widespread, 
venerable, ancient idea that the cosmos is a living being and that its 
origin was a birth exactly like the birth of living things.5  5 For the 
details of the birth of the cosmos, they turned to one of the most recent 
authorities on the subject of reproduction. It was from Aristotle's 
biology that they derived the kernel of their doctrine of archai as well 
as the inspiration to give the archai the fundamental role of bringing 
the cosmos into existence. Aristotle's biological theory included the 
general concepts of matter and mover, which were interpreted by the 
Stoics along orthodox Peripatetic lines as far as this was possible. 
When Aristotle carried the origin of movement back to a prime mover 
who was at the same time divine mind, the Stoics eagerly followed. 
Similarly, when Aristotle carried the notion of matter to its ultimate 
conclusion as the substrate of the elements, the Stoics followed him. 
At the same time the Stoics must have been conscious of the fact that 
their emerging doctrine of archai had significant points of contact with 
another influential philosopher, Plato. The Stoic matter could be 
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viewed as an adaptation of Plato's receptacle; the Stoic active principle 
could absorb both Plato's demiurge and his world soul. Then, too, in 
Plato the Stoics could find an adherent of the popular idea that the 
cosmos had an origin.5  6 In fact, even a few remnants of the biological 
character of its origin could be discovered in Plato.5 7 
The Stoic doctrine of archai was actually only one result of a com­
plex synthesis of ideas, a synthesis motivated undoubtedly by the 
desire to conform to the consensus omnium. In Stoicism the wide­
spread notion of the biological character of the cosmos was interpreted 
according to the latest scientific theories of the biologists. The result 
was a synthesis of the current theories of cosmology and biology. In 
this synthesis the original elements, drawn largely from Plato and 
Aristotle, were so tightly welded that they lost most of their Academic 
and Peripatetic character, and resulted in a philosophical system with a 
soul of its own. The Stoic doctrine of archai shows resemblances to 
Aristotle's theory of reproduction, his four causes, and his prime 
mover, as well as to Plato's receptacle, demiurge, and world soul. Yet 
there was originality in the Stoic doctrine; for it was the Stoic 
achievement to combine these apparently disparate elements and to 
give them a new direction, so that they might serve as the foundation 
of a new cosmological system. 
1. This is evident from the fact that most of the extant doxographies manifest this 
characteristic. See, e.g., the Vetusta Placita (cf. DG 181) and the three doxographies 
in Diog. Laert. 3.69 (assuming with A. Covotti, SIFC 5 [1897]:69, that 3.67-69 is 
misplaced and belongs later); 7.134; 8.25. 
2. SVF 2.579, 580, 581 (The περ\ φύσεως and τά φυσικά are probably the same 
work; cf. E. Brehier, Chrysippe et I'ancien stoicisme2 [Paris, 1951], 32-36. Plutarch 
and Philodemus use the title περί φύσεως, whereas Diog. Laert. calls it τά φυσικά). 
Only cosmogony is expressly ascribed to Book One, but since Book Two went on to 
the subjects of sensation and the soul (SVF 2.105, 140, 741, 867), it is likely that 
Book One also gave the general facts about the cosmos. Hence the second part of SVF 
2.580 ( = Diog. Laert. 7.137) may well represent material from Book One of Chrysip­
pus's Physics. For a reconstruction of the contents of Book One see Appendix 2. 
3. SVF 2.580. Zeno, Chrysippus, and Archedemus are explicitly mentioned as 
witnesses only of the cosmogonal part of the fragment, but since the remainder, 
describing the arrangement of the elements in the cosmos, is closely connected and is 
stated by Diog. Laert. without mention of other witnesses, von Arnim is probably 
correct in making the whole description of cosmogony and cosmology a single frag­
ment, found in essentially the same form in all three writers. 
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4. A parallel that should be compared is SVF 2.414, and perhaps also the view 
assigned by Plutarch (=SVF 2.380) to some unnamed Stoics who understood the term 
"unqualified substance" to mean that which possesses all qualities, rather than none 
(see below, note 5). 
5. The Stoics referred to in SVF 2.380 (see above, note 4) perhaps had difficulty 
finding the denotation of the term "unqualified substance" in the sense-perceived 
world. Neglecting the logical distinction between substrate and quality, they may have 
rationalized the expression to mean the sum total of all qualified matter that exists in 
the sense-perceived world, thereby confusing the capability of receiving any quality 
with the actual possession of all qualities. Their interpretation thereby comes very near 
the statement in Diog. Laert. Cf. C. Baeumker, Das Problem der Materie in der 
griechischen Philosophie (Munster, 1890; reprinted, 1963), 333-34. 
6. For a reconstruction of the contents, see Appendix 2. 
7. Brehier (above, note 2), 32, agrees that it was in connection with the four 
elements considered as matter that Chrysippus introduced the distinction between the 
two principles. 
8. On the absence of quality in prime matter see SVF 1.85 (=1.493 = 2.300), 88; 
2.301, 309. 313, 320, 321, 323a, 326, 380, 382, 1108, 1168; Calcid. In Tim. 289, 
293, 297; cf. SVF 2.318, 449. 
9. On the absence of shape (σχήμα, vultus, figura), see SVF 1.86, 88; 2.1168; 
Calcid. In Tim. 297; cf. SVF 2.311, 318. On the absence of form (μορφή, forma), 
see SVF 1.86, 88; 2.321; cf. 299, 314. Matter is said to be unmoved in SVF 2.303, 
449, 1168; cf. 311. 
10. For shape, see SVF 2.1168; Calcid. In Tim. 311; cf. SVF 2.310, 311; form, 
SVF 2.303, 310, cf. 311, 1044; and movement, SVF 2.1168, cf. 311, 946. The 
double function of providing both movement and shape is brought out clearly by 
Plutarch (SVF 2.1168), and is supported by Sextus and Plotinus (SVF 2.311, 946), 
though these authors do not mention the Stoics by name. 
11. SVF 1.85; 2.323a, 1108; cf. 1.160 (artife.x, factitator); 2.310 (κοσμοποίειν), 
599, 1044. SVF 2.526, 1032 also refer to god as δημιουργός, although not in 
connection with the archai of the cosmos. 
12. Calcid. In Tim. 289; SVF 1.98; 2.299 (The MSS reading σώματα should be 
retained. Cf. A. Schmekel, Die positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Ent­
wicklung [Berlin, 1938], 1.245, note 4. G. Verbeke, devolution de la doctrine du 
pneuma du stoicisme a S. Augustin [Paris and Louvain, 1945], 39-40; Kleanthes van 
Assos, Verhandelingen van de Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Klasse der 
Letteren, vol. 11, no. 9 (Brussels, 1949), 122, defends ασώματος only on the 
mistaken assumption that it is in the MSS of Diog. Laert.). The active cause, god, is 
said to be body in SVF 2.310, 313; cf. also 1028-48. The passive principle is said to 
be body in SVF 2.305, 310, 315, 325, 326, 375, 533. 
13. SVF 1.86; Calcid. In Tim. 289. Von Arnim gives the Calcidius passage at 
greater length under Zeno, and the Diog. Laert. account at greater length under 
Chrysippus; but each account is assigned by its author to both Zeno and Chrysippus. 
There seems to be no way of deciding in either account whether Zeno or Chrysippus 
was the predominant source. 
14. Calcid. In Tim. 289-90. The somewhat unclear argumentation is clarified by 
J. C. M. van Winden, Calcidius On Matter: His Doctrine and Sources, Philosophia 
Antiqua 8 (Leiden, 1959), 94. 
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15. The logical character of the substrate matter is clearly brought out by 
Posidonius (Stob. Eel. 1.11.5 [=DG 458]) and later by Galen (=SVF 2.409), but we 
have no evidence to show how clearly the early Stoics recognized this fact. Von 
Armin s inclusion of the passage from Galen in SVF should not blind us to the fact that 
Galen neither attributes this statement to the Stoics nor sounds particularly Stoic at this 
point. 
16. SVF 1.87; 2.316, 317, 762; cf. 2.597. One wonders why the Stoics bothered to 
stress the point that the matter of the cosmos is constant in amount. The explanation 
may be that the Epicureans promulgated the opposite view. The Epicureans held that 
atoms are constantly being added to or departing from this cosmos, and so the quantity 
of matter in the cosmos is not constant. The amount increases from birth to maturity 
and then begins to decrease until the cosmos is destroyed (Lucr. 2.1105-45; cf. C. 
Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus [Oxford, 1928], 351-52, 366-67). The 
Stoic belief that matter is limited is also opposed to the Epicurean view, for Epicurus 
held that the number of atoms is infinite (Ep. 1.41-42). Lucretius, 1.1008-51, even 
states that the amount of matter (vis material) is infinite. 
17 The author of De Qualitatibus Incorporeis thought the Stoics did not go far 
enough in abstracting matter from its qualifications. He points out that by allowing it to 
be body and limited, they contradict the description of matter as unqualified (SVF 
2.323). 
18. According to Calcidius (SVF 1.88) Zeno said that substance is the one common 
substrate of all things (unam communem omnium quae sunt substantiam). Cf. Marc. 
Aur. 12.30. The matter of the cosmos was called απλή or simplex (SVF 2.323, 346a); 
Calcid. In Tim. 293 and Sextus (=SVF 2.309) refer to it as one. 
19. SVF 1.98. This statement is suspiciously schematic: the element of beings is 
fire; the archai of fire are god and matter. It could be the result of the author's attempt 
to harmonize the Stoic doctrine of the archai with the doctrine of the four elements, of 
which fire is primary. 
20. Diog. Laert. in SVF 1.102 ( = 2.580). A little later Diogenes repeats this 
account omitting the agent: "The cosmos comes to be when the substance is turned 
[τραττΎ]] through air into moisture" (SVF 1.102[ = 2.581]). This is probably a less 
precise rendition of the same source. Cf. also the account of Stobaeus is SVF 1.102. 
21. An influence of Aristotle on the doctrine of archai is recognized by most 
writers on Stoicism, e.g., A. H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy3 
(London, 1957) 123; E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism (Cambridge, 1911), 165, 172; 
Baeumker (above, note 5), 326-27; Brehier (above, note 2) 115-16; J. B. Gould, The 
Philosophy ofChrysippus, Philosophia Antiqua 17 (Leiden and Albany, N.Y., 1970), 
96; R. D.' Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean (New York, 1910), 28; A. C. Pearson, The 
Fragments of Zeno andCleanthes (London, 1891), 12, 25, 98; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: 
Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung3 (Gottingen, 1964), 1.67; 2.38; H. Siebeck, 
"Die Umbildung der peripatetischen Naturphilosophie in die der Stoiker," Unter­
suchungen zur Philosophic der Griechen2 (Freiburg, 1888), 183-84; Verbeke, 
devolution (above, note 12), 37-39, 78-79, 88; E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and 
Sceptics, trans. O. J. Reichel (London, 1880), 396. What has not been satisfactorily 
explained is the precise nature of the influence. 
22. Phys. 1.5.188b28. The expression τάς νπ* αντών χαλονμενας 
αρχάς suggests that some pre-Socratics actually used the term arche of their origina­
tive elements. Plato Tim. 48b3-dl also uses the term arche of the elements from 
which the pre-Socratics derived the cosmos, and his words give the impression that he 
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is not thereby giving the term arche a new meaning. Unfortunately, it is not known 
which of the pre-Socratics used the term. The name that first suggests itself is Anaxi­
mander on the basis of DK 12 A 9, 11.1 and Simplic. Phys. 150.23-24, Diels (cf. C. 
H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology [New York, 1960], 
29-32; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy [Cambridge, 1962-69], 
1.77), though J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy4 (London, 1930; reprinted, New 
York, 1957), 54, note 2, followed by Kirk in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The 
Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957), 107-8, doubts that these fragments 
ought to be given this interpretation. Although Plato uses the word of the pre-Socratic 
"beginnings" that he is criticizing, when he subsequently gives his own theory of the 
beginnings, he does not expressly give the title archai to the actors in the cosmogonal 
drama (Forms, imitations, receptacle, and god). It remained for Aristotle to make 
explicit that these "beginnings" (or at least his own counterparts of them) are to be 
called archai. 
23. Hellenistic doxographies say that Plato's archai were god and matter (e.g., 
Diog. Laert. 3.69; Irenaeus Adv. Haer 2.14.2 [=DG 171]) or god, matter, and the 
Forms (Aet. 1.3.21; Hippolytus Haer. 19.1 [ = DG 567]; Epiphanius [=DG 587.8, 
591.17]; Hermias [=DG 653.27-28]). That Plato's receptacle is not identical with 
Aristotle's matter hardly needs to be stated (for discussion, see below, note 24). 
Although the statements in the doxographies might be due to a Stoic compiler, it must 
be recognized that the roots go back to pre-Stoic sources. Theophrastus Phys. Dox. fr. 
9 (=DG 484-85) says Plato δυο τάς αρχάς βονλεται ποιε'ιν ΤΟ μεν νποκείμενον 
ώς vkrjv ό προσαγορενει πανδεχές, το δε ώς αίτιον και κινούν ό περιάπτει ΤΎ) 
τον ΰεον και τη τον ayauov δννάμει. (Cic. Acad. 2.118 [ = DG 119] is perhaps 
dependent on Theophrastus.) Theophrastus's cautious wording (βονλεται 
ποιεϊν . . . ώς νλ-ην . . . ώς αίτιον και κινούν) shows he is consciously inter­
preting Plato in terms of Peripatetic causes and does not wish to say Plato actually 
stated god and matter to be the archai. An uncritical doxographer, particularly one 
who was familiar with the Stoic archai, god and matter, could easily have summarized 
Theophrastus with less care and selected from Theophrastus the words ΰεός and ύλη 
to represents Plato's archai. (Aristotle's analysis of Plato's archai was somewhat 
different and is unrelated to the development that led to the doxographical vulgate. 
Aristotle believed Plato recognized a material cause in the "great and small," and a 
formal cause, first in the Forms, but ultimately in the One [Metaph. 1.6.987b20-22, 
7.988a23-26, a34-b6].) 
24. On the Platonic origin of Aristotle's doctrine as well as his original contribution 
to the concept, see G. S. Claghorn, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's 'Timaeus' (The 
Hague, 1954), 5-19; J. B. Skemp. "ΥΛΗ and ΥΠΟΔΟΧΗ," in Aristotle and Plato 
in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. I. During and G. E. L. Owen (Goteborg, 1960), 
201-12; and F Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World: A Comparison 
with his Predecessors, Cornell Studies in Classical Philosophy 33 (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1960), 118-26. The correctness of Aristotle's interpretation of Plato is discussed by 
Claghorn (above) and D. Keyt, "Aristotle on Plato's Receptacle," AJP 82 (1961): 
291-300. On the choice of the word νλτη for this concept, see F. Solmsen, "Aristo­
tle's Word for Matter," in Didascaliae: Studies in Honor of Α. Μ Albareda, ed. S. 
Prete (New York, 1961), 393-408. The summary of Aristotle's notion of matter given 
by Baeumker (above, note 5), 212-47, is still useful. 
25. Phys. 1.7.190a24-26; Gen. Con 1.5.32Obl7- 18; Gen. An. 1.18.724a20-26, 
2.1.733b24-26, 30-31; Metaph. 3.4.999b6-7; 4.5.1010a20-21; 7.7.1032al3-17, 
8.1033a24-26; 9.8.1049b27-29; cf. 5.2.1013a24-26; Bonitz 785b8-17 Aristotle 
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reminds us that νΚτη in the strictest sense of the word refers to the substrate of genesis 
(το νποκείμενον γενέσεως καϊ φ&οράς δεκτυκόν, Gen.Corr. 1.4.320a2-3). 
Sometimes Aristotle considers privation to be the έξ ου of genesis, e.g., in Phys. 
1.7.190a21-23 (cf. 5-8), 8.191M3-16; cf. Gen. Corr. 1.3.317a32-b5; Bonitz 
148a5-10. What this means is that the expression εκ τίνος has two meanings and may 
be used to refer either to the matter or to one of the opposites of change (usually 
privation). We are concerned here only with the one sense, that of the matter. 
26. Phys. 1.6-7 (see esp. 1.7.191a3—5). The same conclusion is reached in 
Metaph. 12.2.1069b32-34, 4.1070bl8-19; cf. Gen. Corr. 2.9.335a24-30. Aristotle 
frequently states that all things that come to be have matter, e.g., Metaph. 
7.7.1032a20, 8.1033bl8-19; 8.5.1044b27-28; cf. 12.2.1069b24-25. 
27. When a statue comes to be, the substrate is said to be bronze (or stone or gold), 
and the opposite from which it comes to be is άσχημοσυνη, αμορφία, and αταξία 
(Phys. 1.7.190bl0-17; cf. 1.5.188bl9-20, 7.191al-3, 8-12; Metaph. 
5.4.1014b26-30). One may thus infer that in itself the bronze is without shape, form, 
or arrangement. The process by which the statue comes to be is called μετα­
σχημάτισις (Phys. 1.7.190b5-6; cf. Cael. 3.7.305b29-30). The verb σχηματιζειν 
is also used (e.g., Phys. 1.5.188bl9-20.). 
28. As a statue, e.g., in Metaph. 1.3.984a22-25; 5.2.1013a24-26, b6-8, 
2.1014all-12, 4.1014b26-32; 7.3.1029a3-5; cf. 7.10.1035a6-9; and as a sphere in 
5.25.1023bl9-22; 7.7.1033a2-4. 
29. In Metaph. 8.4.1044a 15-25 Aristotle further elaborates on his theory that 
different levels of matter will be reached in breaking up (άναλνεσΰαι) an object, 
before the final πρώτη νλ-η is reached. For example, phlegm comes from the fatty and 
sweet, whereas bile comes from the bitter, but both come from the same matter, i.e., 
the πρώτη υλη underlying the sweet and the bitter. In another example 
(8.4.1044a34-b3), Aristotle gives as the immediate matter of man the menstrual 
blood, but as more distant matter the four elements. This example again alludes to his 
belief that all things in the sublunar world may be resolved into the four elements. This 
well-known theory is set forth in Gen. Corr. 2.8. 
30. Gen. Corr. 2.1-5, esp. 2.1.329a24-b6. For a discussion of the evidence for 
Aristotle's notion of prime matter underlying the elements, see F. Solmsen, "Aristotle 
and Prime Matter: A Reply to Hugh R. King," JHI 19 (1958):243-52. Solmsen 
defends the notion of prime matter against H. R. King, "Aristotle without Prima 
Material JHI 17 (1956): 370-89, who contends that Aristotle never conceived a 
substrate to underlie the elements, but believed the elements change directly into one 
another, with one element playing the role of prime matter for the other. For a more 
recent, but no more convincing, denial of the notion of prime matter, see W. Charlton, 
Aristotle's Physics, Books I and II, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford, 1970), 129­
45. 
31. This step might be concealed in the obscurely abridged statement "The four 
elements together are the unqualified substance, or the matter" (SVF 2.580). 
32. That matter underlies the eternally revolving heavens can be deduced from 
Metaph. 12.2.1069b24-26. What this passage refers to is not immediately clear. The 
passage occurs in the paragraph discussing perceptible substance (cf. the first sentence 
in 12.1.1069b3), and so the passage must refer to that species of perceptible substance 
which is also eternal (cf. 12.1.1069a30-31). Since this eternal, perceptible substance 
is said to move (12.2.1069b25-26), 12.7.1072a21-23 and 12.8.1073a23-36 show 
that it must be the celestial bodies and especially the first heaven. 
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We have seen above that prime matter underlies the changing elements. The eternity 
of this matter may be inferred from the fact that the cosmos which the elements 
constitute is ungenerated, imperishable, and eternal (Cael. 1.10-12.279b4-283b22). 
33. Cael. 1.9.278b8-279al8. Aristotle uses this very argument to prove that the 
celestial element is not subject to growth in Cael. 1.3.270a22-25. 
34. SVF 2.762. The word for quality has fallen out. To fill the lacuna Zeller 
proposed ποιόν and Wyttenbach ποώτ-ης (Von Arnim and Pohlenz follow Wytten­
bach). A clue to the lost word is Plutarch's subsequent statement that he has actually 
oversimplified Chrysippuss doctrine (Comm. Not. 1083e). Chrysippus actually 
claimed that each of us consists of four corporeal substrata (υποκείμενα), but 
Plutarch has recorded only two, substance and the one now lost in the lacuna. From 
this we may conclude that the substrate mentioned in the lacuna is the second of a set 
of four entities that begins with ουσία. The Stoic categories (υποκείμενον [or 
ουσία], ποών. πώς έχον, προς τί πως έχον) are an attractive candidate for this set 
of substrata (for a parallel cf. SVF 2.374). This lends support to Zeller's emendation 
(ποιόν) and it certainly confirms the suspicion that a word for quality has fallen out. 
35. Cf. Solmsen, Aristotle's System (above, note 24), 40-52, 118-35. 
36. Gould (above, note 21), 96-97, has called attention to some of the similarities 
between Plato's receptacle and the Stoic matter. 
37. We need cite only a few of the more memorable examples, such as Arist. Cael. 
3.1.298a29—31 (λέγω ουσίας τά τε άπλα σώματα . . . και όσα εκ τούτων); 
Phys. 4.7.214al2 and Gen. Corr 1.5.320b22 (ούσϊα σωματική); and finally 
Metaph. 12.1-5, which discusses the two kinds of αισθητή or φυσική ουσία. Cf. 
also Bonitz 545al-16. Plato frequently uses the word of property or wealth (see G. A. 
F Ast, Lexicon Platonicum [Leipzig, 1835-38], s.v. ουσία). 
38. See above, Chapter 1. 
39. Baeumker (above, note 5), 329, 332, 337, holds the materialistic bias of the 
Stoics responsible for the identification of matter, body, and substance. It is not 
impossible that, once the Stoics came to believe only the corporeal is real, they might 
have asserted the corporeality of some real thing that had formerly been considered 
incorporeal; but there is no recorded example of a logical deduction of this nature. It is 
impossible to say when the specific examples of corporeal realities (god, soul, qual­
ities, etc.) served to buttress the general contention that only bodies truly exist, or 
when, if ever, the general contention led the Stoics to assign a corporeal nature to some 
entity they considered real. See above, Chapter 1. 
40. Brehier (above, note 2), 115-16; Hicks (above, note 21), 28; Pearson (above, 
note 21), 25; Pohlenz (above, note 21), 1.67, 2.38; and Siebeck (above, note 21), 
183-84, all view the Stoic doctrine as a modification of Aristotle s archai, form and 
matter. They consider the Stoic achievement to be the substitution of an active force 
for the Aristotelian formal cause. Baeumker (above, note 5), 346-54, gives a subtle 
explanation of the origin of the active principle. He believes the Stoics began with the 
Aristotelian concept of form, which they called quality. Then by interpreting quality as 
a tensional movement (κϊνησις τονικ-ή) or a current of pneuma, that is, an activity, 
the Aristotelian formal cause fell together with the motive cause to produce the Stoic 
active principle. This ingenious theory perhaps deserves more than a passing reference 
in a note. Chrysippus does seem to give the qualities precisely the same role in forming 
matter as we have seen the active cause has. He says that the qualities are πνεύματα 
και τόνους άερώδεις, which form and shape (ε'ώοποιέϊν και σχ-ηματίζειν) the 
bare, unmoved matter underlying them (SVF 2.449). My reason for minimizing 
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Baeumker's line of thought is that it depends on concepts that were probably devel­
oped primarily by Chrysippus (e.g., pneumatic qualities and motions), whereas the 
archai go back to Zeno. Moreover, though the concepts of pneuma and qualities 
eventually made contact with the doctrine of the archai, these concepts have their own 
background and history in an area quite different from that of the archai (see below. 
Chapter 5). J. Moreau, L'ame du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens (Paris, 1939), 160, 
thinks that although Aristotle's matter supplied the Stoics with their conception of 
matter, Plato's active-passive dualism of Soph. 247d-e and the demiurgic activity of 
the Timaeus are the real sources of the dualistic Stoic archai and the Stoic conception 
of the active principle. 
41. The first mover moves the first heaven in a uniform, circular motion (Metaph. 
12.7.1072a21-24). The first heaven moves the planetary spheres, and so the move­
ment is passed on down (Metaph. 12.8). By the time the movement gets to the sun, it 
is movement along an ecliptic. As the sun moves, it generates heat; and this heat varies 
as the sun approaches and recedes along its ecliptic (Meteor, 1.2-3). This movement 
is the cause of meteorological phenomena. For example, when the sun approaches the 
earth, it draws up moisture; and when it recedes, the moist vapor cools and turns to 
water, causing rain (Meteor. 1.9). The sun with its heat is also the efficient cause of 
biological genesis. As the sun approaches, it causes genesis; and as it recedes, it causes 
destruction (Gen. Corr. 2.10.336al5-b24, 11.338al7-b5; Phys. 2.2.194bl3; 
Metaph. 12.5.1071al3-17; Gen. An. 2.3.737a3-5; 4.10.777bl6-778a3). Even the 
local motion of men and animals is controlled by their environment and hence ulti­
mately dependent on the prime mover (Phys. 8.2.253a7-21, 6.259bl-260al9). Fora 
more detailed summary, see A. L. Peck, Aristotle: Generation of Animals, Loeb 
Classical Library (London, 1963), 567-76. 
42. The Stoics generally use the word logos where other writers would use νους 
(one exception is the spermatikos logos, on which see below Chapter 3). Where the 
word ρους does occur in the Stoic fragments, the word logos could also be substituted. 
It is especially significant for the point under consideration here that god is expressly 
said to be νους, and the words are regarded as virtually synonymous (SVF 1.102 
[ = 2.580], 146, 157, 158, 160, 530; 2.1027). 
43. SVF 2.339. Simplicius may have deduced this from the texts that say god 
permeates or passes through (διαφοιτάω, διέρχομαι, διήκω) the matter of the cos­
mos. See index, SVF 4, pages 40-41, sub vocibus. 
44. Phys. 8.10.267a21-b9; cf. Mot. An. 4.699b34-35. There is a possibility that 
in On the Heavens Aristotle considers the element of which the heavenly bodies are 
composed to be a self-mover (Cael. 1.9.279a30-35; 2.3.286a3-ll). Unfortunately 
the crucial passage (279a30-35) does not state its subject clearly. H. Cherniss, Aristo­
tle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore, 1944), 587-88, thinks the 
subject is a mover beyond the outermost heaven; Solmsen, Aristotle s System (above, 
note 24), 308, note 20, disagrees and defends the traditional view taken by von Arnim, 
Guthrie, Ross, and Moreau (for bibliography see Cherniss, 588, cf. 584) that this 
passage refers to the celestial element. If before Aristotle discovered the unmoved 
mover, he did indeed believe in a self-moving body at the periphery, the effect is still 
that the ultimate source of movement is at the periphery of the cosmos. 
45. SVF 1.85, 155, 158; 2.300, 310,311,323a, 1044. At first sight this may seem 
to contradict the statement above that the Stoic first mover operates through a series of 
Principles 55 
intermediate movers. The fact is that the Stoics could look at the cause of movement 
from two points of view. God causes events through a series of movers, and this 
process is called fate. They derived ειμαρμένη from είρω and loved punning defini­
tions of ειμαρμένη as an αιτία ειρομένη or an ειρμός αιτίων (SVF 1.175; 2.914, 
915, 917, 918, 920). On the other hand, they also viewed the process itself as god 
(SVF 1.102[ = 2.580];cf. 1.527; 2.528, 931, 1076), for the chain of causes is eternal 
and there never was a first cause (SVF 2.949). Hence god can only be he who is 
responsible for the continuing movement of the causal chain (The movement of the 
causal chain is emphasized in SVF 2.1000). Since unlike Aristotle's prime mover, the 
Stoic god is not locally removed from the movement he causes, it makes no difference 
whether one says that god operates through a chain of causes, or one says that god 
causes movement directly from within. 
46. The connection between these three ideas is demonstrated in Laws 10.894b­
896b, 899b. Although in the Timaeus Plato does not lay much stress on soul as a 
source of movement for other things (Tim. 58a is one exception; cf. Solmsen, Aristo­
tle's System [above, note 24], 63-65), he does maintain an intimate connection be­
tween soul and god, for each part of the world soul (i.e., each heavenly body) is a god 
(Tim. 34a-40d). See F, Solmsen, Plato's Theology, Cornell Studies in Classical 
Philology 27 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1942), 75-97, 114-15, 136-41. 
47. That soul is a self-mover is stated in Phaedr 245c-246a; Leg. 10.895e-896a. 
As a self-mover it is the source of all movement and change in heaven, sea, and earth 
(Leg. 10.896a5-bl, 896d-897b). It manifests itself in the heavenly bodies (Leg. 
10.896d-e, 898c-d; Tim. 34a-40d) and in living beings (Tim. 41c; cf. 41d-42e; Leg. 
10.898d-e). It should be pointed out that although Plato believed the world soul to be 
dispersed throughout the cosmos, he felt it existed in greatest purity at the periphery; 
for the proper movement of soul is eternal, circular movement, the movement of 
reason, which is found primarily in the heavenly bodies (Leg. 10.897c-898c; Tim. 
34a, 44d). That is why the souls of men were originally assigned to the stars (Tim. 
41d8-el) and why after death the souls of the good will again return to the region of 
the stars (Tim. 42b3-5). The Stoic active principle does not show any connection with 
circular motion or the revolution of the heavens, but these associations (which influ­
enced Aristotle greatly) have left a definite impression on the Stoic concept of the 
world soul (see below, Chapter 5, noting especially the location of the ruling principle 
of the world soul in the heavens). The absence of association between the Stoic active 
principle and the heavens is probably due to the fact that the Stoic archai did not 
originate in a cosmological context; but this subject has yet to be discussed. 
48. Plato Leg. 10.894b-897b. On the role of soul and mind in Plato's cosmology, 
see Solmsen, Plato's Theology (above, note 48), 110-17 Solmsen, Aristotle's System 
(above, note 24), 241-45, discusses the difference in viewpoint between Plato and 
Aristotle. Incidentally, Anaxagoras had already made νους the first cause of move­
ment in the cosmos (DK 59 Β 12, 13). 
49. On the origin of Aristotle's conception of the prime mover, see Solmsen, 
Aristotle's System (above, note 24), 222-49. 
50. This point has been made by Solmsen, Plato's Theology (above, note 48), 
179-83. Needless to say our present treatment does not do justice to the Stoic doctrine 
of god. The origin of Stoic theology is a separate subject, which cannot be dealt with 
here. For a preliminary treatment, see Solmsen, Plato's Theology, 179-85. We have 
dealt here only with points that have a bearing on the Stoic active principle. 
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51. Seneca Ep. 65.11 (=SVF 2.346a), disparages the turba causarum posited by 
Plato and Aristotle. He goes on to attack the sine qua non causes by a reductio ad 
absurdum, but he is probably thinking of Aristotle's four causes at the same time. To 
this turba causarum he contrasts the single Stoic cause, the active principle. 
52. Verbeke, Kleanthes (above, note 12), 118-22, seems to make the Stoic 
achievement a selection from the causes distinguished by Plato and Aristotle, but he 
does recognize that the formal and final causes have become part of the Stoic active 
cause. 
53. SVF 1.548; 2.634, 933, 937, 1140, cf. 1106-26. According to SVF 
1.551(=2.933) there was disagreement between Cleanthes and Chrysippus over how 
many of the events were guided by providence; but even Cleanthes did not deny that 
some events at least were governed by providence. 
54. This is made absolutely clear by Tim. 52d-53b. It is interesting to notice that 
when Plato speaks of the genesis of the cosmos in biological terms, the receptacle is 
the mother; but the father is identified with the Forms, not with the demiurge (Tim. 
50d). However, he does on other occasions refer to the maker of the cosmos as father 
(Tim. 28c, 37c). 
55. This idea is discussed below, Chapter 3. 
56. It is irrelevant whether Plato meant the cosmogony of the Timaeus to be taken 
literally (cf. A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus [Oxford 1928], 66-69, 
and R. Hackforth, "Plato's Cosmogony [Timaeus 27 D ff.]," CQ, n.s. 9 [1959]: 
17-22). If even Aristotle (Phys. 8.1.251bl7-19;CW/. 1.10.280a28-32) felt justified 
in classing Plato among those who believed the cosmos had a beginning, the Stoics, 
who were far less concerned with understanding the subtleties of their predecessors, 
would most likely have taken the Timaeus account literally. 
57. Most important is Tim. 50d, where Plato says the receptacle is fittingly com­
pared to a mother, the Forms to a father, and the things that come to be to the 
offspring. See also Tim. 28c and 37c, where the demiurge is called father. The 
creation of the cosmos by the demiurge or his agents is described by the verb -γεννάω 
in Tim. 32c, 34a,b, 37c, 41a,d, 68e, 92a. 
CHAPTER III 
Cosmogony 
One of the chief functions of the Stoic archai was to bring the cosmos 
into existence, and so the Stoic cosmogony must be considered next. 
Having arrived at the realization that the archai were in all probability 
partly biological in origin, we are in a better position not only to 
determine the origins of the Stoic cosmogony but even to achieve the 
preliminary task of reconstructing the doctrine itself. If the archai 
came out of a biological context, we may expect them to carry out the 
creation of the cosmos in a biological manner. With this hypothesis we 
may be able to make better sense of the difficult and obscure sum­
maries of Stoic cosmogony than would otherwise be possible. If it 
should turn out that Stoic cosmogony does indeed show a distinct 
biological character, we shall have further confirmation that the archai 
were, in fact, a synthesis of biological and physical concepts. 
In reconstructing the Stoic cosmogony and in analyzing its origins 
the safest course is to begin with the more intelligible physical aspect. 
Plutarch preserves a verbatim excerpt from the first book of Chrysip­
pus's Physics:1 "The change of fire is as follows: It is changed through 
air into water. And from this, when earth has settled down, air is 
evaporated. Then, when the air has been thinned, the aether is poured 
around in a circle" (SVF 2.579). Other fragments confirm this basic 
scheme. The initial condition is a mass of pure fire (SVF 2.605). This 
entire mass of fire changes to air, and then from air to water (SVF 
1.102; 2.580, 581, 590). At this point nothing but a mass of water 
would be visible to an observer.2 The four elements of which the 
present cosmos consists are produced from this water. First the heavier 
portion of the water (το παχνμερές) settles down and masses together 
(νφίστασΰαί, σννίστασΰαι, σννίζεσϋαί), thereby producing 
earth.3 Of the remaining water, part continues on as water; but the 
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lighter part of it (λεπτομερές) evaporates {άτμιζομένον, 
άναϋ^υμίάται, έξαροαω&Ϋ), κατά άνάδοσυν) and forms air. Some 
of the air thins out still more (λεπτννομένον, έπ\ πλέον 
λεπτννΰέν) and produces fire; or to put it another way, from some of 
the air, fire is ignited (έξάπτεσϋαι, SVF 1.102, 104, 105; 2.579, 
581, cf. 436, 527). This account is purely physical. Elemental change 
is the only process used to explain the origin of the cosmos, and the 
elemental change itself is explained in purely physical terms. Accord­
ing to Zeno the four elements come from water by such processes as 
settling and gathering {νφίστασϋαι, σννίστασΰαι), evaporation 
(άτμιζομένον), and ignition (έξάπτεσΰαι, SVF 1.102 [page 
28.15-19], 104). According to Chrysippus all elemental change can be 
reduced to a single physical process, solidification and dissolution or 
thinning.4 
If the Stoic cosmogony amounted to no more than this, we should 
have no difficulty understanding it and little trouble seeing how the 
Stoics came to hold this view. The Ionian physicists before Parmenides 
had all sought the origin of the cosmos in the genesis of the many 
elements from a single substance.5 Anaximenes had even anticipated 
Chrysippus's solidification and dissolution when he explained the pro­
cess of elemental genesis by condensation and rarefaction of a single 
element (DK 13 A 5, 6, 7.3, 8; Β 1). Above all, Heraclitus had 
asserted that fire is the primary element from which the others are 
derived.6 Of course, Parmenides with his denial of the possibility of 
genesis and change (DK 28 Β 7-8) had brought an end to such specula­
tion for a time, and cosmogony had to circumvent the Eleatic ban by 
postulating a plurality of eternal elements, whose combination and 
mixture produced the cosmos.7 But then Plato restored the process of 
genesis and elemental change to respectability, with the proviso that 
one element comes to be from another element and not from sheer 
nothing.8 When Aristotle and his school continued to defend the notion 
of elemental change,9 the stigma of Parmenides' interdict vanished 
completely; and the Stoics could use elemental change in their cos­
mogony without a word of apology. 
If we knew only the Stoic physical explanation for the origin of the 
cosmos, we would be forced to conclude that, with elemental change 
back in fashion, the Stoics were, in effect, reviving the pre-
Parmenidean cosmogonal speculation and, in particular, the forgotten 
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ideas of Heraclitus. We could even ignore the probability that Hera­
clitus may not have written a cosmogonal account.1 0 The fact that the 
well-known fragment 31 ("The changes [τροπαί] of fire: first sea, and 
of sea half earth and half fiery waterspout") has been preserved in a 
Stoic source and interpreted as being identical with the Stoic cos­
mogony (SVF 2.590) would suffice to assure us that the Stoics be­
lieved Heraclitus was in this passage describing the genesis of the 
cosmos. It would not be hard to see in Heraclitus the seed of the Stoic 
11 
cosmogony. 
If Heraclitus provided the seed, later philosophers could have pro­
vided the nourishment. Archelaus is said to have believed that water, 
when melted by fire, insofar as it settles down, produces earth, and 
insofar as it overflows, generates air.1  2 Plato enumerates the normal 
elemental changes in a way that comes even closer to the Stoic cos­
mogony: "Water when it has been solidified [πηγννμενον], becomes 
stones and earth. When melted and dispersed [τηκόμενον καϊ 
διακρινόμενον], it becomes wind and air. And air, being ignited 
[σνγκανΰέντα], becomes fire" (Tim. 49b-c). With only the slightest 
change of wording this could pass for a description of the second part 
of the Stoic cosmogony, the part following the stage in which the 
cosmos consists solely of water. Plato continues: "Then, again, com­
bining and being quenched [σνγκριΰεν και κατασβεσΰέν], fire 
passes into the form of air; and again, air coming together and becom­
ing dense [σννιόντα και πνκνονμενον] becomes cloud and mist; and 
from these, having been compressed [σνμπιλον μένων] still more, 
water flows; and from water, earth and stones come again, thus trans­
mitting genesis to one another in a cycle" (Tim. 49c). The processes of 
elemental transformation are the same processes as those used in the 
Stoic sources: solidification, gathering, quenching, becoming dense, 
melting, dispersion, and kindling. Only the addition of cloud and mist 
to the cycle of transformations sounds un-Stoic. 
Thus, if the Stoic cosmogony amounted to no more than a physical 
account of the genesis of the elements, the explanation of its origin 
might easily be disposed of. But important as the influence of Hera­
clitus, Plato, and perhaps other physicists may have been, it is not the 
full explanation for the Stoic doctrine; for the Stoic cosmogony in­
volves much more than a simple transformation of elements. Diogenes 
Laertius gives the following account: "In the beginning god, being by 
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himself, turns the whole substance [ουσία] through air into water" 
(SVF 1.102[ = 2.580]).1 3 Here we do not find a simple element 
passively undergoing a change into another element; but there is an 
active cause, operating on some substance to initiate change. Of 
course, since god is fire, this account represents the same process as 
the physical account; but the point of view is different: the Stoic archai 
are now in play. 
We have suggested that the archai are descended from biology, and 
now we see their inherited biological character in evidence. Diogenes 
Laertius continues: "As the seed [σπέρμα] is embraced [περιέχεται] 
in the seminal fluid [yovrj\, so also this [i.e., god], being aspermatikos 
logos of the cosmos, is left behind as such in the wet, making the 
matter adapted [ενεργοί] to himself for the genesis of the next things; 
then he gave birth to [άπο-γεννάν] the four elements first of all, 
namely fire, water, air, earth" (SVF 1.102[ = 2.580]). Although not all 
of this account is immediately intelligible, it is obvious that a birth, 
and nothing else, is being described; for the account bristles with 
biological terms.1 4 
A careful analysis, drawing on other fragments, will be necessary if 
we are to comprehend the birth process of the cosmos. The account 
begins with a simile: "As the seed is embraced in the seminal fluid, so 
god is left behind in the wet." The wet, or water, which constitutes the 
cosmos at this stage, is compared to the seminal fluid; and god is 
compared to the seed in the seminal fluid. In fact, he is called a 
spermatikos logos, literally, a "logos pertaining to a seed." This 
difficult expression is best left untranslated in the hope that its meaning 
will eventually emerge. For the present it is enough to notice that it 
describes that function of god which is analogous to the function of the 
seed in reproduction. 
The connection of seed (σπέρμα) with the origin of the cosmos is 
seen clearly in other fragments. The early Stoics called the fire of the 
conflagration (which is the same as the fire from which the cosmos 
originates) the seed (σπέρμα) of the future cosmos (SVF 2.596, 618, 
cf. 619). Zeno reportedly said fire is "as it were a seed, possessing the 
logoi of all things and the causes of events, past, present, and future" 
(SVF 1.98). Thus the primary fire, which is actually identical with 
god, has the same cosmogonal function as did god in the account of 
Diogenes Laertius; fire is the seed and, as seed, is associated with what 
Zeno calls the logoi of all things. 
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In addition to conceptualizing the origin of the cosmos as a function 
of the archai and as an act of biological reproduction, the Stoics 
brought in another set of ideas, which appears in Chrysippus's descrip­
tion of the birth of the cosmos: "The cosmos, being fiery throughout, 
is directly its own soul and hegemonikon [i.e., principal part of soul]. 
But when, having changed into the wet and the soul left enclosed in it 
[έναπολειφΰέϊσαν], it changed in a way into body and soul, so that it 
consists of these; then it has something else as logos" (SVF 2.605). 
Here the process is seen in terms of body and soul (or logos). Fire is 
soul; and so during the conflagration, before a cosmos is born, only 
soul exists. Therefore we may say that at this time the world and the 
world soul are identical (cf. also SVF 2.604, 1032, 1052). But when 
the primeval fire has changed into water, soul is left behind in the 
water; and so the cosmos consists of body and soul as two distinct 
entities. Clearly the water is body and fire is soul. 
All these motifs are drawn together in a passage of Dio Chrysostom, 
where the Stoic cosmogony is translated into an allegorized myth: 
"Zeus, remembering Aphrodite and genesis, softened himself and, 
having quenched much of his light, changed [τρέπεται] into fiery air 
of less intense fire. Then having had intercourse with Hera . . . , he 
ejected the entire seminal fluid [yovqv] of the All. . . . Thus he made 
the whole substance wet, one seed [σπέρμα] of the All, he himself 
running through in it, just as the forming and fashioning [το πλάττον 
καϊ δημυονργονν] pneuma in seminal fluid [yovfj]. At this time he 
most resembled the other living things, inasmuch as he would properly 
be said to consist of soul and body. Then he easily formed and molded 
[πλάττει κα\ τνπόί] the remaining things, having poured around 
himself the substance in a smooth, soft, and easily yielding state" 
(SVF 2.622). 
Here we find most of the motifs we have seen clustering around the 
birth of the cosmos. God is fire and soul. He passes by way of air 
( = Hera) into water. This water is conceived as seminal fluid (γονή), 
through which god himself, being both fire and soul, passes. There in 
the water he is a formative and creative power, just as the pneuma is in 
the seminal fluid. This account seems to use the term σπέρμα of the 
water and therefore of the seminal fluid (γονή, cf. 2.590), using 
pneuma for the analogue of the divine fire in the water. Therein it 
differs slightly from Diogenes Laertius's account (SVF 2.580), which 
uses σπέρμα of the creative power in the seminal fluid. But basically 
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it sets forth the same conception of the fluid from which the elements 
are born. 
In these accounts, however, there is one motif that is difficult to 
place, and that is matter (νλη). The motif is important because it is one 
of the archai and ought to find a place in the cosmogony. In Diogenes 
Laertius's account the divine fire in the water makes the matter work­
able (ενεργόν) for the generation of the elements (SVF 2.580). With 
this the mythological account agrees. When Zeus has made wet the 
entire substance {ουσία), he is said to have easy work forming the 
remaining things (scil. the elements), because he has made the material 
(ονσϊα) surrounding himself pliable and easily yielding (λείαν κάί 
μαλακήν κάί πάσαν έίκονσαν ενπετώς, SVF 2.622). Clearly the 
wet is considered matter. In biological terms Zeus's seminal emission 
supplies both the creative power and the matter out of which the 
cosmos is made. Hera, the female, has the function of inducing the 
emission of seed, but contributes nothing to the offspring. Hence Hera, 
through whom Zeus produces seminal fluid, is identified with the air 
through which fire changes on the way to becoming water. Origen, 
however, states that Chrysippus interpreted an erotic painting of Zeus 
and Hera as a mythical representation of the fact that matter has re­
ceived and now possesses in itself the spermatikoi logoi of god for the 
ordering of everything. Origen expressly states that Hera is the matter 
and Zeus is god.1 5 Here the female functions as matter. This is plainly 
a different assessment of the female's role in reproduction and also of 
the source of matter in reproduction. It is hard to decide whether these 
two approaches represent different theories or whether the attempt to 
allegorize a variety of myths has distorted a single theory. If we leave 
the female out of account, the role of matter in the birth of the cosmos 
is the same in all reports. God acts on matter, introducing spermatikoi 
logoi, with the result that the present cosmos comes to birth. It is true 
that this is not very specific, but we shall soon see that it is specific 
enough to help us track down the origins of the Stoic cosmogony. 
By now it should be apparent that the Stoic cosmogony involves 
much more than a mere transformation of elements. Before we set out 
to track down the individual ingredients that went into the Stoic cos­
mogony, we must consider the basic model for the conceptualization 
of the cosmogony, namely, the embryological model. Without the 
basic presupposition that the origin of the cosmos was a biological 
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process, the Stoics could never have promulgated the cosmogony we 
have described. 
The analogy between living beings and parts of the cosmos is ex­
tremely ancient in Greece and antedates all written records.1  6 From 
earliest times Greek mythology contained stories that equated the earth 
with a mother. According to these myths gods and men were born from 
the earth. Ovid's version of the Flood of Deucalion carries the analogy 
so far that stones are called "bones of our mother." 1  7 The idea that the 
earth is capable of producing life was taken over by the Ionian philoso­
phers and so entered the body of Greek philosophy.18 Early in the 
history of Greek philosophy the idea became popular that the cosmos 
as a whole is a single living being, and its parts correspond to the parts 
of living animals. The analogy between microcosm and macrocosm 
can be traced back as far as the sixth century.1 9 If the fragment be 
genuine, Anaximenes saw an analogy between the human soul, which 
is air, and the air of the cosmos (DK 13 Β 2). For the Pythagoreans the 
cosmos was a living animal that breathes in the void outside it (DK 58 
Β 30; Aet. 2.9.1). By the fifth century the analogy between man and 
the cosmos was being spelled out in greater detail.2 0 Empedocles 
referred to the parts of the cosmos as limbs (μέλη, γυΊα, DK 31 Β 
27.1, 27a, 30.1, 31, 35.11). Aristophanes portrayed Euripides describ­
ing the eye as an imitation of the sun (Thesm. 16-17). Leucippus 
called the outer shell of the cosmos νμήν, a word that generally is used 
as a technical term for the amnion enclosing the fetus in the womb (DK 
67 A 1.32). If the Armenian philosopher David can be believed, 
Democritus said man is actually a little cosmos (μικρός κόσμος, DK 
68 Β 34). Aristotle gives a lucid summary of this fifth-century point of 
view: "If something can occur in a living animal, what prevents the 
same thing from happening also in the universe? For if it happens in a 
microcosmos, why not in a macrocosmos?"2 1 
In the fourth century this point of view was no less prevalent than in 
the fifth. According to Plato (Phil. 29a-30a) and Xenophon (Mem. 
1.4.8), Socrates maintained that the four elements in our bodies are 
derived from the four elements in the body of the cosmos, and our soul 
is derived from the world soul. Plato deduced from this that man is a 
derivative and imperfect form of the universe. Accordingly, in the 
Timaeus he reversed the relationship between man and cosmos and 
deduced facts about man from the cosmos. For example, he explained 
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biological functions and activities, such as nutrition and exercise, by 
analogy to cosmic processes, such as movement of like to like and the 
eternal shaking of the receptacle (Tim. 81a-b, 88c-e). Even though 
Plato preferred to use the analogy from cosmos to microcosmos, he did 
firmly believe that the cosmos is a living, ensouled, intelligent animal 
(Tim. 30b and passim). 
To a certain extent Aristotle agreed with Plato that the cosmos is 
alive, but Aristotle made little use of this idea in his cosmological 
researches, preferring an exclusively physical approach.22 Neverthe­
less, he could not completely escape the traditional point of view, and 
so he constantly used the analogy of living animals to explain his 
cosmological theories. For example, both Aristotle and his successor, 
Theophrastus, referred to the eternal revolution of the heavenly bodies 
as a kind of life (ζωή τις, Arist. Phys. 8.1.250bl 1-15; Theophr. 
Metaph. 8.10a 15-16). Aristotle also argued that as in an animal the 
center of the animal (i.e., the heart) is not necessarily in the center of 
the body, so in the cosmos the principal part is not at the mathematical 
center but at the periphery (Cael. 2.13.293b6-15). In the Meteorology 
he made extensive use of biological analogies to explain cosmological 
phenomena, such as the location of the sea and changes in its location, 
the salt in the sea, drought and rain, and finally earthquakes (Meteor. 
1.14.351al9-31; 2.2.355a32-b20, 356a33-b3, 3.358a3-20, 
4.360b22-26 [cf. also Part. An. 2.7.653a2-8j, 8.366bl4-30, cf. 
367a33-b4). The reason these analogies are useful, he admitted, is 
that "the greater is similar to the smaller" (Meteor. 2.8.366b29-30; 
Part. An. 2.7.653a3). With this powerful tradition behind them, it is 
no wonder the Stoics believed the cosmos to be a living thing and saw 
validity in using biological analogies to describe the cosmos. 
When the Stoics conceived the origin of the cosmos to be a birth, 
they were merely conforming to one phase of this old tradition. Al­
ready among the Egyptians and Babylonians, there existed a belief that 
the parts of the cosmos came to be through a biological process.23 The 
early Greek cosmogonies manifested the same character. Hesiod's 
Theogony, 116-33, described the birth of the various deities that rep­
resent the parts of the cosmos, such as Earth, Tartaros, Night, Day, 
Aether, Heaven, Mountains, Sea, and Ocean. Some of the so-called 
Orphic cosmogonies gave similar accounts of the birth of deities repre­
senting parts of the cosmos.24 Another type of Greek cosmogony 
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described the birth of the cosmos as the hatching of an enormous 
egg.25 Pherecydes of Syros (sixth century B.C.) wrote a cosmogony in 
which the semen of Chronos played a part (DK 7 A 8), and earth and 
ocean were produced by Zas ( = Zeus) in connection with his marriage 
to Chthonie, possibly in an erotic situation.26 
When we get to the pre-Socratic philosophers, we find small, but 
distinct, traces of a biological conception of the origin of the cosmos. 
In Anaximander's cosmogony the first thing " to be separated off" 
(άποκριΰ-ηναι) from the infinite was "the generative [το γόνιμον] of 
hot and cold" (DK 12 A 10). The word γόνιμον is obviously biologi­
cal; and άποκριβήναι is frequently biological, since it is the word 
used of the separation of the seed from the parent. This suggests that 
Anaximander held some kind of embryological conception of the ori­
gin of the cosmos.2 7 The Pythagoreans seem to have thought the 
cosmos grew from the unit as a seed. This unit-seed began to inhale the 
infinite void surrounding it, and by imposing limit on it produced the 
cosmos. 
2 8
 Empedocles, who called the four elements the roots (ριζώ­
ματα) from which all things grow (DK 31 Β 6) and said that the 
mingling of these is what men mean by the word "bir th" (φύσις, DK 
31 Β 8), described the origin of the cosmos in a way that is strikingly 
similar to contemporary descriptions of the growth of an embroyo.2 9 
Anaxagoras called his ultimate particles "seeds" (σπέρματα, DK 59 
Β 4), and so all things must have grown from the initial condition in 
which all the seeds were together.30 Aristotle refers to the atomic 
elements of Leucippus and Democritus collectively as a πανσπερμία 
(DK 59 A 45; 67 A 15, 28). Even if the word is Aristotle's, the idea 
that the elements are seeds may go back to the early atomists, for the 
Epicureans also called the atoms seeds or generative bodies (semina, 
genitalia corpora, Lucr. 1.58-60), and Epicurus said a cosmos comes 
to be when "seeds of the right kind" (επιτηδείων σπερμάτων) 
come together (Ep. 2.89).3 1 Moreover, Democritus spoke of the cos­
mos as coming to maturity (άκμάζειν, DK 68 A 40). The fact that 
even the atomists used biological language to describe their cos­
mogony is a good indication that the embryological analogy was firmly 
embedded in the Greek mind. 
In the fourth century Plato continued to use biological language to 
describe the origin of the cosmos. The demiurge begets (γερνάω) the 
cosmos;32 the Forms are like a father, and the receptacle is like a 
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mother to the cosmos, which itself resembles an offspring {Tim. 50d). 
The receptacle is also a nurse {πΰήνΎ)) for things that come to be in it 
{Tim. 49a). Only Aristotle, who insisted the cosmos had no beginning, 
did not make use of embryological analogies to describe the origin of 
the cosmos. Nevertheless, even he manifests the power of the old 
tradition; for he asserted the eternity of the cosmos by denying to it any 
predicates of change, declaring the cosmos as a whole to be unborn 
{άγέν-ητος) and undying (cf. ά&ανασία) and the celestial element to 
be, in addition, unaging {άγηρατος, Cael. 1.12.281a28-283b22; 
2.1.283b26-284a2; 1.3.270bl-3). Moreover, he spoke of the eternal 
motion of the cosmos as "undying," serving as " a kind of life" (ζωή 
τις) for all natural things {Phys. 8.1.250bl 1-15, 6.259b25-26). Even 
if for Aristotle the term γένεσίς no longer had any biological connota­
tions, the terms "unaging" and "undying" show that he had before 
his mind the biological analogy that saw the origin of the cosmos in 
terms of a birth. 
In the light of this long tradition the Stoic achievement becomes 
clear. The idea that the origin of the cosmos was a birth in the literal 
sense of the word had disappeared, at least among the philosophers. 
The biological language, once expressive of a real conviction, had 
deteriorated into mere metaphor. It was the Stoic achievement to re­
juvenate the ancient idea by taking literally again the metaphorical 
language. 
The early Greek tradition that provided the basic idea also provided 
the Stoics with a precedent for two of the prominent details of their 
cosmogony, namely that the cosmos was born out of water and that 
heat played an active role in the origin of the cosmos. The ancient 
Egyptian and Babylonian cosmogonies generally made the cosmos 
come into existence from water. This primeval sea, called Nun by the 
Egyptians and Nammu by the earliest Babylonians, was the first god­
dess; she brought forth other deities who represented other parts of the 
cosmos.
3 3
 The same idea seems to lie behind Homer's statement that 
Ocean is the genesis of gods and all things (//. 14.201, 246); and if 
Thales actually maintained that the earth came from the sea, he too 
may be reflecting this originally Near Eastern idea.3  4 After Thales 
Greek cosmogonal speculation immediately moved away from this 
primitive idea in search of a more serviceable primeval substance from 
which the rest of the materials in the cosmos might come. Neverthe­
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less, the basic feeling for the importance of water survived in the very 
widespread popular idea that the material of life is actually a fluid of 
the body.3 5 From this idea the Milesian philosophers deduced a theory 
of the origin of living things. They seem to have thought that if life is a 
fluid, life must originate from a fluid; and consequently living things 
must have originated from something wet. Anaximander maintained 
that the first animals arose from the moisture on the earth's surface 
(DK 12 A 30). Anaxagoras (DK 59 A 1.9, 42.12), Democritus (DK 68 
A 139), and, in a sense, Xenophanes (DK 21 Β 29, 33) agreed.36 The 
popular view that life resides in a fluid also developed along another 
line, giving rise both to myths such as those of Zeus impregnating 
earth with rain to bring forth crops,3  7 and to the later scientific theories 
of the nature of the seed and the development of the embryo. But since 
this line of thought takes us out of the realm of ultimate origins into the 
realm of biology, we shall have to dismiss it for a moment and pick up 
another, related development. 
It was obvious to the Greeks that dry earth could not bring forth 
crops; water is necessary for life. It also became apparent that even 
earth and water are not sufficient for life and growth; the warmth 
produced by the sun's rays is also necessary. Consequently, the Greeks 
began to see the importance of heat as an agent that cooperates with 
moisture to produce life. Anaximander and Anaxagoras gave the sun's 
heat a role in the production of living things from the moisture (DK 12 
A 11.6, 30; 59 A 1.9). The zoogonies of Epicurus (fr. 333, Usener), 
Lucretius (5.805-806); and Diodorus (1.7.3-4[ = DK 2, page 135]) 
all give heat an active role in producing life in the wet element. These 
zoogonies may well go back to the fifth century B.C.,38 to the time at 
which Archelaus was saying the earth produced animals when it was 
warmed (DK 60 A 1, 4.5). 
More important than the role of heat in zoogony is the role of heat in 
cosmogony. In the cosmogony of Anaximander the first step is the 
separation of "the generative of hot and cold." From this a sphere of 
fire forms around the air, and this fire produces the heavenly bodies 
(DK 12 A 10). The remainder of the cosmogony is accomplished by 
the agency of the heat from the newly formed sun. This heat dries up 
some of the water in the region of the earth and thereby produces dry 
land and seas (DK 12 A 27). It then produces wind and rain3 9 and 
eventually, as we have already noted, animals and all living things. 
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Empedocles, too, gives fire the key role in his cosmogony. Fire initi­
ates the original "whirl" (DK 31 A 30). Fire congeals some of the air 
at the periphery of the cosmos to make the solid dome of the heavens 
(DK 31 A 51). Fire is involved in the formation of rocks (DK 31 A 
69), and fire is active in the production of living things (DK 31 Β 62, 
73).40 Finally, the hot is the cosmogonal agent in Archelaus (DK 60 A 
1.17, 4.2). 
In viewing the origin of the cosmos as a birth and in giving water 
and fire important roles in this birth the Stoics were, in a sense, 
reviving the popular theories of a bygone era. They were bringing to 
life an idea that was too deeply embedded in the Greek consciousness 
to die out completely. To make these outmoded theories again respect­
able, they had to adapt and update them. This they did by explaining 
the cosmic birth in terms of a specific biological theory that had never 
before been given cosmic application. Fortunately, the Stoic accounts 
of the birth of the cosmos contain enough details to allow us to identify 
the biological theory behind their cosmogony. 
The clearest detail that may be abstracted from the Stoic accounts is 
the precise nature of the seed. The Stoics clearly stated that the cosmic 
seed is more than mere fluid. They maintained that the wet is only the 
vehicle for the actual reproductive force. In the seminal fluid is some­
thing called variously seed {σπέρμα), pneuma, or soul, whose ele­
mental character is hot.41 One can infer that the Stoics believed male 
semen to consist of two components, water and an active seminal 
substance. The biological theory of their cosmogony is thus seen to be 
identical with their actual biological theory, for both Zeno and 
Chrysippus asserted that human semen (σπέρμα) is pneuma with 
moisture (πνενμα μεΰ' vypov, SVF 1.128; 2.741, 742). Properly 
speaking, the seed (σπέρμα) is the pneuma in the moisture; and 
according to Zeno's definition, this seed or pneuma is a fragment of 
the father's soul (SVF 1.128; 2.742; cf. 2.741). As in the cosmogony, 
the active force in the seminal fluid is seed (σπέρμα), pneuma, or 
soul. 
Speculation about the nature and source of the semen was popular 
among the philosophers of the fifth century B.C.42 The fluid nature of 
semen was, of course, obvious. In the Periclean Age the Pythagorean 
Hippon seems to have remarked on the wet nature of the semen (DK 38 
A 3; cf. Arist. De An. 1.2.405bl-5[=DK 31 A 4]), and a late 
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fifth-century Hippocratic writer deduced from this that semen is de­
rived from the fluids of the body.4 3 This same period also brought the 
recognition that the production of semen involves more than fluid. 
Sometime during the second half of the fifth century a theory was put 
forth that breath (pneuma) is the agent that causes the ejection of 
semen.
4 4
 This theory, described briefly by Aristotle (Gen. An. 
2.4.737b28-35), is referred to in a Hippocratic treatise, which proba­
bly comes from the latter part of the fifth century.45 Diogenes of 
Apollonia gives the pneuma a. much more sophisticated function in the 
production of semen. According to Diogenes the inhaled breath light­
ens or thins the blood to produce semen, which is the froth (αφρός) of 
blood joined with pneuma.46 According to another version, Diogenes 
gives the innate heat of the male the function of producing the froth 
that is semen (DK 64 A 24). Both versions are probably authentic, for 
the soul-air that travels in the veins with the blood (cf. Simplic. Phys. 
153.13-16, Diels[ = DK 64 Β 6]) is warmer than the inhaled air (DK 64 
Β 5). When a child is born, it contains innate heat; but it is not 
ensouled until it breathes. The inhaled breath tempers the innate heat, 
and the heat warms the breath.4 7 Thus the soul-air that permeates the 
blood to form froth is warm air. That is why Diogenes can describe the 
semen as light, warm, and frothy (DK 64 Β 6). Clearly in the view of 
Diogenes semen is more than mere moisture; it is also warm and 
contains air or breath. 
There is a trace of a similar point of view in the Hippocratic author 
who was quoted earlier as saying the semen comes from the wet. This 
writer states that when the wet semen enters the warm womb, pneuma 
is produced (presumably by evaporation); and this pneuma forces its 
way out, making channels in the semen by which the cold, respired air 
of the mother may enter and nourish it (De Nat. Puer.[=De Genit.] 
12 [7.487-88, Littre ]). Thispneuma does not seem to come from the 
father but to be generated by the heat of the mother. Nevertheless, the 
pneuma is connected with heat and is thought to be warmer than the 
outer air and tempered (or nourished) by the outer air. Thus in many 
respects it resembles Diogenes' idea of pneuma in the semen. 
The theory of Diogenes of Apollonia had a decided influence on 
Aristotle.48 Aristotle says: "Semen is a compound [κοινόν] of 
pneuma and water; and pneuma, in turn, is hot air. Semen is wet in 
nature, because it is made of water." 4  9 He explains the origin of the 
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heat in the semen by saying that semen "has much hot pneuma be­
cause of the animal's internal heat . " 5  0 Moreover, Aristotle makes it 
plain that the heat of the seminal pneuma is the most important con­
stituent of the semen and is of a unique kind; for he says: "There is 
present in the semen [σπέρμα ] . . . the substance called the 'hot.' 
This is not fire or some such power, but pneuma . . . and the natural 
substance [φυσυς ] which is in this pneuma, a substance analogous to 
the element of the stars" (Gen. An. 2.3.736b33-737al). 
It is obvious that the Stoic conception of semen is derived from 
Aristotle. Both consider semen to consist of pneuma mixed with mois­
ture. In maintaining that pneuma consists of fire and air (SVF 2.310, 
442, 841) the Stoics have converted Aristotle's description of pneuma 
(hot air) to one that spells out its elemental composition, but they 
certainly concur with Aristotle on its basic nature. Moreover, both of 
them may view the generative constituent of the semen either as this 
pneuma, or, alternatively, as heat. Finally both connect the heat of the 
semen with the element of the heavenly bodies. Aristotle does this by 
saying the semen's heat is analogous to the element of the stars; the 
Stoics not only admit that the pneuma is analogous to the aether (SVF 
2All), but when speaking of the cosmic seed, actually identify the 
divine fire with the semen's heat. 
A second motif found in the Stoic cosmogony is the identification 
of the generative power, the heat or pneuma, with soul. This belief is 
in complete harmony with the general Stoic doctrine that the heat or 
pneuma of the body is its soul (SVF 1.134-41, 521; 2.773-87, 796, 
879, 885). We cannot here go into the entire background of the Stoic 
doctrine of soul, but it is instructive to look at Aristotle's discussion of 
the relation of soul to the generative power in the seed. Aristotle 
devotes a long discussion to the question whether the seed contains 
soul. The discussion comes in the context of another question: By what 
is the embryo formed? He states the following alternatives: either the 
parts are formed by something external or by something present in the 
seed; and this is either some part of soul, soul itself, or something 
possessing soul (Gen. An. 2.1.733b31-734al). After a lengthy dis­
cussion leading to an impasse and a new attack based on the 
potentiality-actuality distinction, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that 
semen possesses and is soul potentially (Gen. An. 2.1.735a4-9; cf. 
2.3.737al6-18). Then after having discussed the nature and composi­
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tion of the semen, he tackles the question whether the semen or any 
part of it enters physically into the embryo. Since he maintains that no 
part of the semen enters into the composition of the embryo, he must 
explain how the embryo comes to possess soul. In explaining how soul 
is transmitted from father to child through the seed he states: "Now the 
faculty [δνναμις] of every type of soul seems to participate in 
[κεκοινωνηκέναι] some material substance different from and 
more divine than the so-called elements; and as the types of soul differ 
in value, so also the nature of the associated material substance differs. 
For in every case there is present in the semen [σπέρμα] that which 
makes seeds in general [σπέρματα] fertile, namely the substance 
called 'the hot.' This is not fire or some such power, but the pneuma 
which is enclosed in the semen and froth, and the natural substance 
[<£>ύ(τΐ9] which is in this pneuma, a substance analogous to the ele­
ment of the stars" {Gen. An. 2.3.736b29-737al). Thus Aristotle 
brings the soul that exists potentially in the seed into connection with 
the pneuma or heat of the semen.5  1 Here he says soul participates in 
{κεκοινωνηκέναι) the pneuma. On other occasions Aristotle brings 
soul into close connection with pneuma and the heat of the body, 
suggesting that these physical substances are tools of the soul.5  2 It is 
only a short step to the Stoic view that completely identifies soul with 
the pneuma or heat in the seed.5  3 
Another detail of the biological theory behind the Stoic cosmogony 
is the role of agent and matter, the Stoic archai. The fire or soul is 
related to the water as agent to matter. God acts upon the matter and 
makes it suitable (ενεργον) for generation (SVF 2.580). This detail 
clearly reveals the Stoics to be in the shadow of Aristotle's biology. In 
Aristotle's theory the female supplies the matter for the embryo. This 
matter is the menstrual blood and so is considered wet. The male 
supplies a power that resides in the semen and that acts upon the wet 
matter supplied by the female, cooking it and thereby preparing it to be 
a new animal.5 4 The Stoic statement could easily be a summary of the 
Aristotelian view. The most serious discrepancy is the role assigned to 
the female by the Stoics. In the cosmogonal passages (SVF 2.580, 622) 
the wet material upon which the generative agent works is the fluid 
vehicle of the male semen; it is not, as in Aristotle, supplied by the 
female. In the Stoic cosmogony, the female (Hera) is merely an agent 
inducing the production of the seed. At first sight this would appear to 
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reflect the older biological theory that the female supplies only the 
place in which the embryo grows; but before drawing this conclusion, 
we must remember Chrysippus's interpretation of the erotic painting of 
Zeus and Hera. Chrysippus claims that Zeus represents god, and Hera, 
matter; so the painting represents the fact that matter receives the 
spermatikoi logoi of god (SVF 2.1074). This is obviously a variation 
of the theory of the cosmogony, where Zeus is the spermatikos logos 
left behind in the wet matter (SVF 2.580). Apparently the Stoics tried 
to incorporate into their cosmogony, not only the Zeus-Hera myths and 
artistic portrayals, but also the assumed etymological connection be­
tween Hera (ήρα) and air (αήρ), a connection mentioned already by 
Plato (Crat. 404c). The result was that Hera received an inconsistent 
interpretation by the Stoics. In the cosmogonal testimonies Hera's 
position is determined more by the assumed etymology than by the 
biological theory, but Chrysippus's interpretation of the Zeus-Hera 
myths in a noncosmogonal context manifests the Aristotelian theory 
that the female supplies the matter. Therefore, even the role of the 
female does not argue against an Aristotelian influence on the biologi­
cal theory behind the Stoic cosmogony. 
If Aristotle's biology influenced Stoic cosmogony, it ought to be 
possible to find traces of Aristotle's theory of conception. This, after 
all, is the core of his theory of reproduction. Reduced to its simplest 
form, his theory maintains that the father through the semen gives 
movement and form to the matter supplied by the mother.5  5 We have 
earlier observed that giving movement and form is the essential func­
tion of the archai. Now we must see whether the archai have this 
function in producing the cosmos. If we examine the cosmogonal 
accounts, we find no statement that god (the fire) moves the matter (the 
water); but the mythological version of the cosmogony states that god 
molds and models (πλάττει και τνττόί) the matter, just as the molding 
and fashioning (πλάττον και δημιουργούν) pneuma in the semen 
does (SVF 2.622). Here, indeed, we find god giving form to the 
matter. Although the vocabulary of this late source cannot be pressed, 
we may at least observe that one of the words used of the pneuma is 
δημιουργούν, the very word that Aristotle uses of the male and his 
seed in reproduction (Gen. An. 2 .4 .738b9-21; 4 .1 .766a l5 , 
4.771bl8-23, cf. 772b31). 
Cosmogony 73 
This single late source is rather weak evidence of an Aristotelian 
influence, so we must look a little deeper into the Aristotelian theory of 
reproduction. It is through the semen that the father gives form and 
movement to the female matter. Now the moisture of the material of 
the semen contributes nothing to conception; it is rather the power 
(δύναμις) in the semen that gives the movement and form to the 
matter (Gen. An. 1.21-22.729a34-730b32; cf. 2.3.737a7-22). Na­
ture behaves as a craftsman and uses the seed as a tool that has move­
ment and may through its movement bring form to the matter at hand 
(Gen. An. 1.22.730b5-32; cf. 2.4.738bl 1-13). The seed is set in 
motion by the father and continues in motion until it comes into contact 
with the matter. Then this movement causes the parts of the embryo to 
come to be and to become ensouled (Gen. An. 2.1.734b4-24). 
Before comparing Aristotle's theory of reproduction with the Stoic 
theory, it is necessary to determine more precisely what Aristotle 
meant by movement and by form. The movement in question in these 
passages is certainly not local movement. Aristotle defines movement 
in general as the actualization of a potentiality (ή τον δυνάμει όντος 
εντελέχεια, i) τοιούτον, Phys. 3.1.201 alO— 11; cf. Bonitz 391 a36­
38). Accordingly the movement initiated by the father through the 
agency of the semen is the progressive actualization of the potentiality 
of the matter, i.e., the form of man. Thus when Aristotle says that the 
father through the semen moves and forms the matter of the mother, he 
does not mean that the father performs two distinct operations on the 
matter. Moving actually means producing form. This is why Aristotle 
can explain heredity on the basis of movement and can say that if the 
movement from the male gains the mastery completely, the child will 
be a male resembling his father; but if this movement fails to gain the 
mastery in some respect, the child will either be a female, resemble the 
mother, resemble an ancester, or show a combination of these charac­
teristics (Gen. An. 4.3.767bl5-769a6). Aristotle's entire theory of 
heredity is dependent on this principle, and this is possible only be­
cause movement means the actualization of form. 
When we turn to Aristotle's notion of the form that is produced in 
matter in the process of reproduction, we again encounter a term 
whose meaning is fuller than one might at first think. Aristotle fre­
quently calls form the formula or definition of a thing's essence (6 
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λόγο? της ουσίας, e.g., Gen. Corr. 2.9.335b6-7; Gen. An. 
1.1.715a4-7; cf. Bonitz 219a49-54, 434bl3-53). The form of a liv­
ing being involves much more than the sum total of the physical 
qualities of its parts. That is why Aristotle says that the movement 
causes the parts to come to be and to become ensouled. If they did not 
come to have soul, they would be like the face and flesh of a corpse 
(Gen. An. 2.1.734b22-27; cf. Gen. An. 1.19.726b22-24; De An. 
2.1.412bl0-413a3). Aristotle then explains: "Heat or cold alone can 
produce qualities such as hardness, softness, toughness, and brittleness 
in the ensouled parts, but it cannot produce the logos by which one 
thing is flesh and another bone; this is produced by the movement 
which comes from the father, who is in actuality what the material 
from which the embryo comes is potentially" (Gen. An. 
2.1.734b31-36). What the power or movement of the semen gives to 
the matter is more than physical qualities; it is a formula that includes 
the life and activity that each part must have to deserve its name. This 
formula of the living body is the soul (De An. 2.1.412bl0-413a3). 
Aristotle has many names for the soul, all expressing the same concep­
tion. He calls it "the form of a physical body which potentially has 
life," "the actuality [εντελέχεια] of the body," "the substance ac­
cording to the definition" (ή ουσία ή κατά τον koyov), "the es­
sence" (το TL ην είναι), or simply "the logos" of a body (De. An. 
2.1.412al9-bl7, cf. 2.414al2-14, 27-28, 4.415bl2-15). Since the 
seminal movement carries with it the form, logos, or soul for the 
matter, Aristotle goes on to say that potentially the semen both pos­
sesses soul and is soul (Gen. An. 2.1.735a4-9). 
Thus Aristotle's theory of reproduction involves a complex interplay 
of many concepts: movement, form, potentiality, actuality, essence, 
logos, soul, and, as we saw earlier, also heat, ρneuma, and the sub­
stance analogous to the element of the heavens. The nuances of mean­
ing accompanying all these concepts were carefully distinguished by 
Aristotle, but even he had to admit that there is a degree of overlapping 
among them. Referring to the factor of the male that gives form to the 
matter of the female, Aristotle says: "It makes no difference whether 
we say 'semen' or 'movement which causes each of the parts to grow,' 
nor whether we say this movement is one 'which causes to grow' or 
'which constitutes from the beginning.' The logos of the movement is 
the same" (Gen. An. 4.3.767bl8-20). 
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Returning to the Stoic cosmogony, we find it contains many of the 
concepts that Aristotle used in his theory of reproduction; but instead 
of being differentiated, they are virtually identified. We have already 
observed that the Stoics identified the generative factor in the semen 
with soul, heat, and pneuma. Now we must examine still another 
concept associated with the generative factor, namely the spermatikos 
logos; for in the cosmogony god is left behind in the water as the 
spermatikos logos of the cosmos (SVF 2.580), and the Zeus-Hera 
painting represents the matter receiving the spermatikoi logoi of god in 
itself for the ordering of everything (SVF 2.1074). 
Stobaeus's summary of Cleanthes' account of the cosmogony makes 
the nature of the spermatikoi logoi slightly clearer. After describing the 
cosmogony, the account states: "As all the parts of a thing grow from 
seeds at the proper times, so also the parts of the universe . . . grow at 
the proper times; and as certain logoi of the parts come together and are 
mixed in seed and then again are separated, and the parts come into 
existence, so also all things [i.e., the cosmos] come from one [i.e., the 
primeval fire]" (SVF 1.497). According to Aetius, one Stoic defini­
tion of god is  " a creative fire, proceeding along the road toward 
generating a cosmos, embracing all the spermatikoi logoi according to 
which individual things come to be by fate" (SVF 2.1027). The nature 
of the spermatikoi logoi becomes still clearer when we turn to Stoic 
biology. The Stoics recognized that "seed is that which is capable of 
generating things of the same sort as that from which it is separated" 
(SVF 2.741, cf. 742). Zeno explained the phenomenon of heredity by 
saying that "the seed is a part or fragment of the soul . . . and 
contains the same logoi as the whole [i.e., the living being from which 
it came]" (SVF 1.128). Finally physis, which means both nature and 
growth, is said to have been described by the Stoics as "an inflation 
[έμφυσησυς] and expansion [διάχυση] of the logoi and numbers 
which are opened and loosed by nature" (SVF 2.744). All these de­
scriptions make it clear that the spermatikos logos is a formula in the 
seed, according to which the emergent offspring takes its shape. In 
addition to guiding the embryological development of the living being, 
it also controls the form and activities of the fully developed animal. 
The soul is moved according to spermatikoi logoi (SVF 2.780); and the 
physical soundness of a hand, health, perception, and strength are 
examples of "shapes and movements according to the spermatikoi 
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logoV (SVF 3.141). Thus the spermatikoi logoi in the cosmos or any 
other living thing are the formulas or principles contained in the seed 
of any thing that determine what it shall be and how it shall behave 
during its life. 
The concept of a formula (or formulas) governing the development, 
form, and activity of the cosmos and all living things in the cosmos is 
surely a Stoic appropriation of the Aristotelian concept of the same 
name, the logos.56 As we have seen, Aristotle viewed the seed and its 
movement as an agent in transmitting the formula or logos of the 
offspring, the formula that defines also the nature, life, and activity of 
the body and is, in fact, the soul of the body. This formula, which 
comes through the seed and, in a sense, is present in the seed, the 
Stoics gave the name spermatikos logos or "seminal formula." In 
Aristotle they found it in the circle of ideas that clustered around the 
generative factor of the semen, including soul, heat, andpneuma. This 
context made it easy for the Stoics to identify the spermatikos logos 
with the active principle, god, in one account of the cosmogony (SVF 
2.580). On the other hand, its Aristotelian function as the form im­
posed on matter by the father made possible the Stoic statement that 
god introduces spermatikoi logoi into matter to order all things (SVF 
2.1074) and that god embraces the spermatikoi logoi according to 
which all things come to be (SVF 2.1027). Thus the Stoics not only 
have incorporated into their cosmogony a few details from Aristotle's 
theory of generation, but they have in their idea of the spermatikos 
logos taken over an important part of Aristotle's explanation of con­
ception (the moving and forming of matter by the father), which is 
actually the core of his entire theory of reproduction. 
There is still another aspect of the Stoic cosmogony that can be 
pressed for biological precedents. When the matter of the cosmos has 
reached the water or semen stage, the embryo of the cosmos comes 
into existence. Presumably under the action of the fire left behind in 
the wet matter, the heavier material settles together and produces 
earth. The words used to describe the process by which earth comes 
from the fluid are νφίστασ&αυ, σννίστασ&αι, σννίζεσΰαι, 
πήγνυσΰοίί, and στερεμνιονσΰαι. These words sound like de­
scriptions of physical processes; but when we look at the ancient 
descriptions of the formation of an embryo, we find this same vocabu­
lary; and what is even more important, we find that the first stage in 
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development is the production of solid material from fluid under the 
action of heat. 
Accounts of embryogony are found in Aristotle and the Hippocrat­
ics. Aristotle's simple account comes closest to the Stoic cosmogony. 
Aristotle says that semen containing vital heat leads the similar into 
one and " s e t s " (συνίσττησι) i t . 5  7 When the corporeal matter 
(σωματώδους) has collected together (συνώντος), the wet separates 
off around it; and when the earthy (γεηρών) has dried, a membrane 
encircles it. 5  8 The Hippocratic treatise On Regimen says that fire mov­
ing in the wet dries out the water and causes solidification on the 
outside. The imprisoned fire then uses up the moisture in the inside, 
and the remaining dry matter becomes bones and sinews. The account 
adds that the water in the belly comes together (συνισταμένου), 
becomes compacted (πήγνυταυ), and is called flesh (De Victu 1.9 
[6.482-84, Littre]). The Hippocratic treatise On The Nature of the 
Child contains a lengthy description of the development of the embryo. 
The seed of the mother and father are mixed together; this seed collects 
and, when heated, is thickened (De Nat. Puer\ = De Genit.] 12 
[7.486, Littre]). The material is then increased by the mother's blood; 
and when this blood is compacted (πτηγνυμενού), it becomes flesh 
(De Genit. 15 [7.492, Littre]). When the flesh has increased, it is 
differentiated and each part takes on a homogeneous character, part 
dense, part light, and part wet. Then each comes to its own proper 
place corresponding to the part from which it originated. So whatever 
came to be from dense is dense, and that from wet is wet, and so on. 
Then the bones, being compacted (π-η-γνύμενα) are hardened 
(σκληρύνεται) by the heat (De Genit. 17 [7.496-98, Littre]). Thus 
the first stage in the Stoic differentiation of elements is parallel to the 
first stage in the formation of the embryo. The solid material solidifies 
from the wet under the action of the heat. In Aristotle some water 
remains to surround the solid material, as it does in the Stoic cos­
mogony. 
The second stage in the Stoic cosmogony, the evaporation of air 
from the wet, finds less clear parallels in embryogonal accounts; but 
the account in On the Nature of the Child does say that after the heated 
seed has been thickened, the heat causes pneuma to be given off (De 
Nat. Puer.[ = De Genit.] 12 [7.486, Littre]). Aristotle does not men­
tion vaporization as a process in the formation of the embryo of vivip­
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arous animals, but he does mention it as a process that occurs in the 
growth of fish eggs. Fish eggs are said to grow in the same manner as 
insect larvae or yeast; the solid becomes wet and the wet becomes 
pneuma (πνενματονμένον, Gen. An. 3.4.755al4-21). Even though 
the parallel between Stoic cosmogony and traditional embryogony 
weakens in the second stage and breaks down completely in the third 
stage of the Stoic cosmogony, the stage in which air is changed to fire, 
the strength of the parallel in the first stage (the formation of earth) is 
not diminished. It was inevitable that the Stoics would be forced to 
abandon the analogy between cosmogony and embryogony at some 
point. What is remarkable is that they maintained it as extensively as 
they did. 
The parallels that we have traced between the Stoic cosmogony and 
Greek biological theories, in particular those of Aristotle, are too great 
to be coincidental. They can only be due to a deliberate attempt on the 
part of Zeno and his followers to portray the origin of the cosmos as the 
birth of a living animal, and to make this birth conform to Aristotle's 
biological theories in as many details as possible. Apparently the 
Stoics viewed the origin of the cosmos under two aspects, the physical 
and the biological, both of which had precedents. Their originality lay 
in combining a particular physical theory (the theory of four mutually 
convertible elements) with a particular biological theory (the Aristote­
lian) to produce an original cosmogony. 
The originator of this synthesis was most likely Zeno. The physical 
theory of the origin of the cosmos is unambiguously attributed to him 
by Stobaeus, and Diogenes Laertius cites Zeno along with other Stoics 
as exponents of this view (SVF 1.102, cf. 104, 105). Although the 
biological aspect of the cosmogony is embedded in a summary that 
Diogenes assigns in common to a number of Stoics (SVF 1.102) and 
therefore may or may not go back to Zeno, the biological theory 
behind the cosmogony conforms in detail to the biological theory of 
the seed explicitly assigned to Zeno (SVF 1.128). What is more impor­
tant, the doctrine of the archai of the cosmos, which we have seen had 
its roots in Aristotle's theory of reproduction,59 was certainly origi­
nated by Zeno (SVF 1.85). Therefore, we can feel fairly safe in 
assigning the biological aspect as well as the physical aspect of the 
cosmogony to Zeno himself. So it must have been Zeno who integrated 
the two aspects into a coherent account and thereby gave birth to the 
Stoic theory of the origin of the cosmos. 
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If synthesis of physical and biological theories is the fundamental 
principle that determined the genesis of Stoic cosmology, hardly less 
important is the principle of harmonization of predecessors. Even the 
little we have seen of the origins of Stoic cosmology suggests that 
Zeno's aim was not to blaze new trails, but to give his assent to 
established beliefs.60 To support his belief that he was following the 
consensus omnium, he had to do a considerable amount of harmoniza­
tion. One way in which he harmonized the cosmogonies of his pre­
decessors was by allegorization. For example, Zeno allegorized 
Hesiod's Theogony 116-20 to correspond to his own cosmogony. For 
this purpose Hesiod's cosmogony was fairly convenient: "First of all 
Chaos came to be, and then broad-breasted earth . . . and airy 
[ήερόεντα] Tartaros . . . and also Eros." Zeno derived the word 
χάος from χεεσΰαι and hence understood it to mean water (SVF 
1.103, 104). Eros he allegorized as fire, since love is a fiery passion 
(SVF 1.104). If then "airy Tartaros" is interpreted as air (cf. SVF 
2.430, 563), Hesiod presents the cosmogonal sequence as water, 
earth, air, and fire.61 This is precisely the sequence found in the Stoic 
cosmogony, if we overlook the preliminary transformation of fire into 
water. Zeno could argue that even so revered a sage as Hesiod sup­
ported the Stoic cosmogony. 
When Cleanthes took over the leadership of the Stoa from Zeno, he 
also took over Zeno's doctrine to a large extent. The reconstruction of 
Cleanthes' cosmogony involves immense problems, for we must rely 
on a single obscure fragment in Stobaeus (SVF 1.497). But this frag­
ment in Stobaeus makes it sufficiently clear that Cleanthes carried on 
Zeno's biological conception of the origin of the cosmos. According to 
Stobaeus, Cleanthes reasoned that "just as all the parts of a thing grow 
from seeds at the fitting times, so the parts of the universe [το όλον] 
grow at the fitting times; and as logoi of the parts collect together into a 
seed . . . and are again separated when the parts come into existence, 
so from one all things come to be, and from all one is combined." 
The physical aspect of Cleanthes' cosmogony is lost under the 
unintelligible and probably mistaken account of Stobaeus. Only by a 
speculative reconstruction can any statements be made about 
Cleanthes' cosmogony.62 According to my own hypothetical recon­
struction Cleanthes followed Zeno's basic cosmogonal scheme, but he 
elaborated on it to introduce a number of new motifs, the principle of 
which was symmetry. One of the symmetries he found in the cos­
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mogony was the biological contrast between seed and mature animal. 
Another symmetry was between the one and the many. Cleanthes 
maintained that the primeval fire is the seed and is one in substance; 
the world is the mature offspring of the seed and is many in that it 
contains four elements.63 Not only did he see contrasts between the 
initial and the final state of the cosmogony, but he seems to have 
viewed the cosmogony as a cyclical process in which one half balances 
the other. The process begins with all cosmic matter in the form of fire. 
This fire is transformed into air, the air into water, and finally the 
water into earth, in a process proceeding from the peripheral to the 
central element. In the second half of the cosmogony the process is 
reversed, and there is a transformation from earth up to fire. Cleanthes 
may have used much of the language of Zeno's asymmetrical cosmog­
onal transformation, but in it he saw a new symmetrical process, a 
process in which a single element, fire, through a series of transforma­
tions moves quasi-locally in a downward direction to earth and then, 
changing direction, moves upward toward fire.64 In conformity with 
the notion of quasi-local elemental movement, Cleanthes probably 
introduced also the motif of contraction and expansion. As the fire is 
transformed in the direction of earth, it contracts in size and increases 
in density; then when it has reversed its direction and is proceeding up 
again toward fire, it expands. This cyclical process of contraction and 
expansion, of condensation and rarefaction, seems to have been called 
"tension" (tonos) by Cleanthes. If this reconstruction is trustworthy, 
we may say that in cosmogony Cleanthes was, at heart, a faithful, but 
not slavish, follower of Zeno. Keeping the basic framework, he could 
still find fresh approaches to the theory of the origin of the cosmos. 
Cleanthes seems also to have pushed forward Zeno's search for 
predecessors. Whether at Zeno's suggestion or on his own initiative, 
Cleanthes called attention to the remarkable support that Heraclitus 
could give to Stoicism. He wrote four books of Interpretations of 
Heraclitus (SVF 1.481) and his well-known Hymm to Zeus is satu­
rated with Heraclitean phrases.65 One fragment of Cleanthes survives 
in which he cites Heraclitus as the inspiration for Zeno's doctrine of 
soul.66 The reason for mentioning Cleanthes' interest in Heraclitus is 
that there may be a connection between Cleanthes' interest and the 
well-known passage from Clement of Alexandria (SVF 2.590). This 
passage, obviously taken from a Stoic book, has preserved two frag­
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merits of Heraclitus pertaining to the transformation of fire (DK 22 Β 
30, 31); and these two fragments are interpreted in such a way that they 
seem to conform to the Stoic cosmogony. It is quite possible that the 
inspiration for interpreting these statements of Heraclitus as support for 
the Stoic cosmogony originally came from Cleanthes' Interpretations 
of Heraclitus; and so Cleanthes may have added Heraclitus's name to 
the growing list of ancient sages who purportedly supported the Stoic 
cosmogony. 
Since Cleanthes found in Heraclitus support for the Stoic cos­
mogony, it is possible, and even probable, that his own version of the 
cosmogony was influenced by Heraclitus. Heraclitus's stress on the 
balance between opposites67 may have been what prompted Cleanthes 
to introduce the many symmetries that seem to be present in his cos­
mogony Heraclitus's statement about "the way up and down" (DK 
22 Β 60), which regardless of its meaning to Heraclitus himself was 
taken by Theophrastus and sometimes by others in antiquity to refer to 
elemental change,6 8 may have inspired Cleanthes to view the elemen­
tal changes of the cosmogony as quasi-local movements of fire. Thus 
Cleanthes, in addition to quoting Heraclitus as a forerunner of Stoi­
cism, may actually have introduced some Heraclitean elements di­
rectly into his own philosophy. 
Chrysippus, coming after Cleanthes, had both Zeno and Cleanthes 
to draw upon; and in cosmogony he seems to have done just that. In his 
Physics he followed Zeno's asymmetrical version of cosmogony (SVF 
2.579, 580, 581), and Stobaeus preserves a summary of Chrysippus 
that indicates he also made use of Cleanthes' symmetrical approach. In 
this fragment Chrysippus considers fire the basic element, which by 
transformation produces all the other elements. Like Cleanthes, he 
sees contraction and expansion as the process behind elemental 
change: "The first change is from fire to air by contraction, the second 
from air into water, and the third when water contracts still more into 
earth. Then again, from earth, dissolved and liquefied, there is first a 
pouring [χνσις] into water; then a second pouring from water into air 
and a third and last into fire." Although it is not clear from this 
whether Chrysippus is referring to cosmogony or ordinary elemental 
transformation, a subsequent sentence suggests he is referring to cos­
mogony, since he calls the fire "the eternal power which has such a 
nature so that it moves itself down toward the turning point [τροπή] 
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and from the turning point up in a complete cycle, absorbing all things 
into itself and reestablishing all things again from itself in an appointed 
order."69 If our hypothetical reconstruction of Cleanthes is correct, 
Chrysippus must here be following Cleanthes closely. Cleanthes' in­
fluence is seen not only in the motif of contraction and expansion but 
in the symmetrical transformation from fire to earth and back to fire 
again, and in the description of the changes of fire in terms of local 
motion, so that fire moves down to a turning point and then moves up 
again. Thus on the physical side of the cosmogony Chrysippus seems 
to have carried on the formulations of both Zeno and Cleanthes. 
Chrysippus also continued to see cosmogony in biological terms. 
The fragment that displays the biological side of the Stoic cosmogony 
(SVF 2.580) is assigned by Diogenes to Chrysippus as well as to Zeno. 
We have also mentioned that Chrysippus allegorized the Zeus-Hera 
myths in terms reminiscent of the biological view of cosmogony (SVF 
2.1074). Finally, Chrysippus spoke of the fire of the conflagration as 
the seed of the future cosmos (SVF 2.618, cf. 596). Whether the 
biological side of the Stoic cosmogony underwent any modifications 
during the third century, as the physical side seems to have done, is not 
known because of the meagerness of the fragments. Then, too, 
Chrysippus carried forward the search for precedents by allegorizing 
large numbers of myths (cf. SVF 2.1067, 1069, 1077, 1078), includ­
ing the Zeus-Hera myths to which we have so frequently referred (SVF 
2.1071-1074). 
When Zeno formulated the Stoic cosmogony, he was guided by the 
fundamental conviction that the cosmos is a living animal and was 
born in the manner of living animals. This idea was not original with 
him; in fact, it was very ancient; but recent philosophical thought 
had tended to minimize it, preferring a mechanistic (pre-Socratic) or a 
technological (Plato) model to explain the origin of the cosmos, or else 
denying that the cosmos had an origin at all (Aristotle). It was Zeno 
who gave the idea of a cosmic birth a new lease on life. He ac­
complished this by synthesizing what he considered the most reason­
able cosmological theory of the day with the latest theory of reproduc­
tion, namely, that of Aristotle. Though Zeno's successors may have 
modified some of the details of Zeno's doctrine, the basic synthesis 
survived to become the orthodox Stoic doctrine of the origin of the 
cosmos. 
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1. SVF 2.579. All MSS except one say that this fragment is from the third book 
(τρίτω), but modern editors seem to agree in reading πρώτω (cf., e.g., M. Pohlenz, 
ed., Plutarchi Moralia2 [Leipzig, 1959], vol. 6.2, page 48). The reason for reading 
πρώτω is that Diogenes Laertius gives an account found in the first book of Chrysip­
pus s Physics that is nearly the same as this (SVF 2.580). Moreover, the fragments 
suggest that the third book had an ethical orientation (SVF 2.636; 3.153, 526, 760). 
The reading πρώτω may well be correct, but we must at least be aware that this 
summary sentence may actually have been found in the third book. The first book 
probably contained a more detailed cosmogonal account, and it Is possible that 
Chrysippus included in Book Three a summary of the conclusions he reached in Book 
One. Aristotle could furnish many parallels for the practice of giving brief summaries 
of results reached in other books. We should note that Book Three included at least one 
mention of a physical subject, for SVF 2.479 informs us that Chrysippus talked about 
the doctrine of mixture in Book Three. 
2. That all the fire has been transformed and only water can now be seen may be 
inferred from Diog. Laert. 7.136 ( = SVF 1.102 = 2.580), who says that την πάσαν 
ονσίαν becomes water (cf. also SVF 2.590, 622). Even more conclusive is Seneca 
QNat 3.13.1: "For we say that it is fire which lays hold of the cosmos and turns all 
things into itself; this, slackening, settles together and nothing else is left in the nature 
of things, when fire has been extinquished, but water; in this lies the hope of the future 
cosmos." See alsoS^F 2.565 (cf. 436), where it is stated that the elements come from 
water. Plutarch preserves a verbatim fragment of Chrysippus that states, "The cosmos 
being fiery throughout. . . changes into water" (SVF 2.605). This fragment actually 
expresses a much more complex idea (see below); but it also implies that if an observer 
existed, he would see only water. 
3. SVF 2.582, which states that the genesis of the cosmos began at the center with 
earth, perhaps refers to the fact that the actual differentiation of elements began at the 
center with earth. 
4. κατά σνστασιν and δίαλνομέντης καϊ διαχεομένης, or χνσι,ς in SVF 2.413; 
λεπτννομενον, SVF 2.579. The process of elemental change is referred to several 
times in the Stoic sources, but there is no agreement about its precise nature. Plutarch 
refers to it as change in density (παχννόμενον, SVF 2.605); Philo as contraction 
(στελλεσΰαι, σνράγεσΰαυ) or increase in density (παχννεσΰαι, cf. πνχνότατον) 
and the opposite process as dissolution (άναλνεσϋαί, διαλνεσϋαι, χε'ισΰαι, SVF 
2.619); Athanasius as contraction and expansion (σνστέλλεσϋαι and έχτεϊνεσΰαι, 
SVF 2.615); and finally, Galen as χνσις and πίλησις (SVF 2.406). This may indi­
cate that the Stoics never spelled out the precise nature of elemental change. 
5. Thales, from water (DK 11 A 1.27, 12, 13); Anaximander, from the Infinite (DK 
12 A 9, 10, 11.1-2, 14, cf. 1.1); Anaximenes, from air (DK 13 A 5, 7, 8); and 
Heraclitus, from fire (DK 22 Β 90, cf. 30, 31). 
6. DK 22 Β 30, 31, 90. The unsolved question is whether fire was the primary 
element only in importance (G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments [Cam­
bridge, 1954], 307-38; W. K. C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy [Cambridge, 
1962-69], 1.454-59; M. Marcovich, Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commen­
tary [Merida, 1967], 259-304), or also in time (C. H. Kahn, Anaximander and the 
Origins of Greek Cosmology [New York, 1960], 225-26; R. Mondolfo, "The Evi­
dence of Plato and Aristotle relating to the Ekpyrosis in Heraclitus," Phronesis 3 
[1958]:75—82). (These are only some of the most recent proponents of each view; 
Kirk, 335-36, cites the more important earlier discussions.) 
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7. Empedocles, DK 31 Β 8, 9; Anaxagoras, DK 59 Β 17; Democritus, DK 68 A 
1.44, 37, 57. Cf. F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides (London, 1935; reprinted, 
New York, 1957), 53-56. 
8. Tim. 53d-e. 54b-d, 56c-57c, cf. 49b-d. See F. Solmsen, Aristotle's System of 
the Physical World: A Comparison with his Predecessors, Cornell Studies in Classical 
Philology 33 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960), 20-24, 52-57. 
9. Gen. Corr. 2.1.329a35-bl,4.331al2-23; cf. Cael. 3.2.302a3-4, 6.304b23­
305a32; Meteor. 1.3.339a36-b2. See also Solmsen, Aristotle s System (above, note 
8), 327-30, 336-42. 
10. The problem has been much discussed, but not yet settled. Kahn (above, note 
6), 225, note 2, makes the significant point that "there is no good evidence that 
Heraclitus denied the most fundamental tenet in all early Greek thought: that the 
universe undergoes a process of generation and growth comparable to that of living 
things." Aristotle, who sought precedents for his doctrine that the cosmos is eternal, 
did not feel justified in assigning eternity to Heraclitus's cosmos except in an unusual 
sense (Cael. 1.10.279bl4-17, 280all-23; see below, Chapter 6). On the other hand, 
when the Stoics wished to cite Heraclitus as a forerunner of their own doctrine, the best 
testimony they could find was Β 30 and 31. Β 31 does not sound at all like a 
cosmogony, and Β 30 is so worded that opposite conclusions can be drawn from it (cf., 
e.g., Kirk, Heraclitus [above, note 6], 307-24, and Kahn [above, note 6], 225). Even 
in antiquity opinion was divided, for though Aristotle and the Stoics thought Heraclitus 
believed in a generated cosmos, Aetius 2.4.3(=DK 22 A 10) and Plutarch Def. Or. 12 
(415f-416a) seem to have held the opposite view. The applicability of Plato Soph. 
242d-e is disputed (cf. Kahn, 226), though, if applicable, it suggests Plato thought 
Heraclitus's cosmos to be eternal (cf. Kirk, 321, 336-37). One is inclined to suspect 
that Heraclitus wrote no clear cosmogonal account, nor clearly denied that the cosmos 
is generated, but rather stressed the nature of the present-day cosmos and man's proper 
relationship to it. 
11. This observation has been made by many, e.g., E\ Brehier, Chrysippe et 
I'ancien stoicisme2 (Paris, 1951), 142-44; R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean (New 
York, 1910), 30-31; A. C. Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno andCleanthes (London, 
1891), 102; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung3 (Gottingen, 
1964), 1.78; E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, trans. O. J. Reichel (Lon­
don, 1880), 161. 
12. DK 60 A 1.17; cf. A 4.2. This presumably pertains to the cosmogony, but the 
text is corrupt and involves some difficulties. See Guthrie, HGP (above, note 6), 
2.342 and note 1. 
13. SVF 2.581 states that "from fire the substance is turned [τραττρ] through air 
into moisture." This may reflect the same point of view as SVF 2.580 but with the 
motive cause, god, removed, and the original elemental condition of the substance 
(fire) spelled out. Notice that the verb has been changed from active to passive. 
14. J. Moreau, Lame du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens (Paris, 1939), 166-70, 
discusses briefly the embryological point of view of the Stoic cosmogony. 
15. SVF 2.1074. The allegorization of Zeus-Hera myths seems to have been a 
favorite subject of Chrysippus. We are told he allegorized not only this episode 
depicted in a painting in Samos but also another depicted in a statue group at Argos 
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(SVF 2.1072, 1073). Moreover, his allegorizations were found in at least two works, 
On the Ancient Natural Scientists and Erotic Epistles (SVF 2.1071, 1072). 
16. A thorough survey of this view down to the time of Aristotle can be found in G. 
E. R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek 
Thought (Cambridge, 1966), 232-72. 
17. Ovid Met. 1.381-394. Many of the myths dealing with Mother Earth and 
earth-bom peoples are recounted by W. K. C. Guthrie, In the Beginning (London, 
1957), 21-28. 
18. Anaximander was the first we know to express himself on the origin of life. He 
states that life arose in the moist places of the earth (DK 12 A 30, cf. Kahn [above, 
note 6], 110-11). He seems to have been followed by Xenophanes (DK 21 Β 29, 33). 
Empedocles says that the whole-natured forms that produced men arose from earth 
(DK 31 Β 62.4, 73; cf. A 75), and Archelaus too maintained that the first living things 
came from earth (DK 60 A 1.17, 4.5). The cosmogony of Diodorus Siculus 1.7.3-4 
( = DK 2, page 135), which probably goes back to the fifth century (cf. Guthrie, In the 
Beginning, 35-38; 122, note 10; HGP [above, note 6], 2.210, note 1, for discussion 
and bibliography), says that the first living things came into existence in membranes 
out of the primeval mud. This idea, which came from Anaximander and is found also 
in Hipp. De Cam. 3 (8.586, Littre), was carried on by the Epicureans, who concluded 
from this that the earth is rightly called mother (Lucr. 5.793-820). Plato says that the 
seed for the first Athenians came from earth and Hephaestus (Tim. 23d-e; cf. Critias 
109c-d) and the first animals were born of earth (Polit. 271 a-c, 274a). He also states 
that woman in her ability to reproduce imitates earth (Menex. 238a). Aristotle admits 
that earth is rightly called mother (Gen. An. 1.2.716al5—17) and uses his theory of 
spontaneous generation to show how men could have been born from the earth (Gen. 
An. 3.11.762b28-763a24), though he does not commit himself to the theory that men 
actually were earth-born. The Stoics said that the first men were born from the earth 
with the aid of the divine fire (SVF 1.124). In general cf. Guthrie, In the Beginning, 
29-45. 
19. W. Kranz, "Kosmos und Mensch in der Vorstellung friihen Griechentums," 
NGG, Phil.-hist. Kl., Fachgruppe I, vol. 2 (1938), 121-61, attempts to trace the 
origin of this view to sixth-century Persia, but questionable assumptions vitiate much 
of his argument. Cf. J. Mansfeld, The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract ΠΕΡΙΈΒ­
ΔΟΜΑΔΩΝ Ch. I-11 and Greek Philosophy, Philosophical Texts and Studies 20 
(Assen, 1971), 25-26, 56-65. 
20. At some time two Hippocratic works named earth, water, air, moon, sun, stars, 
and the outerfirmament as the cosmic analogues of flesh and bones, blood and bodily 
fluids, breath, the diaphragm, internal heat, hypodermic heat, and the skin respec­
tively. See esp. De Hebd. 6 (Greek text in Kranz [above, note 19], 122-24) and De 
Viet. 1.10; cf. 4.89 (6.484-86, cf. 644-646, Littre). Kranz, 121-35, dates these 
works shortly after 500 B.C., but various dates down to Hellenistic times have been 
proposed; see Mansfeld (above, note 19), 16-31, 229-31, and 25, note 116. 
21. Phys. 8.2.252b24-27. Aristotle attributes this use of analogy specifically to 
Empedocles, saying that Empedocles saw Love and Strife in operation among men and 
extrapolated these forces to the cosmos (Phys. 8.1.252a27-31). 
22. In Cael. 2.2.285a29-30 he says that the ουρανός is έμφνχος and in Cael. 
2.12.292a20-21 he adds that the stars partake of life. Aetius 2.3.4 says that Aristotle 
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believed only the celestial region of the cosmos to be ensouled. This suggests that even 
the doxographers, who had access to Aristotle's published works, did not know of a 
discussion in which Aristotle emphasized the presence or activity of soul throughout 
the cosmos. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the doxographers may 
have missed something. Cf. the warning of Solmsen, Aristotle's System (above, note 
8), 244, note 73, against overworking the unique statement of Cael. 2.2.285a29-30. 
Vitalist conceptions in Aristotle's cosmology are discussed at greater length by Lloyd 
(above, note 16), 257-65. 
23. Some of the Egyptian cosmogonies describe how the god Atum-Re generated 
the parts of the cosmos from his own seed; cf., e.g., J. B. Pritchard, Ancient Near 
Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament2 (Princeton, 1955), 5, 6; and Pyramid 
Text 1248. Egyptian cosmogonal accounts are summarized by J. A. Wilson in The 
Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man, ed. H. Frankfort (Chicago, 1946), 50-61 
(=Before Philosophy [London, 1949], 59-70). In Sumerian mythology the goddess 
Nammu (the primeval sea) gave birth to An (sky-god) and Ki (earth-goddess); An and 
Ki gave birth to Enlil (air-god), and so forth (S. N. Kramer, Sumerian Mythology 
[Philadelphia, 1944], 73-75). Enuma elish, a later Babylonian cosmogony, describes 
the parts of the cosmos as deities begotten of the three primeval water deities, Apsu, 
Mummu, and Ti'amat. Cf. T. Jacobsen in Frankfort (above), 184-87. On the earliest 
Egyptian and Babylonian cosmogonies in general, see S. A. B. Mercer, Earliest 
Intellectual Man's Idea of the Cosmos (London, 1957), 88-90). 
24. DK 1 Β 12, 13. The age of these so-called Orphic cosmogonies is disputed. W. 
K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks and Their Gods (London, 1950), 307-19, thinks they go 
back to the sixth century B.C.; I. M. Linforth, The Arts of Orpheus (Berkeley, 1941), 
thinks most Orphic writings were composed after 300 B.C. 
25. DK 1 Β 13. The egg motif may be traced back as far as the cosmogony of 
Aristophanes Av. 693-703. Its origin is uncertain. Cf. G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, 
The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957), 42-48. 
26. DK 7 Β 1, 2, 3; A 9-11 are the relevant texts, but their meaning is by no means 
clear. Cf. the attempts at interpretation by Kirk (above, note 25), 60-62, and M. L. 
West, "Three Presocratic Cosmogonies," CQ, n.s. 13 (1963): 157-72. 
27. Cf. Kahn (above, note 6), 57, 86-87, 156 (and note 1), and Lloyd (above, note 
16), 234-35. The embryological terms in this fragment are also discussed by H. C. 
Baldry, "Embryological Analogies in Pre-Socratic Cosmogony," CQ 26 (1932):29­
30. As Kahn, 57, says, even if the wording of this fragment is more recent, the basic 
ideas, including the embryological viewpoint, go back to the Milesians (Guthrie, HGP 
[above, note 6], 1.90-91, agrees). Kirk (above, note 25), 132-33, is more sceptical of 
the value of this fragment for proving that Anaximander had the embryological anal­
ogy in mind, but even he admits that he would not be surprised "to find that Anaxi­
mander resorted to the old mythological medium of sexual generation" in his cos­
mogony. 
28. DK 58 Β 26, 30. Cf. Theon of Smyrna 97.17-20, Hiller. The passages are 
translated and discussed in Guthrie, HGP (above, note 6), 1.276-81. Guthrie argues 
that this idea must be early, because what is inhaled in respiration is still thought to be 
"void." 
29. F A. Wilford, "Embryological Analogies in Empedocles' Cosmogony," 
Phronesis 13 (1968): 108-18. On the translation of φύσις as birth in DK 31 Β 8, see 
Guthrie, HGP (above, note 6), 2.140, note 1. 
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30. Cf. G. Vlastos, "The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras," PhilosRev 59 
(1950):32-41. 
31. Lucr. 1.58-60; cf. C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford, 
1928), 343-44. Bailey thinks that Epicurus himself used the word "seed," not of an 
individual atom but of a nucleus of atoms so constituted as to be specially adapted for 
the creation of a particular thing, be it organic or inorganic. 
32. See above, Chapter 2, note 57. 
33. See references in note 23. 
34. Cf. U. Holscher, "Anaximander und die Anfange der Philosophie," Hermes 
81 (1953):385-89, and Guthrie, HGP (above, note 6), 1.58-61. The Orphic view 
described by Athenagoras should also be compared: "For water was the origin for all 
things" (DK 1 Β 13). 
35. Cf. R. B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought (Cambridge, 1951), 
200-228. 
36. Xenophanes actually says we all come from earth and water. This seems to 
imply that moisture is necessary for life (on these passages, see Guthrie, HGP [above, 
note 6], 1.383-87). Kahn (above, note 6), 110-12, has reconstructed a general Mile­
sian view that water is the source of life. Compare the zoogony in Diod. 1.7.3-4 
( = DK 2, page 135) and in Epicurus, fr. 333, Usener; Lucr. 5.805-815. 
37. Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks and Their Gods (London, 1950), 53-55. 
Aeschylus, fr. 44, Nauck (=fr. 125, Mette), and Euripides, frs. 839, 898, Nauck, 
both make use of this motif. Cf. A. B. Cook, Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion 
(Cambridge, 1940), 3.452-54. 
38. The Epicurean accounts probably go back to Democritus, and Diodorus may go 
back even earlier. Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, In the Beginning (London, 1957), 35-38; 
122, note 10. 
39. DK 12 A 24, cf. 27. DK 12 A 11.7 is further evidence, if Kahn (above, note 6), 
63-64, is correct in reading έκ γης νφ" τηλίον άναδίδομένης. 
40. Cf. Guthrie, HGP (above, note 6), 2.185-90. 
41. SVF 1.102(=2.580); 2.605, 622; cf. 1.98; 2.596, 618. 
42. For an overview of all the ancient theories of both reproduction and embryol­
ogy, see H. Balss, "Die Zeugungslehre und Embryologie in der Antike," Quellen u. 
Studien z. Gesch. d. Naturwiss. u. d. Medizin 5 (1936), 193-274. Erna Lesky, "Die 
Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike und ihr Nachwirken," AbhMainz, 
Geist.-soz. Kl. (1950), number 19, pages 1225-1425, distinguishes three different 
theories of reproduction and analyzes the origin and development of each. She does 
not treat the ancient views of embryology. 
43. DeGenit. 1, 11, cf. 3 (7.470.1-3, 484.16-17, cf. 474.5-7, Littre); De Morb. 
4.32 (7.542.6-11, Littre); cf. Lesky (above, note 42), 1301-3. 
44. Onians (above, note 35), 119-20, believes that the association of breath with 
reproduction is a very primitive conception. If so, the views we are beginning to 
discuss here are sophisticated rationalizations of the primitive conception. 
45. Aph. 5.63 (4.556, Littre), dated between 450 and 400 B.C. by W. H. S. Jones, 
Hippocrates, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1923), 2.xx-xxix. Aristotle agrees, in 
part, with this view, for he says that holding the breath produces the strength necessary 
for the ejection of semen; but he denies pneuma any other role in producing or moving 
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the semen (cf. Gen. An. 1.6.718a2-4, 20.728a9-ll; 2.4.737b35-738a9; Hist. An. 
7.7.586al5-17). 
46. Vindicianus 3 (=DK 64 Β 6). The word for "lightens" is suspendit, which 
probably translates κονφι,ζτ) (cf. DK 64 A 19.43). Simplic. Phys. 153.13-14, Diels 
(= DK 64 Β 6) says that according to Diogenes of Apollonia semen is πνευματώδες. 
47. Cf. H. Diller, "Die philosophiegeschichtliche Stellung des Diogenes von Apol­
lonia," Hermes 76 (1941):373. 
48. The influence of Diogenes on Aristotle in this respect is discussed by E. Lesky 
(above, note 42), 1345-49. The bibliography discussing his influence in general is 
collected by Guthrie, HGP (above, note 6), 2.381, note 1. 
49. Gen. An. 2.2.735b37-736a2. Aristotle states that semen is wet also in Part. 
An. 2.2.647bl0-14; 4.10.689a9; Gen. An. 1.13.720a7-8; 2.3.737a7-12; 
7.747al8-19. 
50. Gen. An. 2.2.735b33-34. Elsewhere Aristotle says that the semen possesses 
psychic heat (&ερμόττ\ς ψυχική) or vital heat (ΰερμόττης ζωτική), i.e., Gen. An. 
2.4.739a9-12, b20-26, 6.743a26-29, cf. 7.747al8-19. 
51. See F Solmsen, "The Vital Heat, the Inborn Pneuma and the Aether," JHS 77 
(1957): 119-23, for a discussion of this passage as well as of the background and 
influence of Aristotle's association of heat, pneuma, and the celestial element with 
soul. 
52. All physical bodies are tools (opyava) of the soul (De An. 2.4.415bl8-20). 
The pneuma is the soul's instrument for causing movement and apparently also for 
sensation (Mot. An. 10.703a4-b2; Gen. An. 2.6.744al-5; cf. Part. An. 
2.16.659bl7-18; see F. Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the 
Nerves," MusHelv 18 [1961]: 175-76); and, in spontaneous generation at least, the 
ψυχική αρχή is enclosed in the pneuma (Gen. An. 3.11.762bl6-18). Moreover, 
nature does most of her work with pneuma as instrument (Gen. An. 5.8.789b8-12). 
On the other hand, the functions of the soul cannot occur without φυσικον πυρ, and 
nature kindles (έμπεπνρενχεν) the soul in this fire (De Juv. 14.474blO-12, cf. 
6.470al9-20). One can even say that the soul subsists (συνεστάναι) in some hot 
body (Part. An. 2.7.652b7-15), and that the soul commonly uses hot and cold as its 
instruments (Gen. An. 2.4.740b29-32). Cf. also De Juv. 4.469a28-b20. In general 
see F. Solmsen, "Cleanthes or Posidonius? The Basis of Stoic Physics," ΜΝAW, 
n.r. 24 (1961):277-79. 
53. We cannot here discuss the question whether the Stoics were or were not the 
first to take this step to identify soul with the pneuma or heat of the body. That there is 
only a single step (though a very distinct and significant one) between the Aristotelian 
and Stoic views has been observed, e.g., by W. Jaeger, Diokles von Karystos (Berlin, 
1938), 203, and Solmsen, "Vital Heat" (above, note 51), 123; "Cleanthes" (above, 
note 52), 274-77. 
54. These ideas lie behind the entire On the Generation of Animals. The respective 
contributions of male and female are succinctly stated in Gen. An. 1.2.716a4-7, 
19.727b31-33, 20.729a9-33; 2.4.738bll-13, 20-26. In Gen. An. 1.20.728a26-30, 
Aristotle states that the menstrual blood is impure seed and still needs to be acted upon 
(δεόμενον εργασίας) by the male. That this action by the male takes the form of a 
cooking (πέψις) is implied in Gen. An. 4.1.765b6-766b26, 2.767al3-23; cf. 
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1.21.730al4-17; 2.4.739b20-26; 4.4.772al0-30. Aristotle's statement that the 
menstrual blood requires εργασία by the male should be compared to the Stoic 
statement that god makes the matter ενερ-yov (SVF 2.580). 
55. Gen. An. 1.20.729a9-ll, 28-30, 21.729bl8-21, 730a28-30, 22.730b8-23; 
2.1.733bl8-733al, 734b4-735a29, 3.737al8-22, 4.738b9-13; 4.1.765blO-13; 
766al6-22, 3.767bl5-18, 4.771bl8-23. For further discussion, see Chapter 2. 
56. Lesky (above, note 42), 1393-94; H. Meyer, Geschichte der Lehre von den 
Keimkraften (Bonn, 1914), 18-24, cf. 199-205; J. Moreau (above, note 14), 168-69; 
and Pohlenz (above, note 11), 1.78-79, have discussed the relationship between 
Aristotle's form and the Stoic spermatikos logos. Though Lesky, Meyer, and Moreau 
will admit an influence of Aristotle on the Stoics, Pohlenz merely says that the Stoic 
spermatikos logos assumes the function of the Aristotelian form. Moreau emphasizes 
the direct line of descent from Plato's Form through Aristotle's logos to the Stoic 
spermatikos logos. Meyer clearly stresses the biological origin of the Stoic idea. 
57. σννιστάναι is Aristotle's favorite word for the action of the male seed on the 
female matter. Cf. Bonitz 730b60-731a8; A. L. Peck, Aristotle: Generation of Ani­
mals, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1963), lxi-xii, and index, s.v., "set" fetation. 
58. Gen. An. 2.4.739b20-27. I have paraphrased the text to eliminate the analogy 
with the action of rennet on milk. 
59. See above, Chapter 2. 
60. For an interesting sketch of the history of the idea of consensus as a criterion of 
truth, see K. Oehler, "Der Consensus omnium als Kriterium der Wahrheit in der 
antiken Philosophie und der Patristik," Antike und Abendland 10 (1961): 103-9. 
Oehler emphasizes Aristotle's role in elevating this idea to a formal principal of 
dialectic. 
61. Zeno's allegorization raises a problem because according to the scholiasts on 
Hesiod and Apollonius, Zeno asserted that Eros came to be in the third place (SVF 
1.104, 105). This has led many, beginning with the scholiasts, to speculate that lines 
118-19 of the Theogony are an interpolation, and that the text which Zeno accepted 
and allegorized mentioned only chaos, earth, and Eros. This is not the place to discuss 
the knotty textual question involved here (for a recent discussion, see M. L. West, ed., 
Hesiod: Theogony [Oxford 1966], 193-94). But it should be noted that the scholiasts' 
words need not mean that Eros was the third element to come into existence; the words 
could equally well refer to a discussion of Zeno's cosmogony, which began with water 
(equivalent to Hesiod's chaos) and went on to say that three elemental transformations 
subsequently occurred: the first to produce earth, the second to produce air ( = Tar-
taros), and the third to produce fire ( = Eros). Some scholiast, then, may have abridged 
this in a misleading way. 
62. For a hypothetical reconstruction of the cosmogonal account that lies behind 
Stobaeus's summary (SVF 1.497), see Appendix 3. Here also will be found all refer­
ences for the present summary of Cleanthes' cosmogony. 
63. The one-many symmetry had a long history before Cleanthes. The formula, 
"From all one and from one all," was clearly ennunciated by Heraclitus (DK 22 Β 10) 
and was given an explicit cosmological application by Empedocles (DK 31 Β 17.1 -20; 
cf. D. O'Brien, Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle: A Reconstruction from the Fragments 
and Secondary Sources [Cambridge, 1969], 237-49). 
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64. The difference between the two cosmogonies may be expressed diagramatical­
ly: 
ZENO CLEANTHES 
Fire Fire Fire Fire 
Air ^ A i  r Air Air 
W a t e r < ^ ^  » Water Water Water 
Earth Earth­
65. SVF 1.537. The echoes of Heraclitus can be seen by comparing line 2 with 
Heraclitus DK 22 Β 41; line 10 with Β 30 and Β 64; lines 17 and 26 with Β 1; line 20 
with Β 50, 51, 54; line 21 with Β 1, 10, 50; lines 24-25 with Β 34, 114, cf. Β 2; line 
33 (άπεφοσύνης) with Β 1; line 35 with Β 41; the three regions of lines 15-16 with 
the three elements of Β 31, 36; and finally the unification of opposites in lines 18-20 
with the doctrine of Heraclitus Β 10, 50, 60, 61, 67, 88, 111. Cf. E. Neustadt, "Der 
Zeushymnos des Kleanthes," Hermes 66 (1931):396-98. 
66. Von Arnim, SVF 1, page 137, attributes this fragment (SVF 1.519) to 
Cleanthes' Interpretations of Heraclitus, but according to Eusebius the work from 
which this fragment was taken compared Zeno's doctrine with more predecessors than 
merely Heraclitus (cf. προς τους άλλους φυσικούς). This, of course, may be an 
exaggeration; but it is also possible that Cleanthes made comparisons between Zeno's 
doctrine and that of his predecessors in On Zeno's Natural Science. 
67. For several references, see above, note 65. Cf. also Kirk, Heraclitus (above, 
note 6), 72-262. 
68. Theophrastus's interpretation is reflected in Diog. Laert. 9.8 = DK 22 A 1.8-9 
(cf. DG 163). One of the other ancient accounts that Kirk, Heraclitus (above, note 6), 
107-8, cites for this interpretation of Heraclitus contains some Stoic vocabulary 
(Cleom. Mot. Circ. 1.11 [112, Ziegler] = SKF 2.572; cf. Cic. Nat. D. 2.84); and 
another, though used against the Stoics, has a Stoic ring (Philo Aet. Mund. 110). This 
suggests that the Stoics themselves may have given Heraclitus's statement a cosmolog­
ical interpretation. For a discussion of Heraclitus's intent see Kirk, 105-12. 
69 SVF 2.413. For parallels that show that the vocabulary is that of the Stoic 
conflagration and restoration, see Appendix 3, notes 9 and 10. 
CHAPTER IV 
Cosmology 
The Stoic conception of the cosmos, like the Stoic conception of its 
origin, has both a physical and a biological side. It is commonly 
acknowledged that the physical side follows, in general, the 
Platonic-Aristotelian conception.1 The Stoics believed that the cosmos 
is one, limited, spherical body, situated in an infinite expanse of void. 
It consists of four elements: earth, water, air, and fire, arranged in 
concentric spheres around the center. That is to say, the main mass of 
earth is a stationary sphere in the center of the cosmos. Surrounding 
this are spheres of water and air; and finally rotating at the periphery is 
the sphere of fire or aether. Situated in the sphere of fire are the fixed 
stars and seven wandering stars—Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, 
Venus, the sun, and the moon, in that order. All four elements are 
mutually transformable, and each possesses one primary tactile qual­
ity; that is, fire is hot, air cold, water wet, and earth dry. Within the 
periphery of the cosmos matter is continuous with no void space what­
soever, but beyond the periphery there extends an infinite expanse of 
void.2 
This view of the cosmos is identical with that of Plato and Aristotle 
with two significant exceptions.3 First of all, there is not complete 
agreement between Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics on all details con­
cerning the number, location, and nature of the elements. Second, the 
Stoics do not agree with Plato and Aristotle in rejecting the idea of an 
infinite void outside the periphery of the cosmos. There is no need to 
dwell on the similarities, but the exceptions merit further investigation 
for the light they shed on the relationship between the cosmology of 
the Stoics and the ideas of their predecessors. 
In the Stoic system the cosmos consists of four, and only four, 
elements, of which the one found at the periphery is called either fire 
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or aether.4 To see how this differs from the Platonic and Aristotelian 
views of the cosmos, we must look a little more closely at their views; 
for Plato and Aristotle themselves did not agree in every respect. Plato 
believed that the element at the periphery of the cosmos is fire, and 
below this element lies air (Tim. 62d-63e). This air, in turn, consists 
of two layers, essentially the same, but differing in purity and bright­
ness. The pure, upper air is called aether; the lower, atmospheric air is 
called darkness, fog, or simply air (άήρ, Tim. 58d; Phaed. 109b-c, 
11 la—b). Aristotle recognized the same five-fold stratification, but 
altered the names and status of the layers. In On the Heavens he 
declared that the element at the periphery is a fifth element, distinct 
from the familiar four elements: fire, air, water, and earth (Cael. 
1.2-3.268bl4-270b25). Though he himself gave it no name, he ad­
mitted that the ancients were justified in calling it aether (αϊΰήρ), a 
word that he derived from "eternally running" (άεί ΰέίν); and he 
chided Anaxagoras for using the name aether for the ordinary element, 
fire (Cael. 1.3.270b20-25; cf. Meteor. 1.3.339bl6-30). Fire he 
placed immediately below the celestial element, and air below the fire 
(Cael. 2.4.287a30-b3; cf. Meteor. 1.3.339b30-341al2). The effect 
of Aristotle's change was to bring the number of elements to five,5 and 
to disassociate the celestial element from the ordinary type of fire 
kindled by men. 
It is quite apparent that the Stoics side with Plato in this respect and 
have not seen fit to accept Aristotle's addition of a fifth element. This 
is probably not because the Stoics were ignorant of Aristotle's innova­
tion. They seem to have known a great deal about Aristotle's physical 
and biological theories, and it would be hard to imagine how this 
important idea could have escaped their knowledge, especially if 
Theophrastus was still promulgating it.6 In addition, the fact that the 
Stoics called the element of the stars aether indicates that they knew of 
Aristotle's doctrine. Plato had used the word aether for a species of air; 
it was Aristotle who affirmed that the title aether is most fittingly 
applied to the element of the stars. Ignorance, then, is not a satisfac­
tory explanation for the absence of the fifth element from the Stoic 
system. 
In fact, the Stoics may actually have derived some ideas from Aris­
totle's notion of a fifth element. Xenophon tells us that Socrates called 
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attention to some of the crucial differences between the heat of the sun 
and ordinary fire. One such difference is that sunlight makes vegeta­
tion grow, whereas ordinary fire destroys it {Mem. A.I.1). Aristotle 
made much of this distinction between destructive and creative heat, 
and carried it to its ultimate conclusion. In Aristotle's view there is a 
vast chasm separating the substance of the heavens and the ordinary 
fire that burns on earth; these are two entirely different elements that 
should never be confused as Anaxagoras had done. The celestial ele­
ment is much more honorable and divine than ordinary fire (Cael. 
1.2.269al8-32, bl3-17). Whereas ordinary fire cannot generate a 
living thing, the heat of the sun can. For this reason Aristotle con­
cluded that the heat in living things, and particularly the generative 
heat in the seed, is more akin to the element of the stars and the heat of 
the sun than to ordinary fire (Gen. An. 2.3.736b33-737a7). Theo­
phrastus followed Aristotle in connecting the generative heat of living 
things with the sun and in distinguishing the heat of these from ordi­
nary fire, which is generally destructive and generative only of itself 
(De Igne 5-6, 44). The Stoics were quite willing to accept the distinc­
tion between creative heat and the basically destructive ordinary fire, 
though they were not willing to make them two separate elements.7 
Zeno said that there are two kinds of fire, the uncreative (άτεχνον) 
fire, which changes its fuel into itself, and the creative (τεχνιχόν) fire, 
which causes growth and preservation, and which is found in plants, 
animals, and the heavenly bodies (SVF 1.120). Similarly Cleanthes 
said the sun is not like the ordinary fire that destroys all things but is 
similar to that "vital and beneficial kind in the body" which "pre­
serves, nourishes, increases, sustains, and gives sensation" (SVF 
1.504). 
There is also another idea for which the Stoics may be indebted to 
Aristotle's concept of a fifth element. In On the Heavens the observa­
tion that the celestial element moves in a circle, whereas ordinary fire 
moves in a straight line toward its natural place above air, is made to 
serve as a proof that the element of the celestial bodies is different from 
fire (Cael. 1.2.268bll-269bl7). Zeno, or at least some Stoic, was 
willing to accept this Aristotelian distinction and asserted that earthly 
light moves in a straight line, whereas ethereal light (το αίΰέριον 
φως) moves in a circle (SVF 1.101); but again the Stoics were not 
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willing to follow Aristotle in positing two separate elements. Thus the 
Stoics most likely were aware of Aristotle's introduction of a fifth 
element but were unwilling to accept it. 
Their rejection might be accounted for as a conservative devotion to 
the tradition of four elements and an unwillingness to depart from the 
consensus omnium, but such an explanation is unsatisfactory. Though 
it is widely held that it was Empedocles who made the four elements 
canonical (cf. DK 31 Β 6, 17.18), the evidence does not suggest the 
existence of any consensus on the subject before the Stoics entered the 
scene. At least Anaxagoras (DK 59 Β16), Melissus (DK 30 Β 8), 
Diogenes of Apollonia (DK 64 Β 2), and the Atomists (DK 67 A 1.31; 
9; 68 A 38) remained unconvinced.8 In the fourth century, though 
Plato accepted it, the number four was still not canonical enough even 
in Plato's own Academy to prevent Aristotle, the author of the 
Epinomis (981b-c), and perhaps also Speusippus9 from raising the 
number to five. When Zeno arrived in Athens, one can hardly think an 
overpowering tradition pressured him into accepting the four elements 
of Empedocles and Plato. 
This is not to say there was no Greek tradition against Aristotle's 
innovation. Aristotle definitely upset one old tradition; for before him 
not a single philosopher had explicitly denied that the sun, planets, and 
stars consist of fire, at least in part. Even Anaxagoras, who maintained 
that the sun is a stone, nevertheless admitted it is a fiery stone (DK 59 
A 42.6, 71). Thus there was one important respect in which Zeno 
would have had to break with the consensus to accept Aristotle's fifth 
element, and Zeno could not be expected to take this step without 
weighing the consequences carefully. 
Aristotle postulated his theory of one celestial element rotating 
around the four sublunar elements to explain the movement of the 
heavenly bodies. Maintaining that an element can have only one 
natural movement, and that fire's natural movement is lineally up­
ward, he argued that the element moving in a circle at the periphery 
cannot be fire, but must be a separate element whose natural move­
ment is in a circle (Cael. 1.2.268bl4-269bl7). This left Aristotle with 
five elements—four naturally moving in a straight line each to its 
natural place and one moving eternally in a circle around the periph­
ery. 
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Though this theory sufficed to explain the movement of the ele­
ments, it did entail certain difficulties. One of the most obvious natural 
phenomena is the warmth produced by the sun. Since Aristotle denied 
that the celestial element is warm or possesses any of the four basic 
qualities, he encountered serious difficulty explaining the sun's heat. 
He tried to get out of this dilemma by offering two possible explana­
tions. The sun as it moves produces heat by friction, as projectiles 
flying through the air may be observed to do; and the sun's motion 
scatters the fire that lies between it and the atmospheric air and forces 
this fire down to earth {Meteor. 1.3.341al2-36; Cael. 2 .7 .289al l ­
35). Both of these explanations are forced, and together they are no 
more convincing than either one is separately. 
It was not only the substance of the celestial bodies that caused 
problems in explaining the observed phenomena. In Aristotle's cos­
mology the sublunar region of the cosmos consists of the four elements 
inherited from Plato. Plato had found the four Empedoclean elements 
to be suitable for explaining all the observed phenomena. In the 
Timaeus he used them to construct a cosmological and a biological 
theory. In the Phaedo he found them useful for explaining 
"meteorological" phenomena, such as rivers and wind {Phaedo 
11 lc-112e). Under Aristotle's hand these four elements were worked 
into an admirably symmetrical cosmology in On the Heavens. Even 
when Aristotle in On Generation and Corruption substituted a physi­
cal explanation for Plato's mathematical explanation of their transfor­
mation, he encountered no difficulties, although he was compelled to 
define the elements in terms of a substrate and the four basic physical 
qualities (hot, cold, wet, and dry) that he had reintroduced into philos­
ophy.10 But when he tried to bring meteorological and geological 
phenomena under the same comprehensive scheme, he ran into serious 
difficulty. The theory of a sublunar atmosphere consisting of a layer of 
fire above a layer of air proved useless for explaining meteorological 
phenomena. To produce a unified theory Aristotle had to admit air and 
fire are not the ultimate constituents of the sublunar atmosphere; rather 
he had to posit two exhalations: a hot, dry, smoky exhalation from 
earth, and a cold, wet, vaporous exhalation from water. He maintained 
that the upper atmosphere actually consists of the hot exhalation, 
which is inflammable and potentially fire, but not actually fire; and the 
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lower atmosphere consists of a mixture of the two exhalations 
{Meteor. 1.3.340bl4-29, 4.341b6-24; 2.4.359b27-34, 360a21-27). 
Thus in the Meteorology fire and air had to be dismissed as unscien­
tific approximations, and the four qualities had to be called upon to 
constitute some new substances that would be better able to explain the 
phenomena.1 1 
The effect of this was that the five-strata universe oiOn the Heavens 
was virtually abandoned. Aristotle no longer called the element im­
mediately below the moon "f ire" in an unequivocal sense, but rather 
"what we are accustomed to call fire" {Meteor. 1.3.340b22) or  " a 
sort of fire" {oiov πνρ, Meteor. 1.3.340b29, 32; cf. Gen. Corr. 
2.3.330b21-30) or " t h e so-called sphere of f i re" {Meteor. 
2.2.354b25).12 Moreover, he could now refer to the whole region from 
the moon down to the region in which we live as " a i r " or "what is 
called a i r . " 1  3 In a sense, then, Aristotle had returned to a four-strata 
universe, consisting of spheres of earth, water, a mixture of two exha­
lations, and a unique celestial element. 
The theory of five elements, which Aristotle put forth in On the 
Heavens, was minimized even further in the biological writings, where 
the elements were overshadowed by the qualities or powers operating 
on their own. In the physical treatise On Generation and Corruption 
Aristotle had grappled with the problem of the respective roles of 
elements and powers in the formation of compounds, among which he 
included flesh and bones. He had decided that when the elements are 
mixed to form tissues, the powers neutralize each other to form an 
intermediate at the mean between hot and cold or wet and dry; yet the 
elements exist in the compound insofar as the qualities still exist poten­
tially {Gen. Corr. 2.7.334al5-b30). In On the Parts of Animals, 
however, when Aristotle came to deal with biological matters directly, 
he conceded: "The first type of composition is from what people call 
elements, namely, earth, air, water, and fire; or perhaps it would be 
better to say from the powers . .  . for wet, dry, hot, and cold are the 
matter of compound bodies" {Part. An. 2 .1 .646al2-17; cf. 
2.2.648b8-10; De Long, et Brev. 5.466a20-22). Although he admit­
ted the elements are the material of tissues {Part. An. 2.1.646b5-6), 
he devoted all his attention to determining the precise meaning of hot, 
cold, wet, and dry in biological contexts {Part. An. 2.2-3.648al9­
649b35), on the grounds that these four qualities are the archai of the 
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elements and therefore the real cause of all vital processes (Part. An. 
2.2.648b 1-10). Throughout the biological works Aristotle operated 
primarily with the powers. In short, Aristotle's theory of elements as 
stated in On the Heavens was by no means an all-pervasive theory. It 
was useful for explaining the natural movement of elementary bodies, 
but it could not serve to explain every natural phenomenon. Aristotle 
also had to call on other explanatory principles besides elements, and 
these other principles often competed with his theory of elements. 
A glance at the role of fire as an explanatory principle reveals this 
competition in its intensest form. Whereas fire had always played a 
large role in the theories of the natural philosophers, in Aristotle it 
found itself pushed into the background in one treatise after another. In 
On the Heavens fire lost the celestial bodies to a very powerful new­
comer called "the first body." Then having been pushed down a level 
to a position between the heavens and air, fire was eventually in the 
Meteorology reduced to a mere figurehead with only nominal control 
over this region. Fire was also fighting a losing battle with its rival 
"the hot" for a position in living things. Although in On Youth and 
Old Age it shared with ' 'the hot'' the role of vital principle,14 neverthe­
less, in On the Generation of Animals it was driven out of the repro­
ductive process by "the hot," which had made an alliance with the 
powerful newcomer from the stars (Gen. An. 2.3.736b33-737a7). 
Even its most sacrosanct realm, "f lame" (φλόξ) was no longer in­
disputably its possession, for flame is only "burning smoke" (Gen. 
Corr. 2.4.331b25-26; cf. Part. An. 2.2.649a20-23). In fact, fire 
came to be defined as an "excess of the h o t " (Gen. Corr. 
2.3.330b21-29; Meteor. 1.3.340b23) and was reduced to complete de­
pendence on "the hot." When Aristotle finished with it, fire was left 
in a most precarious position with its very existence under suspicion. 
Theophrastus, too, was at an utter loss about what to do with fire. 
The first chapter of his treatise On Fire states the problems connected 
with the nature of fire and despairs of a solution. Fire did not seem to 
Theophrastus to be in the same class as air, water, and earth; for 
whereas the latter change into each other, fire changes into no element, 
but rather generates and destroys itself. Moreover, fire in all its forms 
is always found in some kind of substrate. Light exists in air or water; 
flame is burning smoke; and burning coal (άνϋραξ) is something hard 
and earthy. Fire is always some material in a burning state. If this is 
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true, however, fire is neither simple nor prior to its substrate; how then 
can it be an archel One possibility is that the celestial sphere is made 
of a very pure, unmixed heat; but then it cannot be called burning and 
this is an essential characteristic of fire. The only solution is to assume 
there are several types of fire, a pure type in the heavens and a mixed 
type in the earthly region; but then what should be assigned as the 
arche of earthly fire? The unmixed fire of the periphery, the substrate 
in which the earthly fire inheres, or both? Moreover, to assume that the 
celestial spheres consist of a species of fire leads to a perplexing 
problem. The sun produces heat in the earthly regions. Both the 
generative heat of animals and ordinary fire come from the sun, yet the 
two are entirely different. How can the sun produce both? On the other 
hand, if the rays of the sun have no connection with fire, and heat is 
not produced through them, fire and the sun must be heat inhering in a 
substrate. This brings us back to the dilemma we started from—heat, 
which is certainly an arche since it causes changes and genesis, is 
found in a substrate (De Igne 1-6). Like Aristotle, Theophrastus could 
not find a consistent role for fire. 
The heart of the problem for both Aristotle and Theophrastus is the 
relationship between fire and heat, and this problem is only a part of a 
larger problem, the relationship between the elements and the powers. 
It is quite obvious that there is in Aristotle an unresolved conflict 
between the elements and the powers, with each striving for the honor 
of being the basic explanatory scheme. If we wish to understand the 
Stoic attitude toward Aristotle's theory of elements, we must first 
understand how this conflict between elements and powers arose, and 
why Aristotle failed to solve it.1  5 
From prephilosophical times the substances that were later to be­
come the four elements were associated with certain qualities; so, for 
instance, no one ever doubted that water is, among other things, wet, 
and fire hot. The substances of the atmosphere, however, presented 
problems. In the epic language aether denoted the bright, clear sky, 
and " a i r " (άήρ) a mistiness that impedes vision.16 When the Ionian 
philosophers applied these terms to portions of the cosmos, they added 
new qualities: aether became the name of the fiery heavenly bodies 
and so acquired the quality hot; " a i r  " became applied to the atmo­
sphere and was associated with cold.1 7 So the elements played their 
roles in Ionian physics in association with certain qualities. 
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Alongside the elements were the powers existing in their own right. 
According to Anaximander it was the powers that separated off from 
the infinite to constitute the cosmos (DK 12 A 9, 10, 16, 17a, cf. 27). 
The opposites were no less important in Anaxagoras; for it is actually 
the opposites that constitute the aether and the air, the first substances 
to separate off (DK 59 Β 12; A 42.2; cf. Β 4). 
Empedocles was the first philosopher clearly to subordinate the 
powers to the elements. For him, fire, air, water, and earth are the 
eternal realities (DK 31 Β 6, cf. 17.18), whereas hot and bright are the 
qualities that fire possesses and that distinguish fire from the cold and 
dark earth.1  8 With Empedocles the powers lost their dominance over 
the philosophical theories. Democritus relegated them to the area of 
sensations with no physical reality (DK 68 A 135.63-67; cf. Β 117, 
125); and Plato did much the same thing.1 9 
Nevertheless the powers lived on among the medical writers; in fact, 
they came to occupy the chief position in explaining physiology and 
disease. Some of the Hippocratic writers attempted to define the rela­
tionship between elements and powers. One described earth as cold 
and dry, air as hot and wet, and water as wettest and thickest 
(παχντατον, De Cam. 2 [8.584, Littre]). Another defined fire as hot 
and dry and water as cold and wet (De Victu 1.4 [6.474, Lit­
tre =4.232, Jones]). The Sicilian physician, Philistion of Locri, a 
contemporary of Plato and a follower of Empedocles, took the easiest 
course of all and simply identified fire with the hot, air with the cold, 
water with the wet, and earth with the dry.2 0 One of the few occasions 
on which Plato did make use of the powers was a physiological expla­
nation of respiration. Here he identified the hot with fire {Tim. 79d-e). 
This is undoubtedly an influence of the medical theories with which he 
was acquainted, and it is possible that it is an influence of his contem­
porary, Philistion.21 
This brings us to Aristotle again. When he entered the scene, the 
powers were dominating the field in medical theory, and the elements 
were triumphing in the philosophy of the Academy. Aristotle, with 
Plato as his starting point in physical philosophy, and the medical 
theories as his starting point in biology, had to face the problem of 
bringing the powers and elements into harmony. He made a virtue of 
necessity in On Generation and Corruption and devised a remarkably 
ingenious explanation for the transformation of elements. Since each 
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element consists of a substrate qualified by two powers (fire, hot and 
dry; air, hot and moist; water, cold and moist; and earth, cold and dry) 
the change of one quality to its opposite causes the transformation 
of one element into the next in the series {Gen. Corr. 2.1-5). This 
theory not only brought powers and elements into harmony but fit his 
general theory of genesis and change, a theory that made typical use 
of the concepts of matter, form, and privation. What is more, it 
allowed him to retain the elements to explain movement in On The 
Heavens and the powers to explain biological phenomena. 
Unfortunately, this beautiful theory did not work out in practice, as 
we have noted. In meteorology other principles, the two exhalations, 
were required, and these took over the region and the qualities for­
merly associated with air and fire. In biology, where traditionally the 
powers had dominated, Aristotle's neat correlation between powers 
and elements had to be ignored completely. Even though in On Gener­
ation and Corruption he had attempted to make the elements and 
powers more easily interchangeable by characterizing earth as dry 
more than cold, water as cold more than wet, air as wet more than hot, 
and fire as hot more than dry,22 he had to yield in the biological field to 
Philistion's conflicting theory that fire is hot, air cold, water wet, and 
earth dry. Accordingly, the innate heat of an animal is referred to as 
the "internal fire."23 The wet is constantly associated with water or 
the watery (νδατώδ-ης), and the dry with earth or the earthy 
(γετηρός).24 Finally, the function of the inhaled air is to cool the innate 
heat (DeJuv. 14-27.474a25-480b20; Part An. 1.1.642a31-b4). 
It is this function of air as refrigerant that most of all suggests a 
different point of view from that of On Generation and Corruption. If 
pressed, Aristotle could have argued that air is indeed warm, but less 
warm than fire, and therefore capable of cooling a more intense heat. 
But when Aristotle in On Generation and Corruption had explained 
how elements mix to produce tissues he had said the qualities hot and 
cold (and wet and dry as well) neutralize each other to produce a mean 
{Gen. Corr. 2.7.334b8-30). Aristotle's explanation of respira­
tion suggests that air cools the internal heat for this very purpose, to 
maintain a mean.25 Moreover, the cooling process is called "quench­
ing" (σβενννναι, De Juv. 27.480bl), which Aristotle expressly de­
fines as "destruction by the opposite" (De Juv. 5.469b21-23; 
20.474b 13-15). In fact, Aristotle specifically states that air is cold 
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when it enters the body, and is warm when exhaled only because it 
comes into contact with the internal heat (De Juv. 27.480a28-b6; cf. 
22.478b 15-19). It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that for Aris­
totle's theory of respiration the basic property of air is coldness; air's 
heat, so essential for the theory of the transformation of elements, is 
forgotten. 
Belief in the cooling properties of inhaled air was shared by Aris­
totle's contemporary, the physician Diodes of Carystus (fr. 15, 
Wellman) and by Plato {Tim. 70c-d). All of them seem to have de­
rived it from Sicilian medicine, since it is the view attested for Philis­
tion.26 When Philistion asserted that inhaled air cools the innate heat, 
he was propounding a thoroughly consistent theory, because in his 
view air is basically cold (fr. 4, Wellman). But when Aristotle adopted 
the Sicilian medical theory of respiration, he introduced into his biol­
ogy a theory whose presuppositions were in direct conflict with one of 
his own carefully contrived physical theories, and so he was forced to 
ignore his basic theory of elements. 
We can now begin to understand why the Stoics adopted the theory 
of elements they did. There was nothing to be gained by adopting the 
fifth element of On the Heavens simply to explain the movement of the 
heavenly bodies. If the heavenly bodies are living beings made of fire, 
as the Stoics maintained, their movement could easily be explained as 
due to the initiative of their souls. This was the theory of Plato {Tim. 
39e-40b; Leg. 10.898c-899b) and probably also of Aristotle's youth­
ful, published work On Philosophy.27 The Stoics may have seen no 
need to abandon it for the later Aristotelian theory that appeared to 
cause more problems than it solved. Aristotle's theory of elements and 
elemental change in On Generation and Corruption might have been 
more attractive to the Stoics since their own theory that each element 
has one primary quality {SVF 2.580) contributes nothing to an expla­
nation of the transformation of elements,28 but the Stoics passed up 
this Aristotelian theory to obtain what must have impressed them as a 
more significant gain—a consistent, unified point of view 
Aristotle was a seeker after truth, exploring first one science and 
then another. For him each science was a self-contained study, based 
on its own archai.29 Since he was not necessarily trying to set up a 
comprehensive philosophical system, it did not matter that elemental 
movement was explained in terms of five elements, meteorology in 
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terms of two exhalations, and biology in terms of four powers. But 
Zeno had an entirely different personality and aim. He too was seeking 
the truth, but his aim was a comprehensive, unified system. If he was 
to produce a unified system on the basis of Aristotle's legacy, he 
obviously had to make some modifications in Aristotle's theory of 
elements. He had to refrain from following Aristotle in positing a fifth 
element for the heavenly bodies and could only posit two different 
types of fire to account for the differences between ordinary fire and 
the revolving, creative element of the heavens.30 Moreover, since 
Aristotle's theory of the qualities and transformation of the elements 
conflicted with the premises on which his biological theories were 
based, Zeno had to reject one or the other; he chose to reject the theory 
of On Generation and Corruption. 
His choice is indicative of another intellectual characteristic—the 
biological bent. To Zeno, with his deep conviction that the cosmos is a 
living animal, it would have seemed foolish to adopt a theory of 
elements that conflicted with the presuppositions of biology. It must 
have seemed far more reasonable to adopt the theory made explicit by 
the great Sicilian physician Philistion, but implicit also in the biologi­
cal theories of Aristotle and his school—the theory that fire is hot, air 
cold, water wet, and earth dry. Medical theory may also have contrib­
uted to some of the other modifications that the Stoics made on Aristot­
le's cosmology. Aristotle had said that the wet, dry, hot, and cold are 
the matter of composite bodies {Part. An. 2.1.646al6-17; De Long, 
et Brev 5.466a20-22; cf. Top. 3.1.116bl8-20), and the whole of 
Aristotle's biological work rested on this assumption. This opinion, 
which was shared by Aristotle's colleague, Diodes of Carystus (fr. 7, 
Wellmann), presumably came from the medical theories of men like 
Philistion, who held that living things consist of the four qualities, 
which are identical with the four elements. Plato adopted the other side 
of this theory and maintained that men consist of the four elements 
(esp. Tim. 42e-43a, 82a; Phil. 29a). Since the Stoics regarded the 
cosmos as a living being, it was only natural that they would regard it 
as consisting of the four powers or the four elements, and that they 
would reject Aristotle's addition of a fifth element. 
By a long and circuitous route we have come to see how the details 
of Aristotle's cosmology and theory of elements, not only involved 
him in minor dilemmas and serious inconsistencies, but conflicted with 
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the presuppositions of his biology and the medical theories on which 
his biology depended. Although no amount of conflict between the 
principles of the separate sciences could invalidate the conclusions for 
Aristotle, the Stoics sought a unified theory of cosmology and so were 
compelled to eliminate all obvious sources of incongruity. Their 
characteristic notion that the cosmos is a living animal compelled them 
to eliminate even the incongruities between the seemingly unrelated 
sciences of cosmology and biology. By a few, simple modifications 
the Stoics cleared Aristotle's cosmological scheme not only of its 
inconsistencies with other physical sciences but also of its incompati­
bility with the fundamental tenets of biology.31 Thereby the Stoics 
produced a cosmology worthy of the divine living being that the cos­
mos actually is and prepared the way for a synthesis of the physical and 
biological sides of the nature of the cosmos. 
The other important difference between the Stoic cosmology and the 
Platonic-Aristotelian view of the world is that the Stoics believed the 
cosmos to be surrounded by an infinite void. This difference is, on the 
face of it, merely one of definition. Both the Stoics and Aristotle 
agreed that there is nothing outside the cosmos (Arist. Cael. 
1.9.278b21-279a7). Whereas Aristotle refused to apply the name 
"void" to this condition {Cael. 1.9.279al 1-18), the Stoics from Zeno 
on called this region of nothing "void" (SVF 1.94, 95, 96, 99; 2.503, 
535, 542, 543). Why did the Stoics refuse to follow Aristotle's ter­
minology, if they agreed with him in principle? 
Aristotle's refusal to call the nothingness outside the cosmos 
"void" was a result of his definition of void. Void is "that in which 
there is no body, but in which it is possible for body to come to be" 
(Cael. 1.9.279al3-14). Since he had previously proven that it is im­
possible for a body to come to be outside the cosmos (Cael. 
1.9.278b21-279a7), it followed that there is no void outside the cos­
mos (Cael. 1.9.279al 1-18). The argument is very closely reasoned. If 
the definition is to be fulfilled, the possibility of the presence of body 
must be established. In Aristotle's view a proposition is possible if, 
and only if, it is actually, or may be imagined to be, true at some 
time.32 But there never was and never will be a body outside the 
cosmos. To put it another way, the cosmos is eternal; and the absence 
of body outside the cosmos is also an eternal condition. In the case of 
eternal realities potentiality becomes actuality.33 If an infinite void, 
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defined as place potentially filled with body, is assumed to exist be­
yond an eternal cosmos, the absurd consequence is that an infinite 
body actually extends beyond the cosmos (Phys. 3.4.203b28-30). 
"Void" is disqualified as a name for the nothingness beyond the 
cosmos precisely because it is defined in terms that presuppose that the 
absence of body is temporary. We cannot go into the complete back­
ground of Aristotle's definition of void,34 but it will be helpful to see 
why Aristotle conceived of void as a temporary absence of body rather 
than as a simple absence regardless of duration. His limitation of the 
term "void" to a place temporarily deprived of body is due to his 
consideration of void in the context of place. He defined place as the 
immediate envelope or continent of a body (το πρώτον περιέχον των 
σωμάτων εκαστον, Phys. 4.2.209bl-2, 4.210b34-211al). Place is 
the surface or limit of a body, yet not the limit of the body contained in 
place, but rather the inner limit of the containing body (Phys. 
4.4.21 la23-34, cf. 211b9-14, 212a5-6). Thus two bodies are re­
quired to define place, the container and the contained. Without a 
container a body cannot be in place; so the outermost heaven is not in 
place, because no body embraces it (Phys. 4.5.212bl3-22). On the 
other hand, if the contained body is absent, the definition of place is 
technically not met; and the result is a misconception of place as a 
dimension between the boundaries.35 The container without the con­
tained is precisely Aristotle's conception of void, which he defines as 
"place deprived of body."3 6 Thus a contained body is required to 
define the place that when deprived of body, becomes void. As a 
result, void can be no more than a temporary absence of body from a 
place, and consequently the term "void" is not applicable to the 
permanent absence of body beyond the cosmos. 
The relationship of the Stoic view to Aristotle's discussion of void 
can be determined only by looking more closely at the Stoic concep­
tion of the void. Unfortunately, we know nothing of Zeno's view of 
the void except the bare fact that he believed a void to exist beyond the 
cosmos.
37
 A few years earlier Epicurus had revived the notion of the 
void as the unfilled space through which the atoms move and in which 
the cosmos exists.38 We may speculate that to Zeno the Epicurean idea 
that any emptiness is void may have seemed more reasonable than the 
subtle argument by which Aristotle rejected the name "void" for the 
emptiness beyond the cosmos, but we cannot say anything definite 
about his reasons, if he had any. 
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Chrysippus's conception of the void, on the other hand, is known in 
some detail; and he at once shows himself to be in Aristotle's debt by 
considering void in the context of place.3 9 Chrysippus defines place as 
"that which is totally occupied by being," or "that which is capable of 
being occupied by being and is, in fact, occupied completely by one or 
more things." Place is compared to a full vessel, void to an empty 
vessel; and finally Chrysippus distinguishes an unnamed entity, differ­
ent from void or place, that is capable of being occupied by being, but 
is only partly occupied (SVF 2.503). The definition of void that may 
be inferred from this passage, and which other fragments assign to the 
Stoics in general, is "that which is capable of being occupied by 
being, but is not so occupied" (SVF 2.505, 535, 543 [reading κενόν 
for άσώματον in lines 16-17]). This definition is essentially the same 
as that accepted by Aristotle (Cael. 1.9.279al3-14). The analogy of a 
full and empty vessel is also used by Aristotle (Phys. 4.2.209b28-30, 
4.212al4-16, 28-29, 6.213al5-19; cf. 4.3.210a24). The only signif­
icant difference is that Chrysippus ignores Aristotle's technical defini­
tion of place as "the immediate continent of a body" or the inner 
surface of the container, and instead emphasizes the other side of 
Aristotle's notion, namely, that place is "something occupied by 
body." 4  0 This change signals a shift in point of view. Aristotle viewed 
void as a species of place, that is, that place which is temporarily 
devoid of body; Chrysippus views place and void as coordinate species 
of a third thing, "that which is capable of being occupied by body." 
Chrysippus's point of view was already implicit in Aristotle's analogy 
of a vessel and in the definitions used in his denial of void and place 
outside the cosmos in On the Heavens (1.9.279al 1 — 18). Chrysippus 
has merely made it explicit, unless Aristotle himself or one of his 
school did so before Chrysippus.41 This change in point of view makes 
the term "void" slightly more applicable to the nothingness beyond 
the cosmos. Since void is no longer defined in terms of place, which, 
in turn, is defined in terms of a containing and a contained body, one 
of the obstacles preventing Aristotle from calling the nothingness 
"void" has been removed. Nevertheless, the removal of this obstacle 
alone is not enough; for the Stoic definition of void as that which is 
capable of being occupied, but is not actually occupied, is just the 
definition that disqualified the extracosmic nothingness from being 
called "void" in On the Heavens. Something must have happened to 
close the gap. 
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The fact is that several things have happened. We remember that 
one of the obstacles to the application of the term "void" to the 
condition outside the cosmos was the eternity of the cosmos. The 
eternal organization of Aristotle's cosmos precluded the possibility of 
matter beyond its periphery. The organization of the Stoic cosmos, 
however, is not eternal. During the conflagration the whole cosmos is 
changed to fire; and since elements changing to fire increase in vol­
ume, the whole volume of the cosmos increases at this time. Because 
the cosmos does at times expand beyond its present periphery, there 
has to be a void into which it can expand (SVF 2.609, 610, 618, 619; 
cf. 537, 597). The fact that in the Stoic system body sometimes oc­
cupies the space beyond the periphery makes the definition applicable 
even according to Aristotle's logic. 
The conflagration, however, can prove only a limited void since the 
cosmos does not expand to infinity.42 Something else must have hap­
pened between Aristotle and Chrysippus, and we may discover it in a 
change in the principles of logic. According to Aristotle's logic a 
proposition is possible only if it becomes actual at some time. Accord­
ing to the Stoics this condition is not necessary; a proposition is possi­
ble if nothing external prevents it from being true.43 Consequently, the 
condition beyond the periphery of the cosmos satisfies the definition of 
void, even if body never comes to occupy it. In this way an infinite 
void not only becomes possible; but if there is any void at all beyond 
the cosmos, it is necessarily infinite, for there is nothing that can 
bound it. 
To prove that the void exists and probably also to prove that it is 
infinite the Stoics (which Stoics we do not know) used an old thought 
experiment derived from the Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum and 
quoted by Aristotle's pupil, Eudemus of Rhodes (DK 47 A 24). Ac­
cording to Simplicius the Stoic asked: If a man stands at the periphery 
of the cosmos and extends his arm outward, what will happen? If he 
can extend it, there is something beyond the cosmos into which he is 
extending it, and this must be void. If he cannot, there is something 
preventing him; and he must go beyond this obstacle or limit and 
repeat the experiment until he does come to the void (SVF 2.535, cf. 
536). By continuing the experiment in the void beyond the periphery 
of the cosmos it is possible to prove that the void is infinite. Archytas 
(DK 47 A 24) seems to have used the experiment to prove infinite 
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extension, and Lucretius records an Epicurean adaptation of this experi­
ment to prove the infinity of the universe, with the infinity of the void 
implied.44 A quotation of Simplicius from Alexander of Aphrodisias 
suggests that the Stoics also used this experiment to prove the infinity 
of the void beyond the cosmos (Simplic. Cael. 285.27-286.2, 
Heiberg). 
With respect to the void beyond the cosmos the Stoic divergence 
from Aristotle is more apparent than real. The Stoics have taken over 
Aristotle's conception of the cosmos with nothing beyond it, but have 
applied the name "void" to this nothingness. Zeno may have done this 
without giving much consideration to the technical reasons for which 
Aristotle refused to use the term; but Chrysippus paid careful attention 
to Aristotle's discussions about the void and even adopted Aristotle's 
basic conception of void. By merely changing the point of view 
slightly and presupposing a different logical doctrine of possibility, 
Chrysippus discovered that the term "void" is actually quite applica­
ble to the region beyond the cosmos. 
However, what began as a mere difference in terminology turned 
out to have far reaching consequences for Stoic cosmology The exis­
tence of an infinite void beyond the cosmos raised a frightening ques­
tion: What prevents the matter of our cosmos from dispersing and 
distributing itself equally throughout the void? Epicurus, whose cos­
mology included an infinite void, readily admitted that matter does 
distribute itself equally in the void, and a cosmos is only a temporary 
concentration of atoms that will eventually be dispersed again.45 When 
the Stoics placed the Aristotelian cosmos in an infinite void, they were 
asking for trouble. Aristotle's cosmos was not designed to live in such 
an environment, and Epicurus's cosmology displayed the inevitable 
consequences. The Stoics now were faced with the problem: How can 
the cosmos remain intact though situated in an infinite void? As usual, 
the Stoic explanation seems to have had both a physical and a biologi­
cal side, though for the present we shall concentrate on the physical 
side.46 
As luck would have it, Stobaeus has preserved Arius Didymus's 
summary of Zeno's attempt to explain the cosmos's immobility in the 
void, a subject intimately connected with the cohesion of the cosmos: 
"Of everything in the cosmos held together with its own hexis [liter­
ally, "holding"] the parts move toward the middle of the whole, 
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similarly also of the cosmos itself. Therefore it is correct to say that all 
the parts of the cosmos move toward the middle of the cosmos, espe­
cially those having weight. The same cause serves both for the immo­
bility of the cosmos in an infinite void and likewise for the immobility 
of the earth in the cosmos, since it is situated in equilibrium around the 
center of this [the cosmos]. Moreover, body does not entirely have 
weight, but air and fire are weightless. These, too, somehow tend 
toward the middle of the whole sphere of the cosmos; but they collect 
at the periphery of it [the cosmos], because they are by nature upward 
moving, since they possess no weight. Likewise the cosmos itself has 
no weight, because its whole composition is of the elements which 
have weight and of the weightless ones. The earth as a whole in itself 
has weight; but by its position, since it occupies the middle space and 
since for bodies of that kind [i.e., heavy] motion is to the middle, it 
remains in this place" (SVF 1.99). 
This account has been abbreviated almost to the point of 
unintelligibility, and it is only by very careful analysis and the support 
of parallel accounts that Zeno's theory can be recovered and under­
stood. Even a superficial reading of the summary reveals that analogy 
played an important role in the argument. The account begins with the 
statement that the parts of all unified objects in the cosmos have a 
motion toward the middle of the object. Then it continues, "And 
similarly [the parts] of the cosmos itself; therefore it is correct to say 
that all the parts of the cosmos move to the middle of the cosmos." 
Finally the argument takes a third step: "The same cause serves both 
for the immobility of the cosmos in the infinite void and likewise for 
the immobility of the earth in the cosmos, since it is situated in equilib­
rium around the center of this [the cosmos]." The account thus begins 
with a triple analogy—natural objects:cosmos:earth (SVF 1.99, page 
27.25-31). After this it turns to explain why fire and air remain at the 
periphery of the cosmos and subsequently goes on to say, "Similarly 
to these [elements] the cosmos itself does not have weight." Finally 
there is a return to the subject of the earth and its immobility at the 
center of the cosmos. This is not introduced with any word like 
"similarly"—in fact, its immobility is explained in a slightly different 
way from that of the cosmos—but it operates with the same concepts 
as the earlier parts. Hence it is not hard to see in the second half of 
Zeno's account an argument proceeding in parallel fashion to the 
first—light elements:cosmos:earth (SVF 1.99, page 27.31-28.4). 
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This structure provides some indispensible clues to understanding 
Zeno's argument, which may now be divided into two obvious com­
ponents. The first component, which we might call the theory of 
centripetal force, explains the immobility (μονή) of the cosmos by the 
fact that all parts of the cosmos move toward the middle of the cosmos. 
Exactly how this theory works is not immediately apparent. In fact, it 
seems to be illogical. A movement toward the middle of the cosmos 
can account very well for the cohesion of the cosmos in the void, but it 
is hard to see how it can explain why the cosmos will not move as a 
whole in the void. What we would expect in an explanation of the 
immobility of the cosmos is movement to the center of the void; for if 
every part of the cosmos moves toward the center of the void, the 
cosmos as a whole would naturally come to rest at this point and would 
remain intact without dispersing. But Stobaeus's summary states 
explicitly that the parts of the cosmos move toward the center of the 
cosmos. 
We might consider the possibility that Stobaeus or his source, Arius 
Didymus, has made an error in excerpting Zeno's text and has either 
substituted the center of the cosmos for the center of the void or has 
mistakenly used the term "immobility" (μονή) in what was actually 
Zeno's proof only for the cohesion of the cosmos.4 7 But the analogy 
with "all objects in the cosmos held together by their own 'holding' or 
hexis" supports the notion of movement toward the center of the 
cosmos, for in each of the objects held together by a hexis the parts 
move toward the middle of the whole (i.e., the object itself), not 
toward the middle of the cosmos.** An example of such an object 
might be a stone (cf. SVF 2.449, 716). A centripetal force holds the 
parts of the stone together, but this force does not affect the movement 
of the stone as a whole. It will still fall if dropped. We can also rule out 
the possibility that Zeno's argument was intended only to prove the 
cohesion of the cosmos, because other witnesses confirm the accuracy 
of Stobaeus's summary. Achilles the grammarian in his Introduction 
to Aratus's Phaenomena records several Stoic proofs that the cosmos 
remains at rest in the void. He begins with an empirical proof: "If the 
cosmos were moving down in an infinite void, rain would not overtake 
the earth. But it does. Therefore the cosmos does not move, but stands 
still." Then after a lacunose proof from the fact that winds move both 
up and down, Achilles gives the theoretical argument: "The cosmos 
remains in an infinite void because of the motion toward the middle, 
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since all its parts incline toward the middle. And the parts of it are 
earth, water, air, and fire, which all incline toward the middle. There­
fore the cosmos in no way sinks" (SVF 2.554). This is identical with 
Zeno's argument, showing that centripetal movement was used by the 
Stoics to prove the immobility of the cosmos in the void. It is true that 
Achilles does not expressly say whether the movement is toward the 
middle of the cosmos or the middle of the void, but it is more natural to 
understand his words to mean the middle of the cosmos. If any doubt 
still remains, it is removed by the Aristotelian commentator, Alexan­
der of Aphrodisias, who attacks the Stoic belief in an infinite void by 
asking what holds the cosmos in its place and prevents it from moving 
to every part of the void. Then he adds, "If they say that it remains [in 
its place] because the same hexis holds it together, the hexis might 
perhaps prevent its parts from scattering, dispersing, and moving in 
different directions; but the hexis still does nothing to make the cosmos 
as a whole with its binding hexis rest and not move" (SVF 2.552 
[quoted at greater length in Simplic. Cael. 286.6-23, Heiberg], cf. 
553). Apparently the Peripatetic commentators saw in the Stoic hexis 
an attempt to explain the cosmos's immobility. Finally, Cleomedes 
explicitly states that the centripetal force of the parts of the cosmos 
refutes the suggestion that the cosmos will move, if there is a void 
outside it: " I t is impossible for it to move through the void, for it 
inclines toward its own middle and has this as its 'down' " (Mot. Circ. 
1.1	 [10, Ziegler]). 
We are thus confronted with the problem of figuring out how the 
motion toward the center of the cosmos kept the cosmos at rest in the 
void. The analogy with other objects, as we have seen, does not help 
us understand this problem; but the analogy with the earth ought to 
help, since the earth must be shown to be immobile in the cosmos. 
However, Stobaeus's account is disappointingly concise, adding only 
the statement that the earth is situated in equilibrium (καθιδρυμένης 
ϊσοκρατώς) around the center of the cosmos. Since the words, "being 
seated around the center of the cosmos," are essentially a restatement 
of the thesis to be proven, the immobility of the earth in the cosmos,4 9 
only the idea of equilibrium or equal force (ϊσοκρατώς) is new; and 
this single word is not particularly illuminating at this point. 
To understand Zeno's argument we must turn to a parallel account in 
Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods. The Stoic speaker in Book 2 uses 
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Zeno's triple analogy to prove the stability and cohesion of the cosmos: 
"For all its parts everywhere striving for the middle press on uniformly 
[aequaliter]. Moreover interlinked bodies endure best when they are 
bound together by a kind of encompassing bond. This is accomplished 
by that substance which, performing all things by mind and reason, 
pervades the whole cosmos and draws and gathers the outermost parts 
toward the center. Consequently, if the cosmos is spherical and all its 
parts are therefore held together everywhere uniformly [aequabiles] by 
and with each other, the same thing must happen to the earth, so that 
with all its parts converging toward the middle, which in a sphere is the 
lowest point, nothing may break through and so cause its great coher­
ence of weight and heavy things to collapse [labefactari]" (Nat. D. 
2.115-16). This account, so similar to Stobaeus's summary of Zeno as 
to suggest a common source, 5 0 confirms the existence of a close anal­
ogy between objects held together by a hexis, the cosmos, and the 
earth. It also shows that the parts of the earth are viewed as pressing 
inward toward the earth's center.5  1 In addition it emphasizes the 
uniformity of the movement toward the interior, thus shedding light on 
the meaning of equilibrium (ίσοκρατώς) in Stobaeus's account of 
Zeno. Though the account in Cicero does not clarify completely the 
logic of this theory, it does point the direction in which the Stoics 
sought an answer to the problem of the stability of the cosmos in the 
void. Somehow or other the Stoics saw in the uniformity of the cen­
tripetal pressure within a sphere a source of rest. With all parts 
(whether of the cosmos or of the earth) exerting equal pressure and 
balancing each other, there was no reason to expect movement in any 
direction. To oversimplify, if the top pushes down and the bottom 
pushes up with equal pressure, the two halves will balance each other 
and so remain at rest. Only if one pushes harder than the other, will the 
two together move. Among parts arranged spherically around a center, 
none will be able to dominate and set the object in motion. 
The second component of Zeno's argument, which we may call the 
theory of counteracting forces, is easier to understand (SVF 1.99, page 
27.31-28.4). Here the threefold analogy begins with the elements of 
air and fire. Whereas the previous theory held that all parts of the 
cosmos move toward the center, Zeno now points out that we must not 
infer as a consequence that all parts have weight. He says: "Body does 
not entirely have weight, but air and fire are weightless. These, too, 
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somehow tend toward the middle of the whole sphere, but they collect 
at the periphery of it [i.e., the cosmos], because they are by nature 
upward moving, since they possess no weight." The logic seems to be 
that air and fire are weightless (άβαρή),52 a condition that causes 
them to move upward and away from the center. At the same time they 
share with all other parts of the cosmos a tendency to move toward the 
center of the cosmos. The two forces acting in opposite directions 
presumably counteract each other and cause fire and air to rest at the 
periphery. We might conjecture that Zeno would have considered the 
ratio of the centrifugal force to the centripetal force slightly higher for 
fire than for air, and thus could explain why fire rises above air. The 
important point is that rest is the result of two counteracting forces, one 
centripetal and the other centrifugal. 
The immobility of the cosmos is explained in an analogous way: 
"Similarly to these [elements] the cosmos itself has no weight because 
its whole composition is of the elements which have weight and of the 
weightless ones." This argument is presented in expanded form by 
Achilles and there attributed to Chrysippus: "One might well believe 
Chrysippus, when he says the composition of all things is from the four 
elements, and equal weight [το Ισοβαρές] is responsible for the im­
mobility [μονή] of these; for since two are heavy, earth and water, and 
two light, fire and air, the mixture of these is the cause of the position 
of the universe; for as the cosmos would move down, if it were heavy, 
so it would move up, if light. It remains immobile, because it has the 
heavy equal to the light" (SVF 2.555). On this theory the weight and 
weightlessness of the elements cause movement down and up respec­
tively. Since the two forces counteract each other, the cosmos as a 
whole moves in neither direction.5 3 
The third stage of the argument explains the immobility of the earth. 
The earth's immobility, however, is not explained by the tension of 
two counteracting forces. Instead, Zeno says, "The earth as a whole in 
itself has weight; but by its position, since it occupies the middle space 
and since for bodies of that kind [i.e., heavy] motion is to the middle, it 
remains in this p lace." 5  4 It is not another force that counteracts the 
earth's weight, but its position in the cosmos; and Zeno sets up a 
contrast between the earth in itself (και?' εαντήν μεν) and the earth in 
its central position {παρά δε την ΰέσι,ν). Thus the analogy with the 
cosmos and light elements is somewhat forced, but still follows the 
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same basic principle that a tendency to move down is counteracted by 
some other factor. 
Zeno's explanation for the immobility of the cosmos and the earth 
raises several questions. First of all, why did he need two different 
theories to explain the same thing? Our perplexity is increased when 
we compare the two theories for the immobility of the earth. In the 
second theory Zeno has a good, clear explanation for the immobility of 
the earth in its position at the center of the cosmos; but Zeno's first 
theory, which seems to make no use of the earth's position at the center 
of the cosmos, is open to an obvious criticism. If the earth's immobil­
ity is due solely to the uniformity of the movement of its parts in their 
spherical arrangement, why should not any other sphere of a hard 
material be equally immobile, regardless of its position? It would seem 
that the first theory of the earth's immobility cannot even stand. Why 
does he then retain it alongside the more cogent second theory? Sec­
ond, in Zeno's eyes which way is down? Fire and air are weightless 
and therefore move upward and collect at the periphery. This idea 
implies that up and down are defined as movement away from and 
movement toward the center respectively. But when Zeno says the 
cosmos is without weight, because it is made of a mixture of heavy, 
downward-moving elements and weightless, upward-moving ele­
ments, he implies that as a whole the cosmos will move neither up nor 
down in the void, thereby suggesting that up and down are absolute 
directions in the void without reference to any middle or periphery. It 
looks as if Zeno is guilty of inconsistency. 
Now that we have analyzed Zeno's argument and noted some of the 
problems it raises, we may turn to his predecessors in an attempt to see 
how he arrived at his position and why he failed to produce a single, 
consistent theory. It is surely obvious that the fundamental concepts 
used in Zeno's argument, namely weight and weightlessness, natural 
movement, and cosmic places are derived from Aristotle.5 5 The 
briefest summary of Aristotle's use of these ideas will suffice to supply 
the background for Zeno's solution. Aristotle maintained that the 
movement and rest of elements is due to nature, for nature is the prin­
ciple of rest and movement (ή άρχη κτήσεως καϊ στάσεως [or 
ηρεμίας], Phys. 2.1.192b8-14, 20-23; 3.1.200bl2-13; 8.3.253b5­
6, 7-9; Cael. 1.2.268bl6; 3.2.301 bl7-18). When an element is in its 
natural place, it remains at rest; when it is not in its place, it moves by 
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nature toward its natural place, unless some obstacle prevents it. Any 
movement away from its natural place must be by force and not by 
nature. The four concentric spheres of earth, water, air, and fire are the 
natural places of these elements and the places to which they move by 
nature.56 Since "up" is to be defined as the direction from the center 
to the periphery and "down" as the direction from the periphery to the 
center (e.g., Phys. 4.4.212a21-28; Cael. 1.2.268b21-22, 
3.269b23-24; 4.1.308al4-29), the direction of movement of each 
element may be calculated from the particular dislocation from which 
it begins to move. Weight and lightness are defined as the properties of 
elements whose natural movements are down and up respectively 
{Cael. 1.3.269b23-29; 2.13.295b3-9; 4.1.308a29-31; 4.311bl4-16; 
Phys. 4.4.212a24-28). Consequently, earth may be called absolutely 
heavy and fire absolutely light, because earth will always move down 
and fire up. Water and air are relatively heavy and light, for in return­
ing to their natural places they will move either up or down, depending 
on the position from which they start. So water is heavy with respect to 
air and fire, but light with respect to earth; and air is light with respect 
to earth and water, but heavy with respect to fire {Cael. 1.3.269b26­
29; 4.4.31 lal5-29, 311bl3-312al2, 5.312a22-b2). Theophrastus 
probably agreed with Aristotle's theory. At least he maintained that the 
elements have a natural movement; for example, fire moves up by 
nature {De Vent. 22), and this natural movement is responsible for an 
element's weight or lightness.57 
Although Zeno uses the same basic ideas, he seems to put them 
together in a different way. In the Peripatetic scheme the natural 
movement and the natural place are the two sides of each element's 
nature. There is no cause for them but nature itself. Weight and light­
ness are also natural qualities of the elements, but they are dependent 
on and, in a sense, the result of the natural movement of the ele­
ments.58 Since place, movement, and weight or lightness are natural to 
an element and due to one and the same cause, nature, Aristotle may 
use any one to deduce the other two.59 Zeno, however, seems to give 
weight and weightlessness priority, making them natural properties of 
the elements".60 They, in turn, cause, or at least determine, the natural 
movement of each element; and the natural movement seems to be 
responsible for the position each element occupies in the cosmos.61 
Thus for Zeno movement and position seem to be due ultimately to 
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weight or weightlessness. This modification of Aristotle's theory 
necessitates another. If weight and weightlessness are permanent prop­
erties of elements and are the cause of the natural movements, each 
element must be either heavy or light. No element can be intermediate, 
for it will then be unable to move naturally, a result contradicted by 
experience.62 Nor can an element be sometimes heavy and sometimes 
light, as are air and water in Aristotle's theory, for then weight and 
lightness become relative to some other factor, such as the particular 
unnatural location in which they find themselves. Accordingly, Zeno 
makes earth and water heavy and air and fire weightless. This change, 
though not a major one, makes the theory less comprehensive, for 
whereas Aristotle's theory explained all possible dislocations of the 
elements, Zeno's does not apply to the relatively uncommon disloca­
tions of air into the place of fire and water into the place of earth.63 
This loss in comprehensiveness was necessary if Zeno was going to 
make natural movement dependent on weight and weightlessness. 
Why Zeno wished to make this change is difficult to say. A major 
reason may have been the fact that he was trying to prove that the 
elements remain in their places. Since place was to be the conclusion, 
weight and weightlessness, or the movements produced by weight and 
weightlessness, had to serve as premises. Since Aristotle, as we shall 
see presently, was content to do the same thing, the difference between 
Zeno and Aristotle may be more apparent than real. 
The precise nature of Zeno's relationship to Aristotle becomes 
clearer from an examination of Zeno's proofs for the stability of the 
earth and of the cosmos. Zeno's second proof for the immobility of the 
earth is taken directly from Aristotle. Aristotle proves the stability of 
the earth in two separate places. The most detailed proof is found in On 
the Heavens. After discussing the previous theories on the subject 
(Cael. 2.13), he offers three proofs. Two are directed specifically 
against the theories that the earth revolves around the center or rotates 
on its axis at the center (Cael. 2.14.296a24-b6); the third gives the 
positive proof that the cosmos rests at the center: "The natural move­
ment of the parts of the earth and of the whole earth is toward the 
center of the universe; for this reason it is now lying at the center" 
(Cael. 2.14.296b6-9). Then restating his argument more fully, he 
reasons essentially as follows: The natural movement of the earth is 
toward the center. A simple body can have only one simple movement. 
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Therefore, earth cannot have the contrary movement (i.e., away from 
center) naturally, but only by force. There is no force great enough to 
move the whole earth. Therefore it must rest at the center (Cael. 
2.14.296b25-297a2). To put it another way, "to whatever place the 
parts move by nature, there the whole exists by nature" (Cael. 
2.14.296b34-35). Here the basic premise is natural movement; weight 
does not even enter the argument.64 As a matter of fact, Aristotle's 
proof does not amount to much more than a restatement of his doctrine 
of natural movements and places. In the Physics Aristotle offers a 
slightly different proof that the earth rests at the center: "The earth is 
heavy. The heavy remains at the center. The earth is now at the 
center" (Phys. 3.5.205bl5-16). Therefore the earth will remain at the 
center naturally. This proof is almost identical to Zeno's second proof, 
which may be paraphrased as follows: The earth in itself has weight. 
Things that have weight move toward the center. The earth already 
occupies the center. Therefore the earth remains in the center. Zeno 
has merely substituted the natural movement of the heavy for the 
natural rest of the heavy in Aristotle's argument. 
Zeno also owes much to Aristotle for his first proof, which is based 
on the equilibrium of the centripetal force acting on all parts of the 
earth; but the origin of this theory is somewhat more complex. Its roots 
extend back to Anaximander, who was the first to maintain that the 
earth remains in place because it is symmetrically related to the center 
and periphery of a spherical cosmos (DK 12 A 26). This theory found 
its most forceful expression in Plato: "  I am persuaded . . . that if the 
earth, being round, is in the center of the heaven, it does not need air or 
any such force to prevent it from falling; but the uniformity [όμοώτης] 
of the heaven itself to itself in every direction and the equilibrium 
[ισορροπία] of the earth itself is sufficient to hold it fast. For any 
thing possessing equilibrium [ϊσόρροπον], placed in the middle of 
something uniform, will not be moved more or less in any direction, 
but, being uniform, will remain without inclining" (Phaedo 108e­
109a; cf. Tim. 62d-63a). This theory certainly lurks behind Zeno's 
explanation for the immobility of the earth; yet Zeno's version incor­
porates the idea of movement toward the center, an idea not found in 
Plato. We can conclude that Zeno has not merely taken over the pure 
version of this theory as found in Plato, but is following Aristotle's 
discussion of it. In a description and criticism of this theory in On the 
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Heavens Aristotle grants that the theory is accidentally true, but not a 
sufficient explanation, because it fails to explain (1) why any other 
body (say, fire) will not remain at the center if placed there; (2) why 
earth and other bodies move; (3) why fire remains at the periphery; and 
(4) why the earth does not scatter toward the periphery (Cael. 
2.14.295bl0-296a21). As Aristotle goes through these unexplained 
phenomena, he repeatedly suggests that his own theory of natural 
places and natural movements will supply a sufficient answer; and in 
the next chapter he definitely states that the natural movement of earth 
toward the center is the explanation for its immobility. Zeno appar­
ently has taken Aristotle's criticism into account and has united the 
theory of equilibrium with the Aristotelian theory of natural movement 
to produce his own theory of uniform, centripetal force as an explana­
tion for the earth's immobility. 
One question we must still ask is why he retained the equilibrium 
theory at all, if he was so committed to Aristotle. An answer might be 
that his fondness for consensus compelled him to keep as many 
theories as he could reasonably synthesize; but there is a deeper reason 
that we must still discover. A second question we must raise is why he 
modified Aristotle's theory in synthesizing it with the theory of equi­
librium. Aristotle's theory for the immobility of the earth held that all 
earthy bodies move toward the center. Though this point, toward 
which earth moves, is both the center of the earth and the center of the 
cosmos, Aristotle makes it amply clear that earth moves toward it 
insofar as it is the center of the cosmos, not the center of the earth 
{Cael. 2.14.296b9-18). Zeno in his first proof disagreed with Aristo­
tle on this very point and held that the earth moves toward the center of 
the earth. 
Before we can answer these questions, we must consider the use 
Zeno was to make of these theories of the earth's stability. Their 
context suggests that his main concern was the immobility of the 
cosmos, and these proofs for the immobility of the earth were 
analogies or models for his first theory of the immobility of the cos­
mos. The use of the earth's immobility as a model for that of the 
cosmos may have been suggested by Aristotle. In the Physics Aristot­
le's proof for the immobility of the earth occurs as an illustration of 
the kind of proof Anaxagoras ought to have used to prove that the 
infinite is stationary. Aristotle rejects Anaxagoras's own proof on the 
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grounds that it misses the point. Even if it is true that the whole is not 
moved, Anaxagoras must explain why this absence of motion is 
natural. As an example of the type of explanation needed, Aristotle 
proves the stability of the earth, using the very proof Zeno adopted as 
his second proof for the immobility of the earth. Then he announces 
that some comparable cause is needed to explain the immobility of the 
infinite {Phys. 3 . 5 . 2 0 5 b l - 2 4 ) . Here Aristotle suggests that 
Anaxagoras ought to find an explanation for the stability of the whole 
on the order of the explanation Aristotle has given for the stability of 
the earth. It looks as if Zeno were trying to follow Aristotle's directive. 
In trying to create a proof on the model of Aristotle's proof for the 
immobility of the earth Zeno encountered a serious difficulty. He 
could not simply extrapolate to the cosmos and claim that all parts of 
the cosmos move toward the center of its environment, the void, for 
Aristotle had insisted that there are no directions in that which is void 
and infinite: "For insofar as it is infinite, there is no up nor down nor 
middle; and insofar as it is void, up cannot be differentiated from 
down" {Phys. 4.8.215a8-9). Zeno had to contrive a proof that did not 
depend on movement toward the center of the thing's natural environ­
ment. Again Aristotle conveniently pointed the way. Aristotle main­
tained that because a void possesses no differentiation, there is also no 
possibility of movement in a void. To prove this point Aristotle used 
the equilibrium theory of the earth's immobility as an analogy: "Noth­
ing at all can move, if there is a void [surrounding it]; for as they say 
that the earth is at rest on account of uniformity, so also in the void a 
thing must necessarily be at rest; for there is no place where it will be 
moved more or less, since a void, as such, possesses no differentia­
tion" (Phys. 4.8.214b30-215al). Since Aristotle could use the equi­
librium theory of the earth's immobility as an analogy to explain the 
impossibility of movement in a void, Zeno may have felt this same 
theory could serve to explain the cosmos's immobility in the void; but 
he could not apply it in a similar way to the earth and to the cosmos as 
long as it retained the shortcomings Aristotle had found in it (Cael. 
2.14.295bl0-296a21). Therefore, he modified it just enough to recon­
cile it with Aristotle's own theory that earth naturally moves toward 
the center. 
Now we can understand more fully why Zeno retained some aspects 
of the equilibrium theory of the earth's immobility and why he mod­
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ified Aristotle's theory of the immobility of the earth so that earth 
moves toward its own center, not the center of its environment, the 
cosmos. In general, Zeno was willing to follow Aristotle in the theory 
of elemental movement and in the explanation of the earth's immobil­
ity in the cosmos; but he refused to follow as soon as Aristotle's 
theories failed to solve Zeno's real problem, the immobility of the 
cosmos in the void. To solve this problem he wished to use the equilib­
rium theory; but to reconcile the equilibrium theory with Aristotle's 
theory, he had to modify Aristotle's theory of natural movement to 
make earth's natural movement a movement toward its own center, not 
toward the center of the cosmos. Then he could develop his theory of 
the cosmos's immobility on the basis of this model. The result was a 
new, characteristically Stoic theory, that all parts of the cosmos move 
naturally toward the center of the cosmos. Though based on Aristotle, 
it turned out to be most un-Aristotelian, at odds with the whole Aris­
totelian theory of natural movements and places. Zeno apparently felt 
this was necessary if he was to solve the objection that an infinite void 
beyond the cosmos would cause the cosmos to float around and even­
tually disintegrate and disperse. 
One rather puzzling question is who raised this objection against the 
Stoics. We would not expect it to come from an Aristotelian, since 
Aristotle denied that movement was possible in a void (Phys. 
4.8.214b28-215al4); yet Cleomedes records Zeno's theory of cen­
tripetal force and of the binding hexis as a direct reply to "Aristotle 
and those of his sect'' who deny the existence of an extracosmic void 
{Mot. Circ. 1.1.5-6 [10, Ziegler]). If he is reporting these theories in 
the correct polemical context, we may infer that Zeno's theory was 
framed expressly to support the Stoic belief in the existence of an 
extracosmic void against Peripatetic attacks. Later the Aristotelian 
commentators, Alexander, Simplicius, and Themistius repeat the ob­
jection and bring the Aristotelian rebuttal that the Stoic theory may 
explain why the cosmos does not disperse, but not why it does not 
move as a whole (SVF 2.552, 553; Simplic. Cael. 286.6-23, 
Heiberg). Thus it would seem that Zeno's theory of centripetal force 
was called forth by a confrontation with Aristotelianism, though we 
cannot identify the opponent by name. 
However, not all of Zeno's theory comes out of Aristotle and con­
frontation with the Peripatetics. One aspect of Zeno's second theory, 
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the theory of counteracting forces, seems to have an entirely different 
background. When Zeno suggests the cosmos will not move because 
its two heavy elements are balanced by two weightless elements, he 
presupposes absolute directions in the void. He seems to be attempting 
to meet the objection that the cosmos will fall down through the infi­
nite void. Such an objection could hardly have come from the side of 
Aristotle, who denied there were any directions in a void. Zeno's 
opponents or potential opponents must, therefore, have been atomists, 
like the Epicureans, who worked out in detail the behavior of matter in 
a void. Faced with the Epicurean dictum that in a void everything, 
even a uniform thing, naturally moves down, Zeno had to devise 
another theory, the theory of counteracting forces. Agreeing with 
Epicurus that weight is a natural property of heavy bodies and the 
cause of a downward movement through the void,65 Zeno added the 
un-Epicurean idea that weightlessness is likewise a property of some 
bodies and the cause of an upward movement through the void. He 
then argued that if a body is made of both falling and rising elements, it 
will remain fixed in the void. Thus in addition to a proof based on 
Aristotelian premises and probably directed against actual or potential 
Aristotelian critics, Zeno puts forth a second proof based on Epicurean 
premises and presumably directed against Epicurean criticism. 
Further light is shed on the origin of Zeno's proofs by a passage in 
Lucretius that attacks the theory that the cosmos's immobility and 
coherence is due to the tendency of everything to strive for the center 
of the universe (in medium summae, Lucr. 1.1052-82). The Epicurean 
attack, unfortunately marred by lacunae in the crucial section, refutes 
the idea that an infinite can have a center, and then goes on to argue 
that even if the void does have a center, nothing will stop there, for 
every void will make way for a weight, whether this weight is at the 
center or not (Lucr. 1.1070-76). The import of the latter argument is 
that things do not move toward a center, even if it exists; things 
naturally move down.66 After disposing of the theory that the cosmos 
remains immobile in the void by movement toward the middle, Lu­
cretius goes on to say that this foolish theory also holds that not all 
bodies tend toward the middle; but air and fire move away from the 
center, and fire ultimately collects in the heavens. From this notion 
Lucretius concludes there is a danger that these upward-moving ele­
ments will continue moving upward until they escape the cosmos and 
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the entire cosmos disintegrates (Lucr. 1.1083-1113). This passage is 
usually taken to be an attack on the Stoics and particularly on the 
theory of Zeno, which we have been discussing. This assumption is 
questionable, for Zeno's theory seems to contain answers to Lucre­
tius's attack.67 For example, Lucretius attacks the idea that all things 
move toward the center of the void; Zeno scrupulously avoids positing 
a center in the void.68 Lucretius assumes the rising elements might 
continue rising right out of the cosmos; Zeno's centripetal force is a 
force that Cleomedes {Mot. Circ. 1.1.6 [10, Ziegler]) and the Aristote­
lian commentators (SVF 2.552, 553; Simplic. Cael. 286.15-23, 
Heiberg) consider an adequate safeguard against the dissolution of the 
cosmos in the void. In fact, Zeno expressly mentions the rising of fire 
and air and shows how this is counteracted by a concurrent centripetal 
tendency to make them collect near the periphery. Finally, Zeno dis­
cusses the theory that the heavy elements balance the weightless ele­
ments in the cosmos, a theory that Lucretius ignores entirely. It is 
tempting to speculate that Lucretius's polemic comes from an early 
Epicurean treatise, perhaps by the hand of Epicurus himself, and that 
Zeno's theory is, in part at least, contrived to meet these Epicurean 
objections. 
If Lucretius's polemic is not directed against Zeno's theory, we may 
well wonder against whom it is directed. Aristotle is a most unlikely 
candidate, because he is never known to have worried about proving 
the immobility or the coherence of the cosmos, and because the notion 
of all things moving toward the center contradicts his theory of natural 
movements and places.69 On the other hand, Zeno, the first Stoic, 
already shows signs of meeting the Epicurean objections; and his 
successors down to Cicero follow his lead. Hence we shall probably 
never know the original target of Lucretius's attack, but we should not 
ignore the possibility that Lucretius's target was an early theory of 
Zeno's. It seems entirely possible that Zeno's first attempts to explain 
the behavior of the cosmos in the void might have included the concept 
of a motion toward the middle of the void, based on a simple analogy 
with the behavior of earth in the cosmos. It would naturally have 
included the seemingly contradictory notion that light elements move 
up by nature, for this is also found in the extant theory. Epicurus could 
have gotten wind of his theory and written a polemic against it, forcing 
Zeno to revise it on the Aristotelian basis we have already discovered. 
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It would be this revised theory that we possess today. Regardless of 
whether Zeno did once subscribe to this particular theory that all parts 
of the cosmos move toward the middle of the void, the surviving texts 
show that Zeno's inconsistent theories most likely evolved from a 
serious, many-sided debate over the issue and may have undergone 
several modifications during his lifetime in an attempt to meet objec­
tions both from the side of the Peripatetics and from the side of the 
Epicureans. 
When Chrysippus undertook the defense of Stoic doctrine, he inher­
ited this vexatious problem along with Zeno's inconsistent discussion 
of it. Chrysippus's fidelity to the founder of the Stoa shows up in the 
fact that he retained much of Zeno's solution, at least for a while. As 
we have seen, Achilles refers to Chrysippus for his exposition of the 
theory of counteracting forces,™ and it is not impossible that Achilles' 
account of the theory of centripetal force goes back to Chrysippus as 
well.71 More significant is the fact that Chrysippus also sought a new 
way to answer critics who maintained the cosmos must fall in an 
infinite void. 
According to Plutarch, Chrysippus frequently stated that the void 
beyond the cosmos is infinite, unbounded (άπειρον) in the literal 
sense of the word; it has neither beginning nor middle nor end. What is 
more, the downward motion asserted by Epicurus is a fiction, because 
the void possesses no differentation according to which one direction 
may be considered up and another down (SVF 2.539). Although 
Chrysippus's criticism is directed against the Epicurean theory of 
atomic movement, the basic idea has wide significance in that it 
sweeps aside in one blow the Epicurean criticism of Zeno, Zeno's 
theories for the immobility of the cosmos in the void, and even the 
need for any theory at all. The cosmos cannot fall down through the 
void; and it is actually meaningless to talk of change of place in the 
void, since "there is no difference in the void which leads bodies to 
one place rather than another."7  2 Accordingly, Chrysippus seems to 
have put forth no new theories why the cosmos does not move through 
the void. The basis for Chrysippus's sweeping solution to the problem 
of the immobility of the cosmos seems to have been Aristotle. Aristotle 
maintained that an infinite void has no up or down (Phys. 4.8.215a8­
9) and that motion is impossible in a void. "For as they say that the 
earth is at rest on account of uniformity, so also in the void a thing 
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must necessarily be at rest; for there is no place where it will be moved 
more or less, since a void, as such, possesses no differentiation" 
{Phys. 4.8.214b31-215al). This is, of course, the same passage that 
may have led Zeno to use the uniformity of the centripetal force as an 
explanation for the immobility of the cosmos. Chrysippus follows 
Aristotle's logic to the conclusion Aristotle intended, that is, that mo­
tion in an infinite void is absolutely unthinkable. This is a conclusion 
that utterly overthrows the Epicurean notion of falling atoms and a 
falling cosmos and allows Chrysippus to ignore completely the prob­
lem of the immobility of the cosmos. 
He could not, however, ignore the related problems of the cohesion 
of the cosmos in the void and of the movement of the elements. These 
two problems he solved with a single theory, expounded chiefly, it 
seems, in Book Two of his treatise On Motion. Since directions in the 
void cannot determine movement, Chrysippus held that "the arrange­
ment (σννταξις) of this cosmos is the cause of movement" (SVF 
2.550). "The cosmos is a perfect body, but the parts of the cosmos are 
not perfect in that they have a relationship to the whole and do not exist 
by themselves" (SVF 2.550). This fact has implications for the 
movement of the cosmos as a whole and for the movement of its parts. 
Chrysippus says, "The natural movement of the cosmos, as a whole, 
is for permanence and self-maintenance, and not for dissolution and 
dispersion." Consequently "since the whole tends and moves to the 
same place, and the parts have this movement inasmuch as it is a 
natural characteristic of bodies, it is plausible that the first natural 
movement for all bodies is toward the middle of the cosmos, for the 
cosmos, insofar as it moves into itself, and for the parts, insofar as they 
are parts of the whole" (SVF 2.550). This first natural movement 
toward the center is the same movement on which Zeno relied so 
heavily, but Chrysippus now seems to refer it back to the permanent, 
natural arrangement of the cosmos and to use it to account for the 
coherence of the cosmos in the void. The movement of the individual 
elements is also presumably due to the arrangement of the cosmos and 
the fact that the parts do not exist by themselves but have a relationship 
to the whole (cf. SVF 2.550, page 173.21-22, 25-26). The extant 
fragments do not explain Chrysippus's theory of natural movements as 
clearly as we could wish, but they do suggest that, just as in Aristotle's 
theory, each element has an appointed place to which the element, if 
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displaced, must move. Chrysippus says that "fire is weightless and 
moves upward, and air behaves in the same way as fire, because water 
is appointed (προσνεμομενον) more to earth and air to fire" (SVF 
2.434). He thus seems to admit that air, like fire, may be considered 
light and upward-moving; but this is because air is appointed to hold a 
position in the same direction from us as fire, that is, above us. Water, 
on the other hand, is appointed to a vicinity more in the region of earth 
and so moves down. Hence the lightness and movement of air is 
dependent on its appointed place. In a passage from the Physical Arts 
Chrysippus says that "of itself [εξ αντον] air has neither weight nor 
lightness" (SVF 2.435). The meaning of this statement out of context 
is not absolutely clear. It may mean that weight or lightness is not 
inherent in air, but is due to its appointed position in the arrangement 
of the whole. It could thus confirm our suspicion that the appointed 
position is responsible for movement. We still do not know whether 
Chrysippus held this view only for air or also for the absolutely light 
element, fire. A report in Aetius defines light and heavy in terms of 
movement away from the middle and toward the middle respectively 
(SVF 2.571). This, too, removes weight and lightness from the pri­
mary position as cause of movement. 
All these fragments suggest a theory of elemental movement very 
much like Aristotle's, yet Chrysippus still seems to accept Zeno's idea 
that the immediate cause of movement is weight or lightness. He says 
(if Plutarch's statement is an accurate reflection of his view), "Fire, 
being weightless, is upward-moving" (άνωφερές, SVF 2.434), and, 
according to Alexander of Aphrodisias, he thought that "if nothing 
prevents it, a stone lifted up is unable not to fall down, for the fact that 
it possesses weight is the cause of such movement according to na­
ture" (SVF 2.979). The apparent contradiction with the view recon­
structed above is cleared up somewhat when Chrysippus explains that 
behind weight and lightness, as well as behind the arrangement of the 
cosmos, stands nature. Movement comes about of necessity, yet not by 
the necessity of force, but rather because the nature of the moved 
object requires it (SVF 2.979). Thus Chrysippus, like Aristotle, makes 
nature responsible for all three: arrangement, movement, and weight 
or lightness. In fact, Chrysippus is so much under the sway of Aristotle 
that in stating that heavy things fall he adds the qualification so typical 
of Aristotle, "if nothing prevents it" (μηδενός εμποδ'ιζοντος, SVF 
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2.979; cf. Arist. Cael. 4.3.311a6-8, 4.311al9-21, bl4-16). To em­
phasize that the movement of an element is natural and not due to any 
external force Chrysippus says: " I n whatever manner each of the parts 
moves when it is joined with [συμφυές] the remaining parts, in the 
same manner it is reasonable for the part to move by itself, even if, for 
the sake of argument, we should imagine and assume it to be in a void 
space of this cosmos. For example, if being held together it were 
moving from everywhere toward the middle, it remains in this motion, 
even if for the sake of argument void were suddenly surrounding it'' 
(SVF 2.550). If this idea were also applied to the upward movement of 
light things, Chrysippus's statement could serve as a rebuttal of the 
Epicurean theory oiekthlipsis, in which all bodies are heavy, but light 
ones rise because they are squeezed out by heavier ones.7 3 Chrysip­
pus's elements move entirely of their own nature to their naturally 
appointed places in the cosmos. 
Chrysippus brings Stoic cosmology back to the theory of Aristotle 
from which the Stoic doctrine took its origin. Nature is again in con­
trol, keeping the elements in their appointed places and moving them 
back to their places when they are forced out. Weight and lightness 
again take their position with movement and place as consequences of 
nature, sometimes being defined in terms of movement, and some­
times considered as the cause of movement. Moreover, the natural 
arrangement of the parts of the cosmos with respect to the whole is 
again given the decisive role in the movement of elements. 
The problems entailed by placing a void around the cosmos are 
finally solved for Chrysippus and the Stoics. The Epicureans, who had 
been harrassing the Stoics with threats that their cosmos would fall 
down, have been refuted for good, along with any Aristotelian critics 
who may have claimed the Stoic cosmos might move. Moreover, since 
Aristotle's confidence in nature's ability both to move elements and 
hold them fast has been vindicated, nature is given the additional 
responsibility of holding the cosmos together and preventing its disin­
tegration in the void. Under Chrysippus's guidance the Aristotelian 
cosmos of elements, each moving by nature to its own concentric 
sphere, is finally given a comfortable home in the infinite void. 
This narrow problem, which involves only the movement of the 
elements and the relationship between cosmos and void, has turned out 
to have had a very complex history If Arius Didymus had not pre­
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served a summary of Zeno's view, or if Plutarch had not quoted so 
much from Chrysippus's allegedly contradictory accounts, or if Lu­
cretius, Cicero, Cleomedes, and Achilles had not reported opinions on 
this subject, we could never have reconstructed even a bare outline of 
this complex history. Fortunately, a relatively rich amount of material 
has been preserved on this problem; but for the problems on which we 
possess less, or only the views of Chrysippus, and these not in his own 
words, we shall never know how grossly we have oversimplified the 
origin of the Stoic doctrine, or how often we have misunderstood it 
entirely. 
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1.81; and E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, trans. O. J. Reichel (London, 
1880), 197-204. 
2. The references are abundant. The cosmos is one (SVE 1.97; 2.528, 530, 531, 
542, 620) limited (SVE 2.524, 528), spherical (SVE 2.547, 555, 654, 681), and 
consists of four elements in concentric spheres (SVE 2.413, 527, 555, 580, cf. 434, 
558). Earth is stationary (SVE 2.527, 555) and fire rotates (SVE 2.527, cf. 642) with 
the fixed stars and seven wandering stars fixed in it (SVE 2.527). The elements change 
into one another (SVE 1.102; 2.406, 413, cf. 309, 579, 580, 581), and each possesses 
a single quality (SVE 2.580, cf. 429, 430). There is continuous matter within the 
cosmos (SVE 1.95, 96; 2.433[=545], 502, 528, 542, 543, cf. 424, 425), and infinite 
void outside (SVE 1.94, 95, 96; 2.503, 509, 535, 539. 542, 543). 
3. For Plato and Aristotle, too, the cosmos is one (Tim. 30d-31b, 33a, 34b, 55d, 
69c, 92c; Cael. 1.8-9), limited (Cael. 1.5-7), spherical (Tim. 33b, 62d, 63a; Cael. 
2.2.285a31-32,4.286bl0-287b21), and consists of the four elements (or five accord­
ing to Aristotle) arranged in concentric spheres around the center (Plato Tim. 62d-63e; 
cf. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology [London, 1937; reprinted, New York, 1957], 
264-66; see also Phaedo 108e-109c, l l l a - b ; Phil. 29a-e; Arist. Phvs. 
4.5.212b20-22; Cael. 2.4.287a30-bl4; Meteor. 1.3.339b9-341al2; 2.2.354b4-13, 
23-26; cf. De Phil. fr. 19b Ross). At the center the earth is stationary according to 
Aristotle (Cael. 2.14.296a24-297a8), and Plato probably held essentially the same 
view (Tim. 40b-c; cf. D. R. Dicks, Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle [London and 
Ithaca, N.Y., 1970], 132-36). Plato appears to have maintained that the earth is 
spherical (Phaed. 108e, cf. 110b; but cf. T. G. Rosenmeyer, "Phaedo 11 Ic4ff.," CQ 
50 [1956]: 193, and the subsequent debate on the shape of Plato's earth in Phronesis 3 
[1958]: 121-25; 4 [1959]:71-72, 101-19). Aristotle certainly did (Cael. 2.14.297a8­
298b20; Meteor 2.7.365a26-31). The order of the celestial bodies can be recon­
structed from Plato Rep. 616d-617b, Tim. 38d-e, Epin. 986e-987d (cf. Dicks, 
111-13, 126, 145-47) and Arist. Metaph. 12.8.1073bl7-1074al4. Both Plato and 
Aristotle banished void from the cosmos (Tim. 58a, 79b-c; Phys. 4.6-9; cf. F. 
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Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World, Cornell Studies in Classical 
Philology 33 [Ithaca, N.Y., 1960], 135-43), although Plato, by imposing a geometri­
cal form on each of his elements, is forced to allow a small amount of void back in 
(Tim. 58b, 60e-61b; cf. A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus [Oxford, 
1928], 399, 427). 
4. SVF 2.580. It seems proabale that all three old Stoics called the peripheral fire 
aether Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus all spoke of the aether and identified it with 
god (SVF 1.154, 530 [=534]; 2.1077, cf. 634). Chrysippus certainly used the term 
aether of the peripheral fire of the cosmos (SVF 2.527, 579, 634, 642), and Cleanthes 
appears to have used it in the same way (SVF 1.504). If Zeno used the term, it would 
be difficult to think of any meaning he could have attached to it other than the 
peripheral fire. 
5. Without going into the question of authorship we might point out that the 
Epinomis (981b-d, 984b-c) stands somewhere between the views of Plato and 
Aristotle; while keeping the Platonic names for the layers (fire, aether, air, water, 
earth), the Epinomis, like Aristotle, gives elemental status to each of the five. 
6. Theophrastus Phys. Dox. fr. 21 ( = DG 493 = Philoponus Aet. Mund. 13.15 
[520, Rabe]). P. Steinmetz, Die Physik des Theophrastos von Eresos, Palingenesia 1 
(Bad Homburg, Berlin and Zurich, 1964), 162-66, argues on the basis of De Igne 1-6 
and other statements about the effect of the sun that Theophrastus rejected Aristotle's 
fifth element. He is answered by Η. Β. Gottschalk, Gnomon 39 (1967):23-24, who 
defends the traditional view. P. Moraux, "Quinta Essentia," RE 47 (1963): 1231-32, 
cautiously suspends judgment. 
7. The Stoic debt to Aristotle in this regard is acknowledged by Moraux (above, 
note 6), 1234. 
8. Philolaos, DK 44 Β 12, is of doubtful value as evidence either for or against the 
acceptance of Empedocles' four elements in the fifth century B.C. Neither its authentic­
ity nor its interpretation is agreed upon (see above, Chapter 1, note 8). The author of 
the Hippocratic treatise De Carnibus 2 (8.584, Littre) seems to have accepted the four 
elements. For a good discussion of the evolution of the four-element theory in the 
pre-Socratic period, see C. H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmol­
ogy (New York, 1960), 134-54. 
9. Iambi. Theol. Arith. 61. Cf. E. Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, trans. S. 
F. Alleyne and A. Goodwin (London, 1888; reprinted, New York, 1962), 578 and 
note 57 In his Life of Plato Xenocrates attributes a belief in five elementary bodies to 
Plato (fr. 53, Heinze), and it is possible that Plato himself also accepted ihzaether as a 
fifth element after writing the Timaeus. This same fragment has been used by R. 
Heinze, Xenokrates: Darstellung der Lehre and Sammlung der Fragmente (Leipzig, 
1892), 68, as evidence that Xenocrates too accepted aether as a fifth element; but the 
fragment itself says nothing about Xenocrates' own belief, and it is hard to square a 
belief in five elements with Aet. 1.7.30 ( = fr. 15, Heinze), which speaks only of the 
fiery celestial bodies (cf. also fr. 56), air, water, and earth (unless the lacuna in the part 
on air should be filled with a mention of both aether and air, something that Heinze 
attempts neither in his discussion [page 92] nor in his text of the fragment). Zeller, 
594-95, also assigns a belief in five elements to Xenocrates, but he does not make 
clear his evidence. 
10. On Aristotle's achievement in the theory of the transformation of the elements, 
as well as for the previous history and fate of the basic qualities, see Solmsen, 
Aristotle's System (above, note 3), 339-48. 
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11. Solmsen, Aristotle's System (above, note 3), 393-400, discusses the signifi­
cance of the new approach taken in the Meteorology and also comments on its implica­
tions for the chronology of Aristotle's development. 
12. The only exception is Meteor. 1.3.341a3-9, but this is so unusual that com­
mentators feel compelled to explain that he really means "what is called fire" or "the 
potential fire" (cf. Alexander In Meteor. 16.16-18, Hayduck, and H. D. P. Lee, 
Aristotle: Meteorologica, Loeb Classical Library [London and Cambridge, Mass., 
1952], 21, note c). 
13. E. g., the celestial element borders on "the air and the terrestrial region" 
{Meteor. 1.3.340b9-10); "of what is called air the part near the earth is wet and 
hot . . . , and the part above this is hot and dry [i.e., potential fire]" (Meteor. 
1.3.340b24-27); clouds do not form in the higher parts of the region between us and 
the moon because "not only is air present, but rather a kind of fire" (οίον ττνρ, 
Meteor. 1.3.340b29-32); the celestial bodies cause heat and light by friction between 
themselves and the air below them (Cael. 2.7.289al9-21, 28-32). 
14. In few passages, i.e., De Juv. 12.473a4, 14.474bl2, 21.478al6-17 (cf. De 
An. 2.4.416a9-10), Aristotle refers to the innate heat as innate fire. 
15. The following summary owes much to Kahn (above, note 8), 126-33, 140-54, 
159-63, and Solmsen, Aristotle's System (above, note 3), 342-48. 
16. Kahn (above, note 8), 140-46, cites and discusses the evidence of Homer and 
Hesiod. 
17. Anaxagoras (DK 59 Β 1,2, 15; cf. A 42.2, 70) is the best evidence for the 
Ionian association of aether with hot and air with cold. Parmenides (DK 28 Β 11, cf. 
8.56, 9, 10, 12) also seems to regard aether as hot; and Anaximander (DK 12 A 10, cf. 
11.4, 18, 17a) seems to regard air as cold (cf. Kahn [above, note 8], 87; Arist. Phys. 
3.5.204b26-28 [ = DK 12 A 16] would be the best evidence of all, if only we could be 
sure Aristotle is quoting Anaximander and not stating this on his own). 
18. DK 31 Β 21. This is not to say that the powers cannot act at all on their own (cf. 
DK 31 Β 65, 67, 75, 90, 104). By mentioning Empedocles after Anaxagoras I do not 
mean to prejudge the disputed question of priority. Anaxagoras is mentioned first be­
cause his point of view is more akin to that of the earlier Ionian philosophers. 
19. Tim. 61d-62b. For discussion, see Solmsen, Aristotle's System (above, note 3), 
344-45. Solmsen points out that there are some situations in which Plato does make 
use of the powers, e.g., Tim. 50a, 58d, 59d, 79d-e, and 82a-b. 
20. Philistion, fr. 4, cf. 5, in M. Wellmann, Die Fragmente der sikelischen Ante 
(Berlin, 1901). 
21. For Philistion's influence on Plato, see C. Fredrich, Hippokratische Unter­
suchungen, Philologische Untersuchungen 15 (Berlin, 1899), 46-48; Wellman, 
(above, note 20), 10, 69, 74, 81-85; and W. Jaeger, Diokles von Karystos (Berlin, 
1938), 8-11, 211-13. 
22. Gen. Corr. 2.3.331a3-6. His choice of a basic quality for each element seems 
strange, for why should water be basically cold rather than wet? A little thought 
supplies the reason for his choices. Hot obviously characterizes no element but fire. If 
water had been characterized as wet, as would seem natural, Aristotle would have had 
cold and dry to distribute between air and earth; but according to Aristotle's theory air 
is hot and wet, and so neither cold nor dry could be its basic characteristic. His only 
alternative was to make water cold, thereby conveniently retaining the opposition 
between fire and water (Gen. Corr, 2.3.331al-2). 
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23. See above, note 14. 
24. E.g., Gen. An. 2.3.737al2 (vypav καϊ νδατώδ-η), 4.739b27 (ξηραινο μενών 
των γεηρών); Part. An. 2.2-9. In this latter passage Aristotle does not use the 
expression "dry" very frequently (Part An. 2.5.651a33 [ξηρά καϊ γε-ηρά] is a 
revealing exception; cf. also 2.7.653a22-24). For the contrary of vypov he prefers to 
use words meaning "hard" (esp. στερεόν; cf. Part. An. 2.2.647blO-ll). Another 
passage clearly revealing the correspondence of dry with earth and wet with water is 
De Juv. 20.477b24-32; cf. 19.477a27-31. It should, in all fairness, be pointed out 
that the coldness of water and earth is not totally ignored, for the cold brain consists of 
water and earth (Part. An. 2.7.652a24-b23). 
25. Cf. esp. De Juv. 5.469b21-470al8; 14.474M0-24; 21.478al 1-25; 
27.480a27-b6. In De Juv. 20.478al-4 Aristotle generalizes on the equalization of hot 
and cold and says, "the environment equalizes the excess of a state to the mean." 
26. Fr. 6, Wellmann. See above, note 21. This theory is also found in Hipp. De 
Corde 5 (9.84, Littre) and De Sacr. Morb. 4 (6.368, Littre=2.154, Jones). 
27 Cic. Nat. D. 2.44 (=De Phil. fr. 21, Ross), where the voluntary movement of 
the stars can only be due to the fact that they are alive and have souls (cf. Nat. D. 2.42 
[=De Phil. fr. 21, Ross]). It is commonly maintained that Aristotle already introduced 
the theory of the fifth element in On Philosophy (cf., e.g., W. Jaeger, Aristotle: 
Fundamentals of the History of His Development2 , trans. R. Robinson [Oxford, 
1948], 138-54), but I suspect, with W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford, 1936), 
96-97, and D. J. Furley, "Lucretius and the Stoics," BICS 13 (1966): 22-23, that 
this was not the case. If Aristotle still believed the stars to be made of fire, the parallel 
with Stoicism is exact. 
28. As far as we can tell from the extant remains, the Stoics never attempted to 
explain elemental transformation in terms of a generalized theory of genesis as Aristot­
le had done. If they had, they might have run into a serious dilemma. How does the 
wet (i.e., water) become the cold (i.e., air)? This problem could be further compli­
cated by asking how it comes about that in the process of evaporation it is the hot (i.e., 
fire) that is responsible for making the wet (i.e., water) become cold (i.e., air). Cic. 
Nat. D. 2.26-27, which deals with this problem, uses the fact that air originates by 
vaporization of water under the action of heat as proof that air, though the coldest of 
the elements, contains a considerable admixture of heat. This explanation seems to 
betray the theory that each element possesses only one quality and suggests that the 
Stoics did not adhere rigidly to their theory under all circumstances. 
29. Cf. especially Anal. Post. 1.7-9, 28. See Solmsen, Aristotle's System (above, 
note 3), 262-65. 
30. Theophrastus had explored this possibility but had found that it still left some 
unanswered questions, such as how the sun can produce both generative heat and 
ordinary fire. The Stoics seem to have ignored this problem, if they knew it; but they 
did make use of Theophrastus's suggestion about mixed and unmixed heat. One 
illustration of this is the Stoic explanation oipneuma. Aristotle had definedpneuma as 
hot air (Gen. An. 2.2.736al), but the Stoics called it a mixture of air and fire (SVF 
2.310, 442, 841). This is in keeping with Theophrastus's problematic suggestion that 
the heat in earthly things might be a mixed form of the heat that exists in purity at the 
periphery (De Igne 4-5). 
31. This is not to say that the Stoic system is without problems and inconsistencies. 
For one problem, see above, note 28. 
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32. What will never be cannot be called possible, but must be called impossible 
(Metaph. 9.4.1047b3-30). In Int. 13.23a25-26 Aristotle refers to potentialities that 
will never be. Here he must be referring to things like the infinite in number or 
divisibility, which can never exist in acutality, but can exist in thought (Metaph. 
9.6.1048b 14-17; cf. Phys. 3.6). See J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De 
Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 153. 
33. In Cael. 1.12.281a28-b25 he makes use of this principle to prove that the 
eternal cosmos cannot be called destructible (φΰαρτός), i.e., capable of destruction. 
34. Cf. Solmsen, Aristotle's System (above, note 3), 135-43, for a little more 
discussion of the background. 
35. Phys. 4.4.21 lbl4-29. Cf. also Phys. 4.1.209a26-27; 4.4.21 lb8-9, 212a5-7, 
all of which suggest that place requires a contained body. 
36. Phys. 4.1.208b26-27, 7.214al6-17, bl7-18, cf. 213b31-34. When he 
wishes to refute opponents who believe in the existence of void, he puts the definition 
in terms of one of his refuted definitions of place and claims they define void as 
"extension [διάστημα] in which there is no body" (Phys. 4.6.213a27-29, 
7.214a4-6, cf. 19-20), though there is no evidence that his opponents actually used 
such a definition (cf. Solmsen, Aristotle s System [above, note 3], 140-41). 
37. SVF 1.99. SVF 1.94, 95, and 96 are of no value for Zeno's doctrine. 5 VF 1.94 
and 96 are both attributed to Zeno's school ("those around Zeno"), and not specif­
ically to Zeno. Moreover, SVF 1.96 is from Philoponus, who, in general, shows little 
knowledge of Stoicism; and mSVF 1.94 Themistius includes "those around Zeno" in 
a large group of "ancients" who believed in a void beyound the cosmos. Stobaeus's 
version of Aetius 1.18.5; 1.20.1 (=SVF 1.95) does indeed speak of Zeno and his 
followers, but Pseudo-Plutarch's version (=SVF 2.504) assigns thisplacitum to "the 
Stoics" in general. Moreover, this fragment may postdate even Chrysippus. For it 
defines space (χώρα) as a place "partially occupied by body," whereas Chrysippus 
defined space as "the larger [or "relatively large"] thing capable of being occupied by 
being" and  " a kind of larger vessel of a body" or else as "that which makes room for 
a larger body." He said that  "a place partially occupied by body" is the description of 
some nameless entity, different from both void and place (SVF 503, cf. 505). Thus 
Chrysippus seems closer to Aristotle and Epicurus who considered place to be 
synonymous with space (see Bonitz 767a25-28, 859a35; Lucr. 1 426, 472, 955, 
1002, 1074; 2.163, 219, etc.; cf. Epicurus Ep. 1.39-40 [τόπος is conjectural; cf. C. 
Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford, 1928), 279, note 1. H. S. Long, in 
the Oxford text of Diogenes proposes κενόν]; 2.89. See Bailey, 294-99). The defini­
tion of void, place, and space in SVF 1.95; 2.504, 505 would therefore seem to be 
later than Chrysippus. 
38. Cf. Bailey, Atomists (above, note 37), 359, cf. 293-99. 
39 On the originality of Aristotle's approach see Solmsen, Aristotle's System 
(above, note 3), 140-42. 
40. In Cael. 1.9.279al2-13 Aristotle states that "in every place body is capable of 
coming to be." To be accurate he should have added "and acutally is"; but since he 
was not defining place, but merely stating one property of it that the region outside the 
cosmos could not meet, we need not fault him for being incomplete. Nevertheless, his 
statement points the way to Chrysippus's definition of place; whether Aristotle himself 
ever defined place in the way the Stoics did we cannot say. 
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The Aristotelian commentators, Themistius and Simplicius, in commenting on Aris­
totle's four tentative suggestions for the meaning of place, put down the Stoics, 
together with the Atomists, as subscribers to Aristotle's rejected suggestion that place 
might be the interval between the limits of the container (SVF 2.506, 508). It would be 
rash to think Aristotle's rejected suggestion represents the Stoic view precisely 
Simplicius does admit that for the Stoics place is eternally occupied by body (SVF 
2.508), and this sounds like the view we have found attested for Chrysippus. Hence 
the commentators cannot be pressed to yield more than is already known from other 
fragments. 
41 SVF 2.505, which seems to be later than Chrysippus (see above, note 37), 
shows some interesting reminiscences of Aristotle. Void is not only said to be that 
which is capable of being occupied, yet is not occupied, but is also called "an interval 
devoid [έρτημον] of body" or "unoccupied [άκαΰ έκτον μενov] by body." An inter­
val in which there is no body is the description of void given by Aristotle Phys. 
4.6.213a27-29, 7.214a5-6, 19-20. The idea "devoid of body" is also Aristotle's, 
though he prefers words derived from στερέΊν to express the idea of "devoid" (cf. 
Phys. 4.1.208b26, 6.213al8, 7.214al6-17, bl7-18, 8.215all). Place is said to be 
not only "occupied by body" but "coextensive with the containing body" 
(έξισαζόμενον τώκατέχονη οώτόν). Introducing a containing body into the defini­
tion of place is another mark of Aristotle. 
42. Cf. Achilles' statement alleging that the Stoics believed the void to be only 
large enough to hold the fire of the conflagration (SVF 2.610). Whether some later 
Stoics actually held this view or whether Achilles is mistaken, we do not know. 
43. SVF 2.201, cf. 202. See B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley. 1953; reprinted, 
1961), 40-41. 
44. Lucr. 1.968-983. C. Bailey in his commentary, Lucretius: De Re rum Natura 
(Oxford, 1947), 2.763, thinks that the experiment is Lucretius's own addition to the 
Epicurean proofs for the infinity of the void, but there is no proof that Epicurus did not 
himself use it at some time. 
45. Epicurus Ep. 2.89-90; Lucr. 5.416-508; 2.1105-74. Cf. Bailey, Atomists 
(above, note 37), 364-67. The assumption of equal distribution of matter in the void 
led Aristotle to argue that the hypothesis of an infinite void implies an infinity of 
cosmoi, for there cannot be more void in one place than in another (Phys. 
3.4.203b25-27). The Stoics, to judge from the extant remains, seem not to have 
worried about this implication of an infinite void; they simply assert dogmatically that 
the cosmos is unique (SVF 1.97; 2.528, 530, 531, 542, 620). 
46. For the biological side of the solution to this problem, see below, Chapter 5. 
47. Though the words μονή and μενειν are normally used in Stoic contexts to 
refer to the immobility of the cosmos, Chrysippus pointed out that μονή sometimes 
means the absence of local motion and sometimes the retention of shape (SVF 2.492). 
Thus it is not inconceivable that Zeno may have had both the immobility and the 
cohesion of the cosmos in mind, when he used the word μονή. In fact, he may not 
have recognized that the two problems might be different and require separate treat­
ment, since we have no record that he discussed the cohesion of the cosmos separately. 
48. The traditional Stoic theory of the hexis actually seems to have originated with 
Chrysippus (see below. Chapter 5), and the use of the word here may possibly be due 
to the epitomist. I have retained the use of the word in this discussion of Zeno, because 
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it does occur in this text, and because it is useful to describe the doubtlessly Zenonian 
theory that all parts of an object move toward the middle of the object. The difference 
between this idea and Chrysippus's theory of the hexis will become clear in the next 
chapter. 
49. If it is not taken as a restatement of the thesis to be proven but as an explanation 
of the earth's immobility, the analogy between the earth's immobility and that of the 
cosmos becomes difficult to maintain; for then the earth's immobility is explained in 
terms of rest (καθιδρυμένης), instead of motion (φορά), and in terms of the center of 
the earth's environment (i.e., the cosmos), instead of its own center. 
50. For the relationship of the various accounts of this subject, see Appendix 4. 
51. Plutarch Fac. Lun. 924d-e (=SVF 2.646) also seems to represent the Stoic 
theory as one in which the movement of the parts of the earth are toward the center of 
the earth, not toward the center of the cosmos. 
52. Furley (above, note 27), 20, points out that the Stoics prefer to call air and fire 
weightless (άβαρης) rather than light (κουφός). He believes this is the Stoic attempt 
to meet the objection that absolutely light elements would rise forever, leave the 
cosmos, and disperse through the void; and he conjectures that in the Stoic view 
weightless elements, in contrast to light elements, were believed to rise only in the 
presence of heavy elements and so would not leave the cosmos. He is probably right in 
thinking there is a deliberate avoidance of the word κούφος. As Furley points out, 
when Plutarch attempts to juxtapose Chrysippus's statement, "Air of itself has neither 
weight nor lightness," with the contradictory belief that air is κουφός, he can only 
find a quotation in which Chrysippus says fire is άβαρές and air similar (Stoic. Repug. 
1053e [=SVF 2.434, 435]). Moreover, Achilles can be trusted no more than Plutarch 
when he attributes to Chrysippus the belief that air and fire are κούφος (SVF 2.555). 
Nevertheless, I am reluctant to follow Furley in conjecturing that the choice of terms 
means Chrysippus and Zeno consider air and fire to be only relatively light and rising. 
Neither actually says anything like this, and both feel safe in inferring motion upward 
directly from a state of weightlessness, with no proviso concerning the presence of 
heavy elements. Chrysippus even says, "In whatever manner each of the parts moves 
when it is joined with [συμφυές] the remaining parts, in the same manner it is 
reasonable for the part to move by itself, even if, for the sake of argument, we should 
imagine and assume it to be in a void space of this cosmos" (SVF 2.550). Though he 
chooses motion toward the middle as his example of this, I see no reason why it should 
not apply to the motion of fire and air as well. Furthermore, the fact that Zeno is going 
to make the weightless elements balance the heavy and constitute a cosmos with "no 
weight" suggests that he regards the weightlessness of air and fire as an absolute, 
active force. Finally, Zenovs explanation of the position of fire and air at the periphery, 
I feel, also demands that weightlessness be an absolute, active force. 
53. Plutarch Fac. Lun. 943f also alludes to this theory. Achilles appends to his 
account of the theory of Chrysippus an interesting analogy adduced by the Archime­
deans to illustrate the theory. The Archimedeans pointed out that if a piece of lead (the 
heaviest of bodies) and a piece of cork (the lightest of bodies) are bound together and 
placed in the sea, the combination will neither sink to the bottom nor rise to the 
surface, but will remain immobile (Achilles Isagoge 4 [32-33, Maass]). 
54. The same theory is attributed to the Stoics by Plutarch Fac. Lun. 923e-f 
(=SVF 2.646). 
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55. For Aristotle's originality in bringing these concepts into mutual relation for 
application to cosmology, see Solmsen, Aristotle's System (above, note 3), 253-86. 
56. Cael. passim, e.g., 1.2.268bl3-269a2, 8.276a22-30; 3.2.300a20-bl. Note 
also the argument underlying Phys. 2.1.192b35-193al; 4.8.214bl4-15; 
5.6.230bl0-21. 
57 De Sens. 88: "Fire and air appear to be and actually are light by virtue of their 
movements to their own places." In general, in this passage Theophrastus is more 
interested in the relative weight of different quantities of material and so is not as clear 
as he might be on his agreement with Aristotle's basic theory. 
58. Though Aristotle repeatedly defines weight and lightness in terms of movement 
down and up respectively, he occasionally makes statements that give the impression 
that weight and lightness logically precede or even cause movement, e.g., Phys. 
3.5.205b26-28; but Aristotle is absolutely clear that both movement and weight or 
lightness are caused by a third thing. When he actually investigates the mover and 
moved in elemental motion, he says "the gravator and levator are what cause upward 
and downward movement [είς το άνω καϊ το κάτω χινηπκον μεν το βαρνντικόν 
κάί τό χονφιστικόν\ and the potentially heavy and light are what moves" (Cael. 
4.3.310a31 -33). What this "gravator and levator" is Aristotle explains a little later 
when he says that the reason for light moving up and heavy moving down is that light 
and heavy have within themselves  "a principle of change," by which he means nature 
(Cael. 4.3.310b23-25). Cael. 3.2.301 a20-b30 also makes it clear that nature is the 
cause of the "inclination [ροπή] of weight and lightness" (301a22-23). 
We should notice that in the one passage in which Aristotle speaks of elements having 
weight in their own places, he infers it from the fact that these elements, even when 
they are in their natural places, will move down if the element below them is removed 
(Cael. 4.5.312b2—19). He must be attempting to explain the fact that air replaces the 
water drained out of a pond or the earth dug out of a pit, and the fact that water and 
earth will fall to the bottom of a pit. His explanation confirms our contention that 
weight and lightness are determined by movement. 
59. Aristotle most commonly uses natural place or natural movement as the basic 
premise, but Phys. 3.5.205bl5-16, 26-28 are two examples in which weight and 
lightness seem to serve as premise. 
60. Aristotle's definition of weight and lightness had made these qualities natural 
to the elements and independent of an observer, thereby giving them an objective 
status they never had before (cf. Solmsen, Aristotle's System [above, note 3], 280-81, 
and D. Hahm, "Weight and Lightness in Aristotle and His Predecessors," in Motion 
and Time, Space and Matter: Interrelations in the History of Philosophy and Science, 
ed. Peter Machamer and Robert Turnbull (Columbus, Oh., 1976). This may have been 
the reason that Zeno felt no reluctance to make weight and weightlessness inherent 
natural qualities of things, as Epicurus was also doing with weight (cf. J. Burnet, 
Early Greek Philosophy4 [London, 1930; reprinted, New York, 1957], 341-44). 
Before Aristotle, Plato had made heavy and light relative to the observer; weight, Plato 
said, is the pressure an observer feels as like attempts to return to like (Tim. 62c-63e). 
Before Plato philosophers merely mentioned heavy and light without defining the 
nature of these qualities (for estimates of pre-Socratic opinion, see Burnet, 342-43; 
and Solmsen, Aristotle's System [above, note 3], 276-78). 
61. The sequence of priority can be inferred from an analysis of the logic behind 
SVF 1.99. Particularly instructive are the following arguments: "Air and fire collect at 
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the periphery [την σνστασιν προς τ-ην περιφερειαν ποιείσΰοα], for these travel up 
by nature since they have no weight"; and "the whole earth in itself has weight, but 
because it holds the middle position, and such [i.e., heavy] bodies have movement 
toward the center, it remains in this place." 
62. Aristotle discusses the consequences of assuming a moving body that has

neither weight nor lightness and concludes that, on the one hand, natural movement is

impossible for such a body, but, on the other hand, force movement will carry it to

infinity (Cael. 3.2.301a22-bl7).

63. We might notice that when precision is not necessary, even Aristotle can

oversimplify: "If the natural movement is upward, the body is fire or air; if downward,

water or earth" (Cael. 1.2.269al7-18).

64. Cf. Cael. 2.13.294b32-295a2. In Cael. 2.14.296b9-25 heavy and light are

used, but do not enter the argument; they merely serve as synonyms for earth and fire

when Aristotle requires a plural noun ("heavy things" or "light things").

65. Epicurus Ep. 1.61; fr. 275, Usener; Lucr. 2.190, 205, 217-18; Cic. De Fato 
46. See Bailey, Atomists (above, note 37), 289-90. 
66. The Epicureans explained the immobility of the earth and of the cosmos by the 
pressure or blows of atoms of air. On the Epicurean theory that the earth rests on air, 
see Lucr. 5.534-563; Epicurus, fr. 348, Usener; and the papyrus fragments of 
Epicurus'sOn Nature, Book Eleven (discussed by Bailey, Lucretius [above, note 44], 
3.1756). The Epicurean theory that atoms of air in the spaces between the worlds hold 
up our world is recorded by Achilles as a counterpart to the Stoic theory of centripetal 
force (Achilles Isagoge 9 [39, Maass] = Epicurus, fr. 301b [page 353, Usener]). 
67. Furley (above, note 27), 20, comes to this same conclusion, but on the grounds

of an interpretation of Zeno's theory that I cannot accept.

68. There is, of course, always the possibility that Lucretius's refutation unknow­

ingly or deliberately misrepresents the opponents.

69. Furley (above, note 27), 21-23, argues for the young Aristotle oiOn Philoso­
phy and has some points in his favor; but he never considers the question whether 
Aristotle ever maintained that all things strive for the center or why a man who denied 
the existence of an extracosmic void would hold such a belief. Furley, 17-18, gets 
around Lucretius's assumption of a void in his refutation by pointing out that Lucretius 
never expressly attributes it to his opponent and therefore is simply using his own 
assumptions to refute his antagonist. If Lucretius did not know this theory of cen­
tripetal force as a serious explanation for the stability of the cosmos in the void, it is 
strange that he would bother refuting it at all. 
70. SVF 2.555. After his exposition of Chrysippus's theory and of the opinions of 
the Archimedeans and Orphics on the composition of the cosmos, Achilles records a 
proof that the earth stands still and then closes with the opinions of Xenophanes, 
Aristophanes, and Empedocles on this subject (Isagoge 9 [34, Maass]). Von Arnim 
assigns Achilles' proof that the earth stands still to Chrysippus and so prints it in large 
type (SVF 2.555). Presumably the structure of the chapter (i.e., Chrysippus on the 
immobility of the cosmos, followed by other opinions on the immobility or composi­
tion of the cosmos; then an unknown source on the immobility of the earth, followed 
by other opinions on the location or immobility of the earth) suggested that Chrysippus 
was the source also of this theory, especially since the theory contains some elements 
that accord well with Stoicism. If we could be sure it came from Chrysippus, we would 
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have to consider it along with all the other Stoic attempts to solve this problem; but 
since we cannot be sure of its source, it seems best to leave it to the side of our 
discussion. 
This does not mean it is of no interest at all. Achilles' account claims that if a seed is 
dropped into a sausage skin and the skin is inflated, the seed will come to rest in the 
middle of the skin. Then the analogy is drawn: "The earth, under equal pressure 
[ώϋονμενην ίσορρόπως] from the air on all sides, is at rest in the middle." The 
account concludes by comparing the earth to an object bound with ropes pulled equally 
taut in every direction. Though we may be amused at the alleged results of the 
experiment with the seed and the sausage skin, the analogies clarify somewhat the 
principle believed to be involved in the earth's stability. The earth is supported by air 
pressure, and its immobility does not depend on the natural movement of any element. 
If it is a Stoic theory, it would seem to be a remodeling of Zeno's equilibrium theory, 
and one that could stand up even to Epicurean criticism. 
71. SVF 2.554. Themistius attributes the theory that the hexis gives the cosmos 
coherence and immobility to "those around Chrysippus," and von Arnim by his large 
type indicates he believes this goes back to Chrysippus himself (SVF 2.553). The 
expression "those around Chrysippus" cannot be pressed. It may be nothing more 
than a synonym for "Stoics," especially in this case, since Simplicius attributes the 
same theory to the Stoics in general (SVF 2.552). 
72. SVF 2.550. Plutarch preserves these accounts in an attempt to show that they 
are contradicted by another statement by Chrysippus which suggests that the cosmos is 
located at the center of the void and for this reason is incorruptible (SVF 2.551). 
However, Plutarch here seems to have found a theory that Chrysippus mentioned, but 
rejected; and so we cannot use the quotation to shed light on Chrysippus's own 
cosmology. For a full discussion of this passage see Appendix 5. 
73. Lucr. 2.191-205. Though Aristotle attempted to disprove the theory in Cael. 
1.8.277bl-9, it seems to have been accepted by Strato (frs. 50-53, Wehrli). 
CHAPTER V 
Cosmobiology 
For the biological side of Stoic cosmology we are in the fortunate 
position of possessing enough fragments to reconstruct the view of 
each of the three heads of the old Stoa.1 Only a little is known of 
Zeno's cosmobiology. He believed the cosmos to be a living being 
(ζωον), ensouled (έμψυχος), intelligent (νοερός, sapiens), and en­
dowed with both the power of sensation (sentiens) and the power of 
reason (λογικός, SVF 1.111, 112, 113, 114). To prove that the cos­
mos is ensouled, capable of sensation, and intelligent Zeno used three 
basic arguments, one of which was teleological: "Whatever possesses 
reason is better than that which does not possess reason. Nothing is 
better than the cosmos. Therefore the cosmos possesses reason." He 
used the same argument for the other attributes (SVF 1.111). The 
second argument was based on the fact that the parent has the same 
attributes as the offspring: "Nothing devoid of soul or reason can 
generate that which has soul or reason. Now the cosmos generates 
ensouled and reasoning beings. Therefore the cosmos is ensouled and 
has reason" (SVF 1.113). He seems to have given the same argument 
also in more picturesque language: "If melodiously singing flutes were 
born on an olive tree, surely you would not doubt that some knowledge 
of flute playing is in the olive tree. If plane trees bore harmoniously 
sounding lyres, you would again suppose a knowledge of music is in 
the plane trees. Why, then, should not the cosmos be judged ensouled 
and intelligent, since it begets ensouled and intelligent creatures?" 
(SVF 1.112). Finally he argued: "Nothing devoid of sensation can 
have sentient parts. The cosmos has sentient parts. Therefore the cos­
mos is not devoid of sensation" (SVF 1.114). This last argument 
allows us to infer one more fact. Since living things are parts of the 
cosmos, Zeno must have conceived the cosmos to be not merely the 
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physical structure in which men live but the totality of the physical 
structure and the living creatures in it. 
Sextus Empiricus already observed that Plato's view is virtually the 
same as Zeno's (SVF 1.110). Plato, too, said the cosmos is a living 
animal, ensouled and possessing mind (Tim. 30b and passim; Polit. 
269c-d; Phil. 30a-d). Closer examination shows that this observation 
has even more truth than Sextus suspected, for everything known 
about Zeno's cosmobiology is found also in Plato. Plato's world soul 
performs all the activities of a human soul; it has an intelligent 
(εμφρων) life and makes use of calculation (λογισμό?). This reason­
ing activity is called a discourse or logos in the soul and occurs when 
the soul is moved by coming into contact either with the dispersed 
world of perceptible things or the indivisible world of Forms. When 
the discourse is about perceptible things, opinions and beliefs are 
produced; when it is about rational things, mind (νονς) and knowledge 
(επιστήμη) are the result (Tim. 36d-37c). The reasoning power of 
the world soul, described as logos, is plainly stressed by Plato; and the 
power of sensation may be inferred, even though it is not plainly 
stated.2 The same ideas are also found in Zeno's cosmobiology. 
Zeno's cosmos possesses both sensation (SVF 1.114) and reasoning 
power, for which he uses the same word Plato had used to describe the 
activity of his world soul, namely logos (SVF 1.111, 113). Zeno 
elsewhere is reported to have said logos is the nature of the cosmic 
mind (animus Jovis, SVF 1.160, cf. 161). 
Even Zeno's proofs are based on Plato. His teleological proof seems 
to be based on a passage in Plato's Timaeus: " I t neither was nor is 
right for the supremely good to do anything but the best. After thinking 
about it, he [scil. the demiurge] found that among naturally visible 
things no work that is without mind will be better than one with mind, 
when each is considered as a whole; and it is impossible for mind to be 
present in anything without soul. On the basis of this reasoning in 
fashioning the Universe he placed mind in soul, and soul in body, so 
that the finished work might be by nature the most beautiful and best 
possible" (Tim. 30a-b). Zeno has modified Plato's argument only so 
far as to eliminate Plato's genetic point of view. 
Zeno's second type of proof is based on the argument attributed to 
Socrates in Plato's Philebus and Xenophon's Memorabilia* In Plato, 
Socrates argues that the elements in our bodies are derived from the 
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elements in the body of the cosmos. Socrates then goes on to say that 
our bodies also have soul and asks: "Whence can a human body have 
received its soul, if the body of the universe does not possess soul?" 
{Phil. 29a-30a). In Xenophon, Socrates uses the same argument in a 
briefer form to prove that mind (νονς) is in the cosmos (Mem. 1.4.8). 
Socrates' argument presupposes that all components of a living thing 
are derived from the components of the cosmos, and this is reason to 
believe that the cosmos must, like a man, have a soul and reason. In 
the Timaeus Plato gives a "likely" explanation of the way in which a 
man derives his components from the cosmos. The demiurge fashions 
human souls out of the ingredients left over from making the world 
soul (Tim. 4Id). Then his children, the celestial gods, borrow a quan­
tity of each of the four elements from the cosmos, rivet it together, and 
enclose a human soul within each body (Tim. 42e-43a). Zeno's only 
contribution to the Platonic argument is claiming the process by which 
man is derived from the cosmos to be biological generation. This is a 
simple natural step, since both man and his source are living beings. 
Zeno's third argument is not found as such in Plato, but its underly­
ing premise is Platonic. Zeno's argument assumes that individual liv­
ing things are organic parts of the cosmos. This unusual idea resembles 
Plato's statement that the cosmos was created in imitation of "that 
living being of which the other living beings individually and generi­
cally are parts" (Tim. 30c). Thus for Plato, as forZeno, our cosmos is 
a living being, and the individual living things in it are parts of the 
whole cosmic animal. 
The similarity between Zeno's conception of the cosmos as a living, 
intelligent animal and Plato's discussions of this subject makes it prob­
able that Zeno was directly influenced by Plato.4 Although the concep­
tion of an ensouled cosmos lived on in the Academy,5 as far as we can 
tell from the fragmentary remains, no philosopher set forth anything as 
close to Zeno's view as did Plato himself. We might well ask, then, 
why Zeno chose to follow Plato so closely on this point. We have 
found that, in general, Zeno's cosmology has taken its start from 
Aristotle, so this leap back over Aristotle to Plato seems somewhat 
anomalous. But we must remember that the Stoic conception of the 
cosmos as a living, ensouled animal was a very deep one. Since 
Aristotle did not provide much material on the soul of the cosmos, it is 
not too surprising that Zeno would turn to someone who did. 
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Moreover, if we look a little deeper, we shall find that Zeno has not 
necessarily ignored the Peripatetic developments in this area. 
Plato had made a self-moving world soul responsible for all move­
ment in the cosmos {Leg. 10.895e-897b). Aristotle, however, had 
rejected this view and had pointed out that a self-mover can actually be 
resolved into an active and a passive part, an unmoved mover and a 
first moved {Phys. 8.5.257a31-258b9). Thus all movement in the 
cosmos can ultimately be traced back to an unmoved first mover out­
side the cosmos. Since there can be no contact with the partless, 
incorporeal unmoved mover, the first moved, the sphere of the fixed 
stars, is caused to move by desire (όρεξις) for the unmoved mover 
(Phys. 7.1; 8.4-10 [esp. 8.10.267a21-b26]; Metaph. 12.7.1072a21­
b4). With this explanation Aristotle had satisfied himself that soul is not 
the ultimate cause of all movement. 
Theophrastus took issue with Aristotle's theory and argued that if 
the heavenly bodies are capable of desire (όρεξις), they must also 
possess soul and therefore psychic movement or change. Both desire 
and the perception that leads to desire have their origin in soul and the 
psychic movements of the body. Accordingly, the thing desired cannot 
be considered the first cause of movement, because the perception of 
the thing desired and the subsequent desire for it presuppose the exis­
tence of movement.6 Instead, the soul of the first moved body must be 
reckoned the first cause of movement. Thus Aristotle's theory actually 
leads to the conclusion that the soul possessed by the stars is the real 
first mover. In effect, then, Theophrastus has shown that Aristotle's 
theory, if followed out logically, comes back to the position of Plato.7 
If Zeno knew Theophrastus's examination of Aristotle's theory of the 
first mover, it is understandable that he conceived of the cosmos as a 
living thing, owing its movement to soul; and it is not so strange that 
he turned to Plato for elaboration of this idea. 
Whether Zeno went beyond Plato at all is hard to say. He probably 
went beyond Plato at least so far as to identify the world soul with fire, 
so that it might have a material substance (SVF 1.157, cf. 154). But 
we have no idea whether or not he made use of this identification to 
introduce strictly biological doctrines into his cosmology. The only 
biological motif we know he introduced is the idea that living things 
are derived from the cosmos by a reproductive process (SVF 1.112, 
113). So it seems quite possible that in his one book on cosmology, On 
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the Universe, Zeno did not go much beyond the Platonic conception of 
the world soul. 
When we turn to the cosmobiology attested for Cleanthes, we find 
the picture quite different. With Cleanthes the predominant motifs are 
physiological, though fitted into the Platonic structure of Zeno's cos­
mobiology. We do not know whether this new look was original with 
Cleanthes, or was developed already by Zeno later in life, after he had 
published the doctrines just reconstructed, or even whether it was part 
of Zeno's original cosmobiology and has merely been lost. All we can 
do is discuss this new approach in connection with Cleanthes and leave 
the question of its original proponent open. 
For Cleanthes, as for Zeno, the cosmos has a soul. "The soul 
permeates the whole cosmos, and we share a part of it and are conse­
quently ensouled" (SVF 1.495, cf. 532). Fortunately, Cicero in On 
the Nature of the Gods preserves a long discussion of the world soul 
that seems to go back to Cleanthes.8 This fragment is particularly 
valuable because it displays the Stoic ideas in context. If we collect the 
conclusions of each section of this account, we can deduce Cleanthes' 
aim. The account aims to prove that the cosmos is preserved by the 
fiery world soul as an intelligent {sapiens), sensitive (non sine sensu), 
ensouled animal (animans).9 It would, therefore, seem that Cleanthes 
is faithfully following Zeno and attempting to prove Zeno's contention 
that the cosmos is a rational, intelligent, sensitive ensouled animal. 
What is new is Cleanthes' proof for this doctrine. 
Zeno's proofs were taken directly from Plato and by themselves 
gave not the slightest indication that the world soul is a material entity; 
Cleanthes rests his proof on the assumption that the heat of the cosmos 
is the world soul. To determine his basis for this assumption and for his 
proof in general, we must look at his arguments in detail. The first part 
of Cleanthes' proof is devoted to proving that the cosmos is preserved 
in a long life by the heat (in tanta diuturnitate servari, Nat. D. 2.28). 
In the previous chapter we examined one of the problems that plagued 
Zeno, namely the survival of the cosmos in the void. The fact that 
Chrysippus was still working on this problem proves that Zeno's at­
tempts had not settled the issue. Hence the survival of the cosmos must 
have been one of the crucial problems facing Cleanthes during his 
leadership of the Stoa. How Cleanthes answered the charges that the 
cosmos would disintegrate in the void, we are not explicitly told; but in 
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this fragment Cleanthes is obviously concerned with the preservation 
of the cosmos in its present state of organization. This may be part of 
Cleanthes' attempt to solve the problem he had inherited from Zeno. 
Cicero's summary of Cleanthes shows how Cleanthes proved that 
the ethereal heat preserves the cosmos. His entire proof rests on an 
analogy with a living animal. Every living thing contains heat without 
which it cannot be nourished or grow; for the heat is a self-mover, and 
everything that is nourished and grows uses a definite and uniform 
movement. As long as this movement remains in us, sensation and life 
remain; but as soon as the heat is extinguished, we die. Cleanthes uses 
several proofs to show that heat is involved in the digestive process and 
in the uniform movement of the pulse, which supplies nutrients for 
growth. Consequently he concludes that everything which has life, 
plant or animal, lives on account of the heat within it (Nat. D. 2 .23­
24). 
From this Cleanthes infers that heat possesses a vital force that 
extends throughout the cosmos. This inference he supports by a proof 
that appears to resemble his proof that heat supplies the vital force in 
men but that is quite different in form, since the key to his microcos­
mic proof, the contrast between the presence and absence of heat, is 
not applicable to the cosmos. First he demonstrates the importance of 
heat in all the major parts of the cosmos, just as he had demonstrated 
its importance in the vital processes of nutrition and growth. He gives 
proofs for the presence of heat in earth, water, and air, pointing out 
that water is fluid only because heat is mixed in, and that air, though 
the coldest of the elements, is generated from water by heat and hence 
contains at least a little heat. The fourth element is heat itself, the 
source of all the other vital, health-giving heat in the cosmos. His 
conclusion is that since all the major parts of the cosmos are sustained 
by heat, the cosmos itself is preserved in such a long life by the same 
or a similar substance (Nat. D. 2.24-28). 
The form of this proof is recognizable as Zeno's. Zeno had argued: 
"Nothing devoid of sensation can have sentient parts. The cosmos has 
sentient parts. Therefore the cosmos is not devoid of sensation" (SVF 
1.114). Cleanthes has merely changed the content; if the parts are 
sustained by heat, then the whole is also sustained by heat. If we may 
trust Cicero's account, Cleanthes did not rest this proof only on the 
argument from parts to whole, but added that the conclusion is all the 
142 The Origins of Stoic Cosmology 
more true because the heat is interfused with nature in such a way that 
it is the generative power by which plants and animals are born and 
grow (Nat. D. 2.28). Cleanthes seems to be arguing that since the heat 
in living things is the sustaining vital force, the cosmic heat from 
which these living things are derived must therefore be the sustaining 
vital force in the cosmos. In form this looks like an adaptation of 
Zeno' s argument that since the cosmos generates ensouled and rational 
creatures, it too must be ensouled and rational (SVF 1.112, 113). 
Formally, Zeno's argument is that the source must have the same 
qualities as the derivatives of the source; Cleanthes argument is that the 
heat in the source must have the same function as the heat in the 
derivatives of the source. Thus by adopting certain logical forms from 
Zeno, Cleanthes has proved that the ethereal heat preserves the cos­
mos. We shall return later to the general significance of Cleanthes' 
physiological conception of the world soul, but first we may ask what 
importance his point of view had for the question why the cosmos 
endures. 
In the next section of Cicero's summary the sustaining vital heat is 
described as a substance that holds together (contineat) and preserves 
(tueatur) the whole cosmos (Nat. D. 2.29), and as a substance that 
holds all things in its embrace (res omnes conplexa teneat), with the 
result that the cosmos is held together (contineri) by a divine nature 
(Nat. D. 2.30). According to Cicero, Cleanthes also describes the 
celestial heat as "poured around on all sides, binding (cingentem) and 
embracing (conplexum) all things" (Nat. D. \31[=SVF 1.534]). The 
idea contained in the word tueatur is the preservation that dominates 
the text we have been discussing, but the idea expressed in contineat 
and contineri is new. This word seems to translate σννεχειν, a term 
that we shall see had great importance later as a technical term for the 
function of the pneuma in holding things together and giving them 
unity. In fact, this is the term used for the coherence of the cosmos in 
the void (SVF 2.540, 551, 552, 553). The occurrence of this term in 
Cleanthes' discussion of the heat is a strong indication that Cleanthes 
used the heat to explain the cohesion of the cosmos in the void, 
considering the cohesion of the cosmos an essential part of its "preser­
vation in a long life." 
It is hard to tell how Cleanthes meant the term to be taken. The 
expression "heat which binds together" (cingentem ardorem, Cic. 
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Nat. D. 1.31[ = SVF 1.534]) could suggest that the celestial fire has a 
binding force that is due to its encircling nature, but need not necessar­
ily have this meaning. On the one hand, Plato, attempting to explain 
why the elements do not separate from each other, says, "The circum­
ference [περίοδος] of the universe . . . being circular and naturally 
wishing to come together upon itself, binds all things together 
[σφίγγει] and allows no empty space to be left" (Tim. 58a). Plato 
seems to take literally the binding function of the outermost heaven.1 0 
On the other hand, the idea that the aether binds the cosmos together is 
an old poetic idea. Empedocles speaks of the "aether which binds 
together [σφίγγων] all things in a circle" (DK 31 Β 38.4); so we 
cannot really draw any inferences from Cleanthes' language, espe­
cially since he was also a poet.1 1 It is well to remember that the 
Epicurean poet Lucretius described the aether in terms very similar to 
those of Cleanthes, for he says the aether, "set around on all sides, 
binds1 2 and, spreading wide in every direction, fences in all other 
things in its greedy embrace" (5.467-470: circumdatus undique 
(flexit) I et late diffusus in omnis undique partis I omnia sic avido 
complexu cetera saepsit). 
Whether Cleanthes also saw in the poetic description of the all-
embracing heavens a force literally binding by encirclement, or 
whether he believed the heat to hold the cosmos together only from the 
inside in the manner in which it sustains living things, he has made a 
significant advance overZeno's theory. In Cleanthes' theory the cos­
mos no longer has to rely on the natural movements of its elements if it 
hopes to remain intact. This natural movement, which was vulnerable 
to Epicurean attack, is now superfluous;13 one of the elements pro­
vides the force that preserves the cosmos.1  4 The troublesome question 
what keeps the cosmos from disintegrating in the void and perishing 
has been answered by Cleanthes on the basis of a biological analogy 1  5 
As the vital force of the heat sustains us, so it preserves and holds 
together the cosmos, which is a living being as much as any man. 
Cleanthes has simply extended the use of the biological analogy that 
Zeno introduced, to an area and problem to which Zeno had not yet 
applied it.1 6 
Having proved that the cosmos is sustained and maintained by the 
vital heat, Cleanthes now turns to the proof that the cosmos is intelli­
gent. The argument (Nat. D. 2.29-30) is difficult to interpret in its 
144 The Origins of Stoic Cosmology 
context; it seems likely that a section has been omitted. Possibly Nat. 
D. 2.40-44 was originally composed to fit between Nat. D 2.29 
{dominatuque dignissimum) and Nat. D. 2.30 (Videmus).17 If so, 
Cleanthes argues that the sun is composed of the kind of fire that is in 
living things, namely, the vital fire; and so it and the other celestial 
bodies must be living animals. Cleanthes then sets out to prove that the 
celestial bodies possess sensation and intelligence. His proof is in­
teresting because it borrows material from Plato and Aristotle. Aristot­
le is mentioned by name on two occasions; and since the quotations 
from Aristotle do not come from any extant treatise, it seems reason­
able to assume that Cleanthes is quoting the now lost On Philosophy.18 
Cleanthes' assertion that the regularity of the heavenly movements 
rules out nature or chance as cause and indicates rather that the 
heavenly bodies are moved of their own accord by sensation and 
divinity (Nat. D. 2 A3) seems to be reminiscent of Plato (Leg. 
10.888e-898c). Plato distinguishes nature (φύσις), chance (τύχη), 
and art, also called mind or god (τέχνη, νονς, &εός) as sources of 
movement (Leg. 10.888e, 889c). He rejects the theory of the physi­
cists who say the movement in the cosmos is due, in the first place, to 
nature or chance (Leg- 10.888e-891d); and he demonstrates that it is 
due rather to a self-moving soul, which moves the cosmos with the 
movement of reason, namely, uniform, circular movement.1 9 
Having proven with arguments derived from Plato and Aristotle that 
the celestial bodies are sentient and rational, Cleanthes again makes 
use of Zeno's argument from parts to whole to prove that the celestial 
heat is sentient and rational. Since the celestial bodies, consisting of 
vital heat and therefore parts of the vital heat, are sentient and rational, 
the whole of the vital heat that holds the cosmos together and preserves 
it must possess sensation and reason. Therefore the cosmos itself must 
be intelligent (sapiens) and, in fact, a god.2 0 Thus, once again, 
Cleanthes has taken the doctrine and the formal syllogistic structure 
from Zeno and filled the form with new content to prove the doctrine. 
The content again includes a physiological view of the soul of the 
cosmos and draws on the writings of Plato and Aristotle without em­
barrassment. 
The next section (Nat. D. 2.30-31, atque etiam . . . ardore 
teneatur) proves that the cosmos possesses sensation. Here the initial 
assumption is that the heat of the cosmos is the same as the heat in us. 
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This belief was first stated in Cleanthes' proof that the cosmos is 
sustained by heat. There he said the heat of the cosmos is infused in 
nature so as to be the generative principle and that by which plants and 
animals are caused to be born and grow (Nat. D. 2.28). Then in the 
proof that the cosmos is intelligent Cleanthes demonstrated that the 
heat in the sun and in living things is of the same nature (Nat. D. 
2.40-41). Now he simply assumes that the heat of the cosmos is 
identical with the vital heat in us. His argument is that since the cosmic 
heat is purer, brighter, and more mobile than our heat, it must be more 
suited for producing sensation. If even our inferior heat produces sen­
sation in us, the superior cosmic heat must produce sensation in the 
cosmos; so the cosmos must be sentient. This a fortiori argument, 
which, as far as we can tell, has not, as the previous arguments, 
obtained its form from Zeno, resembles Cleanthes' other arguments in 
being built around a physiological conception of the cosmos. 
Finally Cleanthes approaches the world soul directly. The heat of 
the cosmos is not moved by another force—for what stronger force 
exists? It must therefore be self-moved (per se ipse ac sua sponte 
moveatur). Plato, "that god of philosophers as it were," says that 
self-movement is more divine than movement caused from without, 
and self-movement exists only in soul. Therefore, since the heat of the 
cosmos is self-moved, it must be soul; and the cosmos must be a 
living, ensouled creature (Nat. D. 2.31-32, praesertim cum . . . esse 
mundum). This time to prove Zeno's doctrine Cleanthes has helped 
himself to the ideas of Plato's Laws (Leg. 10.895b-899b; cf. Phaedr. 
245c-246a, Tim. 89a). But Cleanthes has made some changes, for 
Plato's self-moving soul was an incorporeal source of movement, act­
ing in some obscure way upon the heavenly bodies, whereas 
Cleanthes' self-moving soul is the corporeal cosmic heat. Once again, 
Cleanthes' physiological conception of the world soul is the basis on 
which he constructs a proof for Zeno's doctrine out of this Platonic 
material. 
This lengthy passage clearly reveals how Cleanthes worked. He 
accepted Zeno's doctrine that the cosmos is a sentient, intelligent, 
ensouled animal. Then he took Zeno's syllogisms and appropriate 
ideas and arguments from Plato and Aristotle, and transformed them 
into a proof for Zeno's doctrine. Underlying this transformation of the 
borrowed arguments was a single, powerful idea, the idea that the heat 
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of the cosmos is its soul and consequently the cause of its survival, 
life, sensation, and intelligence. This is the new idea that transforms 
Zeno's general idea of a world soul into a physiological theory. 
Cleanthes thus brings out the full import of Zeno's belief that the 
cosmos is a living animal and that its vital processes are accordingly 
physiological. Whereas Zeno developed the implications of this idea 
for cosmogony, Cleanthes applies it consistently to the continued exis­
tence of the cosmos.21 
From Cleanthes' discussion it is possible to deduce his theory of 
cosmic physiology. The cosmic heat, as soul of the cosmos, performs 
several functions. First of all, it sustains and preserves the cosmos and 
gives it life.22 The analogy with the heat of the body suggests that the 
function of preservation is allied with, and perhaps equivalent to, the 
heat's function of causing nutrition and growth (Nat. D. 2.23-24, cf. 
40-41). In addition to the nutritive function, the cosmic heat has the 
function of producing sensation, just as the vital heat produces sensa­
tion in animals (Nat. D 2.30-31; cf. 23, 41). Finally, since this heat, 
possessing sensation and reason, enables the cosmos to be called intel­
ligent, it seems to function as the mind of the cosmos.23 
The most striking thing about the three functions of the heat in 
Cleanthes is that they correspond exactly to the three functions of the 
soul, or the three kinds of soul, in Aristotle. For Aristotle recognized 
as distinct the nutritive (ΰρεπτυκόν), perceptive (αϊσ&ητικόν), and 
rational (δίανοητυκόν, λογιστικό^) faculties of the soul.24 The re­
semblance becomes all the more striking when we compare the details 
of each function. Aristotle considered nutrition and growth to be the 
basic prerequisite of all life. Plants, for example, are living things, 
though they possess only this one aspect of soul. Thus both plants and 
animals possess the nutritive soul (De An. 2.2.413a20-bl0, 
3.414a29-bl, 4.415a23-25, b26-28; 3.9.432a29-30, 12.434a22­
27; cf. Part An. 2.10.655b28-34; Gen. An. 2.1.735al5-21; Eth. 
Nic. 1.7.12.1097b33-1098al). Cleanthes, too, moves from nutrition 
and growth to life, as if the terms were coextensive; and when he 
speaks of nutrition, growth, and life, he mentions both plants and 
animals (Nat. D. 2.24, 28), though plants are not mentioned in his 
later discussion of the perceptive and rational functions of the heat. 
Moreover, we took note that part of the heat's sustaining function is 
to hold the organism together (continere — σννεχειν). Aristotle in dis­
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cussing the nutritive function of the soul said Empedocles attributed 
the growth of plants to the natural movement of the elements. Earth 
moves down and causes the roots to spread downward; fire moves up 
and so causes the plant to grow upward. One of Aristotle's arguments 
against Empedocles' theory was that if fire and earth move in opposite 
directions, they will be torn apart unless something prevents them. 
There must be something holding them together (το σννεχον), and 
this will be the soul and the cause of growth and nourishment (De An. 
2.4.415b28-416a9; cf. 1.5.41155-19). So even the function of hold­
ing the organism together was found in Aristotle's doctrine of the 
nutritive soul. As Aristotle continued his discussion of the function of 
the nutritive soul, he explained the difference between the terms 
"nourishment" and "growth." Food is a promoter of growth for a 
living body qua quantitative, whereas food is nourishment for a body 
qua individual and substance; for food preserves (σώζει) substance. 
Consequently this soul principle is a power that preserves (δυναμις 
οία σώζειν) its possessor; and food prepares it to do this (De An. 
2.4.416bl 1 — 19). Here Aristotle specifically gave the nutritive soul a 
preservative function, the very function that looms so large in 
Cleanthes' discussion of the first function of heat in the cosmos (cf. 
servari, tueatur, Nat. D. 2.28, 29). 
There is still one essential difference between Aristotle and 
Cleanthes. Aristotle assigned this nutritive, preservative function to 
the soul, which, as "the first realization of a natural body potentially 
possessing life" (De An. 2.1.412a27-28), is incorporeal. Cleanthes, 
on the other hand, assigns this function to the vital heat. The gap 
between them is vast, but not unbridgeable. In his discussion of the 
nutritive soul Aristotle raised the question whether it would be correct 
to call fire the cause of nutrition and growth. He asserted this would 
not be correct; rather we should say fire is the contributing cause 
(σνναίτιον) and soul is the real cause (απλώς αίτιον, De An. 
2.4.416a9-18). To be more specific, he said, the agent of nourishment 
(το τρέφον) is the soul; the means of nourishment (ώ τρέφεται) is the 
food, though actually "means of nourishment" has a double meaning, 
since every food must be cooked, and cooking is accomplished by 
heat. He concluded from this that every ensouled body possesses heat 
(De An. 2.4.416b20-29). Aristotle then dismissed the subject with the 
excuse that this process must be explained more clearly elsewhere. 
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Although there is no specific discussion of nutrition extant, there are 
many incidental statements in which Aristotle reiterated his position on 
the relation between the nutritive soul and heat. In On Youth and Old 
Age he said, "The other faculties of soul cannot exist without the 
nutritive; and this not without natural fire, for nature has kindled 
[έμπεπνρενκεν] the soul in this fire" (De Juv. 14.474blO-13, cf. 
27.480al6-19; Gen. An. 2.4.740b29-34). Again he said, "Life and 
the possession of soul are accomplished by heat, for the cooking 
through which food comes to living things cannot occur without soul 
and heat" {De Juv. 14.474a25-28; cf. 4.469bll-12; 6.470al9-20; 
Part. An. 2.3.650a2-7). Finally, in On the Parts of Animals he faced 
the crucial question whether the soul is actually the fire of the body. 
Without outrightly rejecting the idea he said: "Perhaps it would be 
better to say that the soul subsists [σννεστάναι] in some such material 
[i.e., fire]. The reason for this is that of the corporeal substances the 
hot is the most serviceable for the activities of the body; for to nourish 
and cause movement are activities of the soul, and these come about 
primarily through the hot power" (Part. An. 2.7.652b8-13). He con­
cluded that saying the soul is fire is like saying that the craftsman and 
his tool are the same thing (Part. An. 2.7.652bl3-15). Clearly Aristo­
tle's position was that soul and fire are closely connected but not 
identical. Since, as Aristotle admitted, the soul had been identified 
with fire in the past, and since Aristotle himself still recognized a close 
connection between heat and the soul in its nutritive function, it was no 
difficult matter for Cleanthes to identify them again.25 Then having 
taken this step, he could easily extend the identification to the other 
functions of the soul. This he had to do on his own, because Aristotle 
did not connect heat very closely with sensation or reason. Sensation 
he connected with pneuma, 26 and reason he associated with no mate­
rial substance at all (De An. 2.2.413b24-27; Gen. An. 2.3.736b27­
29). 
Cleanthes does not go into detail on the heat's role in the production 
of sensation (Nat. D. 2.30-31), so we cannot compare his theory with 
Aristotle's; but he does have something to say on the rational aspect of 
the soul. Cleanthes concludes that the cosmos is intelligent because it 
possesses a part that is sentient and rational. In physical terms this part 
is the heat of the cosmos and, in particular, the heat of the heavenly 
bodies; in psychological terms this part is the soul. If our hypothesis 
that Nat. D. 2.40-44 was written to come between Nat. D. 2.29 and 
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30 is correct, Cleanthes proved that the heat has sensation and reason 
by means of two arguments. The first of these, based on the fact that 
the environment of the stars produces sensation and reason, may have 
connections with the cosmology and theology of Aristotle's On Phi­
losophy, but not with his psychological doctrine per se.2 7 The second 
argument merits closer examination. The movement of the heavenly 
bodies that embody the heat is the initial datum on which Cleanthes' 
inference is based. The path by which he goes from this movement to 
the conclusion that the heavenly bodies (and therefore the heat of 
which they are composed) possess sensation and reason is by no means 
clear from Cicero's summary, but it becomes amply clear against the 
background supplied by Aristotle's theory of animal movement. 
Cleanthes infers from the regularity of the celestial movements that 
these movements cannot be due to chance or nature, but must be 
self-moved. Up to this point the argument is Platonic and proves only 
that the movements are due to soul.2 8 Then the argument goes on to 
infer that the heavenly bodies are moved "by their sensation and 
divinity" (suo sensu ac divinitate, Nat. D. 2.43). Plato does link god 
with the mind, which he contrasts to nature and chance {Leg. 10.889c); 
but it is not clear how Cleanthes goes from self-induced movement of 
soul to movement based on sensation, unless Cleanthes is assuming 
with Aristotle that in ensouled animals local movement is a product of 
sensation. Aristotle does not say movement is produced directly by the 
faculty of sensation, nor any other faculty for that matter; but the 
process that leads to local movement presupposes and, in fact, is 
initiated by perception (De An. 3.9-11 [esp. 3.10.433b27-30]; 
3.12.434a22-b8, cf. 3.3.428bl0-429a9). If Cleanthes made this 
same assumption, local movement in ensouled animals is an adequate 
indication that the moving animal has sensation.29 
Cleanthes goes on to approve Aristotle's inference from the circular­
ity of the heavenly movements that the celestial bodies are moved 
neither by nature nor by force, but by will (Nat. D. 2.44). Again it is 
not clear how this leads to the conclusion that the heavenly bodies 
possess sensation or reason. However, it is possible to reconstruct a 
path on the basis of the Stoic premise that will is a "desire with 
reason" and can occur only in the wise.3 0 Now a comparison with 
Aristotle's theory of movement reveals that this reconstruction is in 
substantial agreement with Aristotle. According to Aristotle the cause 
of local movement is appetite (όρεξίς). When mind produces move­
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ment, it, of course, does this with appetite, but with a specific kind of 
appetite called will (βονλτησίς); for will is appetite with reasoning 
(λογισμός). There is also appetite without reasoning; this is called 
desire (επιΰνμία, De An. 3.10.433a22-27). If Cleanthes had Aristot­
le's theory in mind—and this is quite possible, since the Stoics obvi­
ously took over much of his theory into their ethics31—the voluntary 
movement of the stars is adequate proof that they also possess reason. 
It seems more than coincidence that Aristotle's theory of movement 
contains ideas that can transform the loosely reasoned argument of 
Cicero, Nat. D. 2.43-44 into a strictly reasoned piece of writing. It is 
tempting to conjecture that Cicero has abridged the original argument 
and that this argument is as close to Aristotle as Cleanthes' discussion 
of the sustaining function of the soul. If Cleanthes actually wrote this 
section, the similarities between Cleanthes' conception of the world 
soul and Aristotle's doctrine of the human soul are even more 
remarkable—so remarkable, in fact, as to suggest that Cleanthes de­
vised his doctrine under the influence of Aristotle's psychology. 
There are two aspects of Cleanthes' conception of the world soul on 
which we have not yet touched. Cleanthes considered the sun to be the 
ruling principle or hegemonikon of the cosmos (SVF 1.499). 
Hegemonikon in the Stoic vocabulary is the technical term for the chief 
part of the soul. Zeno and most of the Stoics after him divided the soul 
into eight parts: the hegemonikon, the five senses, the vocal part, and 
the generative part.32 There is no evidence that Zeno himself identified 
the parts of the world soul or applied the term hegemonikon to a part of 
the cosmos; and Cleanthes' justification of his use of this word for the 
sun gives the impression that he was innovating at this point.33 If this 
was his own innovation, it was in keeping with the Stoic assumption 
that analogy from the microcosm is a valid means of explaining the 
macrocosm. The eight parts or spheres in the heavens (sun, moon, five 
planets, and the sphere of the fixed stars) may have reminded 
Cleanthes of the eight parts of the soul and suggested that one of these 
heavenly bodies must be the hegemonikon. At any rate, Cleanthes, in 
making the sun the ruling part, was expanding Zeno's conception of 
the world soul, in this case not on the basis of Aristotle's psychology 
but on the basis of the existing Stoic doctrine of the human soul.34 
Though Cleanthes' identification of the sun as the principal part of 
the world soul is based primarily on the Stoic doctrine of the soul, we 
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must not forget that it had a partial precedent in Aristotle's cosmology. 
In On the Heavens Aristotle maintained that just as the true center 
{μέσον) of an animal (i.e., the heart) is not at the center of the body, 
so in the cosmos the true center and arche is not at the geometrical 
center but at the periphery (Cael. 2.13.293b6-15). The parallel with 
Aristotle would be closer if Cleanthes, like Chrysippus (SVF 2.642, 
644), had considered the aether as a whole to be the principal part of 
the world soul. As it is, Aristotle provides a precedent both for the use 
of the zoological analogy to determine the true center or ' 'heart'' of the 
cosmos and also for placing the "heart" of the cosmos in the heavenly 
region. 
Another example of Cleanthes' expansion of the concept of the 
world soul on the basis of the Stoic doctrine of the human soul can be 
seen in Cleanthes' statement that the sun and other heavenly bodies, 
being fire, cannot exist without nourishment (Nat. D. 2.40). Therefore 
the sun is nourished by exhalations from the ocean and the rest of the 
heavenly bodies by exhalations from the rest of the water on the earth's 
surface (Nat. D. 2.40 [=SVF 1.504], 43; SKF 1.501). Cleanthes uses 
this theory to explain the solstices. The sun, requiring a tremendous 
amount of moisture to feed on, has to remain over the ocean that 
girdles the globe; therefore it turns back when it reaches the edge of the 
ocean (SVF 1.501). Cleanthes' theory is obviously patterned on 
Zeno's theory of the soul, which Cleanthes quotes with approval (SVF 
1.519). Zeno held that the soul is a perceptive exhalation 
(άναϋνμίασις) and that souls are continually renewed (νεαραί)35 by 
being exhaled (άναϋνμαώμεναι, SVF 1.139[= 520], 141 [in 
part = 519]). The exhalation for the human soul comes from the blood 
(SVF 1.140[ = 521]; cf. 2.778, 781, 782, 847). Cleanthes has merely 
extended this theory to the world soul and has concluded that the 
heavenly bodies are sustained by exhalations from the liquids of the 
world's body. 
However, by making this extension he has brought his astronomical 
theory into harmony with the theory of Heraclitus. Heraclitus held that 
the heavenly bodies are fire, and in fact, fire consuming an exhalation 
from the sea; so like the Stoics, he maintained that the heavenly bodies 
are sustained by exhalations (DK 22 A 1.9-10; 11; 12). This theory 
was not limited to Heraclitus. Anaximenes seems to have held that the 
heavenly bodies came into existence when moisture rising from the 
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earth was rarefied so far as to become fire.36 Xenophanes also believed 
that the sun draws up moisture (DK 21 A 46; Β 30) and is itself a 
collection of fiery particles gathered from the wet exhalation (DK 21 A 
33.3; 40). In fact, it is not impossible that this was the general Milesian 
theory.37 This theory, and particularly Heraclitus's version of it, ought 
to be compared in detail with the Stoic theory. Unfortunately the 
nature of our sources makes this virtually impossible,38 and so only a 
few details may be compared. The notion that the heavenly bodies use 
water as food (τροφή) may have been held by Heraclitus, though this 
is not certain.39 The idea was certainly put forth by someone before the 
Stoic era, because Aristotle refutes it.4  0 That the sun's search for food 
is responsible for the solstices is also mentioned by Aristotle in the 
same context. If Aristotle is referring to Heraclitus, this idea of 
Cleanthes, too, might be able to be traced back to Heraclitus; but in 
this whole area we are on shaky ground in claiming a Heraclitean 
influence on Cleanthes, as long as we do not know to whom Aristotle 
is referring. 
When we compare some of the well-attested details of Heraclitus's 
astronomical theory with Cleanthes' theory, we find both differences 
and similarities. For example, Heraclitus believed the sun is new every 
day (DK 22 Β 6), and he said the heavenly bodies are bowls in which 
the exhalation is burning (DK 22 A 1.9-10; cf. A 12). Neither of these 
ideas is found in Cleanthes' theory. On the other hand, there is one 
respect in which Cleanthes may have been directly influenced by 
Heraclitus. Cleanthes, unlike the rest of the Stoics, held that the celes­
tial bodies are conical in shape (SVF 1.508, cf. 506). This idea he may 
have derived from Heraclitus's notion that the heavenly bodies burn in 
bowl-shaped containers (DK 22 A 1.9-10; cf. A 12). Conceivably 
Cleanthes used this idea to explain eclipses, just as Heraclitus had 
done.4  1 Therefore, all we can say is that Cleanthes, by conceiving the 
world soul on the pattern of the human soul, found that he could bring 
his cosmology into line with an old theory described by Aristotle, 
possibly going back to Heraclitus, and that he may have adjusted his 
astronomical theory slightly to conform to Heraclitus. We cannot say 
that he made Heraclitus's astronomical theory the basis of his entire 
conception of the heavens. 
We should now be able to see Cleanthes' role in the evolution of 
Stoic cosmobiology in its proper perspective. The doctrine that he 
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upheld, namely, that the cosmos is a living, intelligent, ensouled be­
ing, was the doctrine that Zeno had taught him; but Cleanthes forged 
new arguments to prove Zeno's doctrine. It is this achievement that 
gives meaning to Cleanthes' boast that if he deserves to be called an 
ass, it is because he is the only one able to carry Zeno's load (SVF 
1.463). It is this achievement, too, that constitutes Cleanthes' claim to 
originality. Cleanthes' new proof retained, in addition to Zeno's con­
clusions, the syllogistic forms that Zeno had used to prove his doctrine; 
but the content of the forms was totally new. Yet this content was not 
out of keeping with the course Zeno had set for Stoic philosophy; the 
Zenonian principle that analogy from the microcosm yields valid con­
clusions for the macrocosm was merely applied to the world soul. In 
this application Cleanthes turned to Aristotle's psychology to obtain 
the basic structure for his world soul. Aristotle's functional division of 
the soul provided in Cleanthes' new proof the functions of the cosmic 
heat; and Aristotle's close connection of the soul's functions, espe­
cially the nutritive, with heat seems to have been conducive to 
Cleanthes' transferral of these functions to the cosmic heat and to 
Cleanthes' complete identification of soul and heat. Moreover, 
Cleanthes probably borrowed a few arguments from Plato's Laws and 
Aristotle's On Philosophy to help his own argument along and to give it 
the benefit of the prestige of these philosophers. Where he borrowed 
arguments intact, Cleanthes was willing to give credit by mentioning 
the names of his sources; but where he was performing a radical 
synthesis he was discreetly silent on his sources. Thus Cleanthes' 
cosmobiology, in the last analysis, seems to be a synthesis of physical 
cosmology with Aristotelian biology and psychology. In addition, this 
synthesis is made to converge, where possible, with an older pre-
Socratic, possibly Heraclitean, notion about the heavenly bodies. 
Before leaving Cleanthes we ought to look briefly at his notion of 
the tonos, a notion that takes on more importance in Chrysippus's 
cosmobiology. Cleanthes defines the tonos as "  a blow of fire" 
(πληγή πυρός). In the human soul this blow may vary in intensity; 
when it is sufficient to ward off attacks, it is called strength and might 
(ισχύς και κράτος) and seems to be the physical cause of the virtues 
in men (SVF 1.563). The tonos also plays a cosmological role. First of 
all the origin of the cosmos is due to the tonos in the matter of the 
universe. Here the word may allude to the downward and upward 
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transformation of elements, which in a sphere is an inward and out­
ward motion. Perhaps it alludes at the same time to the contraction and 
expansion that fire undergoes in elemental transformation.4 2 
Moreover, the activity of the tonos in the normal life of the cosmos 
may be referred to in the fragment in which Cleanthes calls the sun 
"the pick" (πλήκτρον), because "in rising it implants its rays and, as 
if plucking [πλήσσων] the cosmos, leads it into its harmonious 
course" (την έναρμόνιον πορείαν, SVF 1.502, cf. 503). The 
words for pick (πληκτρον) and pluck (πλήσσων) are from the same 
Greek root as the word for blow (ττλτ/γή) that Cleanthes uses in his 
definition of tonos as  " a blow of fire.'' Through the use of a metaphor 
Cleanthes shows that he considers the action of the fire of the sun on 
the cosmos to be analogous to the action of a pick on a lyre; the effect 
is harmony. Finally, there is an allegorical treatment of the myth of 
Heracles, which may go back to Cleanthes (SVF 1.514). According to 
this account Heracles represents "the tonos in things" according to 
which nature is strong and mighty (ισχυρά και κραταιά). Here the 
tonos performs the same function in natural things that it performs in 
the soul (cf. SVF 1.563). Heracles is pictured as an archer to signify 
the fact that the tonos penetrates everywhere, like arrows, and makes 
things "taut" (έντονος). This reminds us of Cleanthes' statement that 
the rays of the sun penetrate the cosmos and make it harmonious (SVF 
1.502). The only new information in this allegorization is that the 
tonos is subject to the logos and obeys its commands, just as Heracles 
was subject to Omphale. 
Cleanthes' conception of tonos is transmitted to us in too fragmen­
tary a state to allow either a firm reconstruction or a certain determina­
tion of its background. Nevertheless, the images associated with tonos 
in the few preserved fragments allow us to make a few conjectures. 
Most obviously, the musical meaning of the word "tonos" must have 
suggested to Cleanthes the image of the sun plucking the cosmos, as 
the pick plucks the lyre to produce beautiful harmony. This seems to 
be a poetic elaboration of a more basic idea, namely, that the heat of 
the sun produces tonos, and tonos is a "blow of fire." 
We may come a step closer to the basis for this idea in Cleanthes' 
association of tonos with strength. This association may be traceable to 
Zeno, who seems to have believed that symmetry in the sinews or 
neura is strength (ισχύς) and eutonia, whereas lack of symmetry is 
weakness and atonia.43 The basic meaning of tonos, as well as of the 
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verb τείνω, is the stretching of a cord; and this meaning is well 
attested from Homer through the fourth century B.C.44 The musical 
meaning of tonos is derived from this basic meaning because a 
stretched cord makes a musical sound when plucked. The word "to-
nos " is also applied to other kinds of stretched cords, such as the cords 
or sinews of the body. In the Hippocratic writing On Joints, "tonoi" 
are mentioned several times. Here the term seems to be virtually 
synonymous with "neura."45 In the Hippocratic writers, writing be­
fore the nerves were distinguished from other cords, the word 
"neura" most often refers to tendons or ligaments, and the idea of a 
strong, stretched cord is frequently prominent. For instance, they are 
said to be stretched against (ττροστεταμενα) the bones and to serve as 
a bond (σύνδεσμος) for the joints (De Arte 10 [6.18, Littre = 2.208, 
Jones]). Their general purpose is to give the body flexibility and the 
ability to contract (ξνντασις) and stretch out (έκτασυς, Oss. 11 
[9.182, Littre]). Furthermore, in their capacity as fasteners of joints 
they are stretched along (παρατεταμένα) the whole body; but their 
strength, which in general is intermediate between flesh and bone, is 
said to be greatest where the flesh is least (Loc. Horn. 4-5 [6.284, 
Littre]). 
The close connection between neura, the tonos or stretching of a 
cord, and strength can also be seen in Plato and Aristotle, where 
muscles are clearly included among the neura. Plato says the neura are 
a more taut (σνντονωτέρα) power than flesh (Tim. 74d); and Aristotle 
says the strength (ισχύς) is in the neura (Gen. An. 5.7.787b 10-11; cf. 
Part. An. 3.4.666bl3-16) and the sinewy (νευρώδης) heart of bulls is 
taut (σύντονος) like a sinewy string stretched tight (ώσπερ χορδήν 
τεταμένην νενρίντην, Gen. An. 5.7.787bl5-17). Moreover, he 
claims that the neura that provide strength in living beings acquire 
tautness or syntonia as the body matures, and lose it again with age 
(Gen. An. 5.7.787bl0-15). The fact that Greek biology associated the 
idea of a stretched cord with the ligaments that bind the bones and with 
the muscles that produce strength in the body, may help to explain 
Cleanthes' association of tonos with strength, though a clear connec­
tion between Cleanthes and Greek biology in this idea is by no means 
obvious. 
Cleanthes' concept of tonos also included another idea that may 
have biological affinities, namely the idea that the strength-producing 
tension is a result of fire. According to Aristotle's theory bodily 
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movement comes about by expansion and contraction (έλκειν καϊ 
άνιεναι, ανξάνεσΰαι καϊ σνστέλλεσ&αυ, έκτείνεσΰαι καϊ 
σννάγεσΰαυ) of the sinews or neura. The origin of movement is in 
the heart; a small change in the heart will produce great changes in the 
extremities. What causes the expansion and contraction, first of all in 
the heart, but also eventually in the rest of the body, is heat and cold, 
heat causing expansion and cold contraction {Part. An. 3.4.666bl4­
15; Mot. An. 7.701bl-32; 9.702b20-25; 11.703b3-16; cf. 
10.703al9-21). This is not the whole of Aristotle's theory of move­
ment, and we shall return to it later; but this part of it is enough to 
suggest that biological thought connected heat with the expansion of 
the muscles of the heart and body.46 It is this idea that may lie behind 
Cleanthes' notion that fire produces the muscular tension that results in 
strength. These tenuous links between Cleanthes' concept of tonos and 
antecedent biological ideas are hardly sufficient to clarify the relation 
of Cleanthes' thought to the ideas of his predecessors. More evidence 
will be needed if we are to solve the puzzle, and so we must postpone 
further consideration of the question until we have discussed Chrysip­
pus and his concept of tonos. 
Chrysippus's cosmobiology had its conservative and its original 
elements. Chrysippus, like Zeno and Cleanthes, believed that the cos­
mos is a sentient, rational, intelligent, ensouled, living animal (SVF 
2.618, 633, 634, 636, 1076; cf. 92, 528, 1209). According to 
Diogenes Laertius he defended this belief with arguments reminiscent 
of Zeno's: "The animal is better than the non-animal. Nothing is better 
than the cosmos. Therefore the cosmos is an animal" (SVF 2.633). In 
addition to the teleological argument, Diogenes Laertius suggests he 
used the argument from derivative to source, an argument used by both 
Zeno and Cleanthes; since our soul is a fragment (απόσπασμα) from 
the cosmos, the cosmos too must have a soul (SVF 2.633, cf. 774, 
821, 1015). This argument also includes Cleanthes' idea that we be­
come ensouled by partaking of the world soul (SVF 1.495). 
Cicero preserves Chrysippus's argumentation in fuller form.47 
Chrysippus argues that everything except the cosmos exists for the 
sake of something else and consequently lacks something and is imper­
fect. Plants exist for animals, animals for man, and man for con­
templating and imitating the cosmos. Even man is not perfect, but is 
only a fragment (particula = απόσπασμα!) of what is perfect. Only 
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the cosmos, since it embraces all things and nothing exists that is not in 
it, is perfect. How, then, can it lack the best thing? Since nothing is 
better than mind and reason, the cosmos must possess these. Chrysip­
pus then adduces examples to show that in the perfect and mature 
everything is better than in the imperfect; for example, in the horse 
than in the colt, in the dog than in the puppy, and in the man than in the 
boy. Consequently, the perfect thing ought to possess the best thing in 
the cosmos. Since nothing is more perfect than the cosmos and nothing 
is better than virtue, virtue is an attribute of the cosmos. Moreover, 
since virtue may be realized in man, who is imperfect, virtue certainly 
must be in the cosmos; so the cosmos must be wise and divine. This 
argument reveals clearly the Platonic ideological argument that Zeno 
had adopted. It also manifests the characteristic Platonic motifs of the 
all-inclusiveness and perfection of the cosmos (cf. Tim. 29a-31b, 
32c-33b). 
In another fragment Chrysippus deduces self-sufficiency from the 
all-inclusiveness of the cosmos: "The cosmos alone is said to be 
self-sufficient because it alone contains in itself everything that it 
needs. It is nourished and increased from itself when the various parts 
change into one another" (SVF 2.604). Chrysippus's thought is very 
close to Plato's description of the self-sufficiency of the cosmos, 
which he too deduces from its all-inclusiveness: "[The cosmos] was in 
need of no organ by which it might receive food into itself. . . . For 
nothing went out or came into it from anywhere, because there was 
nothing. It was designed to offer its own waste as food for itself and to 
act and be acted upon entirely in and by itself. For the creator thought 
it would be better self-sufficient than needing other things" (Tim. 
33c-d). 
Apparently Chrysippus could, when it seemed appropriate, be a 
conservative student of the Platonic concept of the world soul that we 
found already in Zeno.48 Yet he also adopted the physiological point of 
view of Cleanthes, for Chrysippus regarded the functions of the world 
soul as functions specifically of the material manifestation of the world 
soul. Nevertheless, it is precisely in the material manifestation of the 
world soul that Chrysippus also diverged from Cleanthes. To 
Cleanthes the world soul was the heat that permeates the cosmos, and 
the ruling part or hegemonikon of the world soul was the sun. Chrysip­
pus, for his part, believed the world soul is the pneuma permeating the 
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cosmos and the ruling part of the soul is the celestial aether. Chrysip­
pus seems to have thought out his conception of the world soul in great 
detail: "When the cosmos is fiery, it is its own soul and hegemonikon; 
but when it has changed into water with soul left behind in it, it has 
changed in a way into body and soul, so that it consists of both of 
these; at this time it has something else as logos" (SVF 2.605). During 
the conflagration the fire is body, soul, and hegemonikon of the cos­
mos; but after the fluid stage is reached, and for all time until the next 
conflagration, body and soul are separate. Water and earth are the 
body of the cosmos, and fire and air are its soul (cf. also SVF 2.821). 
The hegemonikon of the world soul Chrysippus places in the aether, 
which is the name he gives to the fire at the periphery of the cosmos. 
This, he claims, is the purest and most unmixed substance, and also 
the most mobile. In it are situated the heavenly bodies, ensouled and 
divine (SVF 2.527, 634, 642, 644, cf. 1032). 
This pure substance is localized at the periphery; the substance that 
penetrates the entire body of the cosmos is thepneuma (SVF 2.473, cf. 
416, 442, 1027). Chrysippus accepts the common definition of 
pneuma (literally, wind) as moved air; he also accepts Aristotle's idea 
that it is analogous to the substance of the heavens (cf. Arist. Gen. An. 
2.3.736b33-737al), so that bothaether andpneuma "come under the 
same definition" (S VF 2 All). This dual nature of the pneuma must be 
kept in mind to understand Chrysippus's doctrine. To account for the 
dual nature of the pneuma Chrysippus resorts to Aristotle's definition 
of pneuma as hot air (Gen. An. 2.2.736al), but Chrysippus interprets 
this to mean that pneuma is actually a mixture of air and fire (SVF 
2.841, cf. 310, 442, 786). Consequently, the pneuma may function 
either as fire or as air; and its function is determined, in part at least, by 
the proportion of its components (cf. SVF 2.715, 787). Finally, the 
world soul, which the mixture of air and fire constitutes, is believed to 
be exhaled (άναϋνμιαϋεισαν) from the earth and sea (SVF 2.821). 
Chrysippus's conception of the material of the world soul is quite 
different from that of Cleanthes. Whereas for Cleanthes fire alone is 
the world soul, Chrysippus believes both air and fire go into its compo­
sition. This difference is accompanied by a difference in the identifica­
tion of the hegemonikon. Since Cleanthes' world soul consists of fire 
alone, one localized portion of that fire must be the hegemonikon; and 
so the sun, the most intense part of it, receives the honor. Chrysippus 
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does not have to make only part of the heat the hegemonikon. Since the 
soul consists of fire and air both, the hegemonikon can be the entire 
region in which fire exists in absolute purity, namely, the heavens; and 
so either the heavens or the aether may be called the hegemonikon. 
As Cleanthes' theory of the world soul is deduced from biology, so 
Chrysippus's revision is based on biology. Thepneuma seems to have 
been part of Stoic biology from the beginning. Zeno defined the soul as 
a warm or innate pneuma {πνεύμα ένΰερμον, consitus spiritus, 
naturalis spiritus), a portion of which is emitted in the semen (SVF 
1.128, 135-38). In Zeno this pneuma seems to provide the breath of 
life and movement for a man (SVF 1.135, 137, 138), though the mind 
is furnished by fire (SVF 1.126, 134). Whether Zeno tried to integrate 
the notions of fire and pneuma we do not know,4 9 nor have we any 
evidence that Zeno applied the pneuma to cosmology 5  0 Cleanthes 
may have retained Zeno's definition of the soul as pneuma (SVF 
1.521, 525); but he seems to have placed more emphasis on the soul as 
heat, perhaps assigning all psychic functions to the heat.5 1 Yet it is 
Cleanthes who is said to have ascribed to the pneuma which permeates 
the cosmos the role of creative force in the cosmos (SVF 1.533). This 
seems to conflict with the long account of Cicero (Nat. D. 2.23-32, 
cf. 40-44) in which the heat of the cosmos is credited with all the 
functions of the world soul; but knowing what Chrysippus was going 
to make of the pneuma, we might conjecture that Cleanthes himself 
took the first steps in this direction, perhaps after Chrysippus had 
already joined the school.5 2 
For Chrysippus the human soul is pneuma, pure and simple. He 
introduces his work On the Soul by defining the soul as "the pneuma 
innate in us, continuous, and penetrating the entire body, as long as the 
breath of life is in the body" (τ/ φνχτ) πνενμά έστι σνμφντον ήμιν 
συνεχές τταντι τω σώματι διηκον, έ<χτ' αν ίη της ζωής (ενπν­
οια) παρϊ) εν τω σώματι, SVF 2.885). Chrysippus agrees with Zeno 
that the soul has eight parts, of which the chief part or hegemonikon is 
in the heart (On the Soul, reconstructed as SVF 2.911; esp. 2.885). The 
hegemonikon is not the heart itself, but rather the pneuma located in 
the heart (SVF 2.885, cf. 96, 838, 848, 879, 886; 3. Diog.30). The 
pneuma of the human soul is a mixture of fire and air, with a slight 
admixture of moisture from the body in which it lives (SVF 2.841; cf. 
310,442, 786, 787). 
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Chrysippus's conception of the world soul is nothing but his theory 
of the human soul extrapolated to the cosmos, so that the pneuma 
(air-fire mixture) permeating the cosmos is soul, and the very pure 
part, the fire at the periphery, called aether, is the ruling principle or 
hegemonikon. The question we must ask is what made Chrysippus 
revise Cleanthes' theory that the heat of the cosmos is its soul. The 
answer is not hard to find. Zeno's biology had included both the 
pneuma and the heat as competing bearers of the psychic functions, 
much as Aristotle's biology had made both pneuma and heat compet­
ing tools of the soul.53 The difficulty of integrating the pneuma with 
the four-element theory, whether in biology or cosmology, weighted 
the balance in favor of heat, whose biological importance was unques­
tioned and whose reputation was generally high;54 so Zeno made heat 
serve as the material of the world soul and god. Cleanthes thought he 
could settle the issue by ascribing all the psychic functions to the heat, 
but his solution set the Stoics in conflict with contemporary medical 
thought, which had meanwhile been moving in the other direction. 
The key figure in the new movement of medical thought seems to 
have been Praxagoras of Cos (fl. ca. 300 B.C.).55 For Praxagoras the 
pneuma was the main agent of psychic activity. The blood, which 
flows through the veins, he thought, produces nutrition and growth (fr. 
79, Steckerl), whereas the pneuma, with which the arteries are filled, 
transfers movement from the heart to the sinews that move the body 
(frs. 9, 11, 75, 85, Steckerl). Whether Praxagoras believed this pneuma 
to be responsible also for sensation, we cannot tell from the extant 
fragments. We do know that he believed breathing nourishes the soul 
or psychic pneuma (fr. 32, Steckerl), apparently identifying the 
pneuma with soul. Since he thought the soul to be situated in the heart 
(fr. 30, Steckerl) and thinking to be a function of the heart (fr. 62, 72; 
cf. Phylotimus, fr. 1, Steckerl), it is probable that he assigned to the 
pneuma thought as well as the production of movement. In 
Praxagoras's view the heat took a lowly place. Though some heat is 
necessary for digestion, this heat is not innate but acquired, probably 
coming in with the food itself,56 so that digestion is perhaps nothing 
more than ordinary decomposition (cf. Plistonicus, fr. 1, Steckerl). 
In the third century the stature of the pneuma increased, whereas 
that of the heat decreased. Heat seems to have had no role in the 
physiology of Herophilos of Chalcedon and Erasistratus of Ceos, the 
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two chief physicians working in Alexandria. They both assigned per­
ception and movement to the pneuma.51 Erasistratus expressly de­
prived the heat even of its small role in digestion. Instead, he said the 
food is mechanically ground up in the stomach (Galen De Nat. Fac. 
2.8, 3.4, 3.7 [2.110-11, 118-19, 157, 166, Kuhn]; In Hipp, de Ali­
ment. 2.7 [15.247-48, Kuhn]; Def. Med. 99 [19.372-73, Kuhn]). In 
fact, Galen complains that Erasistratus completely ignored the four 
qualities without even deigning to refute those who base their biology 
on the four qualities and give heat the chief role in the body (Galen De 
Nat. Fac. 2.8 [2.110-11, cf. 112-13, Kuhn]). 
Chrysippus thus found the pneuma entrenched in scientific medical 
thought, and spreading even to some of the philosophical schools, 
namely the Epicureans and Peripatetics,58 whereas he found Cleanthes 
and his own school trying to keep alive the already antiquated psychic 
heat. Chrysippus was not one to run after every new scientific theory. 
When Herophilus and Erasistratus emphasized the importance of the 
brain for psychic functions,59 Chrysippus in On the Soul vigorously 
defended the old-fashioned idea that the heart is the seat of the soul. He 
even called to witness Praxagoras, who more than half a century earlier 
had held the old theory (SVF 2.897). But this particular theory had 
jeopardized the venerable old Stoic idea that the hegemonikon is in the 
heart. The theory that the soul is pneuma, not only was not opposed to 
the Stoic theory but was actually part of Zeno's original doctrine. 
Chrysippus did not have to feel that by revising Cleanthes' doctrine he 
was betraying Stoicism. He could view his updating of Stoic doctrine 
as a rehabilitation of Zeno's original doctrine. Of course, he was still 
faced with the problem of integrating the pneuma with the four-
element theory; but he solved this by defining pneuma as a mixture of 
fire and air, though this solution turned out to be exceptionally vulner­
able to criticism (e.g., SVF 2.389, 442). 
To decide how much the new trend in medical thought actually 
influenced Chrysippus would require a detailed comparison of 
Chrysippus's biological doctrine with the medical theories of the day. 
This is beyond the scope of our study, but a brief comparison of two 
key ideas will give us a preliminary clue.6 0 Chrysippus defined the 
soul as innate pneuma (πνενμα σνμφντον, SVF 2.885). The concept 
of pneuma innate in the body was characteristic of Aristotle.6 1 
Praxagoras, Herophilus, and Erasistratus, on the other hand, seem to 
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have believed the pneuma to be acquired, not innate.62 Chrysippus's 
definition of the soul, then, is in terms of the older Aristotelian 
pneuma, not the contemporary medical pneuma. The concept of innate 
pneuma was not taken over by Chrysippus directly from Aristotle. 
Zeno had already defined the soul as innate pneuma (consitus spiritus, 
naturalis spiritus, concretus corpori spiritus, SVF 1.137, 138), and so 
Chrysippus was just perpetuating the definition he had inherited. 
On the other hand, Chrysippus's debt to the medical theory of the 
pneuma is just as obvious. Erasistratus believed the pneuma to be 
acquired through respiration (Galen De Usu Resp. 1, 2 [4.471, 473­
74, Kiihn]; An in Arter. Nat. Sang. Cont. 2 [4.706-7, Kiihn]), and 
Praxagoras believed the pneuma to be nourished by respiration and 
therefore partly acquired from the outer air (fr. 32, Steckerl). The 
purpose of respiration among these medical writers is to sustain the 
pneuma. This stands in sharp contrast to the view of Aristotle and 
Diocles, who held that respiration exists to cool the innate heat (Arist. 
De Juv. 14-27 ; Part. An. 1.1.642a31-b4; Diocles, fr. 15, 
Wellmann). 
Chrysippus's view of the purpose of respiration is not explicitly 
recorded but may be inferred. Cicero records a detailed description of a 
Stoic theory of respiration (Nat. D. 2.138, cf. 136). According to this 
account the respired air is warmed in the lungs and from the lungs 
passes into a ventricle of the heart; from the heart it is pumped through 
the arteries to the whole body as the vital and health-giving pneuma 
(vitalis et salutaris spiritus, Nat. D. 2.117, cf. 83). Cicero's account 
is widely believed to come from Panaetius or Posidonius,63 but this 
does not necessarily mean that his immediate source was the first to 
adopt this physiological theory. Plutarch knows this theory as part of 
the general Stoic theory,64 and a search of the fragments reveals that 
no other theory was known to be held in the Stoa.65 Moreover, what 
we know of Chrysippus's doctrine fits the theory perfectly. As in 
Cicero's account, Chrysippus believed one ventricle of the heart to be 
filled with psychic pneuma (SVF 2.897). Moreover, he believed this 
pneuma is sent out from the heart as vital pneuma (vitalis spiritus) to 
all parts of the body (SVF 2.879). He also believed that there is a direct 
connection between the pneuma in the heart and the pneuma in the 
nostrils and the windpipe (SVF 2.885). In speech the voice, which is 
"struck air" (cf. SVF 2.139-41), is sent out through the throat (SVF 
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2.879, 894, 898). It is reasonable that he would have believed air can 
come into the heart through the same channel by which the voice 
leaves. Finally the pneuma is conceived as the breath of life and 
associated with breathing. For Chrysippus defined the soul as a 
pneuma penetrating the body as long as the breath of life is present,6 6 
and he reasoned: "We breathe and live by one and the same thing. We 
breathe by the natural pneuma [naturalis spiritus]; therefore we live by 
the same pneuma. Moreover, we live by the soul. Therefore the natural 
pneuma is the soul" (SVF 2.879, cf. 792). The close association of 
breathing with the psychic pneuma and the exact correspondence be­
tween the few attested physiological ideas of Chrysippus and the com­
plete theory of Cicero's account makes it almost certain that Chrysip­
pus, too, believed respiration nourishes the soul.6  7 If so, it is obvious 
that he has been influenced by the medical writers, and especially 
Paraxagoras.68 
Thus it seems that Chrysippus was influenced by both the Aristote­
lian and the medical theory of the pneuma. The fact that the medical 
writers influenced his theory of the pneuma suggests that Chrysippus 
was, indeed, cognizant of the recent trend of medical research and was 
eager to update the Stoic philosophy, as long as no crucial doctrines 
were jeopardized. Similarly, he updated Stoic cosmobiology on the 
same basis, discarding Cleanthes' theory of the cosmic heat, and sub­
stituting the vital pneuma as the agent of all the psychic functions in 
the cosmos. 
According to Chrysippus the cosmos is permeated and given life by 
pneuma, the same substance that permeates a living thing and makes it 
alive. Just as this pneuma makes a man a living, organic whole, so the 
cosmic pneuma makes the cosmos a living, organic whole, with each 
single part grown together (οτνμφνές, cf. SVF 2.550) in living sym­
pathy (σνμπνουα, σνμπά&εία) with all the rest (SVF 2.473, 912; cf. 
475, 546). In the cosmos the function of the pneuma is fourfold. In the 
form of "holding" or hexis it provides unity and quality; in the form of 
nature (φνσυς), nutrition and growth; in the form of soul (ψυχή), 
sensation and movement; and in the form of mind (νους) or logos it 
provides rationality. Inanimate objects possess only the simplest form 
of pneuma, namely hexis; plants (φυτά) possess, in addition, nature 
(φνσις); irrational animals possess soul; and man and the cosmos 
possess also reason (SVF 2.473, 634, cf. 458, 459, 460, 714, 715, 
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716, 804, 1013). Each form of the pneuma includes all of the forms 
below it, but adds an additional psychic function. The result is a scale 
of beings; and it is obvious that this scale is indebted to Aristotle's 
scale, in which plants possess only the nutritive soul, animals possess 
also the perceptive soul, and man possesses mind in addition to the two 
lower forms of soul.6 9 We are interested in this scale of beings not only 
for itself but chiefly for what it implies about the function of the world 
soul or cosmic pneuma. Diogenes Laertius preserves a summary of an 
important idea found in Chrysippus's On Providence.70 According to 
this summary Chrysippus stated that mind (νους) permeates the cos­
mos, as soul does in us, but it differs in degree.7  1 Through some parts 
of us it passes as hexis, namely, through the bones and sinews; through 
others as mind, namely, through the hegemonikon. Similarly, the whole 
cosmos, being an ensouled, reasoning animal, has the aether as its 
hegemonikon. Through the aether it passes as mind; through the things 
in the air, such as animals and man, it passes as sensation; through the 
things in the earth, namely, plants, it passes as nature; and, finally, 
through the earth itself it passes as hexis. Thus the cosmic pneuma lies 
behind the four psychic functions that the pneuma performs in the 
various parts of the cosmos. 
Chrysippus's conception of the function of the cosmic pneuma is 
grounded in his Stoic predecessors, yet shows some important new 
developments. Chrysippus has preserved the idea of Zeno and 
Cleanthes that individual living things are parts of the cosmos and 
derive their psychic capacities from the psychic material of the whole. 
On the other hand, Chrysippus has altered the number of psychic 
functions and the parts chosen as manifestations of these psychic func­
tions. It is the grounds for these alterations that we must now examine. 
Let us begin with the second alteration. As we have seen, Cleanthes 
found the four elements to be the cosmic parts that manifest the nutri­
tive or preservative function of heat, but he did not carry out the search 
for parts systematically for the other psychic functions. If our recon­
struction of Chrysippus's argument is correct, Chrysippus did sys­
tematically seek parts that manifest each psychic function; and he did 
this on a different basis, at least in part. Cleanthes' parts had been the 
four elements; Chrysippus's parts are not wholly clear, but the four 
elements are not ignored. The aether and the earth are definitely men­
tioned, and this suggests that Chrysippus intended to make some use of 
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the four elements in his scheme. But what manifests the perceptive 
function is not the air itself, but "the things in the air." This, together 
with the text's explanatory phrase, "both animals and plants," 
suggests that Chrysippus also intended to use the scale of beings as an 
example of the parts that manifest the functions of the soul. Chrysippus 
apparently wished to free himself of Cleanthes' self-imposed limitation 
of seeking manifestations of the world soul only in the elements, the 
major parts of the cosmos. Instead he preferred to follow Zeno (cf. 
SVF 1.112, 113, 114), in using also animals and men, the minor parts 
of the cosmos, as manifestations of the world soul. Though the frag­
mentary text does not allow us to judge how Chrysippus put this 
argument together,72 we can see that he did not hope to find every soul 
function in every part of the cosmos, as Cleanthes had done with the 
nutritive function; but he sought a different soul function in each part. 
Second, we can see that the scale of beings serves as a partial basis for 
his demonstration that the cosmic pneuma functions in the parts of the 
cosmos. Since this scale of beings was derived from Aristotle, the 
same source from which Cleanthes obtained the functions of the cos­
mic soul, we may conclude that it was on the basis of Aristotle's 
psychological theory that Chrysippus has modified the parts chosen to 
manifest the psychic functions.73 
A much more important change is the addition of a fourth psychic 
function. Whereas Cleanthes had followed Aristotle in distinguishing 
three psychic functions, Chrysippus has added a fourth, the "holding" 
or hexis. If we look through the Stoic fragments, we see that this new 
psychic function comes to overshadow the three Aristotelian functions 
to which it was added. In fact, the fragments mention this function of 
the pneuma almost to the exclusion of any other, presumably because 
it was so important and so characteristic of the Stoa after Chrysippus. 
The addition of this fourth psychic function ranks with the transferral 
of the cosmic psychic functions from heat to pneuma as one of 
Chrysippus's major contributions to the evolution of Stoic cosmobiol­
ogy 
Simply stated, the pneuma holds everything together (σννέχείν).74 
Since the pneuma consists of fire and air, it is frequently said that fire 
and air hold everything together. In specific, fire and air (the active 
elements) hold together earth and water (the passive elements) (SVF 
2.439, 440, 444, 473 [page 155.32-36]). The pneuma accomplishes 
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this activity by means of a motion sometimes called pneumatic motion 
(κίνησις πνευματική, SVF 2 AM, 454, cf. 458). This motion has 
two phases, a movement into itself (προς or εϊς εαυτό) and a move­
ment out of itself (εξ αυτού)', or these can be called movements back 
and forth (πρόσω καϊ οπίσω, SVF 2.442, 471, cf. 551 [page 
174.27-29]). The state of the pneuma in this activity is sometimes 
called tension (tonos), and the pneumatic movement in and out may be 
called tonic or tensional movement (τονική κίνησυς, SVF 2.441, 
444, 448, 451). Each phase of the pneumatic or tensional movement 
produces it own result. The inward movement or movement toward the 
center holds the body together and produces cohesion (συνέχεια), 
unity (ένωσις), and being (ουσία); the outward movement or move­
ment toward the periphery causes dimensions and qualities (SVF 
2.451, 452, 551). The new psychic function of Chrysippus, the hexis, 
then, is responsible not only for cohesion but for qualities in all 
things.75 In particular, the hexis operates in inanimate things, the 
lowest step in the scale of beings. In his On Hexeis Chrysippus ex­
plains that a hexis is really air; and air is responsible for holding 
inanimate things together and giving them their shapes and qualities, 
for example, hardness in iron, density in stone, and brightness in silver 
(SVF 2.449). The hexis not only operates in inanimate objects, such as 
wood and stones; it also operates in parts of animals, such as the bones 
and sinews (SVF 2.634, cf. 458). But its most important function for 
our purposes is its function in the cosmos as a whole, for it is the hexis 
that holds the cosmos together and prevents its disintegration in the 
void (SVF 2.540, 552, 553, cf. 551 [page 174.27-29]). Thus Chrysip­
pus's new psychic function was put to good use on an old and elusive 
problem. 
The question we must now ask is from what source Chrysippus 
derived this fourth psychic function. If we look back to Cleanthes and 
to Aristotle, on whom Cleanthes depends, Chrysippus's source be­
comes apparent. Both Cleanthes and Aristotle included cohesion 
among the products of the nutritive soul. Cleanthes may have already 
applied this function to the cohesion of the cosmos in the void. 
Chrysippus has merely detached it from the nutritive soul and given it 
independent status.76 By so doing, he has been able to lengthen 
Aristotle's scale of beings to include inanimate objects, without divest­
ing them of psychic activity. Thus the favorite Stoic device of biologi­
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cal analogy has found another application, namely to extend the sphere 
of psychic activity down to inanimate objects, thereby bringing every­
thing in the cosmos under the influence of the psychic pneuma. 
Having gained independence from the nutritive function of the soul, 
the hexis was free to develop its own personality. As the active cause 
of cohesion and the continued existence of inanimate objects, it im­
mediately came into the company of the archai; for everything in the 
cosmos consists of matter and an active cause that provides form, 
quality, and movement to the matter. The hexis, therefore, became 
identified with the active cause, the source of qualities. Thus the 
quality (ττοώτης) that gives form and shape could be called ' 'pneuma 
and an airy tension" (τόνος άερώδης, SVF 2.449; cf. 379, 389). The 
identification of this pneumatic function with the active principle was 
made easy by the fact that pneuma consists of air and fire, the two 
active elements; so the Stoics could say that air and fire, the active 
elements, hold together (σννέχειν), whereas water and earth, the 
passive elements, are held together (σννεχεσϋαι, SVF 2.439, 440, 
444,473 [page 155.32-36]). 
The movement by which the pneuma effects the hexis is another 
independent development and is probably the result of a synthesis of 
several ideas. The basic idea that the pneuma accomplishes its work by 
movement may have been suggested by the fact that pneuma is literally 
wind or air in motion (SVF 2All, cf. 697). But fluid flow is certainly 
not the primary idea of pneumatic motion, for the inward and outward 
movements are said to occur simultaneously 7  7 What is more, the 
movement is called tonic motion or a tonos, two names connoting 
tension. This points to an entirely different image, namely, the image 
of air pressed into a confined space, such as a skin. The image of 
compressed air gives, on the whole, the most satisfactory explanation 
of the pneumatic motion and its effects.78 Such pressure has no local 
motion and the fact that it acts simultaneously in opposite directions 
could have given rise to the notion that it comprises a simultaneous 
motion toward the center and toward the periphery (i.e., the wall of the 
container). From the notion of compressed air one may readily discern 
a path to the Stoic idea that motion toward the outside produces dimen­
sions and qualities. The Stoics may well have had in mind the picture 
of an inflated skin, in which the shape and dimension are revealed only 
because of the pressure of the enclosed air. At least we know the Stoics 
168 The Origins of Stoic Cosmology 
claimed that stretching (τάσυς) produces shape, and they defined a 
straight line as one stretched to the utmost (SVF 2.456). Moreover, 
Cleomedes, the astronomer whose Stoic influence has already been 
noted, argued that the unconfined air and fire of the cosmos will 
always assume the spherical shape that is natural to these elements, 
because they are braced up (τετονωμέναυ) and stretched out 
(άποτεινόμεναι) equally from the middle in every direction (SVF 
2.455). The concommitant notion that confined air exerts a pressure 
toward its own center that accounts for unity and cohesion is somewhat 
less comprehensible, since there is no empirical evidence for it. Yet we 
know from Achilles that there were people, probably Stoics, who 
maintained that if one places a piece of grain in a bladder and inflates it 
with air, the grain will remain standing at the center of the skin, 
because the air pushes it with equal pressure from all sides (SVF 
2.555). Moreover, Achilles tells us this example was used to illustrate 
and help explain the stability of the earth at the center of the cosmos. 
If the image of compressed air is the basis for Chrysippus's concept 
of the pneumatic hexis, it is not the only factor that shaped this con­
cept. The movement of the pneuma toward the center was credited 
with producing cohesion and unity. When this pneumatic function was 
applied to the cosmos as a whole, it came into contact with another 
Stoic theory. Zeno had said that the cosmos remains intact in the void 
because all the elements naturally tend (τείνεσ&αι) toward the center 
(SVF 1.99). The crucial elements, of course, are air and fire, because 
these are light and therefore move away from the center; but it is to 
these elements that Zeno specifically assigned a tending toward the 
center as an explanation of cohesion. Chrysippus's/wewraa consists of 
fire and air and produces cohesion in similar fashion by a kind of 
centripetal movement, which even bears the same name as Zeno's 
elemental movement, for "tension" (τόνος) is the noun form of 
"tend" (τείνω).79 In Chrysippus's hexis Zeno's purely physical ex­
planation of cohesion coalesces with the physiological explanation that 
may have originated with Cleanthes. Thus a single phenomenon, the 
cohesion of the cosmos in the void, may be visualized by Chrysippus 
in purely physical terms as the result of the natural centripetal move­
ment of all its parts, or in biological terms as the product of the 
cohesive hexis (ή σννέχονσα έξις).80 
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In this context it may be well to return to the question that we left 
unanswered in our discussion of Cleanthes, the origin of the Stoic 
concept of the tonos. Chrysippus retained Cleanthes' idea that tonos is 
equivalent to strength in body and soul (SVF 3.471, 473, cf. 278). 
Moreover, in On Passions he says: "The tonoi of the body are said to 
be poorly or well toned [άτονοι και έντονοι] in respect to the muscu­
lar substance [το νευρώδες], in that we possess or lack power in the 
activities that are accomplished through these [i.e.,tonoi]; and the 
tonos in the soul is also spoken of as a good or poor tone [εντονία και 
ατονία]. . .  . As in running, clinging to something, and similar ac­
tivities, which are accomplished through the muscles, there is a certain 
effective state and an ineffective state, depending on whether the mus­
cles are tensed or relaxed, so also analogously in the soul there is a sort 
of 'muscle' according to which we speak metaphorically of people 
being either with or without 'muscle' " (SVF 3.473). This quotation 
confirms the conjecture made in connection with Cleanthes that behind 
the Stoic idea of tonos lies a biological conception of muscular move­
ment and strength; for Chrysippus regards tonoi as neura, that is, as 
sinews and muscles, and sees strength and movement as a product of 
the contraction and relaxation of the muscles. This, of course, is the 
same conception of movement described in Aristotle's biological 
works, as we have already noted, but it is hard to see how this biologi­
cal theory of movement should have led to the elaborate concept of the 
pneumatic tonos that we have found in Chrysippus's cosmology. 
We abandoned our quest for the connection between Cleanthes' 
tonos and Greek biology because we could not find enough specific 
points of contact. Chrysippus's tonos, however, is not completely 
identical with that of Cleanthes. As far as we can tell from the extant 
references, Chrysippus has given up the imagery of the plucked lyre 
and the harmonious course of the universe, which Cleanthes had as­
sociated with the word "tonos," and instead has filled the term with 
new content, derived from his new psychic function, the pneumatic 
hexis.81 This new content, including the idea of pneumatic motion, 
production of unity, cohesion, dimensions, and qualities, is quite 
foreign to Cleanthes' tonos. One can imagine a path from Cleanthes' 
idea that the tonos is strength to Chrysippus's notion that it produces 
cohesion and certain qualities, like hardness and solidity (SVF 2.449). 
170 The Origins of Stoic Cosmology 
Likewise there may be a path from Cleanthes' definition of tonos as a 
blow of fire and his conception of the tonos as the pressure produced 
by the contraction and expansion of the cosmogonal fire to Chrysip­
pus's conception of the tonos as air pressure.8 2 But to dismiss 
Chrysippus's tonos as a logical development from Cleanthes' tonos 
may make us miss its additional points of contact with antecedent and 
contemporary thought; for whether Chrysippus's concept of the 
pneumatic tonos is entirely his own or has borrowed more from 
Cleanthes than the evidence reveals, it does have several antecedents 
that we have not yet noted. 
Tonos is derived from the verb " t  o stretch" and is especially con­
nected with cords stretched tight. We have already mentioned its asso­
ciation with a cord stretched and plucked to provide a musical sound. 
Now we must observe that the word tonos is also used of a cord 
stretched to hold an object together. Tonoi is the technical term for part 
of the system of ropes that was used to hold a ship together.8 3 Plato 
takes note of this nautical term and points out that in preventing disin­
tegration the ropes on a ship {έντονοι, νποζώματα) and the taut 
epitonoi or cords of sinews (νεύρων έπίτονοι)84 in a living creature 
are essentially the same, differing only in name (Leg. 12.945c). Obvi­
ously Plato regards the neura as the bonds that hold the body together. 
The bonding function of the neura is also recognized by Aristotle 
{Hist. An. 3.5.515bll-13). This function of the neura does not, of 
course, exclude their other function, namely, the performance of feats 
of strength. In fact, in the same discussion in which Aristotle refers to 
the role of neura in binding the skeleton together he mentions specific 
neura that are important in running and in other feats of strength (Hist. 
An. 3.5.515b3-10). What is important is that the neura are clearly 
regarded as a most important element in holding the body together, and 
that Plato regarded the term epitonoi, a compound form of tonoi, 
particularly appropriate for the neura in their function as bonds. 
It is, therefore, quite possible that the Stoics adopted the word 
tonos, because it had the connotation of bond and that this connotation 
is what suggested its extrapolation to the cosmos. For this extrapola­
tion they even had a precedent in Plato, who had seen not only an 
analogy between the neura of the body and the ropes of a ship but also 
an analogy between the light that binds the cosmos together and the 
same ropes of a ship (Rep. 10.616b-c). This time, however, Plato did 
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not use the word tonoi, but hypozomata. Yet nothing was to prevent 
the Stoics from applying the word tonos to the bond of the cosmos and 
from seeing a similarity between this cosmic bond and the function of 
the neura in the human body. The biological analogy had served Stoic 
cosmology before, and so it could be pressed to serve again. To the 
Stoic mind accustomed to thinking in biological terms, it must have 
seemed eminently logical that cords, such as those which preserve the 
body, should also preserve the cosmos, and that what is known about 
the cords of the body could help explain the coherence of the cosmos 
and other things. 
By the time Cleanthes and Chrysippus were formulating their ideas 
about tonos and about the coherence of the cosmos, medical research­
ers had come a long way in understanding the ligature of bones and the 
process of movement. In the beginning of the third century B.C. 
Herophilus, the Alexandrian physician, laid the foundation for differ­
entiating the nerves, ox neura properly so-called, from the tendons and 
ligaments, which up to that time also went under the name of neura ,85 
The nerves proper, he found, come from the brain and are of two 
types, motor (προαιρετικά) and sensory (αϊσύιητυκά). The sensory 
nerves convey sensations to the brain, whereas the motor nerves con­
vey the impulse to move from the brain to the parts that move. His 
discovery came in the course of intensive speculation about the mech­
anism by which sensations are carried to the seat of the soul and 
voluntary motions are carried from the principles of movement to the 
extremities. Aristotle, having dismissed the old theory that the blood 
carries the psychic activities, proposed a new carrier, namely the 
pneuma, though for movement heat was equally important. 8  6 
Praxagoras located this pneuma in the arteries, which he believed 
collapsed at their extremities to form the neura.,87 Then Herophilus 
discovered that the neura form a network of vessels independent of the 
arteries and are, in fact, connected to the brain. Accordingly 
Herophilus and his younger associate Erasistratus seem to have main­
tained that pneuma flowing in the nerves, ox neura, carries sensations 
from the sense organs to the brain and motor impulses from the brain to 
the extremities.88 
All of this seems to have taken us a long way from the tonoi and the 
Stoic tonos. If tonos was at one time associated with the neura that 
hold the body together, we must certainly wonder what happened too 
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this term when the term neura became applied to the nerves, the 
vessels that communicate sensations and voluntary movement. Unfor­
tunately we cannot answer this question. In two tantalizing passages 
Rufus of Ephesus informs us that "tonoi" is a name for the nerves 
proper, used of the large nerves extending along the esophagus and 
trachea, and also more generally of all sensory and motor nerves (De 
Nom. Part. 158, 211). This proves the term was by no means dead in 
the first century A.D., but there is no way to tell whether Rufus is 
reporting a widespread, living usage or merely the usage of Hippoc­
rates to which Galen also refers.8 9 In particular, we would like to know 
whether Herophilus and Erasistratus used the word in the third century 
B.C. In the absence of any testimony concerning their vocabulary all 
we can say is that insofar as the word survived in the medical vocabu­
lary, it survived in reference to the nerves proper, not to the ligaments 
and tendons that bind the bones together and fasten the muscles to the 
bone. This obscure piece of information must surely whet our appetites 
to know what connection Hellenistic medical thought presupposed 
between tonos ovtonoi and the ysychk, pneuma. Since we have already 
discovered that Hellenistic medical theory had a significant influence 
on Chrysippus's doctrine of the pneuma, we must at least keep open 
the possibility that it had some influence also on the idea of the tonos. 
There is still another set of medical theories that may lie behind the 
Stoic doctrine of the tonos, but again we can do no more than raise the 
question. According to the Stoic biological theory ih&pneuma flows in 
the arteries of the body. This idea goes back to Praxagoras of Cos and 
was probably the commonly accepted view of the Alexandrian physi­
cians.9 0 The medical writers who subscribed to this theory were also 
intensely interested in the arterial pulse and its qualities.9 1 One fre­
quently discussed quality of the pulse was its intensity (σφοδρότης), 
and Galen summarizes a number of views on this subject (De Puls. 
Diff. 3.1-2 [8.643-46, Kiihn]). According to Galen, Herophilus said 
the intensity of the pulse depends on "the strength [ρώμη] of the vital 
power in the arteries." Asclepiades of Prusa in the first century B.C. 
said it depends on " the abundance and lightness of the pneuma," 
Athenaeus of Attaleia about the same time or somewhat later on "the 
strength of the vital tonos," and Archigenes of Apamea in the early 
second century A.D. on "the tonos of the movement of the arteries." 
The last two introduce tonos into their explanation of a strong pulse, 
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and in fact Archigenes seems to have considered tonos to be one of the 
categories according to which pulses can be classified.92 Since both 
Athenaeus and Archigenes are generally assumed to be under the in­
fluence of Stoicism,93 one might think they have picked up a Stoic 
term to describe a medical concept. It is equally possible that the word 
is medical in origin and was originally associated with the pneuma of 
the arteries. Again we would like to know whether Praxagoras, 
Herophilus, or Erasistratus, all of whom discussed the pulse and the 
movement of the pneuma in the arteries, used this term. In the present 
state of our knowledge of Hellenistic medical theories and terminol­
ogy, we cannot answer this question either. Our ignorance, however, 
should not induce us to dismiss the possibility that somewhere behind 
the Stoic doctrine of the tonos may lie Hellenistic discussions of the 
pulsation of the vital pneuma in the arteries as well as theories of the 
transmission of sensations and motor-impulses through the pneuma of 
the nerves. A medical influence on the Stoic concept of the pneuma 
and its activity seems clear; the question still remaining is where the 
medical influence leaves off and Stoic elaboration begins. 
Our investigation into the origin of the Stoic concept of the tonos has 
yielded relatively few firm conclusions. It has shown that the Stoic 
concept includes a number of ideas already associated with the word in 
non-Stoic contexts. It has also revealed that the word entered the 
biological vocabulary rather early and that Stoicism may well have 
adopted the term from this context. But the incompleteness of our 
knowledge both of the Stoic use of the term and of the medical use 
precludes definite conclusions at this point. Yet we may take comfort 
in the fact that the Stoic concept of the tonos is not an isolated doctrine 
but merely one aspect of the concept of the psychic pneuma, and this 
exceedingly important concept can be understood in some detail and its 
origin determined with a fair degree of probability. Thus Chrysippus's 
major contribution to Stoic cosmobiology can be clearly identified and 
appreciated, even if the Stoic tonos remains incompletely explained. 
In conclusion, it appears that the origin and development of Stoic 
cosmobiology was no simple process. The fundamental idea that the 
cosmos is a living, sentient, intelligent animal was firmly enunciated 
by Zeno and perpetuated by his successors. This idea, rooted deeply in 
the mind of the ancient world, Greek and non-Greek alike, was first 
stated by Zeno in Platonic terms, after Theophrastus had shown that 
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Aristotle's attempt to eliminate the world soul had left it as firmly 
implanted in the cosmos as Plato had believed it to be. Cleanthes 
continued to support Zeno's doctrine and to buttress it with new argu­
ments. In so doing, he expanded the concept of the world soul to 
embrace Aristotle's three psychic functions; and he identified the 
world soul with the heat of the cosmos, an identification that Zeno 
must also have made, but to which Aristotle's physiology now seemed 
to give further support. Chrysippus, noticing that medical theory had 
left his school behind, updated Stoic cosmobiology by identifying the 
world soul with the pneuma (air-fire mixture) that permeates the cos­
mos. To this pneuma he assigned the three psychic functions that 
Cleanthes had taken from Aristotle, but he broke up the nutritive 
function into growth and a new function called hexis or cohesion 
{συνεχεία). This last function he used, probably following the prece­
dent of Cleanthes, to explain the cosmological problem of the survival 
of the cosmos in the void. The ultimate result was that the Stoic 
cosmos had a biological as well as physical side. Though each side 
owed its existence to the ideas of others, the total integration of the 
physical and the biological sides of the cosmos resulted in a totally new 
cosmology, one that can only be characterized as purely Stoic. 
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899b, as of the young Aristotle (Jaeger, 151). 
19. Leg. 10.891e-898c. [Plato] Epin. 982a-e deduces intelligence directly from 
the regularity of the celestial movements; there is no mention of self-movement as in 
the passage from Plato's Laws. Incidentally, Epin. 983a, c, contrasts nature with 
intelligence, just as Plato does in the Laws. 
20. When attributing this idea to Cleanthes we must always be aware that it may not 
have been his own innovation, but could be the expression of an idea of Zeno's that 
does not happen to be attested in the fragments of Zeno. 
21. The reasoning seems to be: The cosmos has a part that possesses sensation and 
reason (i.e., the vital heat), just as we have a part that possesses sensation and reason 
(the rational soul). Therefore the cosmos may be called intelligent, just as we are. 
22. It may seem unjustified to include under one head both sustaining the cosmos 
(Nat. D. 2.25-28) and giving it life (Nat. D. 2.31-32; literally giving it soul; but soul 
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makes the cosmos a living thing). However, the human analogy on which Nat. D. 
2.25-28 is based shows very clearly that the sustaining processes of nutrition and 
growth (ali et crescere) are merely more specific descriptions of the general process of 
life (cf. vita, vivit, vim vitalem, Nat. D. 2.23-24). 
23. Nat. D. 2.29-30. This conclusion follows even without the assumption that 
Nat. D. 2.40-44 belongs between 29 and 30. For Cicero says: "In ea parte igitur in 
qua mundi inest principatus [i.e., the heat]haec [scil. "sensum atque rationem"] inesse 
necesse est." Solmsen, "Cleanthes" (above, note 8), 277, asserts, "Cleanthes does 
not entrust the vital heat with the task of thinking or other noble functions of men and 
animals," but Solmsen considers only Nat. D. 2.23-28, 30 (Atque)-32, the sections 
dealing with the sustaining and perceptive functions of the cosmic heat (cf. Solmsen, 
"Cleanthes," 272, note 25). 
24. Aristotle discusses them in detail in De An. 2.2-3.8 (nutritive: De An. 2.4; 
perceptive: De An. 2.5-3.2; rational: De An. 3.3-8) and mentions them elsewhere as 
the three obvious varieties of soul, e.g., Eth. Nic. 1.7.1097b33-1098a5; Gen. An. 
2.3.736a32-b29. In some summaries (e.g., De An. 2.2.413a20-25, blO-13, 
3.414a29-32, 414b32-415a8) Aristotle adds another faculty, that of local movement, 
which he discusses in detail after the other three (De An. 3.9-11). However, this 
faculty, unlike the other three, cannot be correlated precisely with Aristotle's three 
major classes of living beings (plants, animals, and man), since it is found in some, but 
not all, animals and in man (cf. De An. 2.3.415a6-7; 3.9.432bl9-21); so it cannot 
serve to define any class of living things. Moreover, though Aristotle is certain it 
cannot be simply identified with any other faculty (De An. 3.9), he shows that 
movement involves other faculties, namely the perceptive, the appetitive, and in the 
case of man the rational, and is not independent of them. Ulitmately the cause of 
movement is found in the object of desire (όρεκτόν), which moves the appetite 
(όρεκτικόν, όρεξις) and so initiates movement if the mind permits (De An. 
3.10.433a9-bl3, cf. 13-18). The appetite, however, cannot function without the 
imagination (φαντασία, De An. 3.10.433b27-29), which is itself an effect of percep­
tion (De An. 3.3.429al-2). 
25. Cf. Solmsen, "Cleanthes" (above, note 8), 274-79. 
26. Cf. Gen. An. 2.6.744al-5; Part. An. 2.16.659bl7-18. See F. Solmsen, 
"Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves," MusHelv 18 (1961): 175-76. 
27. With this argument Epin. 982a-985e should be compared. In the Epinomis the 
analogical argument of Aristotle and Cleanthes is also used (Epin. 984b-c), and the 
celestial bodies are said to have the sharpest sight (Epin. 984d). 
28. Compare Plato Leg. 10.888e-898c. 
29. The class of living things that lacks sensation, namely, plants, also lacks local 
movement (De An. 2.2.413a20-bl, 3.414a29-415al3; 3.9.432bl3-19). 
30. See Appendix 6. 
31. Cf. A. A. Long, "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics," BICS 15 (1968):79-82. 
32. SVE 1.143; 2.827-31, 836, 885. Some, e.g., L. Stein, Die Psychologie der 
Stoa (Berlin, 1886-88), 2.108, note 219, have maintained that Zeno did not use the 
word hegemonikon, and that Cleanthes introduced it. Though it is true there is no 
evidence that Zeno tried to identify the hegemonikon of the cosmos, SVE 1.143 would 
seem to be evidence that he did use the term of the human soul. If he divided the soul 
into eight parts, he must have had some name for the chief part; so why should we not 
believe he used the term hegemonikon'} Moreover, Cleanthes' discussion in Nat. D. 
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2.29 does not give the impression that the term is new in reference to man, animals, 
and plants; but it does suggest that the application of the term to a part of the cosmos is 
an innovation. F. Adorno, "Sul significato del termine τρ/εμονικόν in Zenone 
stoico," La Parola del Passato 14 (1959):31 —33, comes to the same conclusion. 
33. Cic. Nat. D. 2.29 (assuming that the argument originally contained some 
mention of the fact that the sun is the hegemonikon [SVF 1.499]; cf. Appendix 6). 
34. Cf. Verbeke, L'evolution (above, note 1), 54-55; Kleanthes van Assos, Ver­
handelingen van de Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Klasse der Letteren, 
vol. 11, no. 9 (Brussels, 1949), 134-35. He is probably right in minimizing the 
influence of the Oriental sun-cult on Cleanthes' doctrine. 
35. νεαραί (instead of νοεραί) is the convincing emendation of J. Meerwaldt, 
"Cleanthea," Mnemosyne, 4th ser. 4 (1951):53-54. 
36. DK 13 A 7.5. As O. Gigon, Der Drsprung der griechischen Philosophie 
(Basel, 1945), 113-14, points out, this theory cannot be harmonized with the theory 
given in DK 13 A 6. G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers 
(Cambridge, 1957), 152, suggest that DK 13 A 6 is due to the imputation of the theory 
of Xenophanes and Anaxagoras to Anaximenes because of a misunderstanding of 
Anaximenes' theory. DK 13 A 7.5 is more in keeping with Anaximenes' ideas in 
general than is DK 13 A 6. 
37. Anaximander, DK 12 A 27, may show a trace of this view, though other 
explanations of this fragment are possible. For discussion cf. C. H. Kahn, Anaximan­
der and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York, 1960), 67, 103; W. K. C. 
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, 1962-69), 1.97-98. 
38. The number of exhalations in Heraclitus is one of the first problems. G. S. 
Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments (Cambridge, 1954), 271-76, maintains that 
DK 22 A 1.9-11 is Aristotle's theory read back into Heraclitus, though Solmsen, 
Aristotle's System of the Physical World, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 33 
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1960), 409-10, has called attention to differences between the dual 
exhalation theory ascribed to Heraclitus and that of Aristotle. Second, some of the 
placita of Heraclitus may be expressed in Stoic terms and therefore distorted. For 
example, the statement of Aetius 2.20.16 (=DK 22 A 12) that the sun is "an intelli­
gent kindling from the sea'' (άναμμα νοερον το έκ ΰαλάττης) may be more Stoic 
than Heraclitean (cf. SVF 1.121, 501; 2.652, 655, 656), since there is no evidence that 
Heraclitus regarded the sun as intelligent, and since his ideas that "the sun is new 
every day" (DK 22 Β 6) and that it is an exhalation burning in a bowl (DK 22 A 
1.9-10; cf. A 12) do not sound like descriptions of an intelligent, living being. 
39. The concept of nourishment occurs in DK 22 A 11, cf. Kirk, Heraclitus 
(above, note 38), 264-66. 
40. Meteor 2.2.354b33-355a32. This passage is sometimes now taken as referring 
to Heraclitus; e.g., by H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy 
(Baltimore, J935), 133, note 541; and H. D. P. Lee, Aristotle: Meteorologica, Loeb 
Classical Library (London, 1962), 133, note c. Kirk, Heraclitus (above, note 38), 
264-66, is skeptical and seems to prefer the traditional ascription to a group of early 
physical philosophers. The basis for referring it to Heraclitus is chiefly that the doc­
trine that an exhalation provides fuel for the sun is attested most clearly for Heraclitus 
and less clearly for others. 
41. DK 22 A 12. According to Diogenes Laertius, Zeno used a bowl of water to 
illustrate an eclipse of the sun {SVF 1.119); but since a solar eclipse is said to be 
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caused by the moon intercepting the sun's light, the bowl analogy is obscure to us. 
Possibly Zeno had more than one explanation for eclipses, just as he may have had 
more than one theory of the nature of the moon. For his explanation for an eclipse of 
the moon in SVF 1.119 (falling into the shadow of the earth) implies that the moon is 
not fire, whereas in SVF 1.120 Zeno is credited with the opinion that the moon is fiery. 
Cleanthes, who said the moon is fiery (SVF 1.506), may well have used its hemispher­
ical shape to explain eclipses and phases. A Heraclitean influence on Cleanthes' 
astronomy is strongly maintained by R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Cicero's 
philosophischen Schriften (Leipzig, 1882), 2.120-21; cf. also A. C. Pearson, The 
Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes (London, 1891), 261-62. 
42. SVF 1.497 (see Appendix 3). The statement of this fragment that "the middle 
offers resistance" to the fire (άντιτνπ-ησαντος αντώ τον μέσον) is perhaps a reflec­
tion of the idea that the tonos is a "blow of fire." 
43. SVF 3.471. This is actually a fragment of Chrysippus, but Chrysippus claims 
that this is the doctrine of Zeno. 
44. H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon9 (Oxford 
1940), s. ν. τείνω, τόνος. 
45. In a discussion of the arm tonoi andneura are interchanged (A rt. 11 [4.108-12, 
Littre = 3.226-28, Jones]), and in a discussion of the spinal cord the author speaks of 
sinewy tonoi (TOVOL νενρώδεες) and states that an outgrowth from the neura is linked 
to the tonoi {Art. 45 [4.190-92, Littre = 3.288, Jones]). Galen has no doubt that 
Hippocrates used the terms tonoi and neura interchangeably for the nerves proper (De 
Plac Hipp, et Plat. 1.9 [5.205, Kiihn]; In Hipp, de Art. 46 [18A.380-81, Kiihn]). 
Some of the tonoi are considered especially important by the author of On Joints, 
because they cause pain if pressed by a bone (Art. 59 [4.256, Littre = 3.340, Jones]; cf. 
Mochl. 4 [4.366-67. Littre = 3.423, Jones]), and allow the ribs to deteriorate if they 
become infected (Art. 50 [4.218, Littre = 3.309, Jones]; cf. Mochl. 36 [4.378-80, 
Littre = 3.434, Jones]). The author of Epidemics II uses tonoi of the nerves extending 
from the brain (Epid. 2.2 [5.125-27, Littre]). 
46. The Hippocratic treatises On Breaths and On the Use of Liquids also associate 
heat with the expansion of the neura (Flat. 8 [6.102, Littre = 2.238, Jones]; Liqu. 1 
[6.118, Littre]). 
47. Nat. D. 2.37-39. The passage is reprinted in part in SVF 2.641 and 1153. The 
passage presents a continuous argument; it is unfortunate von Arnim has broken it up 
and omitted a key part. 
48. Cic. Nat. D. 2.32 (Atque)-36 shows the same Platonic basis for proving the 
intelligence and wisdom of the cosmos. All the arguments seem compatible with 
Chrysippus's philosophy and may originally have come from his pen. If so, they 
merely confirm the portrait we have been painting of Chrysippus. 
49. Cf. Solmsen, "Cleanthes" (above, note 8), 280-81. Rufus of Ephesus (=SVF 
1.127) claims, "Zeno says heat andpneuma are the same," but his testimony cannot 
be trusted. Even if he is referring to Zeno of Citium (and we cannot be sure of this), he 
may have misunderstood Zeno (cf. Solmsen, "Cleanthes," 281, note 61), especially 
since Rufus, in general, seems unacquainted with Stoic doctrine (this is the only 
reference to the old Stoics von Arnim has found in his writings). 
50. Tertullian Apol. 21.10 ( = SVF 1 160, 533) is a small piece of evidence that he 
did not. Zeno is said to have made the logos, or mind, the creative power in the 
universe, in contrast to Cleanthes, who assigned this task to the pneuma that permeates 
the cosmos. Cf. Verbcke, L'evolution (above, note I), 39, 55. 
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51. Cf. Nat. D. 2.23-24; and the discussion of Cleanthes' view earlier in this 
chapter. 
52. SVF 1.525 speaks of a disagreement between Cleanthes and Chrysippus on the 
role of thepneuma in causing local movements. This may stem from actual discussion 
in the Stoa at a time in which the Stoa was seriously grappling with problems con­
nected with the pneuma. Perhaps it was Chrysippus who stimulated the discussion by 
rejecting Cleanthes' theory of heat as mover (Cic. Nat. D. 2.23, 32) in favor of Zeno's 
theory that the pneuma causes movement (SVF 1.135). This would not be the only 
time Chrysippus diverged from Cleanthes; Antipater of Tarsus wrote a book On the 
Difference between Cleanthes and Chrysippus (SVF 3.Antip.66). M. Pohlenz, "Ze-
non und Chrysipp," NGG, Phil.-hist. Kl., N.F., Fachgruppe I, vol. 2 (1938), 173­
210, discusses some of Chrysippus's innovations. 
53. Cf. Arist. Gen. An. 2.3.736b29-737al and Chapter 3, note 52. 
54. The importance of heat in the biological works of Aristotle and Theophrastus is 
good evidence of its reputation in Zeno's day. 
55. F. Steckerl, The Fragments of Praxagoras of Cos and his School, Philosophia 
Antiqua 8 (Leiden, 1958), has collected the fragments of Praxagoras and has provided 
a preliminary discussion of some of his theories and of his historical position. For what 
follows, see especially pages 10-21. 
56. Fr. 18, 19. The apparent contradiction is discussed by Steckerl (above, note 
55), 10-11. 
57. Herophilus's opinion on the pneuma s role in sensation can be inferred from 
Galen De UsuPart. 10.12 (3.813, Kiihn); DeSympt. Caus. 1.2(7.88-89, Kiihn); and 
in movement from Galen De Tremore 5 (7.605, Kiihn). For Erasistratuss opinion on 
the role of the pneuma in movement, see Galen De Melanch. 5 (5.125, Kiihn); cf. De 
Loc. Affect. 6.5 (8.429, Kiihn). On the whole question and especially on the recon­
struction of Herophilus see Solmsen, "Discovery" (above, note 26), 185-88. 
58. Epicurus Ep. 1.63 described the soul as "most resembling pneuma with an 
admixture of heat" (cf. Lucr. 3.231-37). Theophrastus approved of the opinion of 
medical writers who considered paralysis a condition of the pneuma (πνευματικόν 
πάΰος), and he seems to have believed the pneuma is the cause of heat and motion, so 
that the blood will cease flowing and grow cool if the pneuma is interrupted (fr. 11, 
Wimmer). Cf. Solmsen, "Discovery" (above, note 26), 182-83. 
59. For Herophilus, see Rufus De Anat. Part. 74; Galen De Usu Part. 8.11 (3.667, 
Kiihn); Aet. 4.5.4; Tert. De An. 15.5. For Erasistratus, see Galen De Plac. Hipp, et 
Plat. 7.3 (5.602-4, Kiihn); De Usu Part. 8.13 (3.673, Kiihn); Aet. 4.5.3. Cf. Solm­
sen, "Discovery" (above, note 26), 192-93. 
60. A word of warning is in order. Since Hellenistic medical theories are at the 
present time very imperfectly understood, any conclusions must be tentative. Perhaps 
further research in the bulky, but little read, corpus of Greek medicine will some day 
allow a clarification of the relationship between the Stoa and Greek medicine. 
61. Cf. W. Jaeger, "Das Pneuma im Lykeion," Hermes 48 (1913), 43-55 
(=Scripta Minora [Rome, 1960] 1.70-83), and Solmsen, "Discovery" (above, note 
26), 174, who also point out that this is a legacy of the Sicilian school of medicine. See 
also W. Wiersma, "Die aristotelische Lehre vom Pneuma," Mnemosyne, 3d ser. 11 
(1943): 102-7. 
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62. Galen An in Arter. Nat. Sang. Cont. 2 (4.706-7, Kuhn = Praxagoras, fr. 31, 
Steckerl); De Usu Resp. 2 (4.473-74, Kiihn); Aet. 4.22.3. Cf. Steckerl (above, note 
55), 19. 
63. Cicero's exact source for these sections is disputed. K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und 
Sympathie (Munich, 1926), 162-68, and M. van den Bruwaene, La theologie de 
Cicero (Louvain, 1937), 119-21, think Posidonius is Cicero's source, whereas M. 
Pohlenz, "K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie," GGA 188 (1926): 281-88; Stoa 
(above, note 1), 2.99, and I. We\nemann,Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften (Bres­
lau, 1928), 2.195-204, beiieve Panaetius supplied the material for these sections. 
64. SVF 2.847. Galen (SVF 2.782, 783) mentions the same theory that Plutarch 
records, namely that the pneuma is sustained by respiration and by evaporation from 
the blood. Von Arnim believes Galen includes the Stoics in these general statements; 
but, in fact, Galen does not identify his sources precisely enough to make these 
passages useful as evidence for the Stoics. 
65. Von Arnim includes in SVF a reference to Galen's treatise De Usu Respir­
ationis, which attempts to prove that respiration is for cooling the innate heat (SVF 
2.765); but there is no evidence that Galen obtained this theory from the Stoa. 
66. SVF 2.885. Unfortunately, the word for breath has been corrupted in the MS; 
EVTTVOLOL, the conjecture of Petersen, is adopted by von Arnim. εμπνοια is another 
possibility (cf. SVF 2.792). 
67. Chrysippus's student, Diogenes of Babylonia, too seems to have believed that 
breathing supplies at least part of the psychic pneuma (SVF 3.Diog.30). 
68. We cannot here go into all the reasons for this statement. Cf. Steckerl (above, 
note 55), 20, 43-44; Solmsen, "Discovery" (above, note 26), 180-81. M. Pohlenz, 
"Karl Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie," GGA 188 (1926): 281-84, has called 
attention to some striking parallels between the account of Cic. Nat. D. 2.135-38 and 
Erasistratus, but there are also some significant differences. In Cic. Nat. D. 2.136 heat 
and cooking are involved in digestion, as much as the mechanical grinding attested for 
Erasistratus (Galen De Nat. Fac. 2.8, 3.4, 3.7 [2.110-11, 118-19, 157, 166, Kiihn]; 
In Hipp, de Aliment. 2.7 [15.247-48, Kuhn]; Def. Med. 99 [19.372-73, Kiihn]). In 
Cic. Nat. D. 2.139 the nervi seem to be ligaments, at least primarily, and in addition 
originate in the heart, whereas Erasistratus used the term to designate the nerves that 
are connected to the brain (Galen De Plac. Hipp. etPlat. 7.3 [5.602-4, Kiihn]; cf. De 
Usu Part. 8.13 [3.673, Kiihn]; Aet. 4.5.3; see Solmsen, "Discovery" [above, note 
26], 184-97). As I have suggested above (note 60), the whole subject of the develop­
ment and diffusion of Hellenistic medical theories requires much further study. 
69. De An. 1.5.41 lb27-30; 2.2.413a22-b4, 3.414bl8-19, 414b28-415al3; 
3.3.427b6-14, 12.434a25-30; Part. An. 2.10.655b29-656a8; Eth. Nic. 1.7.11­
13.1097b30-1098a4. For the background of Aristotle's scale, cf. F. Solmsen, "An­
tecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings," AJP 76 (1955): 148-64. 
70. SVF 2.634. The fragment is not completely clear and is probably corrupt. The 
doxographer's insertion of Stoic opinions on the hegemonikon of the cosmos ( = SVF 
2.644) has contributed to the confusion. What is clear is that the argument is based on 
the analogy from microcosm to macrocosm, and that the scale of psychological func­
tions is found in each. What is not clear are the details. Even though we know the 
details of the four psychological functions and the scale of beings from other sources, 
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it would be unwise to attempt to fill out or even to locate the lacuna (von ArninVs 
lacuna before αισΰητικώς is an unsatisfactory solution). For some of the difficulties 
facing a would-be emendator, see below, note 72. 
71. The subject of this and the following sentences is obscure. Strictly speaking, 
the subject should be "soul"; but Chrysippus is apparently thinking of the pneuma, 
which has different names corresponding to its function. 
72. It is hard to see how Chrysippus could have gotten a strictly symmetrical 
scheme from this material. For strict symmetry the series of beings should run: earth­
hexis; plants-nature; animals-soul, sensation; and man-mind. But we know that his 
highest part was the aether, not man. Again for strict symmetry on the basis of 
elements we should expect: earth-hexis; water-nature; air-soul, sensation; and 
aether-mind. He does, in fact use earth and aether, and substitutes the things in the air 
for air. But how did he bring water into relation with nature? Indeed, nature (φύσις) 
was considered wetter than soul (SVF 2.715, 787), but this fact helps little. What is 
more, plants, the best representatives of nature, are left out. To bring them into 
relation with water is even harder. The Aristotelian precedent that made footed animals 
the things in air assigned plants to earth (Gen. An. 3.11.761bl3—14; cf. De Juv 
19.477ra27-30). Perhaps Chrysippus did not use a strictly symmetrical scheme. If he 
did not, any attempt to reconstruct his argument exactly is doomed to failure. 
73. The pneumatic functions are also manifested in the cosmos as a whole. A 
sentient power pervades the whole cosmos (SVF 2.1209); nature (φύσις) holds the 
cosmos together and governs it (SVF 2.912, 1132); and hexis prevents it from disinte­
grating in the void (SVF 2.551, 552, 553). 
74. SVF 2.389, 416, 439, 441, 449, 473, cf. 716. This idea is assigned to Chrysip­
pus himself in SVF 2.449, 473. In SVF 2.1132 the cohesive function on the cosmic 
level is assigned to nature (φύσις) rather than to the hexis or pneuma, but it is still a 
function of the pneuma, for nature is a form of pneuma (cf. SVF 2.715, 716, 787, 
1133). 
75. The word hexis is well chosen because it means literally "holding" and figura­
tively "condition" or "state." As such it covers both the cohesive and the qualifying 
functions of the pneuma. 
76. In SVF 2.1068 Chrysippus shows that he considered "being held together" 
(σννέχεσΰαι) to be connected with nutrition, for he says, "The other gods (i.e., the 
heavenly bodies and the elements [cf. SVF 2.1049, 1076, 1077]) make use of food 
(τροφτ)), being held together (συνεχόμενοι) by this." 
77. SVF 2 Ml, 451. Equally revealing is a statement in which Philo opposes 
"tonic motion" to change of place, when he wishes to describe the movement of the 
word of the Lord (SVF 2.453). The evidence that could be adduced in support of the 
hypothesis that pneumatic motion is local is very slight. Von Arnim prints in SVF 
Sextus's summary of an argument of Carneades that refers to movement from middle 
to periphery and back again and uses for this movement the word φερόμενον. which 
usually signifies local movement. Furthermore, he gratuitously emends the text to 
make pneuma the subject of this motion. Not only is this text of dubious value as 
evidence for Stoic doctrine, but it is capable of too many different interpretations to 
prove anything at all. In SVF 2.458 Philo, adapting some Stoic doctrines, speaks of 
the movement of the pneuma in local terms; but again Philo's adaptation is of dubious 
value as evidence for the old Stoa, and he could be speaking metaphorically, since 
another of his echoes of Stoicism, which we have just cited (SVF 2.453), points in 
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precisely the opposite direction. The only clear statement that tonic motion might be 
local occurs in Galen (SVF 2.450). Here tonic motion is described as possibly being 
local motion rapidly alternating in direction over a minute distance so that it appears to 
stand still, just as a swimmer swimming upstream. But Galen suspends judgment on 
the question whether this is the proper view of it or not, and the text does not allow us 
to decide whether this has been proposed as a description of tonic motion by one of its 
proponents, or whether Galen himself is suggesting this description. On this passage, 
cf. S. Sambursky. Physics of the Stoics (London and New York, 1959), 32-33. 
78. S. Sambursky, The Physical World of the Greeks (London, 1956), 137-41, 
and (more cautiously) Physics (above, note 77), 22-23, interprets the pneumatic or 
tonic motion as something akin to wave motion, but his interesting thesis goes beyond 
the texts. The vibration mentioned by Galen (see above, note 77), and the Stoic idea 
that sound is a disturbance of the air spreading out in waves like ripples in a pond (SVF 
2.425, 872) are not a sufficient basis for reading wave motion into all the texts 
pertaining to pneumatic motion. Sambursky's feeling that originally pneumatic tension 
"meant no more than the manifestations of the pressure of compressed air or the 
expansive force of steam from boiling water" (Physical World 135) is much closer to 
the actual texts. 
79 In SVF 1.99 the word "hexis" is used of objects held together by a movement 
of all parts toward the center, and this might indicate another point of contact between 
Chrysippus and Zeno. There is no evidence that Zeno anticipated the entire theory of 
Chrysippus. Specifically there is no evidence that Zeno attributed the cohesion to the 
activity of pneuma. Furthermore, we cannot rule out the possibility that the epitomist 
has introduced a later term into his summary. There is a mention of the pneumatic 
tonos in SVF 1.106 (page 30.35-36); but this is obviously an interpolation, and, what 
is more, it is doubtful that anything in SVF 1.106 goes back to Zeno (see below, 
Chapter 6, note 14). 
80. The most striking example of Chrysippus's integration of the physical and 
biological points of view is the statement quoted by Plutarch: "In whatever manner 
each of the parts moves when it is grown together [σνμφνες] with the remaining parts, 
in the same manner it is reasonable for the part to move by itself, even if for the sake of 
argument we should imagine and assume it to be in a void space of this cosmos. For 
just as, being held together [σννεχόμενον], it would be moving from everywhere 
toward the middle, it remains in this motion, even if, for the sake of argument, void 
suddenly surrounds it" (SVF 2.550). Here in a single sentence Chrysippus both refers 
to the cosmos as "grown together" and "held together" (presumably by some active 
force or substance) and also speaks of the natural, centripetal movement of its parts. 
For furthur discussion of the physical side of this phenomenon, see above, Chapter 4. 
The hexis is referred to in SVF 2.551 (page 174.27-29), 552, 553; but in each case the 
author seems to understand it as a purely physical phenomenon. 
81. This is also the view of Pohlenz, Stoa (above, note 1), 1.74-75, though 
Pohlenz does not stress as much as he might the differences between Zeno's, 
Cleanthes', and Chrysippus's conceptions of the tonos. 
82. This is assuming that my interpretation of the role of Cieanthes' tonos in 
cosmogony is correct (see Appendix 3). 
83. Cf. J. S. Morrison and R. Τ Williams, Greek Oared Ships. 900-322 B.C 
(Cambridge, 1968), 296-98. 
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84. These έττίτονοι, which seem to be a specific kind of sinew, probably in the 
back, are mentioned also in Tim. 84e and Arist. Hist. An. 3.5.515b6-10. 
85. Rufus De Anat. Part. 71-74; De Norn. Part. 150; Galen De Usu Part. 8.11, 
10.12 (3.667, 813, Kiihn); De Tremore 5 (7.605, KUhn). Cf. Solmsen, "Discovery" 
(above, note 26), 184-88. 
86. Gen. An. 2.6.744al-5; Part. An. 2.16.659bl7-18; Mot. An. 7-8.701bl­
702a5; 10.703a4-b2; 11.703b9-18. Cf. Solmsen, "Discovery" (above, note 26), 
169-78. 
87. Fr. 11. Cf. Solmsen, "Discovery" (above, note 26), 178-80. 
88. Cf. above, note 57. 
89. Cf. above, note 45. 
90. The theory of Praxagoras has been discussed above. For Erasistratus see espe­
cially, Galen's treatise An in Arter. Nat. Sang. Cont. (4.703-36, Kiihn). Direct 
testimony on Herophilus is lacking, but there is at least no good evidence that he 
disagreed with Praxagoras and Erasistratus. Cf. L. G. Wilson, "Erasistratus, Galen, 
and the Pneuma," Bull. Hist. Med. 33 (1959): 295-99. 
91. Cf., e.g., Praxagoras, frs. 26, 27, Steckerl; Herophilus On Pulses (cited by 
Galen, DePuls. Diff. 1.28; 2.6, 10; 4.2, 3 [8.556, 592, 625, 716-17, 724, Kuhn]; De 
Dign. Puls. 2.2; 4.3 [8.853, 956-61, Kuhn]; De Praesag. exPuls. 2.3 [9.278-79, 
Kuhn]; Syn. Lib. de Puls. 8, 12 [9.453, 463-65, Kuhn]). 
92. If we may trust the summary of [Rufus] Syn. de Puls. 8 (231-32, Ruelle), a 
summary that seems to be repeated without attribution in [Galen] De Puls. ad Ant. 
(19.634, Kuhn). Since Galen assures us σφοδρότης was one of the qualities of pulse 
distinguished by Archigenes (De Puls. Diff. 2.4 [8.576-77, Kuhn]) and has also 
informed us this quality depends on the tonos of the movement of the arteries, we may 
feel fairly safe in trusting the summary in the treatise attributed to Rufus at least on this 
point. 
93. Cf., e.g., M. Wellmann, Die pneumatische Schule bis auf Archigenes, 
Philologische Unterschungen 14 (Berlin, 1895), 7-8, 132, cf. 131-53; Pohlenz, Stoa 
(above, note 1), 1.362; F. Kudlien, "Pneumatische Arzte," RE, Suppl. 11 (1968): 
1097-1106. 
CHAPTER VI 
The Cosmic Cycle 
This cosmic order, which came into existence in the far distant past, is 
not eternal but must eventually perish. Its destruction will come in a 
tremendous conflagration, called the ekpyrosis, in which everything 
will be changed into fire (SVF 1.107, 510-12; 2.585-620). Then after 
a period during which nothing but fire exists, the world order will 
again come into existence, and by the very same process as that which 
brought the present world order into existence (SVF 1.109, 512; 
2.593, 596, 597, 599, 620, 622-32). In fact, the future cosmos will be 
identical to this one in every respect. Even the people will be identical 
(SVF 2.623-627). There will be another Plato and another Socrates; 
Socrates will marry another Xanthippe and be accused by another 
Anytus and Meletus.1 The history of the cosmos will proceed in an 
eternal cycle of destruction and restoration (SVF 2.596, 597, 617, 
620, 625, 626). 
A cyclical notion of history in general was deeply engrained in the 
Greek mind and found vivid expression in the myths of Phaethon and 
Deucalion, according to which humanity was destroyed by cataclysms 
of fire or flood. Plato used the theory of cyclical cataclysms by fire and 
flood to explain the absence of records and traditions about earlier 
civilizations and attributed these conflagrations to deviations of the 
heavenly bodies (Tim. 22b-23c; cf. Critias 109d, 11 l a -b , 112a; Leg. 
611a; Polit. 270b-d). Aristotle may have picked up this idea and 
perhaps postulated a Great Winter and a Great Summer, in which flood 
and fire destroy civilizations. The Great Winter and Great Summer 
may have been parts of the Great Year, which Aristotle preferred to 
call the Greatest Year, and which he defined as the period marked by 
the conjunction of sun, moon, and planets in the same constellation.2 
Though Plato and Aristotle restricted the cataclysmic destructions to 
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civilizations, others applied them to the cosmos as a whole. In the 
second half of the fifth century B.C. the Pythagorean Philolaos of 
Croton seems to have thought fire and water will destroy the cosmos 
(DK 44 A 18); and the astronomer Meton of Athens predicted the 
destruction of the cosmos, when the seven planets meet in the constel­
lation of Aquarius.3 On the basis of the Platonic theory of cataclysmic 
destructions of mankind by fire and flood, Epicurus argued that if these 
same forces of fire and water should sometime act with greater vehe­
mence, the entire cosmos would be destroyed.4 The Stoic doctrine of 
the conflagration seems to be another variation of this old theme of 
cataclysms. The Stoics follow the tradition that gave these cataclysms 
cosmic scope and actually interpret the cataclysms as parts of the 
cosmic cycle. Thus at one time there is a tremendous fire that destroys 
the entire cosmos; at another time this fire changes to a flood of water. 
Only between the watery stage and the next fiery stage does the present 
state of cosmic organization arise.5 Thus the Stoics give the cataclysms 
a very rigidly determined role in the cyclical cosmic history. 
Another aspect of the cyclical notion of history was developed 
primarily by the Pythagoreans. The Pythagoreans believed that the 
history of civilization is cyclical in the strictest sense. Every individual 
will arise again and repeat his life exactly. Aristotle's student, 
Eudemus of Rhodes, gave a description of this Pythagorean theory as 
an example of the repetition of numerically identical events (fr. 88, 
Wehrli [ = DK 58 Β 34]). Porphyry assigned the same doctrine to 
Pythagoras in a section of his Life of Pythagoras, which very likely 
comes from Dicaearchus, another student of Aristotle (Vita Pythag. 19 
[ = DK 14.8a]). We may conclude that this Pythagorean doctrine was 
well known and much discussed around the end of the fourth century, 
when Zeno came to Athens. We also know that Zeno too was in­
terested in Pythagorean teachings; he wrote a book on the subject and 
may even have attended lectures by a Pythagorean.6 Hence there can 
be little doubt that Zeno adopted from the Pythagoreans his theory that 
each man will be born again in the next cosmic cycle and will repeat 
his life exactly.7 Chrysippus in his book On the Cosmos even stated 
that everything in the next world will be numerically identical with the 
things in this world (SVF 2.624), thus characterizing the nature of the 
repetition in the same way that Eudemus had characterized the nature 
of the Pythagorean repetition. 
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Close as the Stoic theory is to the concepts of a Great Year, cata­
clysmic destructions, and eternal repetition, it seems clear that these 
notions make up only one thread of the fabric of Stoic cosmology.8 
When these ideas are applied to the life of the cosmos as a whole, they 
converge with another philosophical topic, the future fate of the cos­
mos, which goes back to the earliest Greek philosophers. As early as 
the sixth century B.C. the Milesians seem to have viewed the history of 
the cosmos as an epic with a beginning, a middle, and an end,9 though 
they may have devoted little effort to a discussion of the end of the 
cosmos. After the Milesians Heraclitus must have expressed views of 
the destiny of the cosmos. Unfortunately the evidence for his views is 
ambiguous; but since Heraclitus has been promoted as an ancestor of 
Stoicism, we cannot simply pass him by, as we may do with the 
Milesians. Even though we cannot settle the vexed, and perhaps insol­
uble, question of Heraclitus's own belief,10 we can attempt to deter­
mine what the early Stoics knew and thought about Heraclitus, and so 
possibly identify another element in the origin of the Stoic theory of 
the conflagration and restoration of the cosmos. 
In the absence of direct testimony concerning early Stoic knowledge 
of Heraclitus we may begin by comparing Aristotle's information on 
the subject. Aristotle, intentionally seeking out pre-Socratic opinion on 
the corruptibility or incorruptibility of the cosmos, seems to have read 
the works of the pre-Socratics with great care; but the results of his 
study were not great. He found no one who clearly stated the cosmos to 
be ungenerated. Of those who believed this generated cosmos will 
again perish, Aristotle found that some believed the cosmos is simply 
corruptible like any other natural compound, and others believed the 
cosmos will be destroyed and again regenerated in a cycle. The two 
men in whose works Aristotle purports to have found this latter view 
were Heraclitus and Empedocles (Cael. 1.10.279bl2-17). Empedo­
cles' fragments are clear enough to substantiate Aristotle's judgment, 
but Heraclitus's extant fragments are by no means so clear. Aristotle, 
of course, possessed much more of Heraclitus than we do, and there is 
no reason to believe that his judgment was not based on a reading of 
Heraclitus's own words.11 Something in Heraclitus, then, must have 
suggested to Aristotle and the Peripatetics that Heraclitus did not be­
lieve in an eternal cosmos, and conversely they must have found no 
plain statement that the cosmos is eternal.12 The Aristotelian commen­
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tator Simplicius and a Stoic commentary quoted by Clement preserve 
what must have been the best evidence known to antiquity for Hera­
clitus's opinion (DK 22 A 10; SVF 2.590). This is the well-known 
passage which stated: "This cosmos no one of gods or men has made, 
but always was, is, and will be: an everliving fire, kindled by measures 
and quenched by measures [DK 22 Β 30]. . . . The changes of fire: 
first sea, and of sea half earth and half fiery waterspout. [Then] the sea 
is poured out and measured in the same proportion as it was before it 
became earth" (DK 22 Β 31). The only other fragments of Heraclitus 
taken by the Stoics to refer to the conflagration are, "Thunderbolt 
steers all things" (DK 22 Β 64), and "Want and satiety" (DK 22 Β 65; 
cf. SVF 2.616), two fragments that in themselves cannot lead one to 
think that Heraclitus believed in a conflagration if one did not already 
believe this on other grounds. Since we know what antiquity consid­
ered to be the best evidence for cosmic periods in Heraclitus, and since 
we can surmise that Aristotle found no clearer evidence that Heraclitus 
believed the cosmos to be eternal, we are fairly safe in assuming that 
we know as much as Aristotle, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics knew 
about Heraclitus's opinion on the origin and destruction of the cosmos. 
Fortunately, we need not go into the interpretation of these difficult 
fragments, important as they are for establishing what Heraclitus him­
self believed. Since our purpose is to trace the origin of the Stoic 
doctrine, we may simply compare these texts with the Stoic theory and 
see immediately that these texts in themselves are not sufficient to 
account for the entire Stoic doctrine. The least that must be admitted is 
that the Stoics have greatly amplified Heraclitus's theory. Whether this 
is the best explanation for the origin of the Stoic doctrine, we shall be 
able to decide only after tracing the subsequent theories of the future 
fate of the cosmos. 
In the fifth century B.C. Empedocles very plainly stated that the 
history of the cosmic order is cyclical, changing from a homogeneous 
harmony of the four elements to the present state of cosmic organiza­
tion and eventually back to the state of homogeneity (DK 31 Β 17.1­
13; A 52). The atomists held that this cosmos will eventually disinte­
grate and new ones will continually arise in the void (DK 67 A 1.33; 
68 A 37, 40.3, 82). The various universes will be different from each 
other, though it is not impossible that a cosmos identical to this one 
will some day arise (DK 68 A 40, 81). Apart from these two theories, 
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both of which assumed this cosmic order will perish, and one of which 
viewed the destruction as part of a cycle of destruction and regenera­
tion, the fifth-century theories of the end of the cosmic order are 
unknown to us. 
The fourth century brought a radical change in outlook. Plato took 
the first step when he accompanied his mythical description of the 
genesis of the cosmos by the assertion that the cosmos is held together 
by bonds that will never be dissolved, and that the cosmos will there­
fore exist eternally (Tim. 32b-c, 36e, 37c-d, 38b-c, 39d-e). Aristot­
le took the final step and denied that the cosmos had either a beginning 
or an end. Thus he affirmed the cosmos to be absolutely eternal (De 
Phil. frs. 18-20, Ross; Cael. 1.10-12; 2.1.283b26-284a2). At the 
same time the Academy under Xenocrates began interpreting Plato's 
myth of the genesis of the cosmos as a pedagogical device, designed to 
bring out certain truths about the ungenerated and imperishable cosmos 
(Xenocrates, fr. 54, Heinze). 
With the Peripatetics and the Academy unanimous in opposing a 
corruptible cosmos, Zeno stepped into the scene. Zeno and his follow­
ers with their belief that the cosmos will eventually perish would 
appear to be reactionaries, setting themselves in direct opposition to 
the philosophical trend of the fourth century. Even the details of the 
Stoic doctrine would seem to confirm this judgment. The Stoics be­
lieved the sun, moon, and stars draw up moisture from the region of 
the earth; and though most of this is returned in the form of rain, some 
of it is consumed as fuel by the heavenly bodies and thereby converted 
into fire.13 As evidence that this is taking place the Stoics seem to have 
pointed to the recession of the sea.14 All these theories had already 
been refuted by Aristotle. In rejecting the theory that the sun uses 
moisture as fuel, Aristotle had said that the moisture taken up by the 
sun does not reach as far as the celestial region, but returns to earth in 
an eternal cycle (Meteor. 2.2.354b33-355a32). The notion that the 
sea is drying up Aristotle regarded as no more true than one of Aesop's 
fables. All the water that leaves the sea returns again in the form of 
rain. Moreover, the apparent recession of the sea at certain places is 
deceptive; for even though the sea does at times recede in one place, it 
increases in another place, with the result that cyclical variations are 
only local (Meteor. 1 .14.352al7-b22 [cf. 352b22-353a28]; 
2.3.356b9-357a3). 
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However, although the Stoics defended theories that Aristotle had 
criticized, we cannot simply jump to the conclusion that the Stoics 
were either unaware of Aristotle or deliberate reactionaries. We must 
first examine more carefully the core of the opposed doctrines, the 
corruptibility or incorruptibility of the cosmos as a whole. The eternity 
of the cosmos, the premise that was the basis for Aristotle's criticism 
of the theory that the sea is diminishing, is proven by Aristotle in On 
the Heavens. When he sets out to investigate whether the cosmos is 
eternal, or generated and corruptible, he begins by stating the method 
he will use to investigate this problem: "Let us state whether the 
cosmos is ungenerated or generated and imperishable or perishable 
after first running over the theories of others, for difficulties in one 
theory are the proofs for the opposite theory. At the same time the 
theory we are going to propound will be more persuasive to those who 
have heard the pleas of the opponents, for it will not appear so much as 
if we were winning the case by default. In fact, those who wish to obtain 
a satisfactory decision of the truth need arbitrators, not litigants" (Cael. 
1.10.279b4-12). Aristotle makes it clear that he does not intend to 
propose and defend another theory that will merely compete with the 
current theories; he intends, rather, to conduct a trial. Each of those 
who have theories on this subject will be allowed to state his case. 
Then Aristotle will cross-examine each litigant to reveal his false 
statements and thereby arrive at the truth. Aristotle intends to point out 
the dead ends (άπορίαυ) all the former theories have taken and by so 
doing lead men down the opposite path, the one Aristotle believes to 
be the road to truth. 
The litigants are lined up and taken one at a time. All believe the 
cosmos is generated, but the first one believes it is also eternal.1 5 The 
proponent of this view is Plato, and Aristotle cross-examines his view 
from several angles. First of all, his theory is contradicted by experi­
ence, for nothing else is known to have such a nature. Even mathemat­
ical diagrams are not a valid analogy to substantiate this view. The fact 
is that everything which is generated is also corruptible (Cael. 
1.10.279bl7-280al0). Aristotle later returns to this view to show by a 
detailed, theoretical analysis that things which patently exist must be 
either eternal, or else both generated and corruptible; no third possibil­
ity exists (Cael. 1.10-12.280a28-283b22). 
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With Plato's view eliminated only two contending theories remain: 
namely, that the cosmos is eternal, or else that it is both generated and 
corruptible. This second theory comes in two versions. According to 
one version the cosmos is absolutely perishable like any natural com­
pound (Coel. 1.10.279bl3-14). The main defendant of this theory, 
Simplicius tells us, is Democritus (Cael. 293.16-18; 294.23-30, 
Heiberg). Aristotle admits that if there are an infinite number of 
worlds, as Democritus actually believed, this theory is possible; but he 
dismisses it, presumably because he has already refuted the theory of 
infinite worlds (Cael. 1.8-9). However, he does point out that if the 
cosmos is one, as he has proven, the theory that the cosmos has come 
to be and will perish irrevocably is impossible, for before it came to 
be, there must have been a prior formation ((τνστασυς) by a change of 
which the cosmos came to be. 1  6 
In the last analysis, the theory that the cosmos is generated and 
perishable admits of only one defensible interpretation, that of the 
second version of this theory, namely, that the cosmos comes to be and 
perishes in a cycle forever (Cael. 1.10.279b24-30). Thus the only 
theory still competing with the theory of an eternal cosmos is the 
cyclical cosmos that Aristotle finds in Heraclitus and Empedocles 
(Cael. 1.10.279bl4-17). When Aristotle cross-examines this theory, 
he finds, to our surprise, that it does not differ from his own theory that 
the cosmos is eternal: "Making the cosmos alternately combined and 
dissolved is no different from making it eternal, but merely changing 
the form [μορφή] . . . ; for it is clear that when the elements come 
together, the resulting order [τά^ις] and formation [σνστασυς] is not 
fortuitous [τνχονσα], but the same. . . . Consequently if the whole 
corporeal matter [σώμα] exists continuously, but is merely disposed 
[διατίθεται] and arranged [δυακεκόσμηταυ] in different ways, and if 
the cosmos and heaven mean the formation [σνστασις] of the 
universe, then it is not the cosmos that comes to be and perishes, but 
only the dispositions [δίαΰέσευς] of the c o s m o s " (Cael. 
1.10.280al 1-23). The word "cosmos" refers to the order that is 
present in the body of the universe. As long as the corporeal material 
retains its temporal continuity, and as long as this eternal matter main­
tains a continuous order, that is, does not change from order to disor­
der or vice versa, the cosmos must be deemed eternal. The particular 
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state of the cosmic order may change; even Aristotle would not 
exclude all change from the cosmos. 
This explanation clearly fits the theory of Empedocles, but its 
applicability to Heraclitus's fragments must be examined more care­
fully. Aristotle presumably found in Heraclitus his two criteria for an 
eternal cosmos, the continuity of corporeal substance and a succession 
of ordered states. With a little imagination these criteria can be found 
in Heraclitus's extant fragments. "This cosmos no one of gods or men 
has made, but always was, is, and will be: an ever-living fire, kindled 
by measures and quenched by measures" (DK 22 Β 30). Here the 
eternity of the corporeal substance, fire, is clearly stated. Even if 
fragment 31 is taken to refer to cosmogony, it only confirms the fact 
that corporeal substance continues to exist, sometimes in the form of 
pure fire, sometimes in the form of several elements. The second 
criterion, a succession of ordered states, can be found just as easily. If 
the fire is kindled and quenched by measures (DK 22 Β 30), and if the 
elements in their transformations keep the same proportions they had 
before transformation (DK 22 Β 31), there must always be some sort of 
order. Even though the cosmos alternates between a state of pure fire 
and a state of several elements, it alternates between different ordered 
states, not between order and disorder. Therefore, "cosmos" in the 
sense of "order" as such is eternal in Heraclitus. Aristotle might have 
paraphrased Heraclitus, fr. 30, as follows: "The order in the universe 
no one has created; it was, is, and shall be forever, inasmuch as the 
universe is an eternal fire, sometimes kindled and sometimes 
quenched." 
The result of Aristotle's trial of his predecessors is that he has 
discovered his own view imperfectly expressed by two of his predeces­
sors, Heraclitus and Empedocles. After eliminating the incorrect views 
of Plato and the Atomists, and after putting the view of Heraclitus and 
Empedocles into the proper perspective, Aristotle finds that the only 
defensible view is that the cosmic material and the cosmic order may 
undergo changes. This is not to say that the philosophies of Heraclitus 
and Empedocles are correct; for example, Heraclitus's view on the 
arche or element of all things and Empedocles' denial of the transfor­
mation of elements are open to criticism (Metaph. 1.3.984a5-ll, 
8.988b22-989a26; Cael. 3.5.304a7-b22; Gen. Corr. 2.6). But their 
opinion on the eternity of the cosmos is, in the last analysis, substan­
tially correct. 
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Now we are finally in a position to evaluate the Stoic attitude toward 
the perishability of the cosmos. A comparison of the Stoic doctrine 
with Aristotle's discussion shows that the Stoics have appropriated 
Aristotle's theory completely. The Stoics do not admit that the cosmos 
without qualification is perishable. They distinguish different senses of 
the word "cosmos." One is "that which is particularly qualified of all 
substantial matter" (το έκ άπάσης ουσίας Ιδίως ποών), also called 
"god." The other is the "arrangement" (δυακόσμησίς, διάταξις), 
the order in which the qualified matter is currently arranged in the 
cosmos. The cosmos in the sense of "the particularly qualified mat­
ter" is eternal, for the eternal matter never exists without some qualifi­
cation. Only the cosmos in the sense of "this specific arrangement" is 
generated and destroyed in an eternal cycle (SVF 2.526-28, 590, 
620). Accordingly, whenever the Stoics speak of the cosmic order 
created in the cosmogony or destroyed in the conflagration, they use 
the term δίακόσμησις or the verb διακοσμειν (SVF 1.98, 102, 107, 
497, 512; 2.526, 596, 597, 599, 611, 626, 1052). Obviously the Stoic 
theory is an exact repetition of the theory Aristotle expressed in On the 
Heavens (1.10.280al 1—23), with only a slight change in some of the 
terminology.17 Moreover, when the Stoic source quoted by Clement of 
Alexandria cites Heraclitus as an exponent of this view (SVF 2.590), 
this Stoic source is also following Aristotle; and what is even more 
significant, this Stoic source manifests precisely the same interpreta­
tion of Heraclitus that we have postulated for Aristotle. Heraclitus, fr. 
30, is used as evidence that the cosmos in the sense of ordered, qual­
ified matter is eternal; Heraclitus, fr. 31, is used as evidence that the 
cosmic arrangement (διακόσμησις) is generated and perishable. 
The Stoics, therefore, cannot be considered ignorant of Aristotle's 
criticisms; nor can they be considered reactionaries. They are follow­
ing a course to which Aristotle had given his approval. Though Aristot­
le might have been able to criticize on other grounds the cosmic 
destruction envisioned by the Stoics, he could not have faulted them 
for denying the eternity of the cosmos. The Stoics, following Aristot­
le's own lead, have found a way to maintain the old notion of a 
generated and perishable cosmos without rejecting the fourth-century 
preference for an eternal cosmos. 
So far we have been looking only at the physical side of the Stoic 
doctrine of conflagration and regeneration, but like the rest of Stoic 
cosmology this doctrine also had a biological side. Since we know the 
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Stoics considered the cosmogony to be a birth, we might expect that 
they would consider the destruction of the cosmos to be its death. But 
Chrysippus maintains that death is technically not a correct description 
of the destruction of the cosmos: ''Since death is a separation of soul 
from body, and the soul of the cosmos is not separated, but grows 
continuously, until it has absorbed all the matter into itself, it ought not 
to be said that the cosmos dies" (SVF 2.604). In the conflagration the 
elements of the cosmos change into fire as into a seed (σπέρμα), so 
that the fire may be called the seed of the future cosmos. 1  8 Thus the 
Stoics obviously saw in the cycle of conflagration and restoration a 
cycle of growth and reproduction, the cycle that every species of 
animal experiences.1 9 Moreover, since the cosmos grows and repro­
duces itself, if does not actually perish, but survives eternally.20 For 
this reason from the biological point of view, just as from the physical 
point of view, the cosmos must be deemed eternal. 
The Stoics were not the first to apply the analogy of growth and 
reproduction to cycles of cosmic regeneration. When Aristotle in On 
the Heavens interpreted the theories of Empedocles and Heraclitus to 
mean that the cosmos is eternal but merely changes in form, he argued 
that to say the cosmos perishes according to their theories is "as if one 
should think that a man coming from a boy and a boy coming from a 
man is sometimes destroyed and sometimes ex i s t s " (Cael. 
1.10.280al 1-15). What is significant is that Aristotle here not only 
made use of a biological analogy to explain cosmic cycles, but that he 
made use of this analogy in both directions. If he had merely used the 
analogy of a man coming from a boy, we might think he was loosely 
comparing the cyclical cosmos to something that changes shape and 
size without altering its essential nature. But he added the example of a 
boy coming from a man, an event that can occur only in reproduction. 
The analogy Aristotle is obviously calling to mind is the continuity of 
the species, which is eternal regardless of the alterations in shape and 
size produced by growth and reproduction. As individual men grow 
and reproduce themselves, but the species " m a n  " remains the same 
eternally, so individual states of the cosmos may change, even perish 
and be regenerated, but the cosmos exists eternally. Aristotle explains 
the theory of the eternity of the species in more detail in purely biolog­
ical contexts. The nutritive soul, in virtue of which all living things 
have life, has two functions: the assimilation of food (i.e., growth) and 
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reproduction. Reproduction is "making another like itself . .  . in 
order that the subject might participate in the eternal and divine in the 
only way possible. . . . Since it cannot share in the eternal and divine 
by continuity, because no perishable thing can remain one and the 
same numerically, it shares in this in the only way it can. . . .It is not 
the individual itself which remains, but something of the same kind, 
being one, not in number, but in species" (De An. 2.4.415a28-b7; cf. 
Gen. An. 2.1.731b24-732al). According to Aristotle the nutritive 
soul, which all living things possess, is responsible for a cycle of 
growth and reproduction; and it is this cycle that causes each species to 
participate in eternity. This idea Aristotle suggested as an analogy to 
the cosmic cycles of Heraclitus and Empedocles to give the cyclical 
cosmos a form of eternity. The Stoics seem to have taken up Aristot­
le's suggestion; and in keeping with their belief that the cosmos is a 
living being, they have applied Aristotle's analogy literally and have 
interpreted the cosmic cycles as cycles of growth and reproduction.21 
In the Stoic doctrine of conflagration and regeneration three lines of 
thought converge: the concept of the Great Year with its periodic 
cataclysms and (among the Pythagoreans at least) eternal repetition, 
the Aristotelian explanation of the eternity of a cyclical cosmic order, 
and the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of biological species.22 Once 
again the Stoics have taken Aristotle's cosmological theory and syn­
thesized it with his biological theory, following an analogy suggested 
by Aristotle himself. Then with this synthesis they have merged the 
additional motif of the Great Year and the eternal repetition. Charac­
teristically, the result is not an unrecognizable hybrid but an entirely 
new breed of cosmology. 
1. SVF 1.109; 2.625, 626. The Stoics seem to have speculated at some length on 
the nature and extent of the repetition. Chrysippus in On the Cosmos said everything in 
the next cosmos will be numerically identical with the things in this cosmos. Neverthe­
less, the Stoics admitted that things might differ in nonessential characteristics; for 
example, a freckle-faced person might not have freckles in the next cycle (SVF 2.624). 
According to Origen the Stoics said that it will not be the same Socrates who comes 
again, but a man indistinguishable from Socrates will live a life indistinguishable from 
that lived by the last Socrates (SVF 2.626). 
2. The evidence for this theory is admittedly somewhat weak, but there are some 
strong hints that Aristotle put forth some such theory in his Proircpticus and perhaps 
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also in On Philosophy. Censorinus De Die Natale 18.11 preserves a fragment of 
Aristotle's Protrepticus (fr. 19, Ross, Walzer) in which Aristotle says the year marked 
by the conjunction of the sun, moon, and five planets should be called, not the Great 
Year, but the Greatest Year. After this Censorinus describes the cataclysms of the 
Great Summer and Great Winter. We know from Meteor. 1.14.352a28-b3 that Aristot­
le believed the Flood of Deucalion to be an example of a Great Winter, but he did not 
think of this cataclysm as destroying the cosmos. So when Censorinus describes 
cataclysms that destroy the cosmos, we may suppose he is going beyond Aristotle; his 
description of the conflagration of the Great Summer sounds Stoic. It is quite possible 
that in the Protrepticus Aristotle mentioned his less extensive catalysms of the Great 
Year, but Censorinus substituted the cosmic version of the Stoics. (Walzer prints the 
entire passage of Censorinus; Ross omits the description of the cataclysms.) De Phil. 
fr. 8 (Walzer) speaks of μέγισται φϋοραί, which could refer to cyclical cataclysms, 
especially since this work described the cyclical nature of knowledge (cf. W- Jaeger, 
Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development2, trans. R. Robinson 
[Oxford, 1948], 128-38, esp. 137). See also Phys. 4.14.223b24-224a2. 
3. Tzetzes Chil. 10.534-42; 12.219-25, 283-88, Kiessling. On Philolaos and 
Meton, cf. W. Burkert, Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos, 
undPlaton (Nurnberg, 1962), 293-95. 
4. Lucr. 5.338-347, cf. 380-415. See E. Bignone, L'Aristotele perduto e la 
formazione filosofica di Epicuro (Florence, 1935-36), 2.475-84. 
5. See above, Chapter 3. This is another example of the coalescence of different 
motifs in Stoic cosmology. Here the motif of cataclysmic destructions coalesces with 
the cosmogonal motifs of elemental change and biological genesis. It is interesting to 
note that Arms Didymus calls the Stoic cycle by Aristotle's term, "the Greatest Year" 
(SVF 2.599). In SVF 2.625 the Stoics are given credit also for the idea that planetary 
conjunction marks off the cosmic cycle. 
6. See below, Appendix 1. 
7. Cf. W. Wiersma, "Die Physik des Stoikers Zenon," Mnemosyne, 3d ser. 11 
(1943):203-11; B. L. van der Waerden, "Das grosse Jahr und die ewige Wieder­
kehr," Hermes 80 (1952): 131; E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism (Cambridge, 1911), 
193. 
8. Van der Waerden (above, note 7), 129-55, considers these three motifs to be 
different aspects of a single basic belief, which he traces back to Mesopotamia. For the 
Stoic doctrine he points out that in SVF 2.625 all three motifs, planetary conjunction, 
cataclysms, and eternal repetition, coincide. 
9. Cf. C. H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York, 
1960), 199-200; N. Rescher, "Cosmic Evolution in Anaximander," Studium Gener­
ate 12 (1958):728; W. K. C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, 
1962-69), 1.389. 
10. The state of the question is summarized by G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic 
Fragments (Cambridge, 1954), 335-38; cf. Guthrie (above, note 9), 1.456, note 1. 
11. Kirk (above, note 10), 319-24, suggests that Aristotle did not mean to attribute 
cosmic periods to Heraclitus, but carelessly inserted Heraclitus's name with that of 
Empedocles because he had Plato Soph. 242d-e in the back of his mind. This is hardly 
likely. If Aristotle had made a mistake, would not Theophrastus have corrected him, as 
he did in other cases? Kahn (above, note 9), 19-20 (cf. in general 17-24), calls 
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attention to several cases in which Theophrastus has corrected Aristotle's misinterpre­
tations of the pre-Socratics. Significantly, one of these pertains to Heraclitus. Theo­
phrastus admits that the condensation-rarefaction motif that Aristotle claims to have 
found in all pre-Socratic monists, including the one who made fire the ultimate sub­
stance (Phys. 1.4.187al2-16, 6.189b8-10), is not clearly attested in the text of 
Heraclitus (DK 22 A 1.8) but can be documented only for Anaximenes (DK 13 A 5). 
Yet Theophrastus (DK 22 A 5, cf. 1.8) and the Aristotelian commentators who 
followed him were apparently satisfied that Aristotle had interpreted Heraclitus cor­
rectly in respect to his doctrine of cosmic cycles. That Aristotle possessed some sort of 
book by Heraclitus (whether a continuous work or a collection of sayings [cf. Guthrie 
(above, note 9), 1.406-8]) can be deduced from Rhet. 3.5.1407bl 1-18 ( = DK 22 A 
4). 
12. Kirk (above, note 10), 321, is surprised that Theophrastus and the commen­
tators accepted Aristotle's misinterpretation, even though "it is fairly plain from the 
fragments that Heraclitus did not postulate any such absorption by fire"; but one can 
hardly claim that it is fairly plain, when even modern interpreters with all their tools of 
semantic analysis cannot agree on the meaning of fragment 30. Contrast, for example, 
Kirk (above, note 10), 307-18, and Kahn (above, note 9), 224-26. 
13. SVF 2.593. On the Stoic belief that the heavenly bodies consume moisture 
from the sea, cf. also SVF 1.501, 504; 2.421, 650, 652, 655, 656, 658, 663, 806 
(page 223.8-9). 
14. SVF 2.594. If SVF 1.106 is based on Stoic arguments, it would be further 
evidence (esp. page 30.5-29), but the source of the arguments mSVF 1.106 has been 
the subject of an extensive controversy. That Zeno was actually the ultimate source is 
unlikely (cf. W. Wiersma, "Der angebliche Streit des Zenon und Theophrast iiber die 
Ewigkeit der Welt," Mnemosyne, 3d ser. 8 [1940]:235-43, and J. B. McDiarmid, 
"Theophrastus on the Eternity of the World," TAPA 71 [1940]: 239-47). Even the 
third argument (pages 30.29-31.29), which because of its form seems to be the most 
Stoic, is incompatible with what we know of the Stoic theory of the perishing of the 
cosmos. The imagery of the passage suggests that the perishing of the parts, and 
consequently of the cosmos, is viewed as sickness and death (cf. SVF page 30.34­
31.8: στηπονται, νεχρονται, οία ψνχήν άφτ\ρτ\μενον ζώον. νοσεϊν, φϋΊνειν. 
τρόπον τιν' άποΰνήσκείν, ατροφήσαν, χωλόν). As we shall see, the Stoics 
viewed the end of the cosmos, not as death but as maturation and reproduction. 
15. Cael. 1.10.279bl2—13. Throughout his treatment of this theory Aristotle for 
the sake of completeness also deals with the converse theory that something ungener­
ated may be perishable; but since this converse theory is irrelevant to cosmology, and 
since it is refuted by the same arguments as the theory in which we are interested, we 
may dismiss it from our summary. 
16. Cael. 1.10.280a23-26. H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Phi­
losophy (Baltimore, Md., 1935), 181, note 162, tries to identify the defendant of this 
view. He wonders whether it might be Anaxagoras, who did believe the cosmos to be 
unique; but he concludes that Anaxagoras cannot be referred to, because there is 
evidence that Anaxagoras believed cosmic motion eternal, and moreover, Eudemus 
{apud Simplic. Phys. 1185.9-15, Diels [= DK 59 A 59]) reveals that Anaxagoras did 
not clearly express himself on the topic of the end of the cosmos. Therefore, Cherniss 
believes Aristotle is merely generalizing as part of his refutation of the theory of 
Democritus. 
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17. The Aristotealian term διακοσμέίν is appropriated by the Stoics; but instead of 
Aristotle's σώμα and its σνστασίς the Stoics speak of το έκ άπάσ-ης ουσίας ιδίως 
ποών. 
18. SVF 1.98, 107, 512, 2.596, 618, 619. It may have been to emphasize this 
positive aspect of the process that Chrysippus objected to Cleanthes* use of the word 
"flame" (φλόξ) for the fire of the conflagration and preferred instead the word "ray" 
(αυγή, SVF 2.611. Cf. Cleanthes' use of έκφλογισΰέντος in SVF 1.497 to describe 
the cosmos during the conflagration). For the Stoics after Chrysippus "flame" (φλόξ) 
is the form of fire that feeds on a fuel and consumes it (SVF 2.612) and so is generative 
only of itself. "Ray" (αυγή), on the other hand, is the light given off from flame (S VF 
2.612), and from Homer on had most frequently been used of the light of the sun. 
When Xenophon made the distinction between the creative fire of the heavenly bodies 
and ordinary fire, a distinction that the Stoics eventually adopted (see above, Chapter 
4), he used "ray" for the growth-promoting light of the sun (Mem. 4.7.7). Similarly 
Theophrastus, who noted that ordinary fire is generative only of itself (De Igne 1), 
differentiated creative heat from destructive fire and in this context used "ray" of the 
sun, which is the source both of creative and of ordinary heat (De Igne 5). Given this 
distinction in the connotation of the words, it is understandable that Chrysippus made 
the change in terminology; it is doubtful that this represents any significant change in 
doctrine. 
19. The growth that occurs in the conflagration is attested not only in the literal 
quotation from Chrysippus just cited (SVF 2.604), but also in a garbled passage in 
which Philargyrius describes the doctrine of Zeno (SVF 1.108). According to Philar­
gyrius, Zeno says the cosmos "grows [crescere], but does not arrive at death, because 
elements remain by which it may recover [revalescat]." Philargyrius interprets this to 
mean that "the cosmos remains forever because elements [elementa] inhere in it from 
which matters [materiae] are generated." Exactly what Philargyrius means by 
elementa and materiae is not clear. The elementa that survive to generate materiae 
must refer either to the single elementum fire, or more likely to the active and passive 
principles that serve a biological function in cosmogony. The materiae that are gener­
ated from the elementa might be the four elements, or else the corporeal matter (υλη) 
which was absorbed into the soul in the conflagration (cf. SVF 2.604). In spite of the 
imprecise terminology the motif of cyclical growth and reproduction is clear. 
20. SVF 1.108 and 2.620 both attribute the eternity of the cosmos to the fact that it 
regenerates itself eternally. The language of SVF 1.108 has a noticeable biological cast 
(cf. intereant, generantur, crescere, interitum, revalescat). 
21. In Aristotle's biological theory each successive member of the species is identi­
cal, not in number, but in kind. When Alexander says Chrysippus believed the future 
cosmos will be numerically identical to this one, we should not see a discrepancy 
between the theory of Aristotle and Chrysippus. Chrysippus may be using numerical 
identity in a slightly different sense. We should remember that Eudemus described the 
identity of the Pythagorean repetition as numerical (Eudemus, fr. 88, Wehrli [ = DK 58 
Β 34]). Numerical identity may refer to a one-for-one correspondence not only of the 
parts of each cosmos but also of the events performed by the parts (i.e., the men in the 
cosmos). Repetition of specific events is not found in Aristotle's theory of the generic 
identity of successive members of a species. 
22. We should perhaps mention that in Plato's theory of cataclysmic destructions of 
mankind a "small seed" (σπέρμα βραχύ) always survives to regenerate the popula­
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tion {Tim. 23c; cf. Leg. 3.677a). Plato has applied the analogy of biological reproduc­
tion to whole populations.In a sense this is the first step toward the Stoic doctrine. The 
Stoics have subsequently taken both the cataclysms and the analogy of reproduction 
and applied them to the cosmos as a whole. 
CHAPTER VII 
Epilogue: The Definition of Nature

and the Origins of Stoic Cosmology

In the course of its transformations the cosmic fire creates the universe, 
destroys it, and re-creates it again in an eternal cycle. This is the course 
of nature, and the Stoic definition of nature substantiates that fact. In 
Zeno's words, physis or nature is "a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding 
methodically [literally, by a path] to genesis" {πυρ τεχνικόν όδω 
βαδίζον εϊς -γενεσιν).1 This pithy definition of nature, so unlike any 
definition of nature up to its time, conceals a host of clues to its 
origins, and in fact, in its six words reveals as much about the Stoic 
approach to physics as any of the more elaborate cosmological doc­
trines we have been examining. Thus it may serve to exemplify in 
microcosm the origins of Stoic cosmology. 
To determine the origins of the Stoic definition of nature we must 
analyze carefully both the language and the substance of the definition. 
The first thing we notice is that nature is defined as one of the material 
elements of the cosmos, namely, fire. Second, it is obvious that nature 
is viewed not merely as dead matter but as a dynamic substance; for 
nature is not any and all the fire in the cosmos, but only a specific form 
of fire, the craftsmanlike fire that proceeds to genesis. Zeno distin­
guished two kinds of fire, the uncreative (ατεχνον) fire, which de­
stroys things, and the creative, craftsmanlike (τεχνικόν) fire, which 
causes growth and preservation and can be found in plants and ani­
mals, as well as in the heavenly bodies (SVF 1.120; cf. 504). Zeno's 
nature is the dynamic, creative kind of fire in the universe. He under­
scores its dynamic life by giving it an anthropomorphic description. It 
is "craftsmanlike" (τεχνικόν); it "walks along a road" (όδω βαδί­
ζον); and it heads for "creation" or "begetting" (γένεσι,ς). The 
anthropomorphic description reveals a third characteristic of Zeno's 
concept of nature. Nature is conceived as operating in the manner of a 
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craftsman, who follows a methodical course (όδω) in the process of 
creation.2 
Though Zeno's definition of nature is, as a definition, unique, the 
individual aspects of it are not unprecedented, and so allow us to see 
how Zeno arrived at his concept of nature. We may begin with the idea 
that nature operates as a craftsman, for the ancestry of this idea is the 
most obvious, at least in its basic features.3 Already in the fifth century 
Empedocles in a tentative way used the model of the crafts to help 
explain the origin of the world of living things,4 but it was really Plato 
in the fourth century who fully formulated the idea. In the Timaeus 
Plato developed the theory that the cosmos was brought into existence 
by a divine demiurge or craftsman, who intended to introduce as much 
order and perfection into his creation as is possible in the world of 
becoming.5 Plato distrusted physis or nature, because the term had 
previously in pre-Socratic philosophy been applied to the random op­
eration of the powers and material substances of the cosmos; and so in 
the Timaeus all order and craftsmanlike activity was assigned to an 
extrinsic force, the demiurge (Tim. 52d-53b; Soph. 265a-e). Aristot­
le, in turn, ignored the pre-Socratic heritage of physis and assigned the 
craftsmanlike production of form and order to nature herself. Thus we 
must look to Aristotle for the real origin of the Stoic concept of nature 
as craftsman. 
In both Physics II, which is Aristotle's chief discussion of the con­
cept of physis, and in On the Parts of Animals I, which is Aristotle's 
introduction to the study of biology, Aristotle makes it absolutely clear 
that he regards the craftsman as the best model of the way nature 
operates.6 As a craftsman aims to produce a finished product through 
the use of material instruments, so nature uses matter to produce 
natural objects. The major difference between nature and art is that in 
nature the motive cause is in the object itself (e.g., a man begets a 
man), whereas in the crafts the motive cause is in another (e.g., a 
craftsman is required for making a bed) (Phys. 2.1.192b8-23; Gen. 
An. 2.1.735a2-4; cf. Eth. Nic. 6.4.1140al0-14). One result of Aris­
totle's conviction that nature operates as a craftsman is that he uses 
countless analogies taken from the crafts to explain physical and 
biological processes.7 More important is the fact that the model of the 
craftsman serves to reinforce Aristotle's teleological view of nature. In 
the crafts the important thing is the finished product; the materials, 
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tools, and even the craftsman's activities are chosen for their efficacy 
in producing the desired result. In Aristotelian terminology material 
and efficient causes are subordinate to formal and final causes. So 
nature, too, in Aristotle's eyes is " in the class of final or purpose 
causes" (των ένεκα τον αιτίων, Phys. 2.8.198bl0—11). Aristotle's 
exposition of the concept of nature begins with the assertion that nature 
is essentially the principle and cause of movement and rest in natural 
things, that is, in those things that have their principle of movement 
within themselves (Phys. 2.1.192b8-23); and it ultimately reaches the 
conclusion that though nature is cause in all four Aristotelian senses, it 
is cause primarily in the sense of the form which is the final goal 
toward which all natural things strive (esp. Phys. 2.1.192b8-193b21; 
2.7-8.198b4-199b33). 
Zeno's definition of nature is in complete harmony with Aristotle's 
in regarding nature's operation as craftsmanlike and aiming at the 
production of natural objects. Moreover, the Stoics like Aristotle were 
fascinated by the manifestations of purpose in nature.8 Thus we are 
safe in saying that, broadly speaking, Zeno's definition of nature is in 
Aristotle's debt. Yet honesty compels us to admit that the only direct 
link between Zeno's definition and Aristotle's discussions is the word 
technikon, that is, the fundamental idea that nature operates as a 
craftsman. No direct connections are detectable between "walking 
along a path to genesis" and anything in Aristotle's discussions of 
nature. One might be tempted to compare Aristotle's statement that 
"nature, in its etymological sense, like genesis, is a path to nature" 
(ή φύσις ίη λεγομένη ώς γένεσις οδός έστιν εις φνσιν, Phys. 
2.1.193bl2—13). But though this statement uses several of the words 
of Zeno's definition (γένεσις, οδός, εϊς), its resemblance is largely 
superficial. Aristotle is defining nature as a process in which form is 
actualized in a natural object; Zeno seems to be speaking primarily of 
the regular, methodical course followed by nature in the act of cre­
ation. The influence of Aristotle's idea of nature as process on Zeno's 
definition is a subject to which we will have to return. Right now all 
we can say is that the second half of Zeno's definition of nature is 
terminologically only remotely related to Aristotle's discussions of 
nature and of the role of craft as an analogy to nature. 
We might be tempted at this point to abandon our search for the 
origins of Zeno's definition in terms of the analogy between nature and 
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craft, for we could be satisfied with the substantial progress we have 
made in determining Zeno's debt for the idea that nature is craftsman-
like. But the Stoic definition of craft proves that we have not fully 
exhausted the influence of the technomorphic model on Zeno's defini­
tion of nature. One of the Stoic definitions of craft, reliably assigned to 
Cleanthes, and very likely going back to Zeno himself, is "  a path-
making disposition" (έξυς όδοττοιητική), or in slightly different 
words,  " a disposition which accomplishes all things by a plan or 
method" (έξυς όδω πάντα άνύουσα).9 According to the early Stoics 
the essential characteristic of craft is that it does not depend on chance 
or trial and error but makes use of a definite, methodical process or 
hodos to bring something into existence. It is precisely this characteris­
tic that determines the second half of the Stoic definition of nature, 
according to which fire in a craftsmanlike way proceeds toward cre­
ation by a methodical process. Not only are the ideas of creation and of 
methodical process common to both definitions but the word for 
methodical process is the same in each, that is, hodos. There can be no 
doubt that the Stoic definition of nature incorporates the Stoic defini­
tion of craft.10 The question we must now ask is where the Stoics got 
their definition of craft. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle devotes a chapter to art or craft 
as one of the intellectual virtues {Eth. Nic. 6.4.1140al-23). In this 
discussion he makes two major points. First, all craft deals with bring­
ing something into existence (περί γενεσιν), and consequently is 
concerned with making (ποίησις), not with doing (πράξις). Second, 
craft differs from other impulses to genesis in its objects and proce­
dure. It differs from necessity in that its objects are capable either of 
being or not being, from nature in that its objects have their origin in 
the maker and not in the thing made, and finally from chance and lack 
of craft {άτεχνία) in its procedure: "In a sense chance and art are 
concerned with the same objects; as even Agathon says, 'Art loves 
chance and chance loves art.' Art, then, as has been said, is a kind of 
disposition which creates with correct reasoning [έξυς τις μετά λόγου 
άλιηΰονς ποιητική έστιν] and lack of craft [άτεχνία], the opposite, 
a disposition which creates with false reasoning [μετά λόγου 
ψευδούς]. Both deal with that which can be otherwise" (Eth. Nic. 
6.4.1140al7-23). Thus, Aristotle, like the Stoics, regards craft as a 
disposition for making something; and in addition, Aristotle makes 
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explicit, what the Stoic fragments leave implicit, namely, that art bears 
some resemblance to chance, but can be distinguished from chance by 
the presence of an element of planning or design. Finally, the Aristote­
lian definition of craft ("a disposition which creates with reason") 
differs only slightly from the Stoic definition. Hence we can conclude 
that there is some connection between the Stoic and the Aristotelian 
concepts of craft, though we do not know whether the Stoics took their 
definition from the Peripatetic school directly or whether both drew on 
a commonplace definition.11 
The only difference between the two definitions is that for Aristot­
le's phrase "with reason" the Stoics substituted "by a methodical 
process." The significance of this difference is hard to judge in the 
absence of an extended discussion of the Stoic theory. It might seem 
that the Stoics stressed the technique used by the craftsman, whereas 
Aristotle stressed the knowledge that enables a craftsman to choose the 
right technique to accomplish his desired end. This could suggest that 
the Stoics considered craft nothing more than a technique learned by 
practice, involving no intellectual activity. In fact, it could then even 
include some instinctive activity of irrational animals, like nest-
building, honey-making, or web-spinning. But it would probably be 
wrong to read such a theoretical difference into this terminological 
discrepancy, for the other common Stoic definition of craft, used by 
Zeno and Chrysippus, held that craft is "  a collection of apprehended 
perceptions (καταλήψεις) exercised together for some goal useful to 
life" (SVF 1.73; 2.56, 93-97; cf. 3.189). Here the craftsman's intel­
lectual activity is clearly a part of his craft. Furthermore, this definition 
was eventually used as grounds for denying that animals use craft in 
their productive activities, like honey-making and web-spinning.12 
If there is not necessarily a basic difference between the Stoic con­
cept of craft and Aristotle's, we might well ask why the Stoics did not 
use the Aristotelian definition without change. This is, of course, an 
unanswerable question, especially since we do not even know whether 
the Stoics based their definition directly on Aristotle's or whether they 
were following an alternative formulation of a commonplace definition 
of craft. We can speculate and observe that Aristotle often used the 
word hodos in a logical context to refer to methods of rational inquiry. 
He used the word of the method to be followed in constructing a 
syllogism {Anal. Pr. 1.29.45b37, 30.46a3), of the process of reason­
ing to and from first principles (Anal. Pr. 1.27.43a21; 2.1.53a2; Anal. 
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Post. 1.23.84b23), and of methods of proof in general {Anal. Pr. 
1.28.45a21, 31.46b24, 33; Anal. Post. 1.21.82bl2, 29, 32; cf. 
2.5.91 bl2). As such it came very close to logos, in the sense of 
argument or reasoning process.1 3 But logos was a favorite word among 
the Stoics and there seems to be no gain in substituting hodos for logos 
in the definition of craft. Some advantage can be seen in its use in the 
definition of nature, where hodos can be used to create an an­
thropomorphic image of nature. This emphasizes the craftsmanlike 
quality of nature and also allows the Stoic definition to incorporate 
Aristotle's concept of nature as motive cause, according to which 
nature is called a "path to nature" (οδός εϊς φνσιν).1Α Moreover, the 
idea that nature walks along a path in creation may have enabled the 
Stoics to bring their definition into relationship with Heraclitus's 
statement about "the way up and down" (DK 22 Β 60), which Theo­
phrastus and the Stoics probably took as a reference to elemental 
change.15 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Stoic formula­
tion is now reminiscent of Plato's solemn pronouncement of some 
ancient words of wisdom: "God, who holds the beginning, the end, 
and the middle of all things, as the old saying goes, travelling by 
nature on a straight path, accomplishes his end" (ενΰεία περαίνει 
κατά φνσιν περίπορενόμενος, Leg. 4.715e-716a). 
However, simply guessing at some advantage that might be derived 
from the Stoic formulation of the definition of craft does not account 
for the discrepancy between the Stoic and Aristotelian definitions. 
Fortunately, there is no need to fret over this discrepancy; the 
similarities are sufficient to demonstrate that Zeno has adopted a cur­
rent definition of craft and has used it to construct his definition of 
nature. The intellectual process that produced Zeno's definition is 
therefore fairly clear. Zeno has begun by adopting Aristotle's notion 
that nature operates in a craftsmanlike way, and that the analogy of the 
crafts can consequently be used to understand the operation of nature. 
From this he has apparently concluded that a valid definition of craft 
ought to be valid as a definition of the activity of nature; so he has 
incorporated into his definition of the activity of nature a current defin­
ition of craft, found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, if nowhere 
else. 
The Stoic conception of nature as a craftsman presupposes a 
dynamic conception of nature, and the dynamic conception is the 
second characteristic of the Stoic definition of nature that bears inves­
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tigation. Fortunately, the origin of this concept is easy to discover, 
now that we have traced the Stoic concept of nature as craftsman back 
to Aristotle; for Aristotle's conception of nature as craftsman already 
presupposes a dynamic conception of nature. In fact, the restoration of 
a dynamic conception of nature was one of Aristotle's important con­
tributions to philosophy.16 
Though the early Greeks saw no difficulty in assuming the elements 
to be self-moving and alive, by the end of the fifth century philoso­
phers felt the need to postulate along with the elements some force to 
move them, either the force of an outside agent, like Anaxagoras's 
Mind, or an unexplained phenomenon inherent in the elements, like 
Democritus's atomic motion. At any rate, movement in nature could 
no longer be assumed and passed over without comment. By the fourth 
century the problem had become so important that the source of 
movement in the world was one of the major subjects in the philosophy 
of Plato and Aristotle. After exploring the problem in great depth, 
Plato came to the conclusion that all movement in nature is ultimately 
due to a self-mover and that this self-mover is soul {Leg. 10.893b­
896b; Phaedr. 245c-246a). Aristotle, on the contrary, found this ex­
planation of movement unsatisfactory and instead restored nature to its 
early pre-Socratic position as the source of movement in and of it­
self.17 In Aristotle nature took over the major activity of Plato's soul, 
causing movement not only in living things but also in the elements 
and the heavenly bodies. Nature thereby became "the principle of 
movement in all things that have their principle of movement within 
themselves" (Phys. 2.1.192b8-23). As the dynamic principle in liv­
ing beings and in the cosmos as a whole, it was now also prepared to 
take over the management of the cosmos in a craftsmanlike way. The 
dynamic conception of nature thus accompanied the idea that nature 
operates as a craftsman as this idea was absorbed into Zeno's definition 
of nature from Peripatetic philosophy. As a result we can say that the 
dynamic character of nature in Zeno's definition owes its existence to 
Aristotle's conception of nature as a principle of movement.18 
Having traced the Stoic conception of nature as a dynamic, 
craftsmanlike force back to Aristotle, we might jump to the conclusion 
that the Stoic definition of nature represents basically a Peripatetic 
conception. Nothing could be further from the truth. Zeno says nature 
is craftsmanlike fire proceeding by a methodical process to genesis. No 
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matter how closely the activity of this fire resembles the activity of the 
principle Aristotle calls nature, Zeno's nature is still fire, and not the 
Aristotelian principle, or arche, that embraces the four causes of 
genesis in the natural world. To be sure, fire, or at least heat, was in 
Aristotle's eyes the most active and important element in nature, yet it 
was still only a tool that nature uses to accomplish its ends; it was not 
nature itself. Nor could it be, for nature is present in all elements as a 
source of movement and cannot be restricted to a single element. No 
discussion in Aristotle even remotely suggests that nature is, by defini­
tion, fire. Since Zeno emphatically states that nature is, by definition, 
fire, a vast chasm separates the Aristotelian conception of nature from 
Zeno's definition. 
This chasm may seem unbridgeable, but it is not; and it is in the 
bridging of this chasm that Zeno's originality lies. We have in an 
earlier chapter discussed some of the principles governing Stoic defini­
tions, but since the Stoic method of definition helps to account for 
Zeno's definition of nature, we shall have to review the Stoic method 
here.1 9 In defining virtues, vices, and qualities in general the Stoics 
could say, for example, either that virtue is a state of the soul or that 
virtue is the soul in a certain state. The Stoics did not differentiate 
between the subject of an affection or quality and the genus of the 
affection or quality This method of definition has been shown to be 
dependent on Aristotle's discussion of definition in the Metaphysics. 
Aristotle maintained that definitions ought to include both the matter 
and the form. As examples of such definitions Aristotle suggested:  " A 
threshhold is wood or stone lying in a certain way";  " A house is 
bricks and wood lying in a certain way"; or generally,  " A thing is 
certain things disposed in a certain way" (ώδΐ ταδϊ έχοντα). 
Aristotle maintained that the natural philosopher who deals with 
perceptible susbstance, that is, with formed matter, will, ideally at 
least, always include both form and matter in his definitions.20 In fact, 
Aristotle expressed doubt whether qualities and activities per se could 
be said to exist, inasmuch as they cannot exist apart from a material 
substrate (Metaph. 7 .1 .1028al0-29; cf. 9 1.1045b27-32; 
11.3.1061a7-10; 12.5.1071 al-2; 13.2.1077b4-9; 14.2.1089b24-28; 
Phys. 1.2.185a31-32; Cat. 5.2a34-b6). The net result of Aristotle's 
discussions was to suggest that a quality ought not to be defined apart 
from the subject which possesses that quality. Accordingly the Stoics 
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defined a quality of the soul, like virtue, as "the soul in a certain 
state." 
Let us now assume that Zeno wished to follow this principle in 
defining nature. Convinced that nature is characterized by a craftsman-
like mode of creation, he would have to ask himself what it is that acts 
in a craftsmanlike way. If craft is a habit of creating in a methodical 
way, what is it in nature that possesses the habit of creating in a 
methodical way? It is not hard to imagine how Zeno came to conclude 
that it is fire that possesses the craftsmanlike habit of creating in a 
methodical way- Fire was considered the most active and important 
element not only by Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and probably other 
intellectuals of the day, but also by Zeno himself; obviously, Zeno 
would have to conclude that the possessor of the creative power in the 
cosmos is fire. Hence a definition of nature in accordance with the 
Stoic method of definition would have to include fire, the material 
subject that possesses the power of acting in a creative way. 
Zeno's definition of nature is a unique and original definition, not in 
the ideas and concepts that it contains but in the way in which these 
ideas are put together. The importance of fire as a creative agent in 
nature, the idea that nature operates in a craftsmanlike way, the con­
cept of craft as a habit of creating with a plan in mind, and even Zeno's 
particular way of expressing a definition were all found in the philoso­
phy of the Peripatos; and some of these ideas may even have been 
commonplace among Athenian intellectuals in Zeno's day. Zeno has 
synthesized these ideas into a new form to reflect his new spirit, and it 
is this synthesis that constitutes his originality. 
The synthesis that led to the Stoic definition of nature is typical of 
the more intricate syntheses that led to the manifestly complex theories 
of Stoic cosmology, and so this investigation of the origins of the 
definition of nature may stand as a prelude to a survey of the complex 
origins of Stoic cosmology. We embarked upon a systematic compari­
son of Stoic cosmology with its antecedents to determine on whom the 
Stoics depended, what they borrowed from their predecessors, and 
how they used the material they borrowed. These questions, which 
have been investigated in detail, may now be answered in summary 
fashion. 
The comparison has suggested that Heraclitus, whose influence on 
Stoic physics has so frequently been stressed, had almost no direct 
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influence on Stoic cosmology. Some of his cosmological and as­
tronomical theories seem to have been cited, especially by Cleanthes, 
as precedents for the Stoic view. But citing Heraclitus as a precedent 
cannot be regarded as a sign of direct influence any more than Zeno's 
citation of Hesiod and Chrysippus's allusions to Homer and other 
Greek poets can be regarded as signs that Stoicism was directly influ­
enced by the Greek poets. It is possible that in a few details, such as 
the shape of the heavenly bodies and the symmetry of his cosmogony, 
Cleanthes shows a direct influence of Heraclitus; but Cleanthes' idea 
about the heavenly bodies was unique among the Stoics, and his doc­
trine of cosmogony is too imperfectly known to allow firm conclu­
sions. Therefore, Heraclitus cannot be considered the father of Stoic 
cosmology. 
The real antecedents for Stoic cosmology clearly lay in the fourth 
century. The Stoics accepted from Plato not only commonplace defini­
tions, such as the mark of true being and the definition of death, but 
also major doctrines, such as the application of the principles of 
genesis to the cosmos, the conviction that the cosmos is a living, 
ensouled animal, and specific theories concerning the world soul. In 
addition, Plato provided a precedent for the theory that the cosmos 
consists of four transformable elements. 
If in cosmology Stoicism's debt to Plato was large, its debt to 
Aristotle was even larger. Aristotle's metaphysical analysis prepared 
the ground and provided seminal concepts from which the Stoics de­
veloped the theory that all real things are corporeal. Aristotle initiated 
the quest for principles or archai, and his concepts of matter and prime 
mover contributed something to the two Stoic principles. Aristotle's 
conception of the physical structure of the cosmos and his theory of 
natural movements and places were taken over by the Stoics with only 
a few changes. Finally, Aristotle's discussion of the eternity of the 
cosmos provided the theoretical basis for the Stoic theory of cosmic 
cycles. 
Moreover, Aristotle's influence was not restricted to the physical 
side of Stoic cosmology. His theories of sexual reproduction and em­
bryology were the ultimate basis for the Stoic doctrine of principles 
and also for their theory of cosmic genesis. His scrutiny of the biologi­
cal function of heat and its relation to soul opened the way for the Stoic 
identification of heat with the soul of the cosmos. Moreover, his 
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analysis of the three types of soul supplied the functions of the heat and 
the pneuma in the systems of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Finally, his 
theory of the eternity of the species may have been absorbed by the 
Stoics into their explanation of the eternity of the cosmic animal. 
In addition to influences from Plato and Aristotle the Stoics seem to 
have accepted the notion of eternal recurrence from the fourth-century 
Pythagoreans. Epicurean influence and criticism may also have ac­
counted for some developments in Stoic cosmology, such as the ex­
tracosmic void and some aspects of the theory of stability in the void. 
Finally, the stress laid by late fourth- and early third-century medical 
theorists on the pneuma induced Chrysippus to modify Stoic cosmol­
ogy so far as to find a place for the pneuma and its biological functions 
in the cosmic processes. 
Looking over this catalog of borrowed philosophical material, one 
might be tempted to label the Stoics as eclectics. This judgment would 
certainly be wrong. The Stoics did not simply borrow philosophical 
statements and theories intact from their predecessors but transformed 
everything that came into their hands. It is in this transformation that 
the originality of the Stoics lies. If we wish to peer into the Stoic mind, 
we are going to have to survey the process of transformation to see 
whether any guiding principles may be discerned. 
One principle that cries out for attention is the principle of ex­
trapolating biological theories to the cosmos. This procedure rests on 
the deep conviction that the cosmos is a living animal. This idea cannot 
be traced to a specific philosophical predecessor, but was a conviction 
rooted in the consciousness of the Greek people, as well as of other 
ancient peoples. Though philosophy, especially in the late fourth cen­
tury, shunned this idea in its literal sense, it could not, or would not, 
uproot this fundamental outlook from the Grrek mind. So it is under­
standable that the idea would spring to life again if given a chance; but 
it took the Stoic genius to bring about the resurrection and make the 
idea intellectually respectable. The Stoics did this by describing the 
cosmos qua cosmos in physical terms, but by describing the cosmos 
qua living animal in contemporary biological terms. Thus the Stoics 
synthesized what they felt was the best cosmological theory with the 
best biological theory, transforming all into a fundamentally original 
theory of cosmology. 
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From one point of view the Stoic biologization of cosmology might 
seem to be an attempt to account for unexplained phenomena by use of 
a biological model, a perfectly conceivable explanatory method, but it 
is doubtful that this is what the Stoics were trying to do. There seems 
to be nothing hypothetical about the Stoic use of the biological model. 
Nor did the Stoics ever suggest that the biological model is in any way 
analogical. For the Stoics the biological model possessed as much 
ontological reality as did the phenomena it explains. Thus it not only 
explains phenomena; it is itself a phenomenon. This makes the Stoic 
biologistic cosmology quite different from the "likely tale" of Plato's 
Timaeus or the countless analogies in Aristotle's scientific works. 
Stoic physics, therefore, does not seem to be an attempt to explain what 
might be an opaque world by reference to better known phenomena 
from the world of living things. Rather it seems to be an attempt to 
describe the nature of a perfectly clear and intelligible cosmos, a 
cosmos that has a dual nature, physical and biological, both of which 
must be comprehended if we are to understand the cosmos fully-
The Stoic synthesis of theories from two separate, contemporary 
sciences, cosmology and biology, carried the Stoics in a different direc­
tion from that in which Peripatetic and Alexandrian science was head­
ing. In contrast to Aristotle, who compartmentalized knowledge and 
sought the principles for each science, the Stoics, like their contem­
poraries, the Epicureans, strove for a unified science, based on a single 
set of elementary principles. Within the Stoic synthesis biology and 
cosmology, for example, did not require separate principles and 
theories; both could be treated in terms of the same basic principles and 
as parts of a single unified world view. In fact, whether the Stoic was 
talking about the origin of the cosmos, the origin of the human race, 
the sprouting of plants, or the birth of a baby, he could use the same 
basic principles to describe genesis. The impetus toward the specializa­
tion of science and scholarship, for which Aristotle had laid the found­
ations, was reversed by the Stoics. Instead, the Stoics sought the 
common ground on which all wise men might stand, and they found 
this ground in a synthesis of the theories of contemporary science. 
Not only did the Stoics synthesize theories from different sciences 
but they synthesized disparate theories within a single science to pro­
vide a common ground of agreement between antagonistic ideas. An 
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example of this would be the Stoic harmonization of the Aristotelian 
and Epicurean concepts of what is beyond the cosmos. Frequently, real 
synthesis was unnecessary. The Stoics often found statements by pre­
decessors that could be interpreted or (if you will) misinterpreted to 
mean the same as their own dogma. Then, too, mythology could be 
allegorized and words could be etymologized at will to concur with 
Stoic dogma. These phenomena all suggest that the Stoics wished their 
teaching to be viewed as the consensus omnium. Stoicism was to be 
identical with the wisdom of the ages. Hesiod once said, ' 'Best of all is 
the man who thinks out all for himself; but that man, too, is good who 
listens to one who speaks well" {Op. 293, 295). Zeno is said to have 
reversed the quotation to make it say, "Best of all is the man who 
listens to one who speaks well; but that man, too, is good, who thinks 
out all for himself."2 1 Apparently Zeno had no desire to put forth an 
original system, but wished only to accept and use the theories that had 
been developed by others. Yet in selecting, adapting, and synthesizing 
these established theories, Zeno created a new philosophy, whose 
complexities can never be comprehended by any simple formula. 
Thus Stoic cosmology reveals a paradox that no doubt holds true for 
Stoic physics in general. On the one hand, it was a serious attempt to 
synthesize, harmonize, and unify contemporary philosophical and sci­
entific ideas, and, wherever possible, also ideas of the past. On the 
other hand, this synthesis resulted in a totally new conception of na­
ture. Accordingly, whereas Stoicism contributed a great deal to the 
diffusion of certain Aristotelian concepts and theories, it also provided 
a completely new set of concepts and theories with which to analyze 
the world. It had the paradoxical effect both of popularizing some of 
the results of contemporary scientific research and of creating a totally 
new world view. This, in effect, was the essence of the Stoic achieve­
ment in physical philosophy. 
1. SVF 1.171; cf. 1.172; 2.422, 774, 1133, 1134. For further allusions, cf. A. S. 
Pease, M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 2.683-84. 
This definition may have been adapted for use as a definition of god, the creator of the 
universe, by restricting the genesis to the cosmos. Aet. 1.7.33 (=SVF 2.1027); 
[Galen] Hist. Phil. 35 (=DG 618); Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. 6 (broken off in 
midsentence in SVF 2.1027), describe god as "a craftsmanlike fire proceeding 
methodically toward creation of a cosmos" (πυρ τεχνυχον όδώ βαδίζον επί 
κόσμου). 
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2. The word όδώ is a key word in the definition, though Zeno plays with this crucial 
word by using an ambiguous phrase (όδώ βαδίζον), which may mean ' 'walking along 
a road" or "proceeding methodically according to a definite plan." The metaphorical 
meaning is by far the most important, as we shall soon see, though the vividness of the 
image allows little doubt that Zeno wished the reader to keep the human model of his 
concept of nature clearly before his eyes. 
3. The evolution of this idea has been traced by F Solmsen, "Nature as Craftsman 
in Greek Thought," JHI 24 (1963): 473-96. 
4. See esp. DK 31 Β 73, 86, 87, 96. Cf. Solmsen (above, note 3), 476-79. 
5. Tim. 29d-30c, and passim. Solmsen (above, note 3), 481-83, discusses the 
great variety of manual activities used to explain the creation of the cosmos and its 
inhabitants. 
6. For what follows see Phys. 2.1-2, 7-9, (cf. 2.3); Part An. 1.1. See also H. 
Meyer, Natur und Kunst bei Aristoteles (Paderborn, 1919); J. M. Le Blond, Logique 
et methode chez Aristote (Paris, 1939), 326^6; Solmsen (above, note 3), 487-95; and 
G. E. R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy (Cambridge, 1966), 285-91. For a careful 
analysis of Aristotle's concept of nature in general, see A. Mansion, Introduction a la 
physique Aristotelicienne2 (Louvain and Paris, 1946). 
7. See Meyer (above, note 6), 62-84, and Lloyd (above, note 6), 285-86, for 
examples and references. 
8. Cf. SVF 2.1106-67; Cic. Nat. D. 2.73-153; see M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Ges­
chichte einer geistigen Bewegung3 (Gottingen, 1964), 1.98-101. 
9. SVF 1.72,490 (Quintilian 2.17.41 givespotestas viam efficiens according to one 
MS and potestas via efficiens according to another, making it hard to tell which Greek 
rendering he has in mind. Recent editors read via.). The scholiast on Dionysius Thrax 
assigns the definition "path-making disposition" to Zeno (SVF 1.72). Von Arnim has 
reservations about the reliability of the scholiast because Olympiodorus In Plat. Gorg. 
12.1 (63, Norvin) assigns the very similar second definition to Cleanthes and with an 
addition to Chrysippus, while assigning to Zeno an entirely different definition of 
craft, namely  " a collection of apprehended perceptions exercised together for some 
goal useful to life" (SVF 1.73). Of course the scholiast could be wrong, but we cannot 
be sure of this merely from the fact that Olympiodorus assigns a different definition to 
Zeno. The two definitions are not incompatible; and, what is more, Chrysippus seems 
to have used both definitions, that is, if we may believe both Olymp. In Plat. Gorg. 
12.1 (63.6-7, Norvin) and Sextus Empiricus Adv Math. 7.373 (=SVF 2.56 [page 
23.21-22]). The probability that Zeno himself used the definition that the scholiast 
assigns to him is increased by the fact that this definition of craft serves as the basis for 
Zeno's definition of nature, as we shall see. 
10. The close connection between the Stoic definition of craft and the Stoic concept 
of nature is apparent in the argument of Olympiodorus In Plat. Gorg. 12.1 (63.4-8, 
Norvin), where Olympiodorus objects to Cleanthes' definition of craft ("a disposition 
doing everything methodically") because it is then identical with nature, which is "  a 
kind of disposition making everything methodically" (έξι,ς τι<? όδώ πάντα ποίονσα). 
He goes on to approve Chrysippus's definition of art as "  a disposition advancing 
[προϊούσα] methodically with perceptions." It is interesting to note that Chrysippus's 
improvement incorporates the idea of progressing, which is also found in Zeno's 
definition of nature. The connection between the Stoic definition of craft and nature is 
also evident in the version of the definition of nature attributed by pseudo-Galen Hist. 
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Phil. 20 (=DG 611) to "some people," presumably Stoics: "Nature is a creative, 
path-making pneuma [πνεύμα έντεχνον όδοττοιητικόΐ;]." Apparently some Stoics 
also used as the basis for a definition of nature the definition that makes craft  "a 
path-making disposition." 
11. In this section Aristotle admits that his distinction between ποίησι,ς and 
πράξις is in agreement with that of the exoterikoi logoi. The identification of the 
exoterikoi logoi is debated. W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, 1924), 
2.409-10, and I. During, Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens 
(Heidelberg, 1966), 556, believe Aristotle refers to popular philosophical writings of 
unspecified authorship or to commonplace notions of the day. F. Dirlmeier, "Physik 
IV 10 ('Εξωτερικοί λόγοι = EL)," in Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theo­
phrast, ed. I. During (Heidelberg, 1969), 51-58, believes he refers to his own prop­
aedeutic collections of opinions on various subjects, in this case to Eth. Nic. 
1.1.1094al—18. In any case, the distinction between ποίησυς and πράξις was not 
original with the Peripatos, and the definition of τέχνη may also have been current 
outside the Peripatos. F. Heinimann, "Eine vorplatonische Theorie der τέχνη," 
MusHelv 18 (1961): 105-30, has shown that the concept of craft was widely discussed 
from the late fifth century through Hellenistic times, not only by philosophers but also 
by physicians and rhetoricians, and that one aspect of the discussion was what element 
of craft enabled the skilled to be distinguished from the uninitiated or from the poor 
practioners of the craft. 
12. Philo, De Animalibus adversus Alexandrum (=SVF 2.731). For the Stoics' 
concern with apparent intelligence in animals, see Pohlenz, Stoa, 1.84-85; 2.49. For a 
completely different interpretation of the Stoic and Aristotelian concepts of craft, see 
E. Grumach, Physis und Agathon in der alien Stoa, Problemata 6 (Berlin, 1932), 
44-71, who gives a valuable analysis of the evolution of the Stoic concept of nature (in 
the broad metaphysical sense) from the metaphysical speculations of Aristotle and 
Theophrastus and sees a new Stoic concept of craft at the root of the Stoic change from 
a transcendent to an immanent prime mover. According to Grumach's analysis Aristot­
le felt that the mere existence of the form of the object in the soul constitutes the craft; 
but the Stoics, realizing that the layman can possess the form of an object in his soul 
without being able to produce it, now assert that craft is essentially a knowledge of the 
technique or orderly process of producing the object and that the form of the object is 
only an auxiliary cause. This interpretation seems to underestimate the importance of 
the knowledge of technique in Aristotle. Discussions such as Eth. Nic. 3.5.1112al8— 
b31; 10.9.1180b7-28; Part. An. 1.1.639bll-641al4; andPhys. 2.7-8, suggest that 
Aristotle considered knowledge of technique, i.e., the best method of obtaining the 
desired end, to be part of the knowledge of the form that constitutes the craft. For 
example, the doctors' art involves knowing how to produce health under various 
circumstances in addition to a knowledge of health per se. See K. Bartels, "Der Begriff 
Techne bei Aristoteles," Synusia: Festgabe fur W. Schadewaldt (Pfullingen, 1965), 
275-81. On the other hand, Grumach probably overestimates the role of technique in 
the Stoic theory. To be sure, some Stoics (not necessarily all—cf. άλλοι) regarded 
regularity and consistency of result as a mark by which to distinguish the skilled from 
the unskilled (Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. 11.206-207 [=SVF 3.516]), but this does not 
necessarily make regularity and technique a sufficient definition of craft. The case for 
a fundamental difference between the Stoic and Aristotelian views is no stronger than 
the case for the essential similarity of the Stoic and Aristotelian conceptions. 
Moreover, even if Grumach's hypothesis of a dispute over the concept of craft could 
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be made convincing, it would be a somewhat insecure foundation on which to posit the 
radical change from Aristotelian to Stoic metaphysics. It is unlikely that Stoic physics 
can be reduced to a single arche and that the overall Stoic point of view is due to a 
single idea. 
13. Cf. Bonitz 435a21-45. This usage of οδό? also occurs in Plato; cf. G. A. F. 
Ast, Lexicon Platonicum (Leipzig, 1835-38), s.v. οδός. 
14. Phys. 2.1.193bl2—13. It should be noted that the anthropomorphic expression 
όδώ βαδίζον does not necessarily forfeit its logical connotation. Aristotle used not 
only the word οδός but also the word βαδίζω, of a logical process or argument (Anal. 
Post. 1.23.84b33; 2.13.97a5, bl4; Eth. Nic. 10.9.1180b21; Metaph. 6.4.1027bl2; 
9.8.1050a7). Thus the Stoic phrase, "proceeding by a methodical process to crea­
tion," could be interpreted in a metaphorical sense to mean essentially the same thing 
as Aristotle's phrase, "creating with true reasoning" (μετά λόγου ποιητική). 
15. See above, chapter 3, note 68. 
16. On this entire subject, see F Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical 
World: A Comparison with his Predecessors, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 
33 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960), 92-117; W. Theiler, Zur Geschichte der teleologischen 
Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles (Zurich, 1925), 84-85; and Grumach (above, 
note 12), 47-48. 
17. On several occasions, notably in Physics VII-VIIl and Metaphysics XIII, 
Aristotle tried to get behind and beyond nature as a source of movement and postulated 
an extracosmic prime mover, which, in the last analysis, moves the universe as a final 
cause. But otherwise in his physical researches he was usually satisfied to trace the 
causation of the movements of natural objects to their nature. For further discussion of 
the relation between natural movement and the prime mover, see above, Chapter 2, 
and Solmsen (above, note 16), 222-49. 
18. Cf. Grumach (above, note 12), 47-48. 
19. See above, Chapter 1, for a more detailed discussion and the full evidence. 
20. De An. 1.1.403a29-bl2. For interpretation, cf. the commentary of W D. 
Ross, Aristotle: De Anima (Oxford, 1961), 164-65, 169-70. See also Arist. Metaph. 
6.1.1025b30-1026a6; 8.2-3.1043al4-36. 
21. SVF 1.235. See below. Appendix 1, for a fuller discussion of this story and the 
other biographical evidence for Zeno's character. 

APPENDIXES 

APPENDIX I 
Influences on Stoicism According

to the Biographical Tradition

In antiquity numerous reports regarding the intellectual parentage of 
Stoicism were in circulation. These reports might harbor important 
clues to the origins of Stoicism, and so the biographical traditions 
about the early Stoics must be examined carefully for any aid they 
might render in a quest for the origins of Stoic cosmology. To begin, it 
is well known that Zeno was born of a Phoenician father, Mnaseas, in 
the city of Citium on the island of Cyprus.1 We may surmise that he 
received the usual Phoenician education, and so it is conceivable that 
his philosophy was molded by this education and the attitudes of his 
early life.2 Since nearly nothing is known of Phoenician ideas of this 
period, we cannot reliably trace any Stoic views to a Semitic influence. 
All we can do is keep open the possibility of a stratum of Semitic ideas 
underlying Stoic philosophy. Thus our first biographic fact proves to 
be of little aid in our quest. 
The second thing we know about Zeno is that he came to Athens 
during the summer of the year 312 B.C. at the impressionable age of 
22.3 Diogenes Laertius tells us that Zeno's first action in Athens was to 
attach himself to the wandering Cynic preacher, Crates of Thebes, who 
then resided in Athens.4 A group of related anecdotes deals with 
Zeno's conversion to philosophy and his first meeting with Crates. 
Diogenes Laertius relates that Zeno, on a voyage to sell Phoenician 
purple, was shipwrecked at Athens. While shipwrecked, he sat at the 
door of a bookstore and read Xenophon's Memoirs of Socrates. He 
was so impressed that he asked the bookseller where he could find men 
like Socrates. The bookseller pointed to Crates, who happened to be 
nearby, and said, "Follow that man." This was how Zeno came to be 
a follower of Crates (Diog. Laert. 7.2-3 [=SVF 1.1-2]). Demetrius of 
Magnesia gives a variation of the story He says that while Zeno was 
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still a boy in Citium his father, a merchant, brought "many of the 
Socratic books" from Athens for his son to read. That was how it 
happened that when Zeno came to Athens, he attached himself to 
Crates (Diog. Laert. 7.31-32 [=SVF 1.6]). Which books about Soc­
rates Zeno read is not told us. They could have been books by Plato, 
Xenophon, Antisthenes, or Aescnines.5 Perhaps referring to this same 
story, the Aristotelian commentator Themistius says that it was the 
Apology of Socrates that brought Zeno from Phoenicia to Athens (SVF 
1.9). This is more specific, though we still are not told whether it was 
Plato's or Xenophon's Apology. Nevertheless, the anecdotes prove 
that by the first century B.C. it was generally believed that Zeno was a 
student of the Cynic Crates and was attracted to him by his re­
semblance to Socrates. 
That Zeno was, in fact, a close friend of Crates is proven beyond 
doubt by the fact that Zeno wrote Memoirs of Crates (SVF 1.41), of 
which a few fragments perhaps survive.6 Moreover, if this was Zeno's 
original title for the work, it is likely that Zeno was acquainted with 
Xenophon's work and possibly considered his relationship to Crates to 
be like that of Xenophon to Socrates. Although Zeno was certainly an 
acquaintance of Crates, one must also bear in mind that later Stoics 
may have exaggerated Zeno's connection with Crates, through whom 
the later Stoics traced their spiritual ancestry to Diogenes of Sinope, 
Antisthenes, and finally Socrates himself, thereby justifying their 
claim to be Socratics. This succession of teachers and students is 
largely fictitious, but it illustrates the determination of later Stoics to 
connect Zeno with Socrates.7 It may have been the same determination 
that motivated the anecdotes of Zeno's first attachment to Crates, for 
these anecdotes portray Zeno regarding Crates as a second Socrates. 
The anecdote which declares that a reading of Xenophon's Memoirs of 
Socrates prompted Zeno to follow Crates could very well have been 
inspired by the title of Zeno's own work, the Memoirs of Crates.8 
Consequently, the most we can conclude, if we limit ourselves to solid 
evidence, like the title of Zeno's work and its fragments, is the simple 
fact that Zeno knew Crates and perhaps considered himself a follower 
of Crates at one time. 
According to the biographical tradition, Zeno left Crates after a time 
and became a student of Stilpo of Megara, who apparently made 
occasional visits to Athens.9 Diogenes Laertius gives a vivid descrip­
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tion of Athenian crowds flocking to hear Stilpo's demonstrations of 
dialectic (Diog. Laert. 2.119). He also relates that Stilpo attracted 
students away from other teachers, such as Aristotle and Theophrastus, 
to join his school in Megara (Diog. Laert. 2.113-114). We should 
probably not think of Zeno as becoming a formal student of Stilpo, for 
this would have meant moving to Megara; but it is quite likely that 
Zeno attended his lectures when he visited Athens. In addition to 
Stilpo, Zeno seems to have associated with other dialecticians of the 
day, such as Diodorus Cronus of Iasos in Caria and his student, Philo 
of Megara (Diog. Laert. 7.16, 25 [=SVF 1.4, 5]). 
Diogenes Laertius also tells us that Zeno was a student of Polemon, 
the head of the Academy after 314/13 B.C. (Diog. Laert. 7.2 [=SVF 
1.1]). Diogenes' source for this information is unfortunately not 
specified. Since much of his material on Zeno comes from Apollonius, 
one would like to believe that this information comes from him too. 
But it is also known that a contemporary of Apollonius in the first 
century B.C., namely, the head of the Academy, Antiochus of Asca­
lon, was vitally interested in maintaining a close connection between 
Zeno and Polemon.10 Antiochus, in reaction to the previous skepticism 
of the Academy, had initiated an eclectic dogmatism consisting of 
Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic elements. He asserted that true 
Platonism was handed down from Polemon to Zeno and thereafter 
through a succession of Stoic philosophers to himself. To Antiochus, 
the nominal Academic Arcesilaus was a heretical student of Polemon 
and had led the Academy astray into skepticism. In the view of An­
tiochus, then, Zeno was actually teaching Platonic doctrine under a 
slightly different guise. 
This point of view has left clear traces on the biographical tradition. 
The Academic philospher, Numenius of Apamaea, describes the con­
flict between Polemon's two students, Zeno and Arcesilaus (SVF 
1.11, 12). Cicero, a student of Antiochus, describes Zeno as the stu­
dent of Polemon who corrected (corrigere) the Academic doctrine, and 
adds that it was this correction (correctionem) that Antiochus ex­
pounded (Acad. 1.33-35). Elsewhere Cicero reflects the corollary of 
Antiochus's theory, namely, that Zeno was not an original philoso­
pher, but appropriated the teaching of the Academy and merely in­
vented new terms for the borrowed doctrines. Cicero calls Zeno "not 
so much an inventor of new ideas as of new words" (Fin. 3.5, 15 
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[=SVF 1.34]; cf. Acad. 2.15, 16). This same idea underlies a story in 
which Polemon, spying Zeno unobtrusively entering the Academy., is 
said to have retorted, "You don't escape me, slipping in by the garden 
gate, and like a Phoenician stealing my doctrines and giving them a 
new dress." 1  1 This story could be very revealing, if it were not for the 
fact that it fits no imaginable historical setting. Polemon's accusation 
is that Zeno is at the moment stealing Academic doctrines and hence is 
a student of some kind. Yet Polemon's statement clearly implies that 
Zeno is already teaching, for to make the accusation Polemon must 
have had an acquaintance with Zeno's doctrines. Diogenes must have 
recognized this, for he dates the incident to a time when Zeno was 
"already making progress" (ήδη προκόπτων) and places it in the 
section of the book dealing with Zeno's life after the founding of the 
Stoa. Even so, the portrait of Zeno eavesdropping in the Academy one 
day and selling disguised Platonism in the Stoa the next is psychologi­
cally so implausible that it cannot be taken literally, but must be 
considered an anecdote reflecting the view that Stoicism is an offshoot 
of the Academy. It is most likely an invention in the tradition of the 
historical fictions of Antiochus of Ascalon. That leaves only Diogenes' 
bare statement still above suspicion;12 and even this statement, added 
almost as an afterthought to the list of Zeno's teachers, is not necessar­
ily from an independent source, but could be Diogenes' own inference 
from the anecdote in 7.25. 
There is reason, therefore, to be somewhat skeptical of the intimate 
relation between Zeno and Polemon that is attested in our sources. Yet 
it is improbable that Antiochus invented it ex nihilo. Though he may 
have exaggerated the influence of Polemon, Antiochus must himself 
have believed there was a historical connection between Polemon and 
Zeno. The impetus may have come from a genuine historical tradition, 
but it may also have been a misinterpretation of a tradition that brought 
the two men together only later in life. Such contact seems highly 
probable, since it is known that during Polemon's lifetime, Zeno's 
Stoic doctrine was attacked by at least one member of the Academy, 
Crantor of Soli, an intimate friend of Polemon.13 Finally, it may be 
only a striking coincidence, but if Zeno came to Athens in 312/11 
B.C., he came in the archonship of Polemon (έπϊ Πολέμωνος). Is it 
possible that some statement of the date of Zeno's arrival at Athens in 
Apollodorus's Chronika or in a biography of Zeno misled Antiochus 
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into believing Zeno came to Athens to study under Polemon the 
Academic?14 All we can really say for sure is that Antiochus, a preju­
diced source, said Zeno was a student of Polemon; how far he can be 
trusted we have no way of deciding. 
The biographical tradition records one other teacher for Zeno, 
namely, Xenocrates, the head of the Academy before Polemon. The 
statement occurs in Diogenes Laertius's list of teachers (Diog. Laert. 
7.2 [=SVF 1.1]) and in a similar list by Numenius (SVF 1.11), whose 
source was probably Antiochus of Ascalon. The statement is virtually 
impossible if our reconstruction of Zeno's chronology is correct. For 
Xenocrates probably died in 314/13 B.C., and Zeno did not come to 
Athens until 312 B.C.15 Moreover, even if Zeno did have an opportu­
nity to hear Xenocrates, it is unlikely that he entered into any intimate 
intellectual relationship with Xenocrates, at least if Diogenes' charac­
terization of Xenocrates is correct. Diogenes records that on one occa­
sion a man who knew no music, geometry, or astronomy wanted to 
attend Xenocrates' lectures. Xenocrates sent him away, saying, "You 
have no handles on which philosophy may lay hold" (Diog. Laert. 
4.10). Zeno's later philosophy suggests that he had not the slighest 
interest in any of the subjects that Xenocrates considered prerequisites 
for his course, and so it is hard to believe Xenocrates and Zeno could 
ever have entered into a mutually satisfying scholarly relationship for 
any period of time. 
Some writers who have been aware of the chronological difficulty 
have simply dismissed this statement in Diogenes and Numenius with­
out another thought,16 but it is not likely that the statement was simply 
invented as a deliberate fiction. One explanation offered for the origin 
is that it arose from the mistaken chronology of Apollonius who made 
Zeno live for 98 years rather than the actual 72.17 Granted that the 
statement presupposes the longer Apollonian chronology, it is ques­
tionable whether the long chronology in itself can be assigned as the 
cause of the statement. First of all, Diogenes Laertius seems to say that 
a certain Timocrates in a work called Dion is the authority for the 
statement that Zeno studied under Xenocrates. Hence the false 
chronology as well as the false conclusion must be pushed back to 
Timocrates. But who was this Timocrates? One possibility is that this 
was the brother of the Epicurean, Metrodorus, though no work named 
Dion is otherwise attested for him. However, this Timocrates was a 
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contemporary of Zeno, and it would be hard to assign a false chronol­
ogy to him, especially since the long chronology seems to be derived 
from the spurious letter of Zeno to Antigonus (Diog. Laert. 7.8-9), a 
letter that must have been composed long after Zeno's death. Not only 
would this Timocrates be unlikely to have published a false chronol­
ogy, he would also be unlikely to have believed Zeno was a student of 
Xenocrates, if in fact he was not. This difficulty can be eased some­
what by assuming the Timocrates referred to is a later, otherwise 
unknown, writer;18 but on this question we must suspend judgment. 
Second, regardless of the original source of the long chronology, 
there is only one possible way in which it could actually have been the 
cause of the belief that Zeno studied under Xenocrates. If Apollonius 
did, in fact, state that Zeno was head of the school for 58 years, and 
also knew the year of Zeno's death, he would have placed the founding 
of the Stoa in ca. 320 B.C. (Diog. Laert. 7.28). Then Zeno could not 
have heard Polemon; and Apollonius, if he was conscious of a tradition 
linking Zeno to the Academy, might have speculated that he heard 
Xenocrates instead. This explanation, however, requires the assump­
tion that Apollonius knew the exact year of Zeno's death and the exact 
year of the accession of King Antigonus, but did not know the correct 
date of the foundation of the Stoa, although his contemporary Philode­
mus did (SVF 1.36a). It seems at least as plausible to assume that 
Apollonius had as much information as Philodemus, that is, Apollo­
dorus's Chronika, and he knew the date of the founding of the Stoa, but 
his statement that Zeno was head of the school for 38 (ΛΗ) years, was 
misread by Diogenes as 58 (NH) years.1 9 On this hypothesis the long 
chronology of Apollonius may still be a presupposition for the belief that 
Zeno studied under both Xenocrates and Polemon, but it cannot be 
called the cause. The mere fact that Zeno arrived in Athens in time to 
have heard Xenocrates does not adequately account for the report that 
Zeno studied under him. The basis for this report must still be sought. 
One possible explanation, which should not be overlooked, is that 
the biographical tradition originally recorded another real teacher of 
Zeno, and this man's name became corrupted into Xenocrates. It is not 
unknown in Diogenes Laertius for an unfamiliar name to be replaced 
by a better known, but similar, name.2  0 It is generally the latter part of 
the name that is altered. If we search for Athenian teachers who 
could have been active in the last decade of the fourth century, one in 
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particular stands out as a prime candidate, Xenophilus of Chalcidice. 
Xenophilus belonged to the last generation of Pythagoreans and is the 
only Pythagorean known to have lived in Athens in the fourth century 
(DK 52.1, 2). Although his date is unknown, he seems to have been 
teaching in Athens when Aristoxenus of Tarentum arrived sometime 
after 344 B.C.21 According to Pseudo-Lucian, Aristoxenus is supposed 
to have said Xenophilus lived 105 years (DK 52.2). Whether this 
improbably high age is correct, we cannot say. If Aristoxenus actually 
said it, it may be correct. It is also possible that Aristoxenus is the 
authority only for the date of Xenophilus's death and his age was 
subsequently calculated from the known death date and a presumed 
birth date. Diodorus Siculus states that the last generation of Pythago­
reans was flourishing in 366 B.C. (Diod. 15.76.4). This date is proba­
bly intended to coincide with the restoration of Timotheus and the 
beginning of Athens' resistance against Thebes, which ended in the 
Battle of Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas. If Xenophilus's age 
was calculated on the basis of this year as an acme, he would have 
been born in 406 and would have died in 301 B.C. Not only would this 
mean that Zeno could have heard Xenophilus, but he could have heard 
him for ten years as the text of Diogenes states in regard to Xenocrates. 
Alternatively, the birth of Xenophilus could have been calculated by 
the Apollodoran method of making the teacher 40 years older than the 
pupil.22 Xenophilus was best known as a friend or teacher of Aris­
toxenus (DK 52.1, 3; Aristoxenus, fr. 25, Wehrli). Since the Apol­
lodoran date of Aristoxenus's acme was the 111th Olympiad (336/32 
B.C.), coinciding with the accession of Alexander the Great (Aris­
toxenus, fr. 1, Wehrli), his birth must have been dated to 376/72 B.C. 
The birth of his teacher, Xenophilus, might then have been dated to 
416/12B.C. and his death between 311 and 307 B.C., perhaps 311 B.C., 
if Aristoxenus's acme was dated at 336 B.C. Either dating of 
Xenophilus brings his lifetime down into the time when Zeno was in 
Athens. Regardless of whether Xenophilus was as old as the sources 
seem to make him,23 Aristoxenus assures us that he was healthy and 
active to the end of his life (DK 52.2) and could well have been 
teaching when Zeno arrived. 
It may seem surprising to suggest that Zeno attended lectures of a 
Pythagorean, but it must be remembered that interest in the Pythago­
reans ran very high in the last half of the fourth century Nearly every 
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Academic and Peripatetic philosopher of note wrote about the 
Pythagoreans. Speusippus, Heraclides Ponticus, Xenocrates, Aristot­
le, and Aristoxenus wrote separate books about them; and Theophras­
tus and Eudemus included the Pythagoreans in their histories of phi­
losophy.24 That Zeno shared their interest is proven by the fact that he 
also wrote a book about Pythagoreanism (SVF 1.41). How far 
Xenophilus contributed to the widespread interest in Pythagoreanism 
in fourth-century Athens, we do not know; but we do know he was 
primarily responsible for Aristoxenus's interest (Aristox., frs. 1, 19, 
20, 25, Wehrli). If he was still living, it is possible that he was 
responsible also for Zeno's interest in Pythagoreanism, and that some 
report of this in the biographical tradition gave rise to Diogenes' report 
that Zeno studied under Xenocrates; but this must remain in the realm 
of speculation. 
In addition to personal instruction, the biographical tradition depicts 
Zeno as having received instruction from books. One of the anecdotes 
describing his conversion to philosophy tells how Zeno asked an oracle 
what he should do to live the best life. The oracle is said to have 
replied, "Take on the color of the dead." In response, Zeno began 
reading the ancient authors.25 That Zeno read the old Greek authors is 
certain. He wrote a book on Homer and quoted Hesiod and 
Euripides.26 The titles of two of his own works, Memoirs of Crates 
and Republic, suggest he was acquainted with the works of similar 
titles by Xenophon and Plato respectively (SVF 1.41, cf. 260). Anec­
dotes, though of questionable historicity, assign to him an acquain­
tance with the Apology of either Plato or Xenophon and Antisthenes' 
essay on Sophocles (SVF 1.9, 305). A fragment of one of his works 
shows he also knew of the existence of Aristotle's Protrepticus (SVF 
1.273). Since he was acquainted with works by Homer, Hesiod, 
Euripides, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and perhaps Antisthenes, we 
may safely conclude he was fairly well read and must have been 
acquainted with the writings of his philosophical predecessors. 
Finally, we must also remember that the biographical tradition is an 
accidental and fragmentary collection of the most entertaining, but not 
necessarily the most significant, information. The tradition may well 
have passed over important influences on Zeno's thought. Therefore 
we must not overlook the possibility of influences from the Peripatetic 
school. Theophrastus was beyond doubt the most popular lecturer of 
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the day; his lectures attracted a total of two thousand students (Diog. 
Laert. 5.37). It would be strange if Zeno had lived in Athens, thirsting 
for instruction, without having heard so much as a single lecture of 
Theophrastus. Theophrastus could not only have acquainted Zeno with 
his own version of the Peripatetic philosophy but also have introduced 
him to the results of Aristotle's unpublished philosophical activity, if 
this was not otherwise accessible to him. Then, too, in 306 B.C. 
Epicurus opened his school in Athens. Zeno very probably came into 
contact with his future rival soon after Epicurus had begun teaching. 
So Epicureanism too must be considered part of the background 
against which Stoicism arose. 
The anecdotes that antiquity loved to collect are notoriously unreli­
able as historical sources, but their portrait of Zeno and his early 
intellectual activity in Athens makes a delightful conclusion to this 
survey of the biographical tradition. Apollonius of Tyre relates that 
when Zeno had abandoned Crates to hear Stilpo, Crates tried to drag 
him back by force. Zeno replied, "The only proper way to grab a 
philosopher is by the ears. If you take me by force, you will have my 
body; but my heart will be with Stilpo" (SVF 1.278). If we are to 
judge from the biographical tradition, many of the philosophers at 
Athens must have dragged the young Zeno about by the ears; and 
apparently Zeno relished the experience. At least another anecdote 
tells us that Zeno once asked a man who had just given him a lesson in 
logic how much pay he wanted; when the man asked for a hundred, 
Zeno gave him two hundred (SVF 1.279). To find such generosity in 
the frugal Zeno is astonishing; his love of learning apparently knew no 
bounds. Most provocative is the very popular story of his revision of 
some lines of Hesiod. Hesiod had said, "Best of all is the man who 
thinks out all for himself; but that man, too, is good who listens to one 
who speaks well" (Op. 293, 295). Zeno is said to have interchanged 
the words to say, "Best of all is the man who listens to one who speaks 
well; but that man, too, is good, who thinks out all for himself" (SVF 
1.235). Though Hesiod would praise most highly the man who thinks 
things out for himself, Zeno appears to feel no need for original think­
ing; the past has produced so many wise men who spoke well, that all 
one needs to do now is to listen to the sages of the past and to apply 
their wisdom to one's own life. In the view of the ancient biographers 
Zeno appears to have been a young outsider in the intellectual capital 
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of the world, dazzled by its learning, running here and there to hear 
every man with a reputation for wisdom; too impatient to attach him­
self to one man or school exclusively, but learning what he could from 
whomever he met; of insatiable curiosity and willing to pay any price 
for a bit of wisdom; feeling no compulsion for original thinking, but 
heeding the wisdom of others; and, above all, recognizing the neces­
sity of living in accord with the divine truth taught by wise men of all 
generations. 
Though the biographical tradition purports to show us Zeno's rela­
tionship to the philosophical movements around him, it actually gives 
us very little concrete information; and some of that is of dubious 
historical value. As a matter of fact, the tradition gives us the impres­
sion that Zeno could have been exposed to almost any intellectual 
movement afloat in Athens in the last decade of the fourth century. The 
biographical tradition about Zeno thus offers few significant clues in a 
quest for the origins of Stoic cosmology. 
Since the fragments of Zeno are so meager and any investigation of 
Stoic cosmology must include the works of Zeno's successors, 
Cleanthes and Chrysippus, it may be helpful also to look briefly at the 
transmission of Stoic cosmology through the third century to see what 
later influences, if any, the biographical tradition suggests in this 
period. The cosmological system of Zeno was transmitted both in writ­
ing and by oral instruction of students. Zeno's cosmological writings 
were very few The chief work dealing with physics must have been 
On the Universe, as far as we know, in only one book (SVF 1.41). 
Apparently this work discussed the origin of the elements and of the 
cosmos, as well as meteorological and astronomical phenomena (SVF 
1.97, 102, 117, 119). There is also a reference to a work entitled On 
Nature (SVF 1.176) and one to a work called On Substance (SVF 
1.85). Since the list of Zeno's works does not mention any by these 
titles, and since both references concern the doctrine of the archai of 
which all things in the cosmos consist, it is not unlikely that these two 
fragments were also from On the Universe, merely designated arbitrar­
ily by the titles On Nature and On Substance.27 In this same work 
Zeno probably allegorized Hesiod's Theogony-28 Since no other cos­
mological writing is known, it is unlikely that Zeno transmitted by 
writing any more than the bare foundations of the cosmological system 
that was eventually to develop. Any further details that Zeno himself 
had developed must have been passed on to pupils orally. 
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The most important of Zeno's students was Cleanthes of Assos.29 
Cleanthes grew up in Assos, the city in Asia Minor where in the fourth 
century the tyrant Hermeias had gathered a number of philosophers, 
including several Platonists, Aristotle, Xenocrates, and perhaps also 
Theophrastus.30 Whether the memory of this school survived into 
Cleanthes' day and had any influence on him we do not know. We do 
know that in Assos, Cleanthes was a boxer and therefore probably 
spent most of his time training in the gymnasium (SVF 1.463). This 
may possibly have brought him into contact with some medical 
theories of strength and health. When he came to Athens, he became a 
student of Zeno. As far as we know he attended lectures of no other 
philosopher. The traditions concerning his life as student and later as 
scholar stress two characteristics. As one might expect of an athlete, 
Cleanthes was renowned for his physical strength and his capacity for 
hard labor (SVF 1.463, 466, 597, 598, 611; Val. Max. 8.7.11). In 
fact, he had to draw water by night to support himself, so he could 
study philosophy by day. His strength earned him the nickname, 
"Heracles the Second" (SVF 1.463). Second, he was considered 
somewhat dull and uncreative, but a faithful and unswerving follower 
of Zeno in every Stoic doctrine (SVF 1.463, 464, 599, 600). The fact 
that Cleanthes wrote a commentary on Heraclitus shows that he was 
interested in at least this one earlier philosopher, undoubtedly inter­
preting him as a precursor of Stoicism (SVF 1.481, cf. 519). In addi­
tion, the fragments suggest that Cleanthes was also acquainted with 
Homer, Sophocles, Euripides, and other poets.31 That he was aware of 
his contemporaries in philosophy is clear from the fact that he was 
attacked by Arcesilaus, wrote treatises against the Epicureans and 
Aristarchus the astronomer, and mocked the Peripatetics;31 but the 
sources show no awareness of an influence of any of his contem­
poraries on his thought. Thus judging from the biographical tradition, 
one would not expect to find innovations or the importation of outside 
influences by Cleanthes. 
Like Zeno, Cleanthes devoted only a small effort to cosmological 
writings. Of the more than fifty titles ascribed to Cleanthes, it is likely 
that only two contained extensive expositions of Stoic cosmology.33 
One was entitled On the Natural Science of Zeno in two books and 
may have been his basic work on physics. Since it is longer than 
Zeno's book on the same subject (On the Universe), it must have 
elaborated on Zeno's doctrine or defended it at greater length. The 
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other was a commentary on Heraclitus in four books, a work that could 
hardly avoid a discussion of cosmology.34 If SVF 1.519 is from this 
work, we may infer that Cleanthes' method was to harmonize Herac­
litus with Zeno's doctrines; but the introductory statement that 
Cleanthes' method was to set Zeno's doctrines alongside those of his 
predecessors for comparison suggests this fragment may have come 
not from the commentary but from the more general work On the 
Natural Science of Zeno. In addition, Cleanthes' polemics against the 
Atomists and against Aristarchus and his book On Time probably also 
mentioned Stoic cosmology.35 
Cleanthes had two prominent students. Sphaerus of Borysthenes, 
after having been a student of both Zeno and Cleanthes, left Athens 
and spent the rest of his life in Sparta with Cleomenes, and after 
Cleomenes' fall, in Alexandria with Ptolemy Philopator (SVF 1.621­
25). Sphaerus wrote two treatises on cosmological subjects, On the 
Cosmos in two books, and On Elements. Like his teacher Cleanthes, 
he also wrote a long work on Heraclitus, and a refutation of the 
Epicureans (SVF 1.620). It is noteworthy that the titles of nearly all his 
physical works find a counterpart among the works of his teachers, 
Zeno and Cleanthes. The only totally original titles are On Elements 
and On Seed. He may have been a conservative follower of the physi­
cal teachings of Zeno and Cleanthes. 
Cleanthes' most famous pupil was Chrysippus of Soli, who later 
became his successor. Of Chrysippus's life as little is known as of 
Cleanthes'.36 Like Zeno, Chrysippus was a Semite and spoke Greek 
only as his second language (SVF 2.24, cf. 894). When he came to 
Athens, he became a student of Cleanthes (SVF 2.1). Diogenes Laer­
tius states he later became a student of Arcesilaus and Lacydes, suc­
cessive heads of the Academy (Diog. Laert. 7.183-84[ = 5KF 2.1]). 
His account implies that Chrysippus quarreled with Cleanthes and as a 
result joined the Academy shortly before Arcesilaus's death, but this 
seems highly improbable in view of his later selection as head of the 
Stoa and his ardent battles with the Academy. It is possible that he 
studied under Arcesilaus as a fellow student with Lacydes, as soon as 
he arrived in Athens, before he ever joined Cleanthes' class.37 It is also 
possible that the story is fictitious and was devised to explain why one 
of Chrysippus's books contained Academic rebuttals of Stoic epis­
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temology without comment or refutation by Chrysippus.38 The bio­
graphical tradition depicts Chrysippus as a very acute and original 
thinker, who created his own new arguments in support of the tradi­
tional Stoic doctrines (SVF 2.1, 21). In so doing, he may well have 
modified details in order to make the main tenets more defensible 
against Academic attacks, for he is said to have differed in doctrine 
from Cleanthes and Zeno (SVF 2.1). He had read very widely in Greek 
poetry, philosophy, and medical writings, and quoted so many au­
thorities that it was said if the quotes were erased, his pages would be 
bare.39 Therefore, in Chrysippus the biographical tradition leads us to 
look for influences from almost any published literature, as well as 
logical developments within the system on the basis of traditional Stoic 
premises. 
Chrysippus was a most prolific writer, turning out at least 705 
volumes (SVF 2.1). Unfortunately Diogenes Laertius' list of these 
works is broken off before the section of his physical works (SVF 
2.13-18), but from the titles mentioned in the fragments we may 
suppose Chrysippus wrote very extensively on physics.40 Of the few 
titles accidentally preserved to us, no less than four are general 
treatises on physics, all of which may have included cosmological 
material: On Nature (also called Physics),41 Physical Investigations, 
Physical Theses, and Physical Arts. The important work On Nature 
contained at least five books and Physical Investigations at least two. 
Moreover, Chrysippus wrote a work allegorizing old myths into Stoic 
physics (On the Ancient Natural Scientists) and a separate work On the 
Cosmos in two books. Then, too, we know the titles of several works 
dealing with some of the basic principles of physics and cosmology: 
On Substance. On the Void, On Hexeis, and On Motion. One can 
readily understand why the system of Chrysippus is known so much 
better than that of Zeno or Clean thes. Of the books written by early 
Stoics more than nine-tenths were by Chrysippus. It is only natural that 
the later Stoic handbooks would be based on this, the most thorough of 
the Stoic writers, with Zeno and Cleanthes cited only to prove the 
antiquity of the various doctrines. The titles of Chrysippus's works 
reveal another interesting fact. Chrysippus shows a definite inclination 
to discuss the principles of physics, including the subject of move­
ment, a subject so important for Plato and Aristotle, but seemingly 
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neglected by the Stoics. Thus, not only does Chrysippus seem to have 
discussed physics in greater depth than any previous Stoic, but he must 
have extended his inquiry to many new subjects. 
In conclusion, upon critical examination the biographical tradition 
proves to be of little value in deciding which philosophical movements 
actually influenced the early Stoics. The traditions concerning Zeno, 
where they are not of questionable historicity, show him to have been 
exposed to most of the intellectual influences of the day as well as to 
the thought of the past preserved in books. Then, although Cleanthes 
and Chrysippus appear to have expanded, refined, and modified 
Zeno's system, the biographical tradition is conscious of few external 
influences on them that were not already present in Zeno's day. There 
is no evidence that either one was influenced significantly by a non-
Stoic teacher, and the books they read were for the most part the same 
as those that Zeno read. Consequently it seems clear that the biograph­
ical tradition, interesting as it may be in itself, is of little value in a 
search for the origins of Stoic cosmology. 
1. On Zeno's life, see M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Be­
wegung3 (Gottingen, 1964), 1.22-25; 2.14-15. 
2. For attempts to identify the Semitic influence on Stoicism see Introduction, note 
8. I must confess more sympathy, however, with the cautious reservation of E. Bevan, 
Stoics and Sceptics (Oxford, 1913), 20-21. Pohlenz's theory of extensive, identifiable 
Semitic influences has been attacked by reviewers; e.g., L. Edelstein, AJP 72 (1951): 
427-28; and F H. Sandbach, JHS 71 (1951):262; cf. also E. Schwartz, Ethik der 
Griechen (Stuttgart, 1951), 161-62; and W. Schmid, Der Hellenismus in der 
deutschen Forschung, 1938-1948 (Wiesbaden, 1956):83-84. 
3. For a concise discussion and bibliography of the problems of Zeno's chronology, 
see K. von Fritz, "Zenon von Kition," RE 10A (1972): 83-85. The date of Zeno's 
arrival at Athens can be calculated from the information of his close friend and 
follower, Persaeus, who says that Zeno came to Athens at the age of 22 and died at the 
age of 72 (Diog. Laert. 1.2S[=SVF 1.6]). Since it is known that Zeno died in the 
archonship of Arrheneides and Arrheneides was probably archon in 262/61 B.C., 
Zeno's arrival at Athens can with probability be dated to 312/11 B.C. (SVF 1.7-8; 36a 
[for variant readings and reconstructions of this text, see F Jacoby, Die Fragmente 
der griechischen Historiker (Berlin, 1930), 2 D 736-37]). B. D. Merrit, The Athen­
ian Year (Berkeley, 1961), 221-26, 233, argued that Arrheneides should be moved 
down to 260/59 B.C. because of the uncertainty of the text of the Herculaneum index 
(SVF 1.477); but since the reading of this text has since been confirmed by F. 
Sbordone (cf. W. K. Pritchett, Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone, University of 
California Publications in Classical Archaeology 4 [Berkeley, 1963], 388-89), Merrit 
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has abandoned his suggestion and has come to accept the traditional date of 262/61 
B.C. ("Metonic Intercalations in Athens," Hesperia 38 [1969]: 112). 
4. Diog. Laert. 6.105; 1.2( = SVF 1.1). Diogenes' source is perhaps the biography 
of Zeno by Apollonius of Tyre (early first cent. B.C.). The same information comes 
from Demetrius of Magnesia (first cent. B.C.). Diog. Laert. 1.3l-32(=SVF 1.6) and 
Numenius of Apamea (second cent, A.D.) (SVF 1.11), who, in turn, may have derived 
his material from Antiochus of Ascalon (first cent. B.C.) (cf. Pohlenz, Stoa [above, 
note 1], 2.14). Several anecdotes also connect Zeno with Crates (SVF 1.1 -2, 278). On 
the life and teachings of Crates, see D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism (London, 
1937), 42-53; F. Sayre, The Greek Cynics (Baltimore, 1948), 31-36. 
5. Diog. Laert. 2.64. On Antisthenes' Socratic Discourses, cf. Dudley (above, 
note 4), 14-15, and 16, note 3. An anecdote implies Zeno's later acquaintance with 
the works of Antisthenes (SVF 1.305). 
6. SVF 1.272, 273. Neither fragment is directly assigned to the Memoirs; in fact, 
SVF 1.272 is alleged to be from the Χρεΐαι. However, no such title is listed for Zeno 
by Diog. Laert. 7.4 (=SVF 1.41), and it is likely that the Xpelm is the same work as 
the Memoirs. The title Xpelac was a standard title in Hellenistic times for a collection 
of apophthegms or anecdotes. It would probably have been appropriate for a collection 
of the sort of material found in Zeno's Memories of Crates (cf. U. von Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff, Antigonos von Karystos, Philologische Untersuchungen 4 [Berlin, 
1881], 106, note 6; and A. C. Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes 
[London, 1891], 31). 
7. This fictitious succession is evident in the arrangement of Diog. Laert. Books 6 
and 7; cf. 2.47. The link between Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope is certainly 
fictitious, since Antisthenes died before Diogenes reached Athens. See Dudley (above, 
note 4), 1-3; Sayre (above, note 4), 56. Sayre, 63-64, even maintains that the link 
between Diogenes and Crates is fictitious. He argues that since Diogenes was nothing 
more than a street preacher, Crates cannot, strictly speaking, be called his pupil. The 
line of succession was probably invented by the Stoics and subsequently popularized 
by the Alexandrian succession-writers (Dudley, 3-4; Sayre, 91-92). 
8. See O. Gigon, "Antike Erzahlungen iiber die Berufung zur Philosophie," 
MusHelv 3 (1946): 1-21, esp. 20. 
9. Diog. Laert. 2.114, 120; 7.2 (=SVF 1.1); 7.24 (=SVF 1.278); and Numenius 
(SVF 1.11). The tradition goes back to the second century B.C. Diog. Laert. 7.24 
comes from Apollonius of Tyre (early first cent. B.C.), and Heraclides Lembos (second 
cent. B.C.) in his epitome of Sotion's Successions (early second cent. B.C.) agrees 
(Diog. Laert. 2.120). On Stilpos life and teachings, see K. Praechter, "Stilpon," RE 
3 A(1929):2525-33. 
10. On Antiochus of Ascalon, see Pohlenz, Stoa (above, note 1) 1.249-54; 
2.129-31. 
11. Diog. Laert. 7.25 ( = SVF 1.5). τα δόγματα κλεπτών φοινίκων μεταμ­
φιενννς is often translated "stealing my doctrines and putting them in Phoenician 
dress." This is sometimes interpreted to mean that Polemon was accusing Zeno of 
giving old Greek ideas a superficial Semitic appearance. But the real import of the 
anecdote seems to be that Zeno took the doctrines of others and, after disguising them, 
passed them off as his own. Whether the disguise had a Semitic tinge or not is 
irrelevant to the point of the anecdote. Moreover, Cicero gives no hint that the disguise 
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had a Semitic coloring. He merely accuses Zeno of inventing new words (SVF 1.34, 
35). The change wrought by Zeno on the old ideas seems to be one of terminology. 
Though it has been suggested that some Stoic motifs are of Semitic origin (cf., e.g., 
Pohlenz, "Stoa und Semitismus," Neue Jahrbucher, n.s. 2 [1926]:257-69), there is 
no evidence of Semitic influence on the terminology as such. Therefore it seems better 
to understand Polemon's accusation to be that Zeno is behaving as a typical Phoenician 
in stealing things from others, disguising them, and then selling them as his own. 
12. Diog. Laert. 7.2. There is also an anecdote preserved in Stobaeus (SVF 1.304) 
that has the Academy as its setting, but Plutarch (SVF 1.304) gives the same 
apophthegm without the Academic setting. An anecdote such as this is of virtually no 
value in determining Zeno's relation to Polemon or the Academy. 
13. Plut. Cons. adApoll. 102d; cf. Pohlenz, Stoa (above, note 1), 1.173-74; 2.88. 
14. This same mistake is found in reverse in the Life of Aristotle (V. Rose, Aris­
totelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta [Leipzig, 1886], 429, line 1), where some 
statement that Aristotle entered the Academy while Eudoxus was present has given rise 
to the statement that Aristotle entered the Academy in the archonship of Eudoxus (cf. 
W. Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development2, trans. R. 
Robinson [Oxford, 1948], 16, note 2). A comparable mistake is possible in the tradi­
tion concerning Zeno. That Apollodorus dated events by archons is shown by F. 
Jacoby, Apollodors Chronik, Philologische Untersuchungen 16 (Berlin, 1902), 
57-59. Philodemus, who used Apollodorus, dates Zeno's life by archons in the frag­
mentary On the Stoics, Col. \W(=SVF 1.36a). 
15. Xenocrates' death is calculated from the statement that Xenocrates succeeded 
Speusippus as head of the Academy in the archonship of Lysimachides (339/38 B.C.) 
and served in this capacity for twenty five years until his death (Diog. Laert. 4.14). 
Hence, his death must have occurred in 314/13 B.C. It is remotely possible that if the 
twenty five years was reckoned exclusively, Xenocrates may have died in 313/12. If 
we push his death to the very end of 313/12 and if Zeno was able to get to Athens early 
enough in the summer of 312, it might have been possible for him to have heard 
Xenocrates a few days before his death; but this is highly improbable. It is certainly 
impossible that he heard him for ten years, as Diog. Laert. 7.2 states. 
16. E.g., Pearson (above, note 7), 3-4; and C. J. de Vogel, Greek Philosophy 
(Leiden, 1959), 3.44. A few, like E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism (Cambridge, 1911), 
64-71; and R. Mondolfo, II pensiero Antico2 (Florence, 1950), 376, omit Xenocrates 
from their otherwise complete lists of Zeno's teachers, thereby suggesting that they too 
mistrust Diogenes' statement. E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, trans. O. J. 
Reichel (London, 1880), 37, note 1, has doubts on philosophical, rather than 
chronological, grounds. 
17. Pohlenz, Stoa (above, note 1), 2.14. It is not entirely clear whether Pohlenz is 
giving Apollonius's chronology as the origin of the statement or merely believes the 
statement presupposes Apollonius's chronology. 
18. W. Cronert, Kolotes und Menedemos, Studien zur Palaographie und Papyrus­
kunde 6 (Leipzig, 1906), 143, note 557, speculated that the name Timocrates is an 
erroneous expansion of an abbreviation for Timonides, who did write a book about 
Dion. Since Timonides was a contemporary of Plato and Speusippus and campaigned 
with Dion in Sicily, it is not likely he would have lived long enough to know Zeno, 
much less have written about him in his book on Dion. Therefore, Cronert, 195, 
speculated that the statement έτη δέκα, ώ? Τιμοκροτης εν τω Δίωνι actually be­
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longs in the biography of Xenocrates (Diog. Laert. 4.6). Cronert's theory leaves much 
to be desired and, in addition, takes us nowhere in tracing the source of Diogenes' 
statement. It is rejected by W. Capelle, "Timonides," RE 6 Κ (1937): 1306. 
19. This is suggested by W Cronert (above, note 18) 138. If Apollonius reckoned 
exclusively, he could have been using the same data as Philodemus (foundation of Stoa 
in the archonship of Clearchus [301/300] and Zeno's death in that of Arrheneides 
[262/61]). Cronert's suggestion has been rejected as arbitrary by A. Mayer, "Die 
Chronologie des Zenon und Kleanthes," Philologus 71 (1912):223-24, note 31, and 
set as second choice by F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (Ber­
lin, 1930), 2 D 738, who finds the scheme 40 + 58 years too attractive to pass up. 
20. Cronert (above, note 18), 3-4 and 173, note 4,, mentions a number of such

mistakes in Diogenes.

21. Aristoxenus, fr. 1, and commentary, F Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles,

vol. 2 (Basel, 1945), 47-48.

22. Jacoby (above, note 14), 47-48. Apollodorus seems to have derived the tech­
nique of dating by acme from Aristoxenus (Jacoby, 46-47), but it seems unlikely that 
Aristoxenus would himself have used this method to date a personal acquaintance like 
Xenophilus. 
23. Gell. ΝA 4.11 ( = DK 14.9 = Aristox. fr. 25, Wehrli) calls Xenophilus a 
familiaris of Aristoxenus and implies that they were nearly contemporary, for he says 
that Aristoxenus got his material also from older Pythagoreans. 
24. Speusippus, On Pythagorean Numbers (Iambi. Theol. Ar 82.10-15, De Fal­
co[=Speusippus, fr. 4, Lang]); Heraclides, On the Pythagoreans (Diog. Laert. 5.88); 
Xenocrates, Pythagoreanism (Diog. Laert. 4.13); Aristotle, Against the Pythagoreans 
and On the Pythagoreans (Diog. Laert. 5.25); Aristoxenus, Pythagorean Assertions 
and a life of Pythagoras (Aristox, frs. 11 —41, Wehrli). 
25. Diog. Laert. 1.2(=SVF 1.1). The story probably originated from the story of 
Socrates' call to philosophy by an oracle of god (Plato, Apol. 20e-22e; Xen. Apol. 
14-15; Arist. De Phil. frs. 1, 2, 3, Ross, Walzer). See Gigon (above, note 8), 3-8. 
26. Zeno's Homeric Problems, SVF 1.41, cf. 274, 275; quotations of Hesiod, SVF 
1.100, 103, 104, 105, 167, 235, 276; and of Euripides, SVF 1.245. Von Arnim, SVF 
1, page 71, postulated a separate commentary on Hesiod's Theogony. For this there is 
noevidence. The list of Zeno's works in5VF 1.41, probably based on Apollonius (cf. 
SVF 1.37), mentions no commentary on Hesiod. Cic. Nat. D 1.36 ( = SVF 1.167) 
and Val. Prob. (SVF 1.103) say that Zeno interpretatur Hesiod, but the only lines that 
Zeno interprets in the extant fragments are \\6(SVF 1.103, 104; cf. 105; 2.565), 117 
(SVF 1.105), \2Q(SVF 1.104, 105), 127 or 133 (SVF 1.276), 135 (SVF 1.100), and 
perhaps 453-58 (SVF 1.167. 169). All except one are from Hesiod's relatively short 
cosmogonal section, lines 116-35. The fragments show that Zeno interpreted Hesiod 
allegorically to make him conform to Stoic physical theory. Cic. Nat. D. 2.63, says 
Zeno allegorized myth less extensively than Cleanthes or Chrysippus, thereby suggest­
ing he knew of no extended allegorical commentary of Hesiod. Zeno more likely 
allegorized the cosmogony in On the Universe, citing Hesiod as an authority for his 
own theory 
27. Cf. Wicrsma, "Die Physik des Stoikers Zenon," Mnemosyne, 3d ser., 11 
(1943):28-29, cites earlier authorities for this identification, though he himself be­
lieves the three are separate works. 
28. SVF 1.100, 103, 104, 105, 167, 276; see above, note 26. 
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29. The only other student of Zeno who showed an interest in physics was Apol­
lophanes (cf. SVF 1.404), of whom almost nothing is known (fragments in SVF 
1.404-8). On the life of Cleanthes, see Verbeke, Kleanthes van Assos, Verhan­
delingen van de Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Klasse der Letteren, vol. 
11, no. 9 (Brussels, 1949), 50-65; H. von Arnim, "Kleanthes," RE 11 (1921): 
558-60. 
30. Verbeke, Kleanthes (above, note 29), 50-52; Jaeger (above, note 14), 111-15. 
31. Homer, SVF 1.535, 549, 611; cf. Cleanthes' book On the Poet (SVF 1.481); 
Sophocles, SVF 1.607; Euripides, SVF 1.610; and mythological poetry in general, 
SVF 1.539, cf. 1.166. 
32. On the attacks of Arcesilaus, see Pohlenz, Stoa (above, note 1), 1.174-75. His 
writings against the Epicureans and Aristarchus are included in the list of SVF 1.481, 
cf. 493, 500. For his opinion of the Peripatetics, see SVF 1.606. 
33. A list of Cleanthes1 works is given by Diog. Laert. 7.174-75(=SKF 1.481); 
cf. SVF, Vol. 1, pages 137-39. For a characterization of Cleanthes' individual works, 
see von Arnim, "Kleanthes" (above, note 29), 561, and Verbeke, Kleanthes (above, 
note 29), 68-90. 
34. K. Deichgraber, "Bemerkungen zu Diogenes' Bericht iiber Heraklit," 
Philologus 93 (1938):28-30, has suggested with some plausibility that the second 
verse fragment on Heraclitus in Diog. Laert. 9.16 may be by Cleanthes and may have 
stood in the introduction to his commentary on Heraclitus. 
35. Cf. SVF 1.493, 500. Plutarch Stoic. Repug. lO34d (=SVF 1.563), quotes from 
a work that he calls Physical Notes (υπομνήματα φυσικά). The fragment speaks of 
the tonos of the soul as the cause of various virtues. This may have been a separate 
work, perhaps a loose collection of notes on ethics and its physical premises (cf. 
Verbeke, Kleanthes [above, note 29], 78-79). Since the title is not found in Diogenes 
Laertius's list of Cleanthes' works, it might also be another name for On the Natural 
Science of Zeno (cf. von Arnim, "Kleanthes" [above, note 29], 561); or since the 
fragment provides definitions for the virtues, Plutarch may actually be quoting 
Cleanthes' On Virtues. At any rate, the fragment cited by Plutarch sheds some light on 
Cleanthes' doctrine of the tonos, a doctrine that had cosmological applications. 
36. On Chrysippus's life, see E\ Brehier, Chrysippe et I'ancien stoicisme2 (Paris, 
1951), 7-16; Pohlenz, Stoa (above, note 1), 1.28-30; J. B. Gould, The Philosophy of 
Chrysippus, Philosophia Antiqua 17 (Leiden and Albany, N.Y., 1970), 7-9. 
37. Pohlenz, Stoa (above, note 1), 1.28-29. The difficulty with Pohlenz's theory is 
that Diogenes puts the story later in Chrysippus's life (cf. the introductory word 
τέλος). Η. von Arnim, "Chrysippus," RE 3 (1900):2502, seems to make Chrysippus 
a student of Cleanthes and Arcesilaus at the same time. 
38. Brehier, Chrysippe (above, note 36), 10-11. 
39. SVF 2.1, 22. As an example of his method see SVF 2.904-8. Of the poets he 
quoted at least Anacreon, Alcman, the Cypria, Empedocles, Epicharmus, Euripides, 
Hesiod, Homer, Ibycus, Menander, Musaeus, Orpheus, Pindar, Sappho, Stesichorus, 
Theognis, Thespis, Timotheus, and Tyrtaeus. He showed a knowledge of the philoso­
phers Heraclitus, Empedocles, Democritus, the Pythagoreans, Socrates, Plato, Aristot­
le, Polemon, Arcesilaus, Strato, Epicurus, Stilpo, and Menedemus of Eretria. For 
references see the index of M. Adler, SVF 4, pages 175-86 (add SVF 2.636 on 
Heraclitus). He also showed an acquaintance with the medical writers, especially 
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Praxagoras of Cos and the third-century Alexandrians, presumably Herophilus of 
Chalcedon and Erasistratus of Ceos (cf. SVF 2.885, 897). 
40. For a detailed account of Chrysippus's physical treatises, see Brehier, 
Chrysippe (above, note 36), 30-47. 
41. Cf. Brehier, Chrysippe (above, note 36), 32-36. 
APPENDIX II 
The Contents of Book One

of Chrysippus's Physics

If the surviving fragments are any indication, the first book of 
Chrysippus's Physics must have discussed the following subjects: 
I.	 Nature and its logos (SVF 2.937). 
II.	 The origin of the cosmos: the birth of the four elements from 
fire (SVF 2.579, 580 [first part = Diog. Laert. 7.135-36], 
581). 
Transition (SVF 2.580[ = Diog. Laert. 7.136: έστι δε . . . 
αναλύεται] and perhaps SVF 2.299). 
III.	 The archai of the cosmos (SVF 2.300). 
A.	 The passive arche: The unqualified substance or matter 
(SVF 2.300, 316, 580 [ = Diog. Laert. 7.137: τά δή 
τέτταρα . . . νλην]), including the distinction between 
matter in general and prime or ultimate matter (SVF 2.316, 
317, cf. 1.86). 
B.	 The active arche: The cause of qualities (SVF 2.300, cf. 
318). 
IV.	 The prime quality proper to each element (SVF 2.580 [ = Diog. 
Laert. 7.137: είναι δε . . . μέρος]). 
V.	 The arrangement of the elements in the cosmos (SVF 2.580 
[ = Diog. Laert. 7.137: άνωτάτω . . . ονσαν]). 
SVF 2.937, the long fragment stating that all things occur according 
to the logos of nature, sounds like a general introduction to the whole 
work. That this was an important theme of the work in general is 
suggested by the fact that it is repeated in Book Two, the book that 
deals with the soul, senses, and reproduction (SVF 2.1181). Perhaps, 
as the title On Nature suggests, the work dealt with the Stoic doctrine 
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of nature, Book One discussing the role of nature in the cosmos and 
Book Two the role of nature in man, the microcosmos. Since the 
discussion of the archai (Part III [see above]) came near the end of the 
book, we may conjecture that this introductory section and the discus­
sion of the origin of the cosmos occupied the bulk of the book. 
SVF 2.636 (την νύκτα ύεάν είναι πρωτίστων) cannot be placed, 
unless it refers to the fact that air is the material substrate of periods of 
time (cf. SVF 2.693), and air is basically dark as well as cold (cf. SVF 
2.429, 430). Then perhaps this fragment came from an allegorization 
of a theogony, where night is explained to be the very first goddess 
because dark air (night) was the result of the first elemental change 
made by fire (Zeus). Alternatively, if this fragment presupposes that 
air is dark and cold, it might belong to the discussion of the qualities of 
the elements; and perhaps the unintelligible sentence, ov μην άλλα 
και έτι
1
 εν τω αέρι είναι το αυτό μέρος, should be emended to ov 
μην άλλα και έτι εν τω αέρι etmi (τα) το (ν ένι) αντο(ν) 
μέρ(η). This emendation would bring the meaning close to Diog. 
Laert. 7.151 (=SVF 2.693), where the four seasons are called τα εν 
αέρι γινόμενα. Or perhaps this sentence might even be viewed as the 
end result of a series of corruptions produced by the doxographers 
before Diogenes, reflecting an original account in which night and day 
were described as particular states of the atmospheric air, and which 
went on to argue that since day was such, a month was also of this 
nature, and finally ονχ 6 μην μόνον άλλα και έστι εν τω αέρι 
πάντα τα τον ένιαντον μέρη. Chrysippus uses a similar sequence 
in asserting that all units of time are bodies (SVF 2.665). 
1. έτι may be a relic of an έστι from an earlier, direct discourse account. If the σ 
had already fallen out, a doxographer may have neglected to remove it when he 
changed the account to indirect discourse. It is omitted in one of the MSS. 
APPENDIX ΙΠ 
Cleanthes' Cosmogony 
Stobaeus's summary of Cleanthes' cosmogony is one of the most 
obscure fragments in von Arnim's collection of the Stoic writers (Eel. 
1M[ = DG 210=SVF 1.497]). Because it is the only account of 
Cleanthes' cosmogony, it is very important; and it is therefore worth 
the effort required to make some sense of it, even though the end result 
will be, at best, highly conjectural. One method of making sense of 
this fragment is wholesale emendation, such as that proposed by von 
Arnim.1 This procedure involves the assumption that this small section 
of Stobaeus's text has suffered an above-average amount of corrup­
tion, and what is more, creates as many problems as it removes with­
out producing a clear account. It would seem to be a better procedure 
to attempt to keep the text, if possible, and to try to understand what 
Stobaeus believed Cleanthes to have said. If this reveals contradic­
tions, internal or with other Stoic material, we might suspect, instead 
of textual corruption, a misunderstanding of Cleanthes by Stobaeus or 
his source (Arius Didymus, fr. 38 [=DG 470]). Then perhaps by 
seeking the motive for the misunderstanding we might be able to 
reconstruct the cosmogony that lies behind Stobaeus's summary. 
Even a superficial reading of the fragment reveals two stylistic de­
vices that may serve as guideposts to Stobeaus's meaning. The first is 
an antithesis between Stobaeus's words έκφλογασύέντος τον παντός 
and a similar phrase a few lines later, τον δε παντός έξνγραν­
ϋεντός. We could have expected a μεν in the first phrase, and we can 
only wonder whether its absence is intentional or unintentional. The 
second device is a tripartite series: το μέσον πρώτον, είτα τά 
έχόμενα, and το έσχατον.2 This tripartite series is superimposed on 
the bipartite antithesis. 
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Let us first go through the account guided by the tripartite series. 
"When the All is enflamed,//m the middle sinks together; then the 
next parts are completely quenched. And when the All has become 
wet, the last of the fire. . . .  " So far Stobaeus's meaning is fairly 
clear; he is thinking of a mass of fire undergoing change. The change 
begins at the middle with a process of sinking together (σννίζευν), a 
process that in Stoic texts is frequently associated with the formation of 
earth (cf. SVF 1.104; 2.565). The adjacent parts (τα έχόμενα) are 
subject to the second change, which is a process called quenching 
(άποσβενννσΰαι) and subsequently described by the words: "When 
the all has become wet." This can only describe the formation of 
water.3 Finally Stobaeus speaks of "the last of the fire." In the series 
this can only refer to the outermost sphere of fire, the remainder of the 
fire after earth and water have been formed in the middle. At this point 
Stobaeus becomes unintelligible if we take his words in their literal 
sense. He says that this peripheral fire, "when the middle offers resis­
tance to it [We may well wonder how this is possible with water (τά 
έχόμενα) intervening.] is turned back into the opposite direction [This 
is puzzling, since the fire was not actually in motion]; and when it has 
been so turned, it begins to increase in an upward direction [What a 
surprise! If anything, after a reversal of direction it ought to begin 
moving down, for our account had been proceeding from center to 
periphery.] and begins to arrange [δίακοσμε'ιν] the universe." The 
second part of the account seems suddenly to have lost all contact with 
the first part, and one is tempted to conclude that either the first or the 
second part misinterprets Cleanthes. 
To get at Cleanthes' original intent we may look at the continuation 
of Stobaeus's summary. "The tonos in the matter . . . does not cease 
making [read: ποιονμενον] this sort of continual cycle [περίοδος] 
and arrangement [δυακόσμιησυς]', for as all the parts of a thing grow 
from seeds at appointed times, so also the parts of the whole . . . 
grow at the appointed times; and as certain logoi of the parts, coming 
together into a seed, are mixed and separate out when the parts come to 
be, so all things come from one and one is combined from all, the 
cycle [περίοδος] proceeding harmoniously on its course" (όδώ καϊ 
σνμφώνως). Since this seems to be a generalization of the cosmogonal 
process that Stobaeus has just attempted to describe, we may expect 
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Cleanthes' cosmogony to include a cycle (περίοδος), one motif of 
which will be an alternation between one and many. To identify this 
distinction in Cleanthes' cosmogony, we should remember that 
διακόσμιησις is the technical Stoic term for the cosmos in its present 
state of organization (SVF 2.527, 528, 558; cf. 1.102; 2.597). This 
state, in which the cosmos consists of four elements, is generally 
contrasted to the state of the cosmos during the conflagration, when the 
cosmos consists of only one element—fire (SVF 1.98; 2.596, 618, 
626; cf. 616). Consequently δυακόσμησυς in this passage can be 
expected to refer to that part of the cycle in which the cosmos is 
"many." 
What traces are there of an alternation between the one and the 
δυακόσμησις or many in Stobaeus's cosmogonal summary? At one 
point Stobaeus says, "the fire is turned into the opposite direction 
. . . and begins to arrange [διακοσμέίν] the universe." This should 
be the beginning of multiplicity and διακόσμησις, and the state of the 
cosmos up to this point should have been unity, though the account of 
Stobaeus does not give this impression at all. However, in the or­
thodox Stoic cosmogony,4 we find that fire changes through air into 
water, still remaining a single element; but then from the water earth 
settles out; air is evaporated; and from some of the air, fire is again 
kindled with the result that there are subsequently four elements. This 
account does, indeed, show an alternation between one and many and 
would seem to be a more appropriate example of Cleanthes' gener­
alization that cosmogony marks a transformation from one to many 
than the account Stobaeus assigns to Cleanthes. Moreover, Cleanthes' 
association of "seed" with the "one" is in conformity with the or­
thodox Stoic association of seed with both the primeval fire and the 
primeval water. 
In view of the peculiar appropriateness of Cleanthes' generalizations 
to the orthodox Stoic cosmogony, we might compare Stobaeus's de­
scription of Cleanthes' cosmogony with the orthodox cosmogony to 
see whether Stobaeus is merely giving a distorted account of the or­
thodox cosmogony. The orthodox Stoic cosmogony begins with a 
mass of fire and so does Stobaeus's description (έκφλογυσϋέντος τον 
παντός). In the orthodox cosmogony this fire "changes through air 
into water," at which point only a mass of water is apparent to the 
hypothetical observer. Stobaeus, in contrast, gives two steps, "the 
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middle sinks together" and "the next parts are completely quenched," 
implying separate changes in two different parts of the mass of fire. 
Though this statement conflicts with the orthodox cosmogony, it is 
followed by the summary: "The all having become wet" (τον δε 
παντός έξνγρανΰέντος), a summary more appropriate to a state in 
which the cosmos is totally water (as in the orthodox cosmogony) than 
to the cosmic state implied by Stobaeus with earth at the center, water 
in between, and fire surviving at the periphery. Thus, though 
Stobaeus's account for a moment diverges from the orthodox ac­
count, it returns in the phrase "the all having become wet." 
In the orthodox cosmogony at this point there is a new development: 
The four elements are differentiated and multiplicity enters the cos­
mos. Stobaeus suggests that he found a sharp break at this point too, 
for he uses a genitive absolute that balances the genitive absolute at the 
beginning of the account (έκφλογίσύέντος τον παντός). We men­
tioned earlier that this stylistic device is so prominent that it must be 
intentional, and Stobaeus, or at least his source, must have felt that the 
part of the process following the phrase τον δε παντός έξνγραν­
ϋέντος in some way balanced the process described up to this point. 
Since the latter part of the fragment attests the importance of the 
one-many symmetry in Cleanthes' cosmogony, it would not be surpris­
ing to learn that Cleanthes' actual account counterpoised the two parts 
of the cosmogonal process as a manifestation of this symmetry 
Stobaeus's stylistic device may well be a reflection of a symmetry 
stressed by Cleanthes himself. Stobaeus goes on to say that the fire 
begins to cause δυακόσμιησις in the cosmos. We have already men­
tioned that διακόσμησις refers to the arrangement of the present 
cosmos, of which the first step is the differentiation of the four ele­
ments. Hence this word most likely corresponds to the differentiation 
of elements from the water in the orthodox account. 
Thus it is possible to find statements in Stobaeus's summary that 
seem to reflect the orthodox Stoic cosmogony. But if Cleanthes gave 
the orthodox cosmogony, we are forced to ask why Stobaeus did not 
give it to us in simple words, as he did under Zeno's name (SVF 
1.102). The answer may be that Cleanthes elaborated on Zeno's simple 
statement. What Zeno had presented in a single volume On the Uni­
verse
5
 Cleanthes restated in two books On the Natural Science of Zeno 
{SVF 1.481). Cleanthes' elaboration of Zeno's doctrine may have intro­
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duced ideas that misled Stobaeus or his source. We have already hinted 
at one new idea that Cleanthes incorporated into the cosmogony, name­
ly, a contrast between the one and the many in the two halves of the pro­
cess. It may also be possible to detect other elaborations that might 
have misled a careless reader. Stobaeus tells us that Cleanthes refers to 
the eternal cycle of the cosmogonal process as τον εν ΤΎ) των όλων 
ουσία τόνον. The role of the tonos is one of the most perplexing 
problems in Stoic physics. Cleanthes describes the tonos as a "blow of 
fire" (πληγή πυρός, SVF 1.563). For the significance of this 
"blow" in cosmogony, we must rely on a single unsatisfactory frag­
ment from pseudo-Censorinus, in which it is said that the Stoics hold 
that the archai are tenor ( = τόνος) and matter. The tonos is said to be 
that which stretches from the middle to the periphery when matter 
becomes rare, and which returns again from the periphery to the mid­
dle when matter contracts.6 A few lines later the author of this state­
ment mentions Cleanthes and Chrysippus as among the sources from 
which his material is derived, so it is not impossible that this statement 
represents the view of Cleanthes. The idea that this tonos moves from 
the middle to the periphery and again from the periphery to the middle 
is the generalized idea of the tonos (SVF 2.451); but two things in this 
fragment point to a cosmogonal application. First of all, the subject 
matter is the archai; and, second, the tonos is interpreted as condensa­
tion and rarefaction of matter. This fragment suggests that tonos in 
matter is a process of condensation and rarefaction. The same thing is 
suggested by Simplicius (=SVF 2.452), who in obvious reference to 
the tonos (compare with SVF 2.451) says the Stoics believe in a 
"rarefying and condensing movement" (κίνησιν την μανωτικην 
και πυκνωτικήν), which moves in and out. 
A number of fragments suggest that the Stoic cosmic cycle was 
viewed as a process of contraction and expansion, of condensation and 
rarefaction. Aetius says the cosmos expands and contracts (SVF 
2.597, cf. 615). Dio Chrysostom's mythological cosmogony says that 
before the cosmogony begins, the primeval mind (equivalent to fire) is 
"equally distributed, with nothing dense left in it, but with rareness 
reigning everywhere" (SVF 2.622). Presumably cosmogony involves 
condensation. Philo and Plutarch stress the fact that the seed of the 
cosmos, unlike that of other living things, is larger than the full-grown 
offspring and the cosmogony begins with contraction and quenching 
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(SVF 2.618, 619). The words used of the process are στελλεσΰαι, 
παχννεσΰαι, and significantly, σννίζειν (SVF 2.619). The idea that 
elemental change involves contraction and expansion can be traced 
back as far as Chrysippus (SVF 2.413), and there is no reason why 
Cleanthes could not have expressed this idea in his cosmogony. Thus it 
seems wholly reasonable to assume that Cleanthes elaborated on 
Zeno's cosmogony by introducing the concept of cyclical contraction 
and expansion, which he designated by the term "tonos." The first 
half of the cosmogony was probably viewed as a progressive contrac­
tion and quenching, in which fire changed to air and from air to water; 
and ultimately some even contracted so much as to become earth. The 
second half of the cosmogony, in which, after earth had settled out, air 
evaporated from the water, and fire was kindled from the air, was 
probably viewed as an expansion, the beginning of the process that 
will ultimately convert all matter into fire again. 
If Cleanthes attempted to describe this idea in his elaborated version 
of Zeno's cosmogony, Stobaeus's misinterpretation becomes explica­
ble. What Cleanthes may have described as a contraction toward the 
middle (presumably into air), Stobaeus summarized as "the middle 
first sank together" (σννίζειν). The use of σννίζειν for the contrac­
tion of fire into air is attested by Seneca (QNat 3.13.1, ignem . . . 
evanidum languentemque considere [= σννίζειν]) and by Philo (net. 
Mund. 110, σννίζοντος μεν πυρός κατά ττ\ν σβέσιν εις αέρα).7 
Cleanthes' next stage, complete conversion into water, was sum­
marized by Stobaeus with the words, "then the next parts are com­
pletely quenched." What for Cleanthes were successive changes of the 
entire mass of matter were interpreted by Stobaeus as changes in 
different parts of the mass of matter. However, his interpretation was 
not carried out consistently, and Cleanthes' idea that the whole mass 
becomes water shows through in the words "completely quenched" 
and "the all having become water." 
At this point Stobaeus speaks of the "last" (εσχατον) of the fire. 
He is apparently thinking of the fire at the outer periphery. Having 
spoken of the "middle" and the "next parts," it is only natural that he 
would pass on to the material that still remained at the periphery. What 
could have misled him into thinking Cleanthes was talking of the 
peripheral fire at this point? When the material of the cosmos had 
turned into water, the orthodox account stated that fire is "left remain­
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ing" (νπολιπεσϋαι, SVF 2.580; cf. έναπολειφϋε~ισαν, SVF 
2.605) in the wet. It is this fire "left remaining" that is presumably 
responsible for the subsequent elemental transformations, the devel­
opment of the four elements, and the present world order. If Cleanthes 
also spoke of fire "left remaining," it is not impossible that Stobaeus 
or his source, already on the wrong track in thinking the cosmogony 
proceeded from center to surrounding water, simply assumed this re­
ferred to some remaining peripheral fire.8 
According to Stobaeus, "the middle offers resistance to the fire" 
and causes it to reverse its direction. The orthodox account at this point 
states that "earth settles out" and then goes on to describe the forma­
tion of air and fire from the water. It has already been observed that the 
elemental transformation of fire to earth was viewed as a contraction 
and the reverse transformation as an expansion. Perhaps Cleanthes 
imagined the cosmic fire to be a resilient material compressed to the 
point of maximum density and then springing back to its original size. 
If so, Stobaeus's summary is entirely appropriate. 
Stobaeus then assigns three activities to the "last fire." This fire 
"turns into the opposite direction, namely upward," "begins to in­
crease," and "begins to arrange [διακοσμεϊν] the universe." In the 
orthodox account after the fire has changed through air into water, and 
after earth has settled out of water, the elemental transformation begins 
operating in the opposite direction. Some of the water remains around 
the earth; the rest of it evaporates into air; and from this air, fire is 
again kindled. Moreover, this elemental transformation from earth to 
fire is viewed as expansion and increase. Finally, the development of 
the four elements is considered the beginning of the δίακόσμησις. 
Hence all three activities of Stobaeus's "last fire" could be derived 
from the orthodox Stoic cosmogony 
In support of this hypothetical reconstruction of Cleanthes' cos­
mogony, we may cite Stobaeus's summary of Chrysippus, which man­
ifests some of the very conceptions we have reconstructed for 
Cleanthes (SVF 2.413). Chrysippus maintains that fire is the element 
par excellence because the others consist of fire by transformation (διά 
το εξ OLVTOV πρώτον τά λοιπά σννίστασΰαι κατά μεταβολήν). 
He explains what he means by giving a summary of elemental trans­
formation: "The first transformation is from fire to air by contraction 
[κατά σνστασιν], the second from air into water, the third when 
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water contracts [συνισταμένου] still more into earth. Then again 
from earth, being dissolved and melted, there is first a pouring into 
water, then a second from water into air, and a third and last into fire." 
Then Chrysippus goes on to summarize the process by saying that this 
fiery substance "moves down to the turning point [τροπή] and from 
the turning point up in a complete circle, absorbing all things into itself 
and from itself again restoring all things in an appointed sequence 
[τεταγμένως καϊ όδω]." The vocabulary of the last sentence suggests 
that the whole fragment has a cosmogonal reference.9 As in our recon­
structed cosmogony of Cleanthes, Chrysippus views cosmogony as a 
series of successive changes of a single element (fire), thinks of the 
process underlying these changes as contraction and expansion, and 
views the cosmogonal process as a symmetrical cycle, proceeding 
from fire to earth and back to fire again.1  0 
With the fragment of Chrysippus giving us confidence that we have 
not gone too far astray, we may sum up what Cleanthes may have 
written in his cosmogony. It would seem that Cleanthes elaborated 
somewhat on Zeno's simple cosmogony to bring out points that Zeno 
had not emphasized. Cleanthes tried to stress the physical process 
involved in elemental change, namely contraction and expansion. He 
also seems to have viewed the process as a symmetrical cycle of 
elemental transformations, from fire to air to water to earth and then in 
the opposite direction up to fire again. This cycle was then described as 
a tonos-cycle and also as an alternation between one and many, be­
tween seed and offspring, and between a single element and διακόσ­
μησες. Stobaeus, or the doxographers who transmitted this material to 
him, misunderstood this complex synthesis of motifs and tried to make 
of the physical description of the cosmogony a simple process, begin­
ning with earth, continuing with water, and concluding with fire, 
unaware that air is left unaccounted for. 
1. SVF 1.497. His translation and interpretation of the amended text are found in 
"Kleanthes," RE 11 (1921): 563-64. J. D. Meerwaldt, "Cleanthea," Mnemosyne, 
4th ser. 4 (1951): 46-47, has pointed out a few of the many inadequacies in von 
Arnim's interpretation and emendations. Meerwaldt's first objection, based on the 
presumed influence of Heraclitus, DK 22 Β 31, on the Stoic cosmogony, is unfortu­
nate; but it conceals a valid objection to von Arnim's interpretation. Even though we 
cannot a priori assume that Cleanthes would not propose a cosmogony at variance with 
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Heraclitus, we can assume (at least, if there is no evidence to the contrary) that as a 
devoted student of Zeno (cf. SVF 1.463, 599), he would not propose a cosmogony at 
variance with Zeno. Meerwaldt's own discussion of this text, 47-53, is the best 
discussion I know of. However, he too resorts to some emendation; he deletes τον 
πυρός in the third line and reads τον δε παντός έξνγρανΰέντος το εσχατον [τον 
πυρός], άντιτνπήσαντος, etc. Moreover, his imaginative speculations about the 
nature of the tonos and its role in the cosmogony go too far beyond the extant texts. Cf. 
also the discussion of J. Moreau, L'ame du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens (Paris, 
1939), 170-73. 
2. Von Arnim's emendation είτα (κατά) τά έχόμενα destroys the series. Meer­
waldt (above, note 1), esp. 47-48, 52, attaches no significance to this series. Indeed, 
by deleting τον πνρός and by understanding το εσχατον with τον παντός έξνγραν­
ύέντος, Meerwaldt refers το εσχατον to an entirely different subject (i.e., the cos­
mos in its wet state) from that of the first two members of this series (successive stages 
in the change of fire to air). 
3. Meerwaldt (above, note 1), 47-48, interprets these first two changes as succes­
sive stages in the conversion of fire to air. Though he cites a parallel from Philo Aet. 
Mund. 110 for the use of σννίζειν and σβεσις for the formation of air, his main 
reason for the interpretation is undoubtedly the reluctance to allow Cleanthes' cos­
mogony to begin in the middle (i.e., with earth), even before the completely wet stage 
has been reached. In addition, however, this interpretation fits his highly speculative 
hypothesis (pages 49-51) that since the outward-moving tonic motion is responsible 
for qualities, qualification itself begins at the center and proceeds outward. 
4. By orthodox Stoic cosmogony I mean the cosmogony described above in Chap­
ter 3. 
5. It seems likely that Zeno wrote only this one book on physics (see Appendix 1). 
6. Fr. 1 (p. 55, Hultsch), absent from SVF. "Ea [scil. principia] Stoici credunt 
tenorem atque materiam; tenorem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summam, 
eadem concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad mediam." 
7. Meerwaldt (above, note 1), 47-48, agrees this phrase refers to the formation of 
air, but he goes further and takes the next phrase to refer to the same process (see 
above, note 3). 
8. E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, trans. O. J. Reichel (London, 
1880), 162, note 2, tries to make the term εσχατον itself designate the remaining fire. 
For this he was taken to task by R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophi­
schen Schriften (Leipzig, 1882), 2.128-31. 
9. "Absorbing (καταναλίσκει) everything into itself" is Chrysippus's expres­
sion for what occurs in the conflagration (SVF 2.604, cf. 1.536 [=2.1049]; 2.526, 
599). "Restoring (άποκαΰιστάναι) all things again" is the Stoic description of the 
restoration (SVF 2.599, 625). 
10. Notice, too, the similarity of the last sentence of each account. Cleanthes: 
όντως εξ ενός τε πάντα 'γίνεσ'&αι και εκ πάντων εν σνγκρίνεσύαι, όδω καϊ 
σνμφώνως διεξίονσ-ης της περώδον (SVF 1.497). Chrysippus: εϊς αντην τε 
πάντα καταναλίσκονσα κα\ αφ1 αντ-ης πάλιν άποκαΰιστάσα τεταγμένως 
καϊόδώ (SVF 2.413). 
APPENDIX IV 
Accounts of the Stoic Proofs for the 
Immobility and Coherence of the Cosmos 
Several accounts of Stoic theories of the immobility, coherence, and 
physical structure of the universe are so similar as to suggest they come 
from a single source or a closely related set of sources. Their relation­
ship can be seen most clearly if they are arranged in parallel columns. 
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Most striking is the correspondence between Arius Didymus, fr. 23 
( = SVF 1.99), and Achilles. Nearly all elements of Arius's account 
appear in Achilles, though not consecutively. Furthermore, the first 
argument (A) occurs in very similar words in Cicero Nat. D. 2.115­
16, thereby linking the three accounts. Nearly as striking is the corre­
spondence between the description of the cosmos in Cicero and in 
Arius Didymus, fr. 31 ( = SVF 2.527). In both accounts the parts of the 
cosmos are enumerated, beginning with the earth and working up to 
the periphery. Then, when the accounts begin to enumerate the 
heavenly bodies, they start with the fixed stars and work down to the 
moon. The same order of enumeration is found, but without detail, in 
Achilles' version of the first argument (A). The link between Achilles 
and Stobaeus is further strengthened by the fact that Arius Didymus, fr. 
31 (=SVF 2. 527), does not stop enumerating parts of the cosmos 
when he reaches the heavenly bodies, but continues down again to 
earth, thereby repeating the parts of the cosmos, this time in the same 
order in which Achilles enumerates them in his version of the second 
argument (B). Thus there are correspondences linking Arius Didymus 
(fr. 23), Achilles, and Cicero, and other correspondences linking 
Achilles, Cicero, and Arius Didymus (fr. 31). This fact suggests all 
four texts are somehow related. 
The relationship is complicated, however, by the fact that the mate­
rial is assigned to two different authors, Zeno and Chrysippus, and 
used for three different purposes. Arius Didymus, fr. 23, assigns both 
arguments to Zeno as proofs for the immobility of the cosmos. Achil­
les uses the first argument (A) without attribution as proof for the 
immobility of the cosmos, and the second argument (B), which he 
attributes to Chrysippus, as a description of the arrangement of the 
cosmos, even though his text makes it absolutely clear that it is another 
proof for the immobility of the cosmos. Cicero preserves only the first 
argument (A), but uses it to prove the coherence, not the immobility, 
of the cosmos. Finally, Arius Didymus, fr. 31, attributes an account 
somewhat similar to that of Cicero to Chrysippus and uses it as a 
descriptionof the arrangement of the cosmos. 
These data do not hold much promise of supporting a firm, detailed 
hypothesis of their origin. We may surmise that Zeno originated the 
argument for the immobility of the cosmos along the lines of Arius 
Didymus, fr. 23 ( = SVF 1.99). Whether it contained a detailed de­
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scription of the parts of the cosmos, we cannot say. Chrysippus pre­
served at least the second of Zeno's arguments, most likely with a 
description of the parts of the cosmos (Achilles Isagoge 4[=SVF 
2.555]). Whether he preserved the first argument, we do not know for 
sure. We do know, however, that he used a similar argument to prove 
the coherence of the cosmos in the void (SVF 2.550), and that he 
enumerated the parts of the cosmos in the order that is characteristic of 
the first argument (Arius Didymus, fr. 3l[=SVF 2.527]). It is quite 
possible, therefore, that he did preserve the first argument, either as 
proof for the immobility of the cosmos or as proof for its coherence (in 
the manner of Cicero Nat. D. 2.115-19), or for both purposes at once. 
That he also wrote a separate description of the arrangement of the 
cosmos, using the same basic ideas, is not impossible, but even harder 
to prove than that he used the first argument (A). Arius Didymus, fr. 
31 (=SVF 1.527), is obviously an anthology of statements drawn from 
various contexts and so is weak evidence for the original context of any 
of its information. It could easily be the result of a doxographer's 
sifting of a text similar to that used by Cicero. Achilles (Isagoge 
4[=SVF 2.555]) obviously used Chrysippus's argument for the immo­
bility of the cosmos as a substitute for a description of its arrangement; 
Arius Didymus may have done something similar. Such a procedure 
may also account for the fact that his enumeration of parts runs from 
earth to periphery and back again to earth. Thus, though we may trace 
the ancestry of these texts back to several closely related discussions 
by Zeno and Chrysippus, we cannot trace precisely the steps by which 
Zeno's argument was expanded and adapted by Chrysippus and sub­
sequently repeated and abridged by Arius Didymus, Cicero, and Achil­
les. 
APPENDIX V 
Chrysippus's Statement on the

Alleged Imperishability of the Cosmos

In On the Contradictions of the Stoics Plutarch preserves a verbatim 
quotation of Chrysippus that purportedly shows Chrysippus believed 
the infinite void has a center at which the cosmos is located (Stoic. 
Repug. 1054c-d[=SFF 2.551]). Since this idea contradicts all other 
Stoic testimony on the subject, modern interpreters either have had to 
share Plutarch's charge of contradiction (though not the delight with 
which he made the charge),1 or have had to explain away the evidence. 
Pohlenz has assumed Plutarch has simply misinterpreted a text torn out 
of context and that Chrysippus really must have meant that the move­
ment of all parts of the cosmos toward the middle of the cosmos 
accounts for its incorruptibility.2 Furley goes even further by para­
phrasing Chrysippus's statement to say, "If matter were not arranged 
around the center, the cosmos would be destroyed." Furley concludes, 
"Chrysippus probably meant that matter must be evenly distributed or 
balanced around its own center."3 It is true that Plutarch is here 
quoting out of context and in addition must, as a general rule, be 
suspected of misrepresentation; but in the present case he purports to 
quote verbatim, and Chrysippus's words say that the incorruptibility is 
due to "the occupancy of space" (ή της χώρας κατάληφις) and that 
the cosmos is "in the middle" (εν μέσω είναι), "occupies the mid­
dle place" (τον μέσον κατευληφνία τόπον), and is not "anywhere 
else" (άλλαχή). Chrysippus's Greek text is not transparently clear, 
but it is hard to see how anyone can think that by these words Chrysip­
pus is referring to motion toward the middle of the cosmos or to the 
even distribution and balance of matter around its own center. 
This is not to say that we must accept Plutarch's charge of contradic­
tion, for there is a ready explanation in the very words quoted by 
Plutarch. Plutarch introduces the quotation by telling us this statement 
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on the imperishability of the cosmos occurred not in one of Chrysip­
pus's physical works, but in the fourth book of the work entitled On 
Things Possible (περί δυνατών), a treatise that is cataloged among 
Chrysippus's logical works by Diogenes Laertius (SVF 2.13[ = page 
5.22]), and that seems to have discussed Chrysippus's definition of the 
possible as "that which is capable of occurring, even if it never will 
occur" (SVF 2.202, cf. 283). This should be a clue to Chrysippus's 
approach in the words quoted; and so when we hear Chrysippus an­
nounce a discussion of the question whether the cosmos is perishable, 
we can expect a discussion of the applicability of the term "perisha­
ble" in the light of Chrysippus's theory of possibility. This is right in 
the tradition set by Aristotle. In On the Heavens Aristotle takes up the 
very same question and after a lengthy" semantic discussion rejects the 
thesis that the cosmos may be called perishable because this statement 
does not conform to his definition of the perishable as that which either 
existed formerly, but exists no longer, or exists now, but will not exist 
at some time in the future (Cael. 1.12.281a28-b33). To Aristotle the 
cosmos cannot be called perishable because perishability is incompati­
ble with eternal existence (esp. Cael. 1.12.281b34-282al). 
Knowing the context of Chrysippus's remarks and the history of the 
problem, we are in a position to face Chrysippus's actual words: 
"Therefore with respect to the cosmos, I believe there is need for 
discussion whether it ought to be called perishable [φϋαρτός]. 
Nevertheless, it appears all the more to me to be so [ov μην άλλα και 
μάλλον έμόι φαίνεται όντως εχειν]." The first sentence is clear 
enough, but the second calls for comment. At first glance it appears 
insignificant, but a little examination shows it to be a crucial link in 
Chrysippus's exposition, without which the following words can easily 
be misconstrued. The first question we may ask is what Chrysippus 
means by " i t appears to be so." Since όντως normally refers to 
something already mentioned, we must assume Chrysippus means that 
the cosmos appears to him to be corruptible. We must avoid the temp­
tation to take it in the sense of "as follows" (which would be ώδε) 
unless other factors compel us to take this course. The second question 
is what Chrysippus intended to convey by the string of particles ov 
μην αλλά. Denniston says ov μην αλλά generally introduces a 
statement that cannot be denied, even though there are strong argu­
ments to the contrary.4 Thus we may paraphrase Chrysippus's second 
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sentence as follows: "Even though there are substantial arguments for 
claiming the cosmos is not perishable, I am convinced all the more 
[after considering these counterarguments] that the cosmos is indeed 
perishable." If this is his intent, we may well expect him to marshal 
some arguments against his position. 
In the next sentence he says: "As if [οιονεί] for the seeming 
[ώσπερ] imperishability any great contribution is rendered even by the 
occupancy of space—I mean because of the fact that it is in the middle, 
since if it were imagined to be anywhere else, destruction would lay 
hold of it entirely." Plutarch omits the next part of the argument and 
then concludes with a quotation from further on: "For thus I suppose 
also the substance by coincidence [σνντετενχεν] occupies the middle 
place eternally, so that, because of that coincidence [δυά την σνν­
τνχίαν] as well as for other reasons, it is not capable of destruction and 
accordingly is eternal." These are the sentences, of course, that 
Plutarch wishes to use to show Chrysippus believed the void has a 
middle; but there are numerous indications that this argument is not 
Chrysippus's own argument but a counterargument that Chrysippus 
must refute to establish his own thesis that the cosmos is perishable. 
Chrysippus indicates his lack of sympathy with this argument by intro­
ducing it with "as i  f (οιονεί),5 by calling the incorruptibility "seem­
ing incorruptibility" (ώσπερ άφ&αρσίαν), by the reluctance of the 
"  I suppose" (πως) with which he concludes that the substance oc­
cupies the middle position eternally, and finally by his emphasis on the 
coincidence of the position of substance in space (σνντετενχεν . . . 
δίά την ο-νντνχίαν). 
If this is merely an opposing argument that Chrysippus himself 
rejects, there is no contradiction between Chrysippus's own cosmolog­
ical views and the reference to a middle of the void in this argument. 
Yet Plutarch could protest in defense of his charge of contradiction that 
Chrysippus is going along with the argument to a certain extent. "I 
suppose" (πως) may suggest reluctant acquiescence, but it is still 
acquiescence. Unfortunately, Plutarch's interpretation cannot be re­
futed with certainty as long as we do not have the full context of these 
quotations. From our knowledge of the general context and history of 
the problem we can make a guess how Chrysippus might have handled 
the discussion. Aristotle had refused to apply the term "perishable" to 
the cosmos because there never would be a time at which the cosmos 
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would not exist. For him eternity entailed imperishability. Chrysippus, 
however, subscribed to a different definition of the possible, as 
Plutarch points out a few pages later. Chrysippus maintained that 
something may be possible, even if it will never occur (SVF 2.202), 
and so even "that which neither is nor will be true is yet possible" 
(S VF 2.283). Hence Chrysippus could grant that the cosmos will never 
be destroyed and yet maintain that the term "perishable" is applicable 
to the cosmos. All he had to prove was that the cosmos is capable 
(επιδεκτικός) of being destroyed. To refute Chrysippus an opponent 
had to prove that the cosmos is not capable of being destroyed.6 The 
eternity of the cosmos is irrelevant. 
The precise logic of the counterargument that Chrysippus presents is 
unclear from the two sentences preserved by Plutarch. It clearly at­
tempted to deduce imperishability from the position of the cosmos at 
the center of the void, but how it made this deduction and what physi­
cal principles were believed to be involved we do not know. In fact, it 
is doubtful that Chrysippus discussed the physical principles behind 
the argument, because Plutarch relies on these very sentences to de­
duce a theory that all parts of the cosmos have a movement toward the 
center of the void, a movement that would destroy the cosmos if the 
cosmos were not at the center (Stoic. Repug. 1054d-e). But the logic 
of the argument is of less importance than Chrysippus's line of refuta­
tion. It looks as if Chrysippus did not attack the presupposition that the 
void has a center, but rather the assumption that the position of the 
cosmos at the center necessarily entails the imperishability of the cos­
mos. In Chrysippus's view the position of the cosmos is at best a 
contributing cause (avvepye't) and then not even of genuine incorrup­
tibility, but of a seeming incorruptibility (ώσπερ άφΰαρσίαν). 
Moreover, Chrysippus was willing to grant that the substance or matter 
(ονσϊα) of the cosmos might occupy the middle eternally; but he 
insisted that this position was a coincidence (ςτνντέτενχεν) and again 
at best a contributing factor (σνντνχία), along with some other cause, 
for the fact that the substance of the cosmos is incapable of destruction 
and hence eternal. Thus when Chrysippus gets to the crucial point 
whether the cosmos is or is not capable of destruction, he allows the 
counterargument to provide only a coincidental cause, not the real 
cause, and, what is more, to prove incapability of destruction only of 
the substance or matter (ουσία) of the cosmos. This is considerably 
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less than Chrysippus requires to justify the conclusion that the cosmos 
per se is incorruptible. 
If we turn to other sources we find that the word "cosmos" had 
several meanings for the Stoics. On the one hand, it could refer to the 
whole mass of qualified matter (ουσία) that constitutes our world. The 
cosmos, in the sense of cosmic material, is indeed imperishable and 
eternal (SVF 2.526, cf. 528, 599). The word could also refer to this 
particular world order and arrangement of elements. Since this world 
order is fated to perish at some time in the future, the cosmos, in the 
sense of world order, is perishable.7 Arius Didymus observes that 
Stoic references to the destruction of the cosmos use the word "de­
struction" in a special sense: "From these things it is clear that in 
referring to the substance [ουσία] Chrysippus did not use 'ruin' [cnry­
χυσίς] in this sense, but in the sense of 'change' [μεταβολή]. For 
those who believe in the dissolution of everything into fire, which they 
call 'conflagration,' do not use 'destruction' [φ&ορά] in the strict 
sense when referring to the periodic destruction of the cosmos, but 
they use the word 'destruction' in place of 'natural change' [ή κατά 
φυσιν μεταβολή]" (fr. 36[SVF 2.596]). Arius Didymus confirms 
that Chrysippus and the Stoics in general spoke of the ruin or destruc­
tion of the cosmos. By this they did not mean the cosmos goes out of 
existence; they meant it undergoes change. This is the same belief 
reflected in the two senses of the word "cosmos." The substance of 
the cosmos never perishes, but its form is constantly being altered and 
so perishing. Eventually in the final conflagration this alteration will 
involve the dissolution of everything into fire. 
From this it is clear that Chrysippus would have insisted that there is 
a sense in which the cosmos must be considered capable of destruction; 
and so even if he grants that the matter (ουσία) of the cosmos is 
imperishable, he is not forced to say absolutely that the cosmos is 
imperishable. The counterargument based on the alleged position of 
the cosmos in the middle of the void proves, at best, that the cosmos in 
one sense (i.e., ουσία) is imperishable; and even this is not proven 
very conclusively, since it uses as a premise what is at best a coinci­
dence. Thus we can understand why Chrysippus would consider the 
proof he quotes as inadequate to shake his position that the cosmos 
must be called corruptible. 
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If this is, in fact, the way Chrysippus handled the counterargument, 
we need not worry about the fact that he apparently grants the presup­
position of a middle in the infinite void. Chrysippus may well have 
been planning to use the counterargument for his own advantage, as he 
suggests in the statement, "Nevertheless it appears all the more to be 
so [i.e., corruptible]." Had he simply rejected the opposing argument 
on the grounds of an invalid premise, as he was entitled to do, he 
would have had to build his own case from the bottom. As it is, he has 
not only refuted the opponent's conclusion but has shown that the 
opponent's assumptions lead to his own position, at least in part. For 
his opponent's argument demonstrates only what Chrysippus himself 
also believes, namely, that the matter of the cosmos is incorruptible. 
Chrysippus may now go on to prove that the particular arrangement of 
this matter that we call our cosmos is capable of changing and there­
fore qualifies for the description "perishable." A parallel for this sort 
of dialectical procedure can be found in Aristotle's proof of the im­
perishability of the cosmos. Aristotle begins his proof by considering 
the views of his opponents; but instead of refuting and dismissing 
them, he shows that, properly understood, they confirm his own view. 
Democritus, Empedocles, and Heraclitus, all of whom reportedly be­
lieved the cosmos to be generated and perishable, are used by Aristotle 
as logical stepping stones to the view that the cosmos is eternal, with 
no attempt to refute all the un-Aristotelian cosmological presupposi­
tions embodied in their views.8 
In conclusion, the words quoted by Plutarch to prove Chrysippus 
guilty of contradiction fail to substantiate the charge. They may reveal 
something about Chrysippus's technique of argumentation, but they 
shed no new light on his cosmological views. 
1. E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, trans. O. J. Reichel (London, 
1880), 203, note 5. 
2. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung3 (Gottingen, 
1964), 1.77. 
3. D. J. Furley, "Lucretius and the Stoics," BICS 13 (1966): 20-21. 
4. J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles2 (Oxford, 1954), 28. 
5. M. Pohlenz, ed., Plutarchi Moralia2, vol. 6, fasc. 2 (Leipzig, 1959), 51, 
emends the text to οία re . . . avvepye~t,i>, which gives the meaning, " T h  e occu­
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pancy of space can help a great deal for the seeming incorruptibility," and therefore 
brings it into conformity with Plut. Def. Or 425d, where Plutarch definitely makes 
Chrysippus himself subscribe to the argument and where Plutarch mentions οιονεί 
άφΰαρσίαν instead of ώσπερ άφ&αρσίαν. But Plutarch's obviously hostile in­
terpretations can give one little confidence in emending a text that Plutarch quotes only 
to ridicule. The received text may well be correct as it stands and Plutarch's indirect 
quotation in Def. Or inaccurate and misleading. 
6. Chrysippus's definition of "impossible" is not recorded, but "not capable of 
being true" is certainly a good conjecture. At least, this is the definition given by some 
Stoic, as Diodes Magnes attests (SVF 2.201). 
7. SVF 2.526, 585. That this distinction goes back to Chrysippus can be inferred 
from its presence in SVF 2.527. 
8. For a more detailed discussion of his procedure see Chapter 6. 
APPENDIX VI 
Cleanthes' Proof for the

Intelligence of the Cosmos

Cicero's summary of Cleanthes' proof that the cosmos is wise (sa­
piens, Nat. D. 2.29-30) presents several difficulties, which have long 
puzzled interpreters.1 First of all, it has only a tenuous connection with 
what precedes it. Cicero states: "There is, therefore, a substance 
which holds together the whole cosmos and preserves it; and this 
substance is not without sensation and reason." The only supposition 
he seems to take from his previous argument is that a preserving 
substance exists in the cosmos. He nowhere in the section states what it 
is, though we may surmise that it is the heat. Then from the bare 
existence of a sustaining substance he sets out to prove that this sub­
stance has sensation and reason. The argument never gets off the 
ground. He begins by introducing a new concept, the ruling principle 
or hegemonikon, and explains that anything that is not simple has a 
ruling principle. After a few examples he states that the substance in 
which the principle exists is most worthy of authority and domination. 
This grand introduction prefaces a surprisingly flimsy argument. Since 
sensation and reason are present in parts of the cosmos, that part in 
which the ruling principle exists must possess sense and reason, and 
these in a greater degree. From this the conclusion is drawn that "the 
cosmos is intelligent and the substance which holds all things in its 
embrace excels in the perfection of reason." This is hardly an argu­
ment to convince skeptics; we are not given even the slightest clue to 
the identity of the ruling principle or the substance in which it exists. 
Furthermore, why should we believe that because some parts of the 
cosmos (we immediately think of men) have sensation and reason, 
therefore another part, namely, the one that contains the ruling princi­
ple, should also have it? We can only conclude that Cicero has omitted 
something and perhaps also distorted the argument.2 
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Fortunately, enough remains to guess what has been omitted. We 
know where the argument is heading, for it concludes with the state­
ment that the cosmos is intelligent. It appears that the argument led up 
to this conclusion by proving that the substance that sustains the cos­
mos also has sensation and reason. We also know that one aspect of the 
proof was a syllogism reasoning from parts. As it stands the syllogism 
reasons from certain parts to another part; but if we assume the syl­
logism was originally more cogent, we might guess that it was a 
syllogism from parts to whole, like the syllogism used by Zeno and by 
Cleanthes in the previous proof. If so, and if the argument seeks to 
prove that the sustaining substance has sense and reason, Cicero's 
summary must have omitted a section that proves parts of the sustain­
ing substance have sense and reason. To do this the argument is going 
to have to tell us what the sustaining substance is and what its parts are; 
and if it is not self-evident, there must be a proof that the alleged parts 
are, in fact, parts of the sustaining substance. Moreover, the elaborate 
introduction of the concept of the ruling principle suggests that the 
ruling principle should be one of the parts of the sustaining substance 
and perhaps the part on which much of the argument is based. 
Having compiled a list of desiderata, we may begin searching for the 
missing parts of the argument. The easiest part to find is the identity of 
the ruling principle. Clean thes tells us that the ruling principle is that 
part "which must and ought to have supremacy in any thing; and so it 
is necessary that the substance which contains the ruling principle of 
all nature is the best of all and most worthy of authority and domina­
tion over all things" (omnium rerum potestate dominatuque dignis­
simum, Nat. D. 2.29). In Academica 2.126 (=SVF 1.499) Cicero 
obligingly tells us that Cleanthes believed ' 'the sun has domination and 
authority over things" (solem dominari et rerum potiri). Thus the sun 
must be the ruling principle of the cosmos, and several ancient authors 
assure us that Cleanthes did, in fact, hold this view (SVF 1.499). With 
this piece of information we may begin to fill the gap in the argument. 
If the sun is to serve as the part from which to draw inferences about 
the whole sustaining substance, we must be made to see that the sun is 
a part of the sustaining substance, which we already know to be the 
vital heat, but whose identity the reader of the argument theoretically 
does not yet know. By a fortunate coincidence Cicero preserves a 
quotation from Cleanthes that does this very thing. Cleanthes proves 
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that the sun is made of fire by the evidence of the senses of sight and 
touch, for the sun is brighter than any earthly fire and it warms, yes, 
even burns, the flesh. Light and warmth can come only from fire. But 
there are two kinds of fire. The fire we use is a destroyer and consumer 
of all things, whereas the vital and health-giving fire of the body 
preserves, nourishes, makes grow, sustains, and gives sensation to all 
things. Since the sun makes things flower and bear fruit, it must be 
similar to the fire in living animals (Nat. D. 2.40-41 [=SVF 1.504]). 
This fragment, after proving that the ruling principle of the cosmos 
consists of vital heat and is therefore a part of the substance that 
sustains the cosmos, goes on to say that because the sun's fire is 
similar to the fire in living things, the sun must itself be a living thing 
and other heavenly bodies similarly (Nat. D. 2.41). 
This fragment almost fills the gap in the argument.3 We now have 
some living animals that have been proven to be parts of the substance 
that sustains the cosmos. All we still need is proof that the sun and the 
heavenly bodies have sensation and reason. This is no small order and 
there are no more fragments under Cleanthes' name that can help us. 
But since Cicero has been so generous in helping us fill out the argu­
ment, we may still have hope that he will yield the rest. 
Cicero gives us Cleanthes' proof that the sun is an animal in the 
context of a longer proof for the divinity of the heavenly bodies. 
However, he introduces the section by saying that "the heavenly 
bodies are rightly said to be living animals possessing sensation and 
intelligence" (ea quoque rectissime et animantia esse et sentire atque 
intellegere dicantur, Nat. D. 2.39); and even though the argument 
directly attributed to Cleanthes proves only that the heavenly bodies 
are alive, Cicero follows it up with other proofs that the heavenly 
bodies also possess sensation and reason. Proof that the heavenly 
bodies possess sensation and reason is precisely what is needed to fill 
out Cleanthes' argument. If Cicero's whole discussion of the heavenly 
bodies (Nat. D. 2.40-44) were inserted into the argument of Nat. D. 
2.29-30, a perfectly reasonable proof would result. Is there any evi­
dence that the whole discussion came from Cleanthes? Cicero treats it 
as a single, unified whole, with one proof that the heavenly bodies are 
living (animantes) and then two proofs that they possess sensation and 
intelligence. The first proof that the heavenly bodies have sensation 
and intelligence depends on the premise that they are born and live 
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their lives in the aether. This proof, therefore, depends on Cleanthes' 
proof that the heavenly bodies are, in fact, alive. Moreover, this proof 
uses the notion that the heavenly bodies are nourished by moisture 
from land and sea (Nat. D. 2.43), a notion that Cleanthes had used in 
nearly the same words in his proof that the sun consists of vital heat 
(Nat. D. 2.40, cf. SVF 1.501). The intimate connection between 
Cleanthes' proof and the first proof that the heavenly bodies possess 
sensation and intelligence makes a single author likely, but does not 
completely exclude the possibility that a sympathetic author may have 
expanded Cleanthes' discussion.4 
An even better indication of the provenience of Nat. D. 2.42-44 is 
the fact that its ideas and vocabulary run parallel to those of Nat. D. 
2.30-32.5 The author of the proof for the sensation and intelligence of 
the stars uses precisely the same premises that the author of Nat. D. 
2.30-32 uses to prove that the cosmos possesses sensation and soul, 
and in the same order. First of all, according to Nat. D. 2.30-31 
(atque . . . ardore teneatur) the purer, brighter, and more mobile the 
heat is, the more it will produce sensation in its possessor; and this is 
how we know the cosmos possesses sensation. The author who wishes 
to prove that celestial bodies possess sensation and intelligence as­
sumes that the purer and more rarefied the atmosphere is, the keener 
will be the intelligence of its inhabitants. Consequently, the animals 
that inhabit the aether, the most rarefied and constantly moving ele­
ment, will have the sharpest senses; and so the stars must possess 
sensation and intelligence (Nat. D. 2.42-43 [cum igitur . . . ex­
tenuatis alantur]). 
Furthermore, Nat. D. 2.31-32 (praesertim cum . . . esse mundi) 
concludes that the cosmos has a soul from the fact that the heat of the 
cosmos is self-moved, since nothing is stronger than the cosmos to 
impart movement to the heat. Thus, since, as Plato says, self-
movement resides only in the soul, the self-moved heat of the cosmos 
must be soul. The author who wishes to prove that the heavenly bodies 
possess sensation and intelligence asserts that the orderly movement of 
the stars is the best indication of their sensation and intelligence. 
According to Cicero's summary, rationality is deduced directly from 
the uniform movement of the stars. It is not impossible that the author 
actually did this, for Cicero presents two other passages in which the 
existence of mind is deduced directly from the order of the heavenly 
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movements. In one, the order of the movements is an indication that 
the heavenly bodies themselves possess mind {Nat. D. 2.54-56); but 
the other, which is actually attributed to Cleanthes, uses the order of 
the heavenly movement to prove only the existence of mind some­
where, not necessarily in the heavenly bodies themselves (Nat. D. 
2.15, cf. 13). In the passage we are investigating Cicero does not make 
clear whether the rationality that is evident from the order of the 
movement is in the stars themselves or in a transcendent mind, but 
rather he goes on to deduce from the order of the celestial movements 
that this movement is by free will (sua sponte) and in support adduces 
Aristotle's proof that the movement of the stars is neither by nature nor 
force, but voluntary (voluntate). At first sight to bring in the voluntary 
nature of the celestial movements seems gratuitous, but Cicero or the 
original author may have omitted a step in the argument. We know 
from elsewhere in Cicero's writings that the Stoics believed will (vol­
untas, βουλτησυς) to exist only in the wise (sapiens), and will is 
defined as " a reasonable desire" (ενλογος όρεξίς, SVF 3.173, 431, 
432) or as "that which desires something with reason" (quae quid cum 
ratione desiderat, Tusc. Disp. 4A2[=SVF 3.438]). If the movement 
of the heavenly bodies is by free choice or will, the heavenly bodies 
must have reason and be wise. This is the kind of proof needed both in 
the context in which Cicero presents it and in the proof of Nat. D. 2.30 
that the cosmos is wise; and the original form of the argument may 
well have included this idea, though Cicero does not make this clear. 
Therefore, the author of the proof that the stars are rational and sentient 
probably bases his proof on voluntary self-motion, the same basis that 
the argument of Nat. D. 2.30-32 uses to prove the cosmos is en-
souled.6 
Therefore it seems likely that if Cleanthes composed the argument 
of Nat. D. 2.23-32, he also composed the argument of Nat. D. 
2.40-44 for use in his proof that the celestial heat possesses sensation 
and reason, and that Nat. D. 2.40-44 was originally designed to come 
between Nat. D. 2.29 (dominatuque dignissimum) and Nat. D. 2.30 
(Videmus autem). Then we may understand the syllogism of Nat. D. 
2.30 as follows: We see sensation and reason in parts of the cosmos 
(i.e., the celestial bodies just discussed); therefore, the substance in 
which the ruling principle (and the other stars) exists must also possess 
sensation and reason, and in a higher degree. The point of the whole 
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argument, then, is that since the part of the cosmos that sustains and 
preserves it (i.e., the aetherial heat that contains the heavenly bodies) 
possesses sensation and reason, the cosmos as a whole must be an 
intelligent being. 
One small incongruity remains. The argument of Nat. D. 2.23-32 
seems to proceed more smoothly without 29-30, and this fact suggests 
29-30 may be an insertion.7 What is more, in its present order the 
argument that the cosmos is intelligent precedes the argument that it is 
ensouled and endowed with movement and sensation. Movement and 
sensation are lower in the scale of psychic activities than reason; and, 
furthermore, the argument for intelligence (Nat. D. 2.29-30, 40-44) 
presupposes the existence of sensation and movement in the cosmos, 
whereas the argument for sensation and movement (Nat. D. 2.30-32 
[atque etiam . . . esse mundum]) does not presuppose the existence of 
intelligence. It is, therefore, tempting to conjecture that these two 
arguments were originally presented in the reverse order, and that 
Cleanthes followed the traditional hierarchic order of psychic func­
tions, which is also found in Cicero's next argument: i.e., (1) suste­
nance and growth, (2) sensation and movement, (3) intelligence.8 
1. Cf. K. Reinhardt, Poseidonios (Munich, 1921), 226-27; "Poseidonios," RE 22 
(1953):700; M. van den Bruwaene, La theologie de Ciceron (Louvain, 1937), 88, 
note 2; F Solmsen, "Cleanthes or Posidonius? The Basis of Stoic Physics," MNA W, 
n.r. 24 (1961):272, note 25. The evidence that the entire section Nat. D. 2.23-32 
comes from Cleanthes is marshalled by Solmsen, 265-89; see above, Chapter 5, note 8. 
2. Sextus Empiricus in Math. 9.75-122 presents Stoic arguments so similar to Cic. 
Nat. D 2.16-44 that a common source is quite probable (cf. Reinhardt, 
"Poseidonios," RE 22 [1953]:697-98); but Math. 9.119-20, the parallel to Cic. 
Nat. D. 2.29-30, gives no clue to the missing elements, a fact which suggests that any 
omissions in the argument were made by Cicero's source and not by Cicero himself. 
3. The fact that the gap in the argument of Nat. D. 2.29-30 can be filled so neatly 
with material specifically assigned to Cleanthes further confirms the theory that 
Cleanthes was, in fact, the author of the arguments of Nat. D. 23-32, as Solmsen 
(above, note 1) has attempted to show. 
4. Thus Posidonius, the suggestion ofK. Reinhardt, Poseidonios, 227-34; Κosmos 
und Sympathie (Munich, 1926), 61-92; "Poseidonios," 701, is still a possibility. It 
may be noted that Posidonius agreed with Cleanthes that the heavenly bodies feed on 
moisture from the sea (cf. SVE 1.501). 
5. K. Reinhardt, Poseidonios, 227-33; "Poseidonios," 700-701, also discerns the 
same author in Nat. D 2.40-44 as in Nat. D. 2.23-32, but he believes it is 
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Posidonius. The similarities can be seen best by arranging excerpts from the two pieces 
in parallel columns; the similarity in ideas which these excerpts reveal are discussed 
in the text. 
Absurdum . . mundum esse sine Quod animal in eo gignatur id

sensu qui acerrimo et mobi- et sensu acerrimo et mobilitate

lissimo ardore teneatur {Nat. D. celerrima esse (Nat. D. 2.42).

2.31).

Mundi ille fervor purior per- Etenim licet videre acutiora

lucidior mobiliorque multo ob ingenia et ad intellegendum

easque causas aptior adsensus aptiora eorum qui terras incolant

commovendos {Nat. D. 2.30). eas in quibus aer sit purus ac

tenuis (Nat. D 2.42). 
Esse autem divinius quod ipsum Sequitur ergo ut ipsa [scil.

ex se sua sponte moveatur {Nat. D sidera] sua sponte suo sensu ac

2.32). divinitate moveantur (Nat. D. 2.43).

Is ardor . . . sua sponte moveatur Cf. restat igitur ut motus astro­

{Nat. D 2.31, 32). rum sit voluntarius (Nat. D 2.44).

Cf. quod est calidum et igneum

cietur et agitur motu suo {Nat.

D. 2.23). 
Nam quid potest esse mundo Nee vero dici potest vi quadam

valentius, quod pellat atque maiore fieri ut contra naturam

moveat calorem eum quo ille astra moveantur; quae enim po­

teneatur? (Nat. D. 2.31). test maior esse? (Nat. D. 2.44).

We should also note that the statement of Nat. D 2.42 that the stars ought to be 
reckoned among the gods is explicitly attributed to Cleanthes in Nat. D 1.37, but this 
idea is too commonplace to be significant. 
6. The parallel in Sext. Emp. Math. 1.111-14 ( = SVF 2.1016) bears this out. In 
Sextus the possibilities of necessity (or vortex), nature, and choice are lined up. 
Necessity is eliminated on the basis of the order of heavenly movements; and nonper­
ceptive nature (φύσις αφάνταστος) on the basis of its inferiority The conclusion is 
that the heavens possess an intelligent (νοερά) nature. However, Sextus, like Cicero, 
does not elaborate on the logic that leads from choice to intelligence, but regards this 
step as self-evident. This step was probably absent from the common source of Cicero 
and Sextus, and it is possible that it was not explicit even in the original author. 
7. See above, note 1 
8. Cic. Nat D. 2.33-34. See also the discussion of psychic functions in Chapter 5, 
above. 
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Mem. 1 (4.8), 63, 138 
4 (7.7), 93, 198 n.18 
Z E N O O F C I T I U M (ed. von Arnim, SVF, vol. 1)

fr.(l),xvii n.4, 219, 221,223,233 nn.4, 9,

235 n.25; (2), 219, 233 n.4; (4), 221; (5),

221, 233 n.ll; (6), 220, 232 n.3,

233 n.4; (7-8), 232 n.3; (9), 220, 226;

(11), 221, 223, 233 nn.4, 9; (12), 221;

(34), 221-22, 234 n.ll; (35), 234 n.ll;

(36a), 224, 232 n.3, 234 n.14; (37),

235 n.26; (41), 220, 226, 228, 233 n.6,

235 n.26; (65), 8, 27 n.40;(72),213 n.9;

(73), 204, 213 n.9; (74), 24 n.19; (85),

29, 32, 49 nn.8, 11, 54 n.45, 78, 228;

(86), 30, 32, 49 nn.9, 13, 238; (87), 30,

32, 50 n.16; (88), 30, 32, 49 nn.8, 9,

50 n.18; (89), 5; (90), 3, 12; (94), 103,

126 n.2, 130 n.37; (95, 96), 17, 103,

126 n.2, 130 n.27; (97), 126 n.2,

131 n.45, 228; (98), 29, 49n.l2,

50 n.19, 60, 87 n.41, 193, 198 n.18,

242; (99), 103, 107-8, 111-12, 130 n.37.

133 n.61, 168, 183 n.79, 250-57, 258;
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(100), 235 nn.26, 28; (101), 93; (102),

34, 50 η.20, 54 n.42, 55 n.45, 57, 58,

60, 78, 83 n.2, 87 n.41, 126 n.2, 192,

228, 242, 243; (103), 79, 235 nn.26, 28;

(104), 58, 78, 79, 89 n.61,

235 nn.26, 28, 241; (105), 58, 78,

89 n.61, 235 nn.26, 28;(106), 183 n.79,

197 n.14; (107), 185, 192, 198 n.18;

(108), 198 nn.19, 20; (109), 185,

195 n.l; (110), 137; (111), 136, 137;

(112), 136, 139, 142, 165; (113), 136,

137, 139, 142, 165;(114), 136,137, 141,

165; (117), 228;(119), 178 n.41, 228;

(120), 93, 179 n.41, 200; (121),

178 n.38; (126), 159; (127), 179 n.49;

(128), 68, 75, 78, 159; (134), 70, 159;

(135), 70, 159, 180 n.52; (136), 70, 159;

(137), 4, 70, 159, 161; (138), 70, 159,

161; (139), 24 n.19,70, 151; (140, 141),

70, 151; (143), 177 n.32; (146), 54 n.42;

(146b), 3, 12;(153), 44;(154), 127 n.4,

139; (155), 32, 54 n.45; (157), 54 n.42,

139; (158), 32,42, 54 n.45; (160),

49 n.ll, 54 n.42, 137, 179 n.50; (161),

137; (166), 236 n.31; (167),

235 nn.26, 28; (169), 235 n.26; (171,

172), 212 n.l;(175),55 n.45;(176), 228;

(202), 17; (235), 215 n.21, 227;(245),

235 n.26; (260), 226; (272), 233 n.6;

(273), 226, 233 n.6; (274, 275),

235 n.26; (276), 235 nn.26, 28; (278),

227, 233 nn.4, 9; (279), 227; (304),

234 n.12; (305), 226, 233 n.5
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Air: as cold in Aristotle's biology, 100-101; as

material of hexis, 166; as model for Stoic
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interpretation of Stoic theory, 33;
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contribution to Stoic doctrine of, 79-81,

240-48; embryological model of, 76-78;

Heraclitean influence on Stoic doctrine of,

58-59; physical aspects of, in Stoicism,

57-58; Platonic influence on Stoic theory of,
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contraction and expansion of, 80, 106,

244-47; cyclical notion of, 185-89;
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of, 91-92, 209; pre-Socratic notions of end

of, 187-89; rebirth of, 185, 193-95;

self-sufficiency of, 157; sentience of, 136,

144-45; structure of, 91 -92. See also World

soul

Craft, definitions and conceptions of, 203-5

Crates, teacher of Zeno, 219-20

Death, 4, 15

Definition, Stoic method of, 18-20, 207-8

Diodes: theory of respiration of, 101; theory of

elements of, 102

Diodorus Cronus, teacher of Zeno, 221

Earth: immobility of, 108, 112-13, 115-17;

movement of, toward center, 116; situated in

equilibrium, 108, 110-11, 116

Ekpyrosis. See Conflagration

Elemental change, 57-58; Platonic theory of,

59; role of archai in, 34

Elements: Aristotle's influence on Stoic theory

of movement of, 113-19; Aristotle's theory

of, 95-103; centripetal movement of,

108- 11; in formation of organic tissues, 96,

100; medical theories of, 99; movement of,

94, 108, 111-15, 123-25; number of,

91-92, 94; origin of, 57-58; in pre-Socratic

philosophers, 98-99; relation of, to passive

principle, 30; relation of, to powers,

96-103; Stoic theory of, 91, 93-94, 101-3
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Embryogony, theories of, 77-78

Empedocles, Aristotle's interpretation of

cosmic cycle of, 191-92

Epicurus, criticism of Stoic cosmology,

119-22

Erasistratus, theory of pneuma of, 160-61,

171-72

Exhalations, 95-96, 151-52

Fate, Stoic view of, xv, 54 n.45

Fifth element: Stoic knowledge of Aristotle's

doctrine of, 92-93; Stoic rejection of, 101-2

Fire: in Aristotle and Theophrastus, 95-98; in

conflagration, 185, 194; creative, 93, 200,

208; identification of, with nature, 200;

position of, in Stoic cosmos, 91-92; role of,

in pre-Socratic cosmogony, 67-68; role of,

in Stoic cosmogony, 57-58, 60-62,

241-47; weightlessness of, 108, 111-12,

124. See also Heat 
Form, cause of, according to Stoics, 32

Forms, Platonic, 6-8

Genesis: Aristotle's theory of, 35-36, 45;

Plato's theory of, 39-40

Geology, Stoic, xix n.12

God: as equivalent to active principle, 29; role

in Stoic cosmogony of, 60-62; Stoic view

of, xv, 4, 54 n.45, 55 n.50, 144

Great Year, 185-86

Heat: Aristotle's explanation of sun's, 95; as

associated with nutritive soul in Aristotle,

147_48; creative (vital), 93, 200, 269;

function of, in plants and animals analogous

to role in cosmos, 141, 144-45, 146;roleof,

in Aristotle's cosmology, 95-97; role of, in

Stoic cosmology, 140-53; sustains cosmos,

141-43. See also Fire

Heavenly bodies: movement of, 144-45, 149;

nourished by sea, 151-52; ordered

movement of, as proof of sentience and

intelligence, 149, 270-71; possess sensation

and reason, 269-70; shape of, 152; Stoic

conception of, 151-52; substance of, 92,

94-95; voluntary movement as proof of

rationality in, 149-50

Heaemonikon, 18,60-62, 150, 157-59, 164,

Heraclitus: Aristotle's interpretation of 
conflagration in, 192; influence of, on 
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Cleanthes, 80-81, 151-52,208-9,229-30;

on conflagration of cosmos, 84 n.10,

187-88; on cosmogony, 58-59; and

possibility of influence on Stoicism,

xiii-xiv, 5, 58-59, 187-88, 208-9

Herophilus: theory of nerves of, 171; theory of

pneuma of, 160-61, 171; theory of pulse of,

172-73

Hexis, 110, 163-68

Ideas. See Forms; Concepts 
Incorporeals, 5, 17

Light, movement of, 93-94

Lightness. See Weightlessness 
Logos: in Aristotle, 73-74, 76, 203, 204-5; in

cosmos, 136-37, 158; as equivalent to active

principle, 29; role in Stoic cosmogony of,

60-62. See also Mind; Spermatikos logos

Lucretius, attack on immobility and coherence

of cosmos, 120-22

Matter: Aristotle's influence on Stoic doctrine

of, 34-39; attributes of, 36-38; continuous,

91; as equivalent to passive principle, 29;

Platonic influence on Stoic doctrine of,

39-40; Posidonius s view of, 50 n.15; role

in Stoic cosmogony of, 61; Stoic doctrine of,

30, 32. See also Archai

Meteorology, Stoic, xix n.12 
Meton of Athens, on destruction of cosmos, 
186

Mind, 163-64. See also Cosmos, mind in

Mixture, Stoic concept of, xix n.12

Motion. See Movement

Movement: Aristotle's doctrine of, 41,

54 η .41; and Aristotle's theory of movement

of animals, 155-56; caused by active

principle, 31-32, 54 n.45; of heavenly

bodies ordered voluntary and rational,

270-71; as impossible in void, 122-23;

natural, 94, 113-15, 124-25; pneumatic or

tonic, 165-68. See also Prime mover

Myth, Stoic allegorization of, 61-62, 72, 79,

82, 154, 239

Nature: anthropomorphic conception of,

200-205; Aristotle's influence on Stoic

concept of, 200-206; as responsible for

movement of elements, 1 13- 15, 124-25;

Stoic definition of, 200

268 
Index 291 
Nerves, 155, 170-72

Nutrition, 146-48

Organic tissues, formation of, according to

Aristotle, 96, 100

Panaetius, as alleged source for Cicero, 162,

175 n.8

Passive principle. See Matter

Philistion, 99-101

Place: natural, of elements, 113-15, 123-24;

in theories of Aristotle and Chrysippus,

104-5

Planets, 91, 150, 185

Pneuma: Chrysippus's theory of source and

physiological function of, 162-63; as

component of seed, 68-71; defined as air in

motion, 167; function of, in cosmos

analogous to function in animals, 163; as

material of soul, 4, 159; as material of world

soul, 157-74; medical theory of, 160-61;

and mixture of fire and air, 129 n.30, 158,

159, 161; and relation to soul in Aristotle,

70-71; role in Stoic cosmogony, 61-62;

Stoic concept of, derived from Aristotle,

129 n.30, 158

Polemon, as alleged teacher of Zeno, 221-23

Posidonius: as alleged source for Cicero, 162;

concept of matter of, 50 n. 15

Possibility: Aristotle's doctrine of, 103-4,

106; Stoic doctrine of, 106, 261

Powers, relation of, to elements, 96-103

Praxagoras, theory of pneuma, 160, 172

Prime matter: Aristotle s doctrine of, 36-38;

Stoic doctrine of, 30, 32

Prime mover: Theophrastus's view of, 139;

Aristotle's theory of, 13-14, 41-42, 139.

See also Movement 
Principles. See Archai 
Providence, Stoic view of, χ ν 
Psychology, Stoic, xv. See also Soul 
Pythagoreanism: influence on Stoicism of, xiv; 
popularity of, in fourth century, 225-26

Qualities: Aristotle's theory of, 18-19; Stoic

doctrine of, 4, 166-67

Reproduction: Aristotle's theory of, 45-46,

69-70, 72-74, 77-78; pre-Socratic theories

of. 68-69; Stoic theory of, 68, 75-78

Respiration, 100-101, 162-63

Scale of beings, 164-65

Sea: nourishes heavenly bodies, 151-51;

recession of, as evidence for perishability of

cosmos, 189

Seed: pre-Socratic conception of, 68-69;

Aristotle's conception of, 69-70; Aristotle's

influence on Stoic conception of, 70; Stoic

conception of, 68-70; in Stoic cosmogony,

60-62, 80, 82, 241-42

Semen. See Seed

Semitic influence on Stoicism, xiv, 28 n.55,

219, 233 n.ll

Sensation, 148-49, \63-64. See also Cosmos,

sentience of

Socrates, xiii, 6

Solidification and dissolution in origin of

elements, 58

Soul: affections, qualities, and states of, 16,

17, 20; Aristotle's views of, 146-48; as

component of seed; 66; corporeality of, 3-4,

15, 16; parts of, according to Stoics, 150,

159; relation of, to pneuma, 70-71; role of,

in Stoic cosmogony, 61-62; Stoic

conception of, 70-71, 151, 159, 163-164.

See also World soul

Sound, 3, 4, 8

Spennatikos logos, 60-62, 75-76, 241

Sphaerus, successor of Cleanthes, 230

Stilpo, teacher of Zeno, 220-21

Stoicism: influence of, xiii; popularity of, xiii;

problems in reconstruction of system of, 
xv-xvi; source materials for, xv; theories of 
origins of, xiii-xiv 
Substance: Aristotle's theory of, 8-9; role in

Stoic cosmogony of, 62; Stoic doctrine of,

29-30

Sun, Cleanthes conception of, 144, 150-52,

154, 268-69

Symmetry in cosmogony of Cleanthes, 79-80,

243

Sympathy, cosmic, 123, 163

Synthesis, methodological principle in Stoic

cosmology, 48, 78, 117, 153,208,211-12

Teleology, 136-37, 156-57, 201 2

Theophrastus: as a corrector of Aristotle,

196 n i l  ; lectures of, 226-27

Time, Stoic concept of, xix n. 12
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Tonos, 53 n.40, 80, 241, 244-45; biological 
influence on Stoic concept of, 154-56, 
169-73; Chrysippus's concept of, 165-74; 
Cleanthes1 concept of, 153-56 
Universals, Aristotle's concept of, 7-8 
Virtues and vices, Stoic concept of, 4, 17-18 
Voice. See Sound 
Void: Aristotle s theory of, 103-4; beyond 
cosmos, 91, 103-7; Chrysippus's notion of 
center of, 260-65; cohesion of cosmos in, 
109-10, 111, 123-25; as continuous and 
infinitely divisible, 17; directions in, 118, 
122; immobility of cosmos in, 107-25, 112; 
motion impossible in, 122-23; proof of 
infinity of, 106-7 
Water, role in cosmogony, 66-67, 242-43 
Weight, 108, 111-12, 114-15, 123-25 
World soul: Aristotle's influence on Stoic 
theory of, 161-63; Chrysippus's view of, 
157-74; Cleanthes* view of, 140-53; as 
identified with fire by Zeno, 139; as identified 
with heat by Cleanthes, 140-46; as 
identified with pneuma by Chrysippus, 
158-60; medical influence on Stoic theory 
of, 161-63; Platonic doctrine of, 42, 
Index 
137-39; Platonic influence on Stoic theory 
of, 137-40; Zeno's view of, 136-40 
Xenocrates, as alleged teacher of Zeno, 223 
Zeno: adapted Aristotle's proof for immobility 
of earth, 118-19; aimed at unified system, 
101-3; biological aspect of cosmology of, 
136-40; characterization of, in antiquity, 
xvi-xvii, 227-28; chronology of life of, 
223-224; contribution to Stoic cosmogony 
of, 78-79; devotion to reading, 226; life of, 
xvi-xvii, 219-28; originality in cosmology 
and theory of elements of, 101-3; relation to 
Polemon of, 221-23; relation to 
Pythagoreans of, 224-26; relation to 
Xenocrates of, 223; and reputation for lack 
of originality, 221-22; response of, to 
Epicurean criticisms, 120; as student of 
Crates, 219-20; as student of Stilpo and 
dialecticians, 220-21; teachers of, 219-26; 
theory of immobility of cosmos of, 107-22; 
writings of, 228. Works: Homeric 
Problems, 226, 235 n.26; Memoirs of 
Crates, 220, 226; On Nature, 228; On 
Substance, 228; On the universe, 30, 
139-40, 228, 229, 235 n.26, 243; 
Pythagorika, 226; Republic, 226 


(Continued from front flap) 
This new understanding of Stoic cosmology 
in its historical perspective sheds new light on 
the role of Stoicism in Greek intellectual his­
tory. It indicates that the Stoics, like their 
contemporaries the Epicureans, were striving 
to achieve a unified science based on a single 
set of elementary principles. Biology and cos­
mology, for example, were not seen as gov­
erned by separate sets of axioms and were not 
explained on the basis of discrete bodies of 
theory, but were understood in terms of the 
same coherent principles as integral compo­
nents of a unified world view. In contrast 
with Aristotle, who laid the foundations for 
the present-day atomization of knowledge into 
ever more diverse and specialized fields and 
disciplines, the Stoics synthesized not only 
disparate theories from different sciences, but 
disparate theories within a single science, to 
produce, in a century of almost unparalleled 
vitality and growth, a totally new philosophy 
that was to have a signal and enduring effect 
on all that followed and that cannot be ex­
plained by the simplistic formulas heretofore 
employed. 
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